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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is a single case study of my work as therapist with four different 
participants from a community-based treatment programme for adolescents who have 
sexually offended.  Using an autoethnographic approach, the study seeks to contribute 
to understanding of how the therapeutic use of self can work to enhance the 
effectiveness of the treatment process.  Central to this argument is the principle of 
optimal responsiveness, developed by Howard Bacal (1985).  Optimal responsiveness 
is founded in specificity theory, which argues that we cannot predict in advance what 
intervention is going to be effective, because of the uniqueness of each therapeutic 
encounter:  hence the importance of the individual practitioner‟s clinical judgment.  I 
locate the theoretical understanding of the therapeutic use of self in the tradition of 
judgment-based practice (Polkinghorne, 2004).  The research explores two questions: 
How might the therapist use their experience of self (their subjective and 
intersubjective experience) to guide their sense of being optimally responsive? How 
might research into the therapist‟s experience of their use of self in therapy contribute 
to the integration of the personal and professional self of the therapist?  
 
The findings are expressed in the form of four autobiographic stories and four therapy 
stories.  The autobiographic stories show how the personal life experience of the 
therapist is integrated with the process of clinical judgment. The findings are analysed 
from the perspectives of systemic-narrative therapy and relational psychoanalytic 
therapy.  I identify a number of examples of how the use of self mediated a variety of 
 iv 
intentional therapeutic interactions such as reflexive questions, interpretations and 
self-disclosures and spontaneous interactions such as playful improvisations and the 
experience of intimacy.  I argue that self reflexivity is at the heart of these processes.  
 
The thesis shows the relevance of autoethnographic case study research to the 
practice of therapy in general and it shows how case study research can complement 
experimental research. This research also has a number of important implications for 
professionals working as therapists in the sexual offending fields. I argue that 
the risk-need-responsivity rehabilitation model will be strengthened by giving closer 
attention to the neglected principle of professional discretion; and that the effective 
implementation of evidence-based procedures is dependent upon the practical 
wisdom of practitioners. The research alerts therapists to the importance of paying 
attention to integrating their professional and personal selves as part of their ongoing 
professional development.  The research highlights the relevance of the subjective 
experience of cultural discourse, in particular the social construction of masculinities, 
an area that often goes under-represented in the delivery of adolescent sexual 
offending programmes.  The findings also support the argument that the experience of 
caring for and being cared for is central to treatment, and that self reflexivity can be 
both a process and an outcome goal for all therapy participants, both client and 
therapist.   Finally, my research also demonstrates how the practice of honest 
introspection by the therapist can mitigate against the temptation (which is always 
there) to get caught up in viewing the person who committed an offence as the 
“other”.   
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For my Dad 
(1921-2004) 
 
 
Thank you for not hitting me when I was small, 
Thank you for playing football 
And taking me to Old Trafford 
To see “the reds” go marching in. 
Thank you for being so gentle 
And speaking out against war; 
Thank you for your sadness, 
And showing me how to bear sadness 
Because life cannot always go your way; 
Thank you for your laughter and joy 
When we won the World Cup in 1966; 
Thank you for all the Christmas toys 
And helping me grow as a boy; 
Thank you for being there. 
Thank you for being there 
When I needed you; 
Thank you for your kindness and grace, 
Thank you for your love of music and dance. 
Thank you for controlling your anger 
And never letting a harsh word be said. 
Dear Dad 
Thank you for your love. 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“As a relationship, therapy is as much about who we are as therapists – and who we 
are in that relationship – as it is about who the members of this family or any client 
system are, and who they are in relationship to the therapist. It is as much about our 
self-narratives, the way we define ourselves as persons and our identities as 
therapists as it is about the client‟s self definitions and identities.”  (Anderson, 1997, 
p. 15) 
 
1.1      The use of self and sexual offending treatment 
The therapeutic use of self has been a construct used in the general 
counselling and psychotherapy literature for many years now, to refer to how 
therapists are inevitably personally involved in the therapy process and how 
therapists can consciously and intentionally develop their ability to integrate their 
personal self with their professional training and techniques to enhance the 
effectiveness of their interventions (Baldwin, 2000; Dewane, 2006; Reupert, 2007; 
Wolsket, 1999).  Psychoanalysis introduced the concept of countertransference to 
refer to how the therapist can become emotionally involved in the treatment process.  
Although countertransference was initially framed as a negative process, it later 
became a central focus of the change process in relational psychoanalysis (Aron, 
1996). Rogers (1957) also focused on the therapeutic relationship as being the main 
vehicle for change and introduced concepts such as genuiness and congruence to refer 
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to how clients experience therapists. These ideas were also developed by existential 
psychotherapy (Yalom, 2001) and gestalt psychotherapy (Polster & Polster, 1973).  In 
1977 Bordin suggested that a good therapeutic alliance is the basis for change in all 
forms of therapy.  He formalised the construct of the therapeutic alliance based on 
three interdependent components: the quality of the bond between the therapist and 
the client; agreement on the goals of therapy; and agreement on the tasks of therapy 
(Safran & Muran, 2000, p. 11).  Since that time numerous research studies have 
demonstrated the significant correlation between the alliance and therapy outcomes 
(Lambert & Barley, 2002).   
 Prior to the 1990s treatment programmes for adult sexual offending tended to 
only focus on treatment procedures and techniques to the neglect of therapy process 
factors such as the influence of the therapist, the participant‟s responsiveness to their 
perceptions of the therapist and the therapeutic alliance (Marshall et al., 2003; Serran, 
et al.,2003; Marshall & Serran, 2004). However, over the last decade, research into 
these therapy processes in adult sexual offending therapy has concluded that there is 
more to sexual offending therapy than discovering “techniques” which work 
(Marshall et al., 2005; Ward & Marshall, 2004). This research has demonstrated that 
the quality of the response of the therapist to the participant, such as genuineness, 
personal warmth, empathy, emotional responsiveness and self-disclosure, the 
participant‟s perceptions of the therapist and the strength of the therapeutic alliance 
are statistically significant when it comes to understanding treatment effectiveness  
(Drapeau, 2005; Marshall, 2005; Marshall et al., 2003; Marshall & Serran, 2004; 
Marshall et al., 2005). This research suggests that the personal self of the therapist 
will always be present and influential during the process of therapy. It therefore 
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follows that the skilful use of self in therapy will necessarily (some might say 
significantly) improve the effectiveness of the treatment process and help to facilitate 
therapeutic change. In this thesis I take the use of self for therapeutic purposes to 
include both the factors as outlined above and the use of self-reflexivity to guide 
intentional interventions.    
 Marshall and colleagues (Marshall et al., 2003, p. 226), have suggested that 
future research into sexual offending therapy should focus on the relationship 
between client change and specific therapist characteristics or what I would prefer to 
call, the therapist‟s use of self.  If the use of self in adult sexual offending is 
something that is worthy of research, then of course the same argument applies to 
adolescent sexual offending treatment. Although working with adolescents presents 
different challenges, including the necessity to work with family members and other 
carers, it is just as important to be able to establish a trusting therapeutic relationship 
in adolescent work as it is with adult work. However, the use of self in adolescent 
sexual offending therapy (regardless of allegiance to any particular therapeutic 
tradition), has been largely neglected. This thesis intends to address this gap by 
studying the use of self in individual therapy with adolescents who have sexually 
offended. Following Ganzer (2007), I use the term use of self, in a relational way, to 
refer to both how the participant in therapy is able to “use” the self of the therapist for 
therapeutic purposes, and how the therapist “uses” their self as a therapeutic tool in 
the service of the participant.  In particular, I was interested in studying how the 
therapist‟s awareness of their subjective and intersubjective experience contributed to 
facilitating the therapist‟s ability to be optimally responsive within individual therapy 
sessions. Optimal responsiveness is a concept which is based on specificity theory 
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(Bacal & Herzog, 2003) and maintains that everything a therapist does and says (or 
does not do and say) within a session can be experienced by a participant as being 
therapeutic.  Specificity theory argues that each therapeutic encounter will be unique, 
therefore the ability to be therapeutic is grounded in the therapist‟s ability to be 
optimally responsive with each new therapeutic encounter (Bacal, 1998c; Bacal & 
Herzog, 2003).    
Relational theories of therapeutic change can perhaps best be summarised by 
the emphasis they place on the inevitable participation of the personal self or 
subjectivity of the therapist in  the change process, and the emphasis they place on 
non-verbal procedural processes as well as verbal narrative-interpretative processes, 
in laying the groundwork for change (Aron, 1996; Wachtel, 2008; Wallin, 2007). The 
participation of the personal self of the therapist in the therapy process is a 
combination of both an aware, intentional use of self, such as in some forms of self-
disclosure; and a more spontaneous, affective participation of the therapist‟s personal 
self in the therapy process, such as when a therapist responds without premeditation.  
Therapist self-disclosure  (Dewane, 2006) is a practice that is now well-established 
within the relational schools of psychoanalysis, but I am curious about its relative 
lack of presence in the literature on sexual offending therapy and other models of 
therapy, such as narrative therapy. I agree with Winslade, Crocket and Monk (1997) 
that: 
 
One of the things we find curious in the literature about narrative therapy is 
the scant mention of the counselor‟s use of his own experience as a resource 
to share with his clients … Particularly when the effect of oppressive 
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problems is to isolate individuals, we think it is valuable to offer clients the 
alternative experience of shared knowledge and shared stories … Stories that 
lend encouragement or support can come, of course, from other clients or 
from books, films, or literature, but they can also come from the personal 
experience of the counselor … Such sharing usually comes after we have 
allowed the client plenty of time to find his own voice and develop his own 
story. It is usually brief, and it is supportive of the client developing 
resourcefulness rather than didactic in tone or instructive in intent. Our 
sharing of our stories needs to arise out of our response to the client‟s story 
rather than out of our desire for an audience. It represents a meeting of our 
storied experiences and hence a meeting between us as people (p. 72).   
 
The use of self in therapy is by definition going to be influenced by the subjective and 
intersubjective experience of the participant and the therapist. For the purpose of this 
thesis subjective and intersubjective experience is defined as being produced by the 
unique configuration of interpersonal experience within a historical and cultural 
context from infancy onwards. These experiences are stored in both the implicit 
procedural memory and in the explicit autobiographical memory, hence our 
subjectivity has an unconscious as well as a conscious dimension (Siegel, 1999; 
Schore, 2003a; 2005). The meanings derived from these experiences determine how 
people respond to their worlds.  Intersubjective experience refers to the ability of 
people to share in and understand the subjective experience of others. 
  The way in which people make meaning of the world they are born into is 
shaped by numerous personal experiences such as class and cultural backgrounds, 
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gender identity, family of origin, abuse related trauma, as well as their professional 
trainings and experience.  For therapists working with sexual offenders, this includes 
assumptions, however derived, about persons who sexually offend, as well as the 
principal theories which inform the way in which they understand sexual offending 
behaviours. Self is defined for the purpose of this thesis as having both a subjective 
and objective aspect.  The subjective experience of self refers to the experience of 
personal agency and the objective experience of self refers to the experience of seeing 
ourselves through the eyes of others (Benjamin, 1988; 1990; Aron, 2000b). I became 
interested in finding a way to study the use of self in therapy and the relationship 
between the personal and professional self of the therapist. In order to accomplish this 
I used a qualitative methodology called autoethnography.  Autoethnography is a 
reflexive, narrative form of research which studies the self of the researcher within a 
particular socio-cultural context (Bochner & Ellis, 2002).   The research reported on 
in this thesis took place while I was working as a therapist on a community-based 
adolescent sexual offending programme in New Zealand (Aotearoa) from 2004-2006. 
Treatment plans and interventions are influenced by how the therapist (in 
collaboration with the participant) formulates the problem. Our formulations are 
influenced by our theory.  In my literature review of explanatory theories for 
adolescent sexual offending, I was attracted to the view that relational traumas such 
as disrupted attachment, and physical, emotional and sexual abuse (Marshall & 
Marshall, 2000; Rich, 2006a; Ryan & Lane, 1997b; Smallbone, 2005; 2006; Ward, 
Polaschek, & Beech, 2006) and the social construction of masculinity (Marshall & 
Barbaree, 1990; Messerschmidt, 2000) help us to understand why adolescent sexual 
offending takes place.  Cognitive and behavioral treatment (CBT) models have until 
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recently been the preferred treatment modality for adolescent sexual offending 
treatment following the precedent set by adult treatment programmes (Marshall, 
Anderson, & Fernandez, 1999).  The emphasis in these earlier CBT approaches was 
placed on specifying the procedures implemented in treatment. This tended to 
emphasise risk management and relapse prevention which focused on deficits and 
negatives rather than strengths (Thakker, Ward, & Tidmarsh, 2006; Ward & Stewart, 
2003). Some of these procedures also involved the use of confrontation. Research has 
shown that aggressive confrontational interventions in this field are counter-
productive (Marshall, 2005; Marshall et al., 2005). The emphasis on procedures did 
not take into account the influence the therapeutic alliance and the personal 
characteristics of the therapist had on therapy outcomes (Marshall & Serran, 2004).  
However,  contemporary developments of adolescent sexual offending treatment 
theory suggest that we need to develop a holistic and  positive approach to treatment, 
in order to help participants increase their self-esteem and enhance their capacity to 
experience  empathy (Marshall et al., 1999; Marshall et al., 2005; Ward & Marshall, 
2004; Ward & Stewart, 2003).   Positive approaches include more sophisticated CBT 
models (Marshall et al., 1999); strengths-based approaches such as narrative therapy 
(Jenkins, 1998) and the Good Lives Model (GLM) (Thakker et al., 2006; Ward & 
Marshall, 2004); and relationship based approaches based upon attachment theory 
(Rich, 2006a).  These approaches have been influenced by therapy research which 
demonstrates the importance of the therapeutic alliance and therapist characteristics 
and style to treatment outcomes. Indeed some research has found that the quality of 
the therapeutic alliance is the single most important factor in determining successful 
treatment outcomes (Safran & Muran, 2000). Specific research into adult sexual 
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offending group therapy (Beech & Fordham, 1997; Beech & Hamilton-Giachritsis, 
2005; Marshall, 2005) has also demonstrated how the personal qualities of the 
therapist (as perceived by the participant) such as empathy, genuineness, 
respectfulness, flexibility, warmth and a non-confrontational style are essential to the 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions.   
While researching the use of self in adolescent sexual offending therapy I 
became interested in relational theory and applying relational theory to adolescent 
sexual offending therapy. Relational theory has its origins in feminism and 
contemporary psychoanalysis (DeYoung, 2003; Freedberg, 2009; Safran & Muran, 
2000; Wachtel, 2008). It also shares similarities to systemic and narrative therapy and 
fits well with the core values and ethics of social work. Relational therapy works on 
the premise that therapy is a process of mutual influence and recognition between two 
or more subjects – therapy is therefore practised as a two-person or two-way process 
that engages both the therapist and the participant in the change process. The use of 
self is a core concept in relational theory and social work practice. Relational theory 
suggests that the micro-world of the therapeutic relationship is an important resource 
for therapeutic change. Furthermore, this often occurs in the domain of implicit 
(procedural) relational interactions that occur on a moment by moment basis (Schore, 
2003a; Stern, 2004b; Wachtel, 2008) as well as the more familiar explicit domain of 
the co-construction of meaning (Anderson, 1997; Stern, 2004b; White, 2007).  The 
participant‟s experience of relationships and the sociocultural context outside of 
therapy are also important, and the therapist must use the therapeutic alliance to help 
the participant negotiate the real world of relationships and the various cultural forms 
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of oppression that continue to marginalise young  people (Altman, 1995; Freedberg, 
2009; Winslade et al., 1997).  
In this thesis I explore an integrated approach to adolescent sexual offending 
therapy, drawing on both the systemic-narrative traditions and the relational 
psychotherapy tradition.   I will show how therapeutic change and personal growth 
take place within the unique intersubjective configuration of the therapist – 
participant relationship and the wider relational context of the therapist‟s and 
participant‟s life.  The structure of the thesis is founded upon the weaving together of 
three different narrative voices: the autobiographical voice (my story in four parts), 
the researcher‟s voice, which describes the methodology together with the  literature 
reviews on the influential explanatory and treatment theories used in the field of 
sexual offending including relational therapy; and finally, the voice of the therapist 
who narrates his experience of the therapy sessions, including the voice of the 
participants from the programme.  The final two chapters return to the research 
questions and relate the findings of the stories back to the theory.  It finishes with a 
discussion of the implications of these findings for treatment theory and policy. 
 
1.2      What is the meaning of “the use of self”?  
 I first came across the concept of “the use of the self” (Baldwin, 2000; Butler, 
Ford, & Tregaskis, 2007; Elson, 1986; Wolsket, 1999) in my social work training.  It 
has been argued that the most important tool the social worker possesses is her self 
(Elson, 1986 ).  David Brandon (1979), who is also a practising Zen Buddhist, writes 
that social work practice “concerns who we are rather than what we may know” (p. 
30).  As discussed above, the use of self is also an important concept in various 
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therapy traditions, including psychoanalysis, person-centred therapy, existential 
therapy and family therapy (Baldwin, 2000).  A point which is central to the 
argument of this thesis is that the use of self is present, regardless of the specific 
tradition, model or approach used by the therapist: 
 
This involvement of the therapist‟s “self,” or “personhood,” occurs regardless 
of, and in addition to, the treatment philosophy or the approach. Techniques 
and approaches are tools. They come out differently in different hands (Satir, 
2000, p. 19).   
 
It follows that if the self or person of the worker is significant to therapy outcomes, 
then the biography of the worker is crucial to the practice of all the various forms of 
therapy.  Who we are as a person, our developmental and cultural history, how we 
relate to others, our ideological beliefs and practices, in short, the subjectivity of our 
self, both known and unknown to us, is the most important gift (or hindrance) we 
bring to our helping practice.  However, this “self” is a very difficult concept to 
define, and perhaps the most talked about question in philosophy and religion is the 
question of personal identity: who am I? 
  Counselling, psychotherapy and social work theories have paid a lot of 
attention to the emotions and to our thinking or narrating self. In the helping process 
we spend a lot of time listening to the participant‟s story and asking them how they 
feel. The expression of feelings and the telling of stories is a never-ending process, 
representing the movement from experiencing to reflecting, from feeling to talking ( 
Fosha, 2000, p. 163). As Paul Ricoeur argued, cited in Madison (1990, p. 94) “it is in 
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telling our own stories that we give ourselves an identity”. We recognise ourselves in 
the stories we tell about our selves: “The self is the story we tell ourselves and others, 
weaving together into a single fabric, as any good storyteller does, actions and events; 
it is the autobiography we are constantly writing and rewriting” (p. 162).  However, 
this is only part of the story. Apart from the ability to reflect on our lives and 
relationships we are also embodied experiential beings, experiencing sensations, 
feelings, thoughts, wishes and intentions, flowing and changing on a moment by 
moment basis like a never-ending stream.  Here, there is nothing permanent to be 
found. The awareness of this stream of consciousness is often called the observing or 
witnessing self (Beck, 1989, 1993).  This awareness of awareness is empty of all 
content, or, as expressed in the Buddhist tradition, emptiness itself!  However, 
although nothing permanent can be found, we still have a sense of continuity and 
coherence, which is essential to our emotional well-being (Magid, 2002).  This sense 
of continuity comes about through the repeated experience of familiar self states and 
affects, and the organisation of our experience (including memory) into a continuous 
and coherent account of our personal history and identity.  I refer to this as our 
narrative or autobiographical self (Anderson, 1997; Bruner, 1990). 
The word “self” is used to refer to many aspects of our personal being. It has 
been usefully defined as tripartite in structure by Russell Meares (2000), 
corresponding to the use of “I”, “me” and “myself”.  When we use “I” we are 
referring to the sense of personal agency.  I make decisions, I act in certain ways, I 
enter into conversations.  I am an active subject. However, the “I” is best thought of 
as a plurality of different “self-states” (Bromberg, 2006), each with its own different 
“I”.   Even during the course of a single day we may enter into and out of different 
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self states. “I” can also refer to the “observing self” or reflective function.  I am aware 
of being an embodied experiential presence.  I am aware of the constant flow of 
thoughts, images, feelings, sensations and sounds.  If we are very skilful we may also 
start to be able to identify different self states. I am aware of being self-aware. Only I 
have access to this experience.  “Me” refers to in this sense my world, my thoughts, 
and my feelings, my different self-states.  This world is unique to me and dies with 
me when I die.  
“Myself” refers to my existence as a public identity, the experience of 
knowing I exist as an object for someone else.  The sense of being observed enables 
us to experience the so-called social emotions such as embarrassment and shame. I 
have a name, I have a profession, I am married, I was born in England.  The sense of 
myself therefore refers to the sense I have of my personal identity.  I am also 
conscious of speaking and writing myself into being through the telling of stories.  I 
can tell stories about “myself‟.     
I am also aware of having the capacity to be both subject (“I”) and object 
(“myself”) at the same time and to relate to others as subject or object (Aron, 2000a; 
Baldwin Jr, 2000; Benjamin, 1988; Flaskas, 2002; Fosha, 2000; Safran & Muran, 
2000). The self is therefore experienced as both an object, which can be hurt in the 
same way our body can be hurt, and a subject (or person), experienced as an active 
centre of personal agency or initiative and as an awareness of the present moment 
experienced as the stream of consciousness only experienced in the present moment.  
To recount the story of our life, even in a slightly different way, is to 
transform our narrative self or identity: “To understand an experience, to reconstruct 
the past, is not to „represent‟ it to ourselves; it is to transform it” (Madison, 1990, p. 
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168). Thus we have the possibility to continually re-create our identity by retelling 
our stories to others.  What occurs in therapy conversations, on one level, is precisely 
a transformation of the narrating self.  Alternatively, Madison states “some 
conversations, such as a bad marriage or family situation, hinder us from becoming 
ourselves and sometimes lead to our self-destruction” (p. 168).  Therefore, we can 
conclude that the conversations we are located in are powerful contexts which 
influence our future life course.  These understandings of the multiplicity of self and 
identity fits well with both narrative therapy as originated by Michael White in 
Adelaide, Australia and David Epston, in Auckland, New Zealand (White & Epston, 
1990) and the collaborative approach to therapy developed by Harlene Anderson 
(1997). 
 
1.3      The research problem 
As I became interested in doing some kind of research into the therapy 
process as experienced by therapists and participants on adolescent sexual offending 
programmes,  I was also aware of the growth of interest in attachment theory and its 
relevance to the treatment of adolescents who have committed a sexual offence 
(Marshall & Marshall, 2000; Rich, 2006a; Smallbone, 2005).   In fact, it seemed to 
me to be no accident that was the case.  The practitioner-researchers in the field who 
were becoming more interested in the role of the therapist and the therapeutic 
relationship were also drawing on attachment theory to justify the need for treatment 
interventions to think beyond the application of techniques and procedures (Chorn & 
Parekh, 1997; Marshall, 2005; Marshall & Serran, 2004; Marshall et al., 2005; Rich, 
2006a, 2006b). Attachment theory suggests that during childhood the client may form 
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an internal working model of (particularly) intimate relationships (a relational 
template) that can become problematic as they get older and potentially interfere with 
the development of healthy attachment in adulthood (Sable, 2008). Extrapolating 
from this, the therapeutic relationship needs to become a secure base for the client, 
before the client will be able to explore the other tasks of therapy.  It also suggests 
that the relationship itself is the key transformative factor in the change process. It 
seemed to make sense therefore that cognitive- behavioural interventions needed to 
be supplemented by an appreciation of the therapeutic relationship and the personal 
characteristics of the therapist. Practitioners began to bring what may be called an 
attachment-informed approach to therapy (Rich, 2006a), or what I would call a 
relational perspective to their work.  
These researchers also seemed to accept the notion that “therapeutic 
techniques and therapeutic relationships are not (and cannot be) mutually exclusive: 
they are inherently interrelated and interdependent” (Mahoney & Norcross, 1993). On 
the basis of my own experience and theoretical understandings, I did not believe the 
application of any particular intervention could be separated off from the person and 
subjectivity of the therapist. To separate interventions from the participants‟ 
experience of the therapeutic relationship did not make sense to me because the 
skilful use of interventions is dependent upon the therapist‟s self-awareness and their 
awareness of the relational field on a moment-to-moment basis.  If interventions are 
reified and separated from our ability to respond spontaneously on a moment to 
moment basis, they hinder, rather than help, therapeutic effectiveness (Safran & 
Muran, 2000). I therefore began to be interested in researching therapeutic change as 
a relational process, taking into account the subjectivities of the therapist and the 
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participants, the unique intersubjective field they created, and the sociocultural 
context in which the participants lived.  I was particularly interested in researching 
the understanding that therapeutic interventions cannot be separated from the 
subjectivity of the therapist and that all participants, including the therapist, are 
potentially changed as a result of participating in therapy.  Indeed, I felt a number of 
different relational traditions intersected on this point, and I began exploring what has 
been called the “principle of mutuality” (Aron, 1996) in different bodies of theory 
and therapeutic traditions including feminist theory and therapy (Chodorow, 1999; 
DeYoung, 2003; Freedberg, 2009; Goldner, 2004; Jordan, 1997); systemic/narrative 
therapies (Anderson, 1997; Bird, 2000; McNamee & Gergen, 1992; Monk, Winslade, 
Crocket, & Epston, 1997; Pare & Larner, 2004; White, 1997); contemporary 
relational psychoanalysis (Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 1988, 1990, 2004; Buirski & 
Haglund, 2001; Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; Safran & Muran, 2000; 
Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994; Wachtel, 2008); experiential approaches 
(Baldwin, 2000; Polster & Polster, 1973; Wolsket, 1999) and contemporary 
developmental/attachment theory (Holmes, 2001; Schore & Schore, 2008; Siegel, 
1999; Solomon & Siegel, 2003; Stern, 1985/2000).  
As I saw it, the problem with the scientific practitioner model and the focus 
on procedures (to the exclusion of the non-specific factors such as facilitative 
conditions and the therapeutic relationship) was that it set up a “them and us” 
situation (Williams, 2006), in which the offender was constructed as the object or the 
person “done to” and the therapist was constructed as the subject or “the doer” 
(Benjamin, 2004) .  I did not want to separate interventions from the relational 
context of the therapeutic relationship (Safran & Muran, 2000). I therefore began to 
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think about how I could use autoethnography to design an alternative way of 
researching the therapeutic process within adolescent sexual offending therapy which 
did not reduce therapy to disembodied techniques and “us and them” dualities and 
which recognised the importance of studying interventions within the relational 
context in which they were experienced by the participants. 
Adolescent sexual offending treatment programmes (modeled on adult 
programmes) have in the past been organised around “one person psychology 
assumptions” (Williams, 2006) –  or “a one-way account” (White, 1997) of the 
therapy process.  The therapist is seen as an objective expert or technician (Drapeau, 
2005)  whose job it is to “fix” the participant through the application of procedures – 
for example, to help the participant identify his cognitive distortions and change them 
(Marshall et al., 1999). This “us and them” problem (Williams, 2006) also contributes 
to the possible abuse of power by the therapist in the name of rehabilitation, such as 
the use of shaming techniques (Jenkins, 1994). 
In this thesis I present an alternative way of thinking about therapeutic 
change, from a relational, rather than a dualistic perspective; one which understands 
therapy to be a form of “practice”; that is, as essentially a practical-moral activity 
concerned with developing self-reflexivity, understanding and personal agency 
(Aron, 2000b; Drury, 2006; Gray & Mcdonald, 2006; Orange, 1995; Orange et al., 
1997; Pare & Larner, 2004; Parton & O'Byrne, 2000).  I will show, through my 
research, how therapy can be understood and studied as a relational two-way process, 
involving a meeting of two (or more) differently organised subjectivities, within a 
specific cultural context – and that an important part of the work of therapy is a 
collaborative “making sense together” which takes place in the intersubjective “third” 
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(Benjamin, 2004), a shared space in which these two subjectivities overlap – hence 
each therapy is always a unique process (Buirski & Haglund, 2001; Orange, 1995).  
This is why “no method, technique, or procedure will yield understanding” (Orange, 
1995, p. 16). 
In the current climate of social policy in which the theory of evidence-based 
practice is dominant, I believe we need a more even balance between subjectivity and 
process, on the one hand, and objectivity and outcomes on the other (Butler, Ford & 
Tregaskis, 2007).  At the moment I think the pendulum has swung too far to the 
outcomes end, and the importance of subjectivity has been lost because it cannot be 
measured. Having said that, I still think therapists can teach skills – such as relaxation 
and mindfulness, to help participants manage themselves better – within a 
collaborative approach.  And I am not opposed to developing outcome measures, but 
I do question the  idea that outcomes can be causally linked to the application of 
disembodied interventions while by-passing the non-specific factors such as the 
person of the therapist and the therapeutic relationship.   
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the subjective and intersubjective 
experience of the therapist, and the meanings the therapist and the participants make 
of their experience, consideration must also be given to how our experience of 
subjectivity is produced (Weedon, 1997).  In this thesis I take the position that we are 
“psychosocial” subjects (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).  Our experience of subjectivity 
cannot be reduced to either a position in discourse or to some psychological essence  
(Benjamin, 1988, 1990, 2004; Chodorow, 1999; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).  For 
example, how we experience gender relations is always a uniquely personal process.  
I agree with Chodorow (1999) that meanings as we experience them always come 
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from without and from within: “Meaning is an inextricable mixture of the 
sociocultural and historically contextualized on the one hand and the personally 
psychodynamic and psychobiographically contextualized on the other” (p. 2). I 
therefore found autoethnography to be a research method that was ideally suited to 
studying the subjective experience of therapy from both a personal and a 
sociocultural perspective. 
Finally, this study can also be seen as an account of my personal and 
professional journey as a therapist.  By personal, I mean firstly, becoming self-aware 
of my motivations for wanting to work as a therapist and to work with adolescents 
who had sexually offended; secondly, becoming aware of how the process of 
participating in this work and reflecting on it in supervision and research contributed 
to my own personal growth; and thirdly, the enormous contribution participants can 
make to the personal and professional life of the therapist (Gerson, 1996; Lax, 1996; 
Sussman, 2007, 1995; White, 1997).   By professional I mean reflecting on theory 
and practice issues related to the field.  I argue that the subjectivity of the therapist 
cannot be filtered out of the process of adolescent sexual offending therapy and that 
therapeutic change can be constructed as a two-way process, which involves both 
therapist and participants in critical reflection on their self and their conduct. Thus, 
the research is exploratory and descriptive, focusing on relational therapy processes, 
in conjunction with stories from my personal life which illustrate how my personal 
and professional lives are intertwined.   
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1.4      The research questions 
Although there is accumulating evidence to suggest that after client factors, 
the therapeutic relationship (and hence the use of self) is the single most important 
factor in psychotherapy outcome research (Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 1999; 
Wolsket, 1999), very little attention has been paid to this area in offender 
rehabilitation research.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this is now 
changing with research starting to focus on three interrelated process issues: the 
influence of the person of the therapist, in particular the expression of empathy, the 
participants‟ perceptions of the therapist and the therapeutic alliance (Marshall, 2005; 
Marshall et al., 2003; Marshall & Serran, 2004; Marshall et al., 2005; Serran, 
Fernandez, & Marshall, 2003; Williams, 2004).  The perception of the participant is 
crucial to the therapy process because if the client does not experience the therapist as 
empathic then the therapist‟s response is not optimally responsive. 
I have sustained an ongoing interest in researching people‟s experience of 
therapy for a number of years now. In my qualitative research for my Masters Thesis, 
I undertook to interview therapists and clients about their experience of participating 
in a solution-focused reflecting team.  I was surprised to discover that both therapists 
and clients thought it was important for therapists to be present in the consulting 
room as persons, not just as professionals.  For example, one of the clients I 
interviewed in my research spoke about her experience of therapist self-disclosure 
and her comment was: “you saw that they were just ordinary human beings too, 
people that have problems”(Tootell, 2003, p. 135); one of the therapists interviewed 
spoke of reflecting from “the heart” rather than doing “technique-driven” reflections 
(Tootell, 2004).  I therefore became interested in furthering my understanding of the 
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therapist‟s experience of therapy and of the relationship between their professional 
and personal selves. 
Most research into counselling and psychotherapy has focused on the process 
of therapy as experienced by the client (McLeod, 1990a).  This is understandable, 
given that therapy‟s raison d‟etre is facilitating client change.  Some of this research 
has focused on the experience of therapists (McLeod, 1990b).  This is also important, 
given that clients and therapists may experience therapy quite differently and 
therefore have differing perspectives on what was helpful.  Some researchers have 
focused on the textual analysis of therapeutic transcripts, hoping to discover the 
conversational or discursive factors which therapists use to create the context for 
clients to experience change (Grafanaki & McLeod, 1999; Kogan & Gale, 1997) .  
The textual analysis of segments of their own transcript of a therapy session is also a 
form of learning often incorporated into therapy training programmes (White, 1997).  
However, few practitioner researchers have ventured into the muddy waters of 
studying their own subjective and intersubjective experiences of the therapy process 
including making linkages with their personal histories. 
In particular I became interested in researching the therapist‟s experience of 
being “optimally responsive” (Bacal, 1998c; Bacal & Herzog, 2003).  Optimal 
responsiveness refers to the quality of what a therapist does or says (or doesn‟t do or 
say) within a therapy session.  It is a relational concept which emphasises the 
specificity of the participant-therapist relationship and the mutuality of this 
relationship.  It was a concept that also seemed to fit well with the current interest in 
treatment responsivity in the sexual offending treatment field (Ward & Eccleston, 
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2004). The following research question was formulated in regards to my work on the 
adolescent sexual offending programme:  
 
1. How might the therapist use their experience of self (their subjective and 
intersubjective experience) to guide their sense of being optimally responsive? 
  
However, as the research progressed, I became more aware of the recursive effect of 
the research on integrating my personal and professional selves. It is usually agreed 
that the personal self of the therapist will influence the professional self (no matter 
how hard we might try to neutralise it) however it is often less understood that the 
professional experience of the therapist will also affect the personal self.  This is quite 
clearly the case in terms of negative effects such as vicarious trauma or burnout 
(Sussman, 1995), but it can also have a positive transformative effect. I therefore 
formulated a second research question: 
 
2. How might research into the therapist‟s experience of their use of self in 
therapy contribute to the integration of the personal and professional self of 
the therapist? 
 
These questions followed on from my intention to study myself within the context of 
an adolescent sexual offending programme, and became the research questions for the 
study. 
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1.5     Justification for the research 
The main reason for doing this research was my concern to develop an 
experience-near understanding of the therapeutic change process from the perspective 
of the therapist, including placing the micro-world of therapy within the larger macro-
world context of my personal life.  This included focusing on how I was changed by 
my participation in both the therapy process and by my choice of methodology. It has 
been argued that autoethnography can make a significant contribution  to “improving 
the quality of the therapeutic alliance, and thus improve forensic psychotherapy 
outcome” (Williams, 2006 p. 23).  Also, although I was aware of the possible 
therapeutic effects of autoethnographic writing (Bochner & Ellis, 2002), I found that 
engaging in this research acted as a form of self-therapy in a way I could not have 
predicted before-hand.   
Disclosing the personal in the professional and giving a space for the voices 
of the boys and young people I worked with is also a political act (Williams, 2004). I 
want to challenge the duality between “us and them” in which treatment providers 
can easily get caught up (Williams, 2006).  Practising self disclosure in both a 
research and therapy context can express the equality of a therapy process based upon 
a mutual two-way process (Aron, 1996). I also want readers of this work to 
understand that these young people have engaged in behaviours which were harmful 
to others, but it doesn‟t mean they are all sexual predators or monsters. In fact, they 
could easily be our fathers, brothers or sons.  I think it is important to remember that 
only a small percentage of adolescents who sexually offend actually experience a 
deviant sexual arousal to children (Zimring, 2004).  I also want readers to appreciate 
these young people as whole people, not as „sex offenders‟; I would hope that readers 
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might gain an empathic understanding of their personal history, which is often 
characterised by episodes of abuse related trauma.  I think the voice of youth in 
general is marginalised and I think boys and young people who offend, particularly 
when one of those offences is a sexual offence, are marginalised even more. 
 I see the audience for this thesis as being all those professionals and 
paraprofessionals who work in the rehabilitation and treatment field such as police, 
correction staff, caregivers, residential workers, teachers, therapists, psychologists, 
social workers, legal people and also anyone who has been affected in some way or 
other by this problem such as the primary, secondary and community victims of 
sexual offending.  I think this thesis is unique because I was not able to find any 
forms of narrative research which have focused on the subjective and intersubjective 
experience of the therapist in adolescent sexual offending therapy.  Also, in all the 
discussion about this problem we rarely hear the voice of the young people 
themselves (Williams, 2004).  I hope that my work will be one small contribution to 
developing a more holistic presentation of both the therapist as a person and the 
participant as a person. 
Conceptualising therapy as an intersubjective process, which is (potentially) 
mutually mutative of both therapist and participant (Aron, 1996; Fosha, 2000; White, 
1997), is relatively new to the sexual offending field. It is therefore important that this 
is recognised as part of professional training, in this field in particular. This is 
important because adult sexual offending treatment theory and research has been 
based on a one person psychology (or one-way account of therapy). It has in the past 
tended to ignore the relevance of process variables (such as the person of the 
therapist) to treatment effectiveness (Drapeau, 2005). And it has only been in recent 
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years that research has drawn some attention to the role of the therapist (Marshall, 
2005; Marshall & Serran, 2004; Marshall et al., 2005; Rich, 2006a; Williams, 2004). 
Although this research has begun to recognise the importance of the personal 
qualities, attitudes and style of the therapist to treatment effectiveness, we don‟t yet 
have an articulation of how the therapist or participant experiences the therapy 
process. If it is accepted that therapy is a relational activity unique to the persons 
involved, attempts to reduce therapy to a set of disembodied techniques in order for 
them to be isolated and researched in randomised controlled trials, tells us more about 
the research design than the actual clinical process.  This also has extensive 
implications for how therapy and research is practised in the field of offender 
rehabilitation where the participant is often positioned as the „other‟.  Let‟s not throw 
the baby out with the bathwater for the sake of objectivity! In order to study therapy 
as it naturally occurs in the field, we have to get our hands and knees muddy in the 
gritty reality of our subjective experiences.    
I also have my personal reasons for choosing to work in the area of adolescent 
sexual offending therapy and to engage in researching this area. All therapy involves 
facilitating, one would hope, the skills and capacity of the participants for self 
empathy – including the therapist. It is a common story to hear that people who 
become therapists do so in order to heal themselves and/or to make sense out of the 
suffering of their own or loved one‟s lives.  In some therapy traditions, such as 
Jungian analysis, the myth of the “wounded healer” has been taken as a metaphor for 
understanding the therapy process (Sedgwick, 1994).  In retrospect, I believe I was 
drawn to working with adolescent boys initially because of my needs to compensate 
for the loss of my relationship with my son, following the aftermath of a traumatic 
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separation and divorce. At first this was in the general field of child and adolescent 
mental health.  Many adolescent boys who are referred to sexual offender 
programmes are also often disconnected from their fathers (and/or their mothers) and 
the knowledge that my son had experienced his father as largely physically absent 
from his life was often close to my heart when listening to the stories of these boys.   
In choosing to work with adolescent boys and young men who had sexually 
offended, I was also always conscious of the knowledge that my own father had 
sexually offended (exhibitionism) when I was an adolescent and he was in his fifties. 
In terms of my own adolescence, although my father was always physically present 
(except for a period of a few months in hospital when he was receiving treatment), I 
often experienced him as emotionally distant or disengaged from me.  The full impact 
of his offending only hit me when I discovered what had happened after finishing 
High School. My mother and sister and I were therefore secondary victims of my 
father‟s sexual offending (Ward & Marshall, 2004; Ward et al., 2006). We were never 
offered any family counselling at the time and as a result we were never able to talk 
about how this had affected us as a family while my father was still alive (I was able 
to talk to my sister about this and later, with my mother). Therefore, there was 
already a powerful field of personal emotions and associations that I experienced 
while working as a therapist in this field.  The combination of these personal and 
professional experiences led me to work in this field as a therapist and ultimately, to 
embark on this research project. 
 In summary, the reason for engaging in this study is that I want to challenge 
the dualistic nature of rehabilitation culture, in which a “them and us” ethos 
dominates, including within the field of adolescent sexual offending. I also wish to 
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support the international and local movement in the adult and adolescent fields 
towards a positive and collaborative approach to therapy and the growing  attention to 
the centrality of the therapeutic alliance and the style, role and influence of the 
therapist (Ayland & West, 2005; Jenkins, 1998; Marshall, 2005; Marshall & Serran, 
2004). I also appreciate that most adolescent programmes are now adopting a holistic 
and developmental approach to treatment, with an emphasis on helping these young 
people discover their values (Maruna, 2001; Nisbet, Rombouts, & Smallbone, 2005; 
Ward, Hudson, & Keenan, 1998).  However, the implication of moving to a genuine 
relational and collaborative approach to therapy raises a number of issues and 
dilemmas, such as how does this fit with risk management?  
This study therefore seeks to begin to remedy this gap by exploring the 
treatment process from an autoethnographic perspective (mine as therapist‟s). It does 
this by showing how the subjectivity of the therapist enters into the treatment process 
and how  the therapy/research process changes the therapist just as much as the other 
participants. It does this by weaving together my personal life stories and stories 
about my work as a therapist-researcher into a series of interconnected narratives. 
This qualitative research is exploratory.  My intention and hope is that this kind of 
research will draw attention to this topic and its findings will be developed and 
researched further.   
Denzin (2003) argued that one of the key evaluative criteria of “subjective” or  
“personal experience” research is that it contributes something to public policy 
debates. I hope this is one of the outcomes of this thesis. It is my hope that this 
research will generate dialogue and debate on the importance of the subjectivity of 
the therapist to the therapy process in adolescent sexual offending treatment both 
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locally and internationally. The treatment of persons who commit sexual harms is an 
issue that is regularly discussed, often in an atmosphere of intolerance, in the media.  
Although the research to be presented in this thesis does not claim to provide a „how 
to do it‟ manual, I believe it makes a contribution to research findings that are 
beginning to stress the importance of the role of the therapist and the therapeutic 
relationship to maximizing treatment effectiveness when working with people who 
have committed sexual harms. I also believe the treatment narratives I have 
documented for this thesis will, in turn, provide a resource for further research, 
theorising and teaching in this field. If my research also allows outsiders who have no 
experience of working therapeutically with these clients, to gain some insight into the 
humanity of the young people who were responsible for the harm that was 
committed, then my efforts will have been worthwhile. 
As I stated at the beginning of this section, autoethnography has the potential 
to contribute to improving the quality of the therapeutic alliance and hence therapy 
outcomes.  It is my belief that the clinicians who work weekly with participants, often 
over a two year period, are well placed to develop an experience-near understanding 
of sexual offending treatment on the basis of their personal experience of the therapy 
process. I believe this research will give other practitioners (and the general public) a 
unique experience of reading several stories of one practitioner‟s attempt to do justice 
to this complex and challenging field of work. I hope that this research will inspire 
other practitioners working within the field of adolescent sexual offending to explore 
autoethnography with their own work and that young people starting a programme 
may also read some of the stories presented in this research. I also hope it will be of 
some interest to professionals working in the criminal justice and child protection 
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agencies as well as the families, caregivers, friends and the general community of 
those who have been affected in any way by sexual abuse. 
 
1.6      Methodology 
I locate my research methodology in the hermeneutic, reflexive and narrative 
research traditions (Etherington, 2004; Speedy, 2008), and in particular, in the 
autoethnographic tradition (Bochner & Ellis, 2002).  I found practising 
autoethnography deeply challenging, and also profoundly healing on a personal level. 
Autoethnography also enabled me to empathise with the participants and utilise this 
empathy to good effect in the therapy process (Berger, 2001).  In this study I write 
both autobiographical stories and therapy stories of my work with the participants. 
The rationale for including the autobiographical stories alongside the therapy stories 
is based on my belief that understanding our own vulnerabilities and frailties can 
enable us to better understand and support the people we meet with in therapy 
contexts (Butler et al., 2007 p. 282; Foster, McAllister, & O'Brien, 2006; Williams, 
2006). I also found practising autoethnographic research acted as a kind of internal 
supervisor (Casement, 1991), enhancing my ability to empathically attune to the 
participants.  Hence I agree with Williams (2006) that autoethnography can make an 
important contribution to the development of the therapeutic relationship and 
therefore to treatment outcomes. Apart from the work of Williams (2004), I am not 
aware of any other attempts to apply autoethnographic research to sexual offender 
rehabilitation; however there has been a growth of interest in the field on the role of 
the therapist in the treatment process (Marshall, 2005; Marshall & Serran, 2004; 
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Marshall et al., 2005).  I think autoethnography can make a significant contribution to 
this discussion. 
As far as I know, this is the first time that autoethnography has been used to  
research adolescent sexual offending therapy. Autoethnography can be understood as 
an example of a postmodern approach to research which grew out of the post-colonial 
critique of modernist research and the narrative turn in the social sciences (Chase, 
2005; Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  It is a form of personal experience research that 
studies the self within a social context.  Autoethnography allowed me to consider the 
social context of adolescent sexual offending, while keeping a focus on my 
introspective and empathic experience of the therapy process. An autoethnographic 
perspective also allowed me to explore cultural factors, like gender and the “us and 
them” divide, and their impact upon the therapy process, such as, the concern that in 
the process of providing therapy for adolescents who have offended we do not 
reproduce abusive practices (Jenkins, 1998) 
Autoethnography builds on the method of participant observation, by 
including observing the participation of the researcher, and how the act of doing 
research influences the subject being researched, in order to compose evocative 
stories about the relationship between the self (of the therapist) and the other (of the 
participant) (Tedlock, 2005). Autoethnographies come in many forms, along a 
continuum ranging on how much focus is given to “the self” towards on the other 
pole “the other” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). It is intended that the autoethnographic 
account presented in this thesis will tend towards the middle of the polarity, focusing 
on the experience of both therapist and other participants from the perspective of the 
therapist. It presents two interwoven narrative threads: the personal and professional 
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journey of the therapist and short stories describing clinical exchanges, interspersed 
over the length of treatment, from a number of individual therapy sessions.  These 
stories of clinical exchanges are written from therapy case notes, collected during the 
treatment process.  These notes recorded details of my observations of participants, 
fragments of conversations with participants, and my introspective observations of 
my subjective experiences both before and after sessions. This method of data 
generation (Crocket, 2001, 2004) is similar to a supervision technique employed in 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy called “process notes”(Gabbard, 2004).These notes 
were then used as the basis for crafting the autoethnographic stories after signing an 
informed consent agreement with the participants. The stories were eventually given 
to the participants for their feedback before being incorporated into the thesis text. 
Autoethnographic research uses various literary forms and techniques to 
involve the reader/audience on an emotional level, therefore giving the reader a direct 
visceral and emotional experience of text, giving a selective representation of my 
experience of the therapy session.  I make links between narratives from my personal 
life to the themes explored in the clinical exchanges (for example the culture of 
hegemonic masculinity).  This structure is employed in order to illustrate how the 
personal and political are always interconnected and to investigate how the 
subjectivity of the therapist enters into the treatment process. Choosing 
autoethnography helped me to clarify how the person or subjectivity of the therapist-
researcher inevitably enters the treatment process, either consciously or 
unconsciously.  For example, autoethnography allowed me to show how we have to 
be always vigilant about the fragility of personal and professional boundaries and to 
face up to emotions or past conduct we like to keep hidden or avoid, rather than 
 32 
pretending we have somehow worked through all these issues as part of our 
professional training.  I don‟t think it is appropriate for us as clinicians to expect these 
young people to expose their own vulnerabilities and shame without going through a 
similar process ourselves.  I am not saying that we need necessarily be disclosing this 
in treatment (although self-disclosure may at times be helpful), but to be facing 
ourselves by writing and telling about it in other contexts such as autoethnography or 
personal therapy and supervision.  Autoethnography therefore becomes a form of 
self-supervision or self-correction in this context (Williams, 2006).  I am therefore 
interested in the overlap between what are regarded as the therapeutic pathways to 
recovery as documented in many programmes such as assessment, empathy, 
addressing personal victimisation, values and the acceptance of personal 
responsibility and how these pathways are relevant to the continuing personal and 
professional development of the therapist.  In this way, the therapist remains 
authentic to their values, and goes through a rigorous self-examination in the same 
way as this is expected of the other participants.   
 Autoethnography is dependent upon the subjectivity of the researcher and like 
other forms of ethnographic research, autoethnography does not claim to be a method 
of objective representation of the external world (Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  It cannot 
measure outcomes or compare techniques.  However, using thick description, it can 
describe the subjective and intersubjective experience of the therapist and the other 
participants.  Hence this is another reason for using autoethnography because there 
has been a lack of research into the therapist‟s subjective experience of therapy 
(McLeod, 1990b; Muran, 2002).  In reflecting on my practice through the lens of 
autoethnographic research, I am able to capture insights which arguably would not 
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have been possible through more orthodox forms of qualitative research.  For 
example, video/audio tapes or interviews do not allow the viewer to observe the 
therapist‟s internal dialogue and feelings; these have to be inferred (Balint, Ornstein, 
& Balint, 1972). Writing autoethnography also positioned me as both a therapist in 
transformation and as a compassionate witness (Weingarten, 2003) to myself and 
others, thereby deepening my empathic connection with clients.  On a more personal 
note, writing autoethnographically is also a form of self-therapy and has involved a 
process of revisiting the shame-based wound, previously mentioned, experienced as 
an adolescent when I was told about my father‟s “illness”. The wounded healer 
(Sedgwick, 1994) is a metaphor that I relate to and one that has influenced my choice 
of autoethnography as my preferred research strategy. 
 
1.7 Organisation of the report 
Chapter 2 sets the legal and theoretical context of adolescent sexual offending 
therapy. It discusses the relationship between explanatory theory and treatment theory 
and gives an introduction to a number of explanatory theories that account for the 
origins of sexual offending in boys and young men and contemporary treatment 
theories. Chapter 3 introduces the origins of relational theories of therapeutic change 
and explores the relevance of relational theory for adolescent sexual offending 
therapy, with a special focus on empathy, optimal responsiveness and specificity 
theory.  Chapter 4 focuses on autoethnography as a methodology.  It describes my 
research procedures, discusses ethical issues and concerns, and concludes with a 
discussion on how to evaluate autoethnographic writings. Chapter 5 tells Billy‟s 
story.  Chapter 6 is the first part of my autobiographical story.  Chapter 7 tells Peter‟s 
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story.  Chapter 8 continues my autobiographical story, focusing on my relationship 
with my children, the disruption to this relationship and the turn to therapy as a 
wounded healer. Chapter 9 tells Adrian‟s story. Chapter 10 continues my 
autobiographic story.   Chapter 11 concludes my autobiographical story and Chapter 
12 tells Jamie‟s story. Chapter 13 provides a comprehensive a meta-analysis of the 
use of self in the autoethnographic stories, focusing on a number of examples of the 
therapeutic use of self and how this relates back to the literature on systemic-narrative 
therapies and relational therapies.  Chapter 14 completes the thesis by focusing on my 
experience of the autoethnographic journey and the implications of the findings for 
practice and policy.  
  
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the research problem and the research 
questions.  I have justified why I think this research is significant and worthy of 
consideration and the possible implications it has for others working in the field of 
adolescent sexual offending and for therapy in general.  I have also briefly described 
and justified my choice of methodology. I have also argued how autoethnography has 
the potential to become an option of choice for practitioner researchers wishing to use 
qualitative methodologies to research client and therapists‟ subjective and 
intersubjective experience of therapy, including adolescent sexual offending therapy.  
I have introduced my research questions within the context of a clear outline and an 
extensive introduction to the literature relating to the use of self in therapy and 
research.  I argue that the use of self has the potential to make a significant 
contribution to improving the therapy process in the rehabilitation of people who 
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have sexually offended by enhancing our capacity to create an empathic therapeutic 
relationship and by challenging the “us versus them” culture of some more traditional 
programmes.   
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2. 
EXPLANATORY AND TREATMENT THEORY 
 
2.1       Introduction 
In this chapter, following a discussion on the relationship between 
explanatory theory and treatment theory, and the legal and social constructions of 
sexual offending behaviour, I give a selective overview of some influential 
explanatory and treatment theories within the contemporary fields of both adolescent 
and adult sexual offending. I do not have the space to review all the literature on this 
topic and there are a number of works that make an attempt to summarise some of the 
vast literature in this field (Barbaree & Marshall, 2006; Nisbet et al., 2005; Rich, 
2003, 2006a; Ryan & Lane, 1997b; Ward et al., 2006). I therefore discuss some of the 
explanatory theory that seemed most relevant to the work of this thesis.  In particular, 
I was concerned to complement attachment theory by including a feminist analysis of 
gender relations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the premier treatment 
theory - the risk-need-responsivity model.  I build on the argument of Ward and 
colleagues (Ward et al., 2006) that this model would benefit from the incorporation of 
a strengths-based, collaborative approach to rehabilitation.  This would have the 
effect of recognising the importance of both the person of the therapist and the 
therapeutic alliance to treatment outcomes.  
 
2.2      Explanatory theory and treatment theory 
Explanatory theories are distinct bodies of knowledge, and they should be 
considered separately from treatment theory. The purpose of explanatory theory is to 
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explain the reasons why someone offended, or has a certain diagnosis – its origins lie 
in medicine, in the search for the underlying cause of disease.  It answers the 
question, why?  Treatment theory, on the other hand, is concerned to work out how 
therapeutic change happens, how disorders or problems are solved or healed.  It 
answers two questions - what works? (“outcome” studies) and, how does it work? 
(“process” studies).  Sometimes treatment theory references explanatory theory for 
support, for example, contemporary attachment research and neuroscience seems to 
lend empirical support to the importance of the therapeutic relationship and non-
verbal communication to treatment outcomes (Wallin, 2007).  Explanatory theory 
guides us through the complexity of real life and helps us during the assessment 
phase of treatment to develop an understanding of the problem.  It therefore helps us 
to design a treatment plan.  However, explanatory theory is experience distant, and 
the therapist has to rely upon their own interpersonal skills to read non-verbal 
communications and  to determine the most appropriate response on a moment by 
moment basis. 
As therapists, our understanding of explanatory theory and indeed our years of 
clinical experience, can help to guide us in the initial stages of the therapy process, 
however, we need to be careful that an understanding of diagnostic categories and 
explanatory theories does not blind us to the unique person before us. The 
psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut argued that the therapist‟s understanding of the problem 
needed to be based on their subjective understanding of the patient‟s subjective 
experiences.  Kohut argued that it was not possible to derive objective reality from 
subjective experience.  He was more concerned to respond to the patient in such a 
way that the patient experienced a feeling of being understood.  I agree with Kohut, 
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that a subjective empathic orientation is effective from a treatment perspective 
because every person we see in therapy is unique. We need to be careful not to let 
diagnostic boxes or any other explanations get in the way of us trying to understand 
the unique “lived experience” of each person. No matter how much knowledge a 
therapist has of explanatory theory, it doesn‟t follow that this will mean he or she is 
an effective therapist.  
 Treatment theories are closely related to how we conceptualise change and 
therefore evaluate change.  Most treatment theories, either explicitly or implicitly, are 
based upon some assumptions about what constitutes a subject or person, what 
constitutes a problem and how change comes about.  The dominant discourse in 
contemporary mental health, including the sexual offending field, argues that 
assessments, treatment planning and interventions should be soundly based on 
empirically grounded explanatory theory, which should be testable or open to 
evaluation. It is also the case, that most of these theories are organised around the 
assumption that the problem lies in some kind of psychological dysfunction located 
within the individual offender. However, for people trained to think systemically or 
relationally, this is problematic.  For example, within a positivist approach it is 
usually assumed that problems or disorders exist independently of the language that 
constructs them and that a causal explanation can be found to explain why they exist. 
This view is often referred to as objective realism.  The epistemological position of 
objective realism is central to the project of modernism and contemporary psychiatry, 
attachment research and developmental neurobiology. 
Modernism has been extensively critiqued from the perspective of 
philosophical postmodernism.  Vivian-Byrne is one of the few treatment theorists 
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working in the field of sexual offending treatment who is interested in applying 
postmodern therapies to sexual offending treatment.  She  defines postmodernism, 
quoting Goldner, as “… a contemporary philosophical tradition that offers a critique 
of all „objectivist‟ claims to knowledge – the belief that the „world-out-there‟ can be 
separated from the stance of the observer constructing it – and argues instead that all 
knowledges should be viewed as „texts‟ that reveal as much about their authors as 
about their subject” (2004, p. 189).  She argues that postmodernism is relevant to 
sexual offending treatment because it questions: 
 
… modernist assumptions that underpin many psychological treatments or 
therapies.  These indicate that we can know what the problem is, agree on the 
truth about this, and they lead us to assign expert status to the holders of the 
truth.  Methods arising from this truth can then be applied to the problem with 
a positive, predictable outcome (Vivian-Byrne, 2004, p. 190).  
 
While I agree that there are a number of problems with objective versions of realism, 
I am reluctant to dispense with epistemological realism altogether.  When it comes to 
explanatory theories, I believe epistemological realism is appropriate for studying the 
domains of biology and I have a preference for a multi-disciplinary, pluralistic 
approach to understanding human development and relationships. I take the position 
that explanatory theory needs to take into account the domains of biology and the 
psychosocial world but that the methodologies developed to study physical and 
biological domains are not always applicable when it comes to the study of subjective 
domains. I take a pragmatic position about the use and value of identifying so-called 
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explanatory or risk factors for the purpose of assessment and treatment. I agree with 
Marshall et al. (1999) that all our attempts at developing comprehensive explanations 
of sexual offending will come up against the limits of human knowledge:  
 
… an all-encompassing account of any complex human behaviour may not be 
able to achieve the status of a true scientific theory in the sense that it could 
serve to reasonably precisely predict the behaviour in question.  The best we 
can hope for is to link by speculative connections those factors that the 
evidence suggests are present in either the history or current status of sexual 
offenders (p.27).   
 
However, I do believe that these “speculative connections” can be helpful in orienting 
treatment practice.  In fact, I agree with both philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer, 
1975/1989) and the critical realist position (Ward, et al., 2006) which argues that we 
always start with some set of theoretical conjectures or presuppositions; our 
observations are therefore always theory-laden.  
When it comes to treatment theory, I prefer the position of perspectival 
realism as opposed to objective realism (Orange, 1995).  Perspectival realism argues 
that we can only describe subjective reality from our particular perspective and we 
cannot separate the observer from that which is observed.  In other words, it is 
impossible to bracket ourselves outside of reality in order to observe or describe it 
from a God‟s eye point of view, so to speak.  Or, to put it another way, observation is 
never passive, it is an active form of interaction and the act of observation changes 
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that which is observed. This was indeed the main insight of what came to be known 
in family therapy as second order cybernetics (or the cybernetics of cybernetics): 
 
One of the factors essential in second-order practice is the recognition of the 
therapist as part of the system that he or she is trying to change.  There has 
been an acceptance of the principle that therapists do not sit apart from their 
clients and cannot act objectively.  Rather, they influence and are influenced 
by the subject area with which they work, and all of their prejudices and 
beliefs play a part in their practice.  It is the recognition of this, which allows 
those beliefs to be taken into account, and their potential undue influence to 
be modified.  Thus, the relationship between the therapist and the client grows 
enormously in importance in the therapeutic process.  Further, our allegiances 
to our employers, the state, our personal beliefs, our experiences of sexual 
offenders, and indeed, sexuality itself, all become important in our practice.  
This, in turn, leads to a much more tentative and „non-expert‟ position within 
therapy, to less certainty about what needs to change and how this might be 
brought about (Vivian Byrne, 2004, p. 189). 
 
It was the move to second order cybernetics that created the context for a renewal of 
interest in the therapeutic relationship and the use of self (and hence the 
rapprochement with psychoanalysis) within narrative and systemic family therapy 
(Flaskas & Perlesz, 1996; Real, 1990).  By placing the therapist as another person 
within the system, it was easy to move to the idea of a collaborative therapeutic 
relationship.  The therapist is a person first, with professional expertise; but the client 
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also became a person with expertise on their lives. The ability of the therapist to be 
with the uncertainty of not-knowing, reflecting on and sharing their inner thoughts 
and feelings with families present became one of the defining features of postmodern 
family therapy (Andersen, 1999; Anderson, 1997; Baldwin, 2000; Bird, 2000; 
Flaskas, 2002; Flaskas & Perlesz, 1996; Safran & Muran, 2000).   
As a therapist I acknowledge the influence of both the systemic-narrative 
traditions and the relational traditions, and I take the position that the use of self is the 
core element of how I work.  In my philosophy of therapy each therapist must over 
time develop their own unique professional style and technique of doing therapy that 
“fits” their personal self.  This journey takes time, often requiring the therapist to try 
on “different clothes” for fit. This is what I call the journey of integrating the personal 
and professional self: 
 
Herein lies a deeper demand for the therapist: with our clients we cannot be 
other than who we are in our ordinary lives. We cannot “turn on” 
collaboration, respect or compassion for the therapeutic moment if these 
qualities are not part of our day-to-day selves … To be present therapeutically 
requires awareness of the baggage, the pre-formed narratives and the texts we 
bring with us into the therapy room. We find it useful to make an arbitrary 
split into two kinds (recognising this split is the very one we are critiquing – 
no one said we have to be consistent!): professional and (even more 
demanding) personal (Cantwell & Stagoll, 1996, p. 136).  
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However, the very fact that our professional self places demands upon us, and places 
us in situations that we would never have been in, meeting with people we would 
never have met with and listening to stories that we would never have heard, means 
our personal self is also transformed during this process of integration. 
I think the relationship between explanatory and treatment theory is therefore 
best understood by clearly distinguishing treatment theory from explanatory theory 
(rather than giving explanatory theory precedence over treatment theory). They can 
therefore be seen more helpfully as mutually informative but separate domains of 
scientific inquiry. That is, treatment theory can inform explanatory theory and 
explanatory theory can inform treatment theory.  For example, research into the 
neurobiological effects of trauma, abuse and neglect can inform psychotherapy, and 
research into the subjective experience of therapy participants can inform 
neurobiology.  This also fits with the distinction developed in philosophical 
hermeneutics between explanation and understanding (Gadamer, 1975/1989) which is 
similar to Bruner‟s (1986) distinction between paradigmatic and narrative modes of 
knowing.  Explanation seeks a universal theory based upon reasoning which can be 
productive of predictions, whereas understanding refers to a dialogical event (an 
agreement) between two or more individuals who are relating as equals.  
Explanations are a form of knowing about, a kind of expert outsider‟s perspective; 
whereas understanding is a form of knowing from within.  If we attempt to reduce a 
person to a brain we are reducing them to an object, an “other”.  However, if our 
stance is one of understanding through dialogue or empathic inquiry, we are relating 
as subject to subject.  In this mode of inquiry, understanding is always partial and 
subjective, and is developed locally in participation with the client we are working 
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with.  This form of understanding is experience near, becoming a form of “emotional 
understanding” (Orange, 1995).  Explanations (for example, those based on brain 
research) can therefore act as resources to the treatment project but take a secondary 
place to the dialogical understanding developed during treatment; however, in turn, 
understanding developed through treatment can influence the formation of 
explanations – this is in fact, how the psychoanalytic method of case history works.  
In the treatment of adolescent sexual offending, attachment theory is a useful 
theoretical “lens” through which to understand behaviour which may otherwise be 
interpreted as “bad”; however, this understanding needs to be balanced by attempts to 
understand the client clinically or phenomenologically, primarily through the mode of 
empathic inquiry.  The dialogical understandings that develop from empathic inquiry 
can then be linked back to findings gained from attachment-based research. 
 
2.3 What is sexual offending behaviour? 
The field of adolescent sexual offending treatment is now a specialist area of 
work, within the larger industry of adult sexual offending treatment.  Like the legal 
response, the therapeutic response initially failed to take into account the 
developmental status of young people who had engaged in sexually offending 
behaviours (Zimring, 2004). To begin with, adolescent treatment was influenced by 
ideas drawn from work with adult sexual offenders, with a focus on the individual 
and social risk factors of young people such as deviant sexual arousal; but in recent 
years practitioners have argued that work with children and young people is quite 
different from adults because of developmental considerations and the need to take 
into account the social ecology within which the young person is embedded such as 
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family, school and peers (Nisbet, 2005; Nisbet et al., 2005; Rich, 2006a; Ryan, 1999; 
Swenson, Henggeler, Schoenwald, Kaufman, & Randall, 1998). 
This understanding is also reflected in the creation of separate juvenile justice 
systems to deal with children/young people who offend.  In most western countries 
children aged 10-17 who offend are dealt with in the Children‟s Court.  It was only 
during the late 1980s that the term “juvenile sexual offender” emerged as a distinct 
therapeutic identity; earlier discourse did speak about abused children acting out in 
sexually aggressive ways (victim-victimiser) but did not constitute a legal or 
psychological subjectivity on the basis of such behaviours (Brownlie, 2001). 
Sexual abuse (like all laws and the social world in general) is a socially 
constructed phenomenon  but that doesn‟t mean that it is any less serious or doesn‟t 
exist in reality; it just means that the reality, if you like, is constructed differently 
according to the particular culture and historical period we are living (Hacking, 1991; 
Jenkins, 1998).  At the moment the construction of sexual acts committed by 
children/young people as abusive occurs within medico-legal discourse.  Once a child 
has been found guilty of a sexual offence or has been charged with a sexual offence 
and then diverted into a treatment programme, the child/young person  is constituted 
as a person who will be held accountable for the crime and who will be expected to 
take responsibility for the harm his behaviour has caused.  Children/young people 
who offend are often considered to have some form of sexual deviance, or paraphilias 
(Ryan & Lane, 1997b). This distinguishes adolescents (children aged over 10) who 
sexually “offend” from children (under 10) who engage in problematic “sexualised 
behaviours” (Friedrich, 2007).  A child under the age of 10 is not regarded as a 
person who can be held accountable for their actions because it is assumed they have 
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not yet reached the developmental stage where they can distinguish between right and 
wrong (Zimring, 2004). Once the facts have been established, this usually leads the 
young person who offended to be legally classified as a “sexual offender”.  This 
officially constitutes the young person as someone who poses a risk to other children 
in the community by definition, for on the basis of risk theory (Worling & 
Langstrom, 2003), the commitment of one or more sexual offences constitutes a 
stable or static risk factor that the person concerned will reoffend.  
Although the term sexual offender is a legal construction, not a psycho-
diagnostic category, it still has the potential to be constitutive of a young person‟s 
identity, leading him to be stigmatized as a “sex offender” in the same way that the 
word “pedophile” or its more colloquial expression “rock spider” constitutes 
individuals as a low form of humanity.  A humiliating and shame producing dominant 
narrative can therefore be inadvertently imposed upon these young people, at the 
family, community and political level, as well as at the treatment level. This identity 
often overshadows the traumas many of these young people have experienced in their 
early lives and the relationship between dominant forms of masculinity and abusive 
practices in the wider culture.  The identity of sex offender is also counterproductive 
to successful treatment outcomes; when the trauma context is not acknowledged, a 
“responsibility overload” is potentially imposed on the young person (Jenkins, 1998).  
If the young person‟s own experience of trauma goes unacknowledged and the adults 
responsible for causing this trauma have not been held accountable, then it is asking a 
lot for the young person to acknowledge responsibility. This is not to say that being a 
victim of prior abuse is an excuse.   I believe young people need, and ultimately want, 
to be held accountable and to take responsibility for their offending behaviour.  
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However, the community and the adults involved who failed in their duty to protect 
these young people when they were young must also shoulder some burden of the 
responsibility. All too often, the dominant discourse of the sex offender individualises 
the problem, creating an “us and them” scenario in which questions about the 
relationship between sexual abuse and other potential influences such as the social 
construction of gender are rendered invisible (Brownlie, 2001). 
Definitions of what constitutes sexual abuse are culturally and historically 
contingent, however in recent years a fairly stable and standard consensus has been 
achieved. The factors usually recognised as useful criteria for assessing the absence 
or presence of sexual offending are equality, consent, and coercion.  Equality refers to 
considerations of age and power differentials.  Usually three to four years age 
difference and including other power differentials such as size, physical strength and 
intellectual capacity.  Lack of consent refers to being against the victim‟s will. It is 
also a legal construct that a person under 16 years of age by law cannot give consent.  
Finally the use of coercion can be covert, such as the use of bribes or overt, such as 
the use of force or threats (Ryan, 1997). These are the criteria that are used in both the 
assessment and treatment process to help the participants and their families 
understand the meaning of sexual offending. 
This field of work is also different to general counselling practice because 
practitioners are required to assess risk on an ongoing basis and to work in 
collaboration with the criminal justice and child protection agencies.  Finding the 
balance between social control and a relational approach can be challenging. This 
extra responsibility that is placed on the clinician can sometimes create tensions in the 
therapeutic relationship between an empathic stance and risk management concerns.  
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It can also contribute significantly to stress and burn-out (Ryan & Lane, 1997b).   The 
agency in which I worked maintained the position, prevalent in the practice standards, 
that the community should be seen as the primary client. Considerations for the safety 
and well-being of the children who were the victims of abuse are always given 
priority in the making of decisions surrounding the person who offended, during all 
stages of the therapy process.  For example, the young offender is often required to 
leave the family home in the case of sibling incest or if there are children living in the 
home. 
Adolescent treatment programmes have become more adolescent and family 
focused over the last twenty years, recognising the need to create a flexible and 
responsive treatment milieu taking into account the special needs of adolescents. 
Most programmes these days have a developmental and contextual awareness and 
have a holistic approach to treatment  (Rich, 2003, 2006a; Ryan & Lane, 1997b).  
Also, in recent years there has been a coming together in the juvenile justice system, 
of ideas known as therapeutic jurisprudence (Birgden, 2004) and restorative justice 
(Daly, 2002; Jenkins, 2006).  Together these ideas underpin the diversion of young 
offenders to family conferences or victim-offender conferences, on the requirement 
that the offender has acknowledged guilt (Daly, 2002).  At these conferences, the 
offender and his family meet with the victim (or victim representative) and their 
family.  The victims have the opportunity to tell their story and the offender has the 
opportunity to acknowledge the wrong, and the harm, and to offer an apology.  
Reparation is also decided at these meetings, usually including some form of 
community service and a commitment made to attend treatment.  In some 
jurisdictions, such as in the Australian states of South Australia and Queensland, the 
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offender attends assessment and some preliminary treatment before attending 
conference (Daly, 2002).  In this way the legal system works in collaboration with the 
treatment system. 
 
2.4 Explanations of adolescent sexual offending    
Theories explaining adolescent sexual offending have obvious overlaps with 
theories explaining adult sexual offending, and the references detailed below include 
adult as well as adolescent theorising. Ward and colleagues (2006) have categorised 
explanatory theories according to levels of generality.  Level one theories are 
multifactorial, aiming at integration, and aspire towards comprehensive explanations 
of sexual offending such as Marshall and Barbaree‟s integrated theory (Marshall & 
Barbaree, 1990). Level two or single factor theories focus on what could be described 
as the key factor, for example attachment disorder/intimacy deficits or empathy 
deficits (Chorn & Parekh, 1997; Marshall & Marshall, 2000; Rich, 2006a; Smallbone, 
2005); theory of mind or intersubjective deficit (Keenan & Ward, 2000); cognitive 
distortions (Marshall et al., 1999) and feminism and gender theory (Brownlie, 2001; 
Herman, 1990; Messerschmidt, 1999, 2000). Level three (micro-level or offence 
process) theories are “descriptive models of the offence chain or relapse 
process”(Ward et al., 2006 p. 13).  These would include the cycle of offending 
models often used in both individual and group treatment interventions (Lane, 1997; 
Ryan & Lane, 1997a).   
A distinction can also be made between “distal” or predisposing causal factors 
(vulnerability factors) and “proximal” or precipitating or situational factors: 
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Vulnerability factors exert an effect only when they co-occur with another risk 
factor, for example, the presence of a victim or sexual arousal. Proximal 
factors function to disinhibit the self-regulation of behaviour and thereby 
erode an individual‟s capacity to control strong internal states such as deviant 
sexual fantasies, strong affect or negative cognitions.  The failure to 
adequately deal with these states increases the chances of a sexual offence, 
particularly once the opportunity arises (Ward et al., 2006 p. 211).  
 
These concepts are similar to the way in which psychiatric formulations are 
structured. Like psychiatry, most of the explanatory theories are based on 
modernist/realist assumptions.  
As it is not possible to cover all the theories in this field, I will first of all 
discuss attachment and gender theory before outlining one of the more influential 
general theories, which seeks to integrate many of the factors generally considered to 
be associated with sexual offending.  I seek to build on this theory by incorporating 
an analysis of the effects of hegemonic masculinity and gender harm. Although some 
of these theories were developed to explain why adults sexually offend, it can be 
argued that many of the ideas developed in theories about offences by adults have 
definite applicability to adolescents and the research that informs the development of 
assessment instruments for adolescent sexual offending, such as the ERASOR 
(Worling & Langstrom, 2003), (to be discussed further in section 2.8) tends to 
identify similar explanatory factors to those identified in adult assessments such as 
disrupted attachment relationships and abuse related trauma.  
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2.5      Attachment theory and intimacy deficits  
It is not possible for me to give a comprehensive overview of the field of 
attachment theory and research, which is covered in some handbooks on the topic 
(e.g. Cassidy & Shaver, 1999); and in books on the relationship between attachment 
theory and psychotherapy (Dallos, 2006; Fonagy, 2001; Holmes, 2001; Hughes, 
2007), even as applied in particular to adolescent sexual offending (Rich, 2006a).  
Attachment theory has become increasingly popular as a lens through which to 
understand the origins of sexual offending (Marshall & Marshall, 2000; Rich, 2006a; 
Smallbone, 2005).  Attachment theory grew from the work of John Bowlby (Bowlby, 
1969, 1973, 1980, 1988) and it was developed by Ainsworth and colleagues and Main 
and colleagues (Fonagy, 2001).  Since these early beginnings, attachment theory has 
been increasingly integrated with findings from infant research, neurobiological 
research and developmental psychology in what may be described as a new 
attachment trauma – affect regulation paradigm which explains both healthy and 
pathological socioemotional development (Schore, 2003a; Schore & Schore, 2008; 
Siegel, 1999; Sroufe, 1995; Stern, 1985/2000). 
Bowlby was a child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst and he was influenced by 
the object relations school of psychoanalysis.  However, he rejected Klein‟s (Klein, 
1988) position that the cause of infant and child pathology lay in the intrapsychic 
realm of internalised fantasies; Bowlby focused instead on the world of interpersonal 
relations.  Bowlby observed the effects of attachment trauma on children who were 
separated from their parents for safety reasons during the Second World War.  These 
experiences led him to be appointed to lead a research programme funded by the 
United Nations to study the needs of homeless children who had been orphaned or 
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separated from their families and needed to be cared for in foster homes, institutions 
or other types of group care.  One of Bowlby‟s main findings was that one of the 
main causes of mental ill-health was maternal deprivation (Bowlby, 1953/1965) and 
eventually he formulated his attachment theory in a series of books (Bowlby, 1969, 
1973, 1980).  Bowlby‟s ideas were influenced by his knowledge of ethology and he 
saw the key concepts of attachment as being grounded in biology.  One of these was 
the concept of the secure base.  Bowlby hypothesised that infants were hardwired to 
seek out the safety of a secure base provided by the caregiver when they felt 
threatened in any way.  The availability of the secure base also provided the impetus 
for the infant to explore his or her environment with the expectation that the secure 
base was not far away.  Bowlby later developed these ideas into a framework for 
understanding the process of psychotherapy (Bowlby, 1988) 
Bowlby‟s initial insights have been further developed over the years by 
ongoing research in the fields of infant, child and adult development and 
neuroscience research.  Ainsworth and colleagues  invented the Strange Situation 
experiment in order to be able to measure attachment (Solomon & George, 1999).  
From observations of how infants and toddlers responded when a stranger entered the 
room to their reactions when their mother left the room and then returned, they 
developed three attachment classifications with respect to a particular parent: secure 
attachment, insecure ambivalent attachment and insecure avoidant attachment.  Since 
their initial work a fourth category has since been added, insecure disorganised 
attachment (Solomon & George, 1999).   Narrative research utilising discourse 
analysis developed by Mary Main and colleagues, has recently opened up the field of 
adult attachment research (Hesse, 1999).   The combination of adult attachment 
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research with the observation of infants, has led to the startling conclusion, replicated 
a number of times by research studies, that attachment patterns are intergenerationally 
transmitted, leading some theorists to draw analogies between attachment theory and 
the human genome project (Dallos, 2006; Holmes, 2001). In recent years attachment 
theory has been increasingly linked with affect regulation; in fact, some researchers 
have argued that attachment should be seen as a form of affect regulation and show 
how the interactions between the infant and the primary caregiver in the first year of a 
child‟s life are crucial for the development of affectional bonds (Schore, 2003a). 
Attachment theory has grown in recent years as one of the major single-factor 
explanations for adult and adolescent sexual offending. It is not a new theory, and it 
has been extensively researched by Bill Marshall over the years, usually under the 
heading of attachments, intimacy and loneliness (Marshall et al., 1999; Marshall & 
Marshall, 2000). It is argued that insecurely attached children are seen as being more 
vulnerable than securely attached children, and this vulnerability increases their risk 
of being sexually abused and increases their use of sex (initially masturbation) to 
avoid problems and feel better.  Over time sex becomes used as their primary coping 
mechanism to deal with stress and lifestyle problems. Repetitive use of deviant sexual 
fantasy eventually leads to thoughts of abuse.  When social constraints are overcome 
by alcohol, negative affect or cognitive distortions and the opportunity arises, the 
offence takes place (Marshall & Marshall, 2000).  Many victims are already 
vulnerable, that is, “characterized by low self-esteem, poor relationship skills, and a 
desire for affection” (Marshall & Marshall, 2000, p. 259)  even before the abuse takes 
place. 
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  Marshall‟s theory draws heavily on attachment theory research to explain the 
presence of vulnerability factors.  However, unlike Marshall‟s initial formulations, 
attachment theory does not have to depend upon the idea of the fusion of sexual and 
aggressive drives to explain sexual offending behaviour.   Rather, as with other forms 
of relational psychoanalytic theory, aggression is understood to be either a reaction to 
frustration or to threat (real or perceived); in fact, severe pathology is seen to arise 
when the caregiver (secure base) is at the same time a source of threat (Perry & 
Szalavitz, 2006). 
It can be argued that attachment theory has confirmed the primary 
psychoanalytic assumption that the roots of healthy emotional development are laid 
down in the first year of life, within the matrix of caregiving relationships.  However, 
we also need to remember that caregiving is a social practice, emotional development 
is always intertwined with social development (and cognitive development); in fact, 
the general course of emotional development can be seen as a movement from dyadic 
affect regulation to the self regulation of affect (Sroufe, 1995).  During this course of 
development the child gradually internalizes the capacity of the caregiver to regulate 
both positive and negative affects.  It is in the regular daily and moment by moment 
interactions of affect regulation between infant and caregiver that the attachment 
relationship develops in the first year of life.  In the second half of the first year the 
infant increasingly takes the initiative to signal to the caregiver, thereby gaining a 
response (Fosha, 2000; Schore, 2003a; Sroufe, 1995).  This is why attachment is not 
considered to be a characteristic of the individual but of the relationship.  Hence, it is 
possible for a child to be securely attached to say the mother and insecurely attached 
to the father.  In order for a child to develop resilience it is hypothesized that a secure 
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attachment relation with one person will be a good enough secure base (Bowlby, 
1988).  The basic pattern of affect regulation takes the form of attunement, disruption 
and repair (A-D-R) (Fosha, 2000; Schore, 2003a); a classic example would be the 
infant and mother engaging in escalating rhythms of positive affect exchange through 
facial expression, voice tone and pitch, followed by the infant grabbing and pulling 
the mother‟s hair, thereby unintentionally hurting the mother.  The mother‟s face 
registers anger for a split second but this is enough to scare the infant who then 
begins to cry.  The mother quickly responds with soothing interactions to repair the 
disruption and the infant begins to smile again and the cycle begins again (Fosha, 
2000).  Stern (1985/200) has described these experiences as “vitality affects” as 
distinguished from the categorical emotions such as joy and anger.  It can be said that 
“vitality affects are to emotional communication what words are to verbal 
communication” (Fosha, 2003 p. 237). 
The A-D-R sequence was observed by Heinz Kohut who hypothesised on the 
basis of his clinical work with adults, that the child internalises the caregiver‟s affect 
regulating function from his or her experience of optimal frustration.  It is not always 
possible for the caregiver to be perfectly attuned to the infant – but this is not a bad 
thing.  The fact that the caregiver is not always going to be perfectly attuned or able 
to perfectly respond gives the infant an opportunity to practice self-regulation. Over 
time, and repeated experiences of optimal frustration, the child grows in their ability 
to self regulate when the caregiver is not around.  However, if the disruption is not 
optimal then it becomes traumatic; for example, if the caregiver is not present when 
the child wakes in the middle of the night in discomfort, or if the child‟s enthusiastic 
efforts to connect with the caregiver are continually rebuffed. It is the repeated 
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experience of these small “t” relational traumas that lead to the development of 
attachment and affect regulation disorders. Kohut was historically ahead of his time 
in the ways in which his work has been largely supported by the findings of 
contemporary neuroscience (Schore, 2003a). 
 
2.6 Gender relations and domination 
  Although most boys who sexually offend have attachment-trauma problems, 
proponents of attachment theory recognise that it cannot in itself explain why some 
boys sexually offend and others do not (Rich, 2006a). It is therefore acknowledged 
that other factors are involved.   I believe one such factor to be the cultural context of 
gender relations. Attachment theory helps us to understand why adolescents sexually 
offend,  however, what is often neglected in the attachment literature is that these 
relational and developmental traumas also take place within a cultural context of 
gender and power relations in which masculinity dominates over femininity.  The boy 
identifies with his father, disidentifies with his mother and repudiates his own 
femininity (Benjamin, 1988).  The formation of gender identity occurs not only in 
relations between the sexes, but also in relations within the same sex.   The term 
“hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1995, 2002) was introduced in order to describe 
how boys and men participate in dominant and submissive relations in our school 
playgrounds, sporting fields and workplaces based on the masculinity---femininity 
polarity.  In this thesis I use hegemonic masculinity to refer to a way of being a man 
which disavows and devalues feminine qualities such as subjectivity, nurture, nature, 
emotional vulnerability, sensitivity and empathy. It is hegemonic because it reflects a 
dominant form of power relations, and is thus self-perpetuating and largely hidden. 
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This culture of hegemonic masculinity makes it hard for male victims to speak of 
their sexual abuse because of their shame of being ridiculed by other men and their 
fear of being labeled homosexual.  Those boys who do not fit into the prescriptions of 
dominant ways of doing masculinity are degraded and abused by other boys.  Many 
of the participants on the programme were affected by their fear of not measuring up 
to the prescriptions of “hegemonic masculinity”. These prescriptions of hegemonic 
masculinity provide another perspective on helping us to understand why adolescent 
sexual offending occurs. 
Since the late 1970s, many family therapists and relational psychoanalysts, 
under the influence of feminism, have incorporated the issue of gender and power 
into their clinical practice (Altman, 1995; Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 1988; Goldner, 
2004; Luepnitz, 1988).  Constructionist, feminist and narrative therapies also link the 
perpetration of intimate violence and sexual abuse by boys and men to dominant 
ways of doing masculinity (Goldner, 2004; Jenkins, 1990; Law, 1999; Slattery, 2003; 
Tootell, Wright, Hall, & Jenkins, 1997). However, discussions of the relationship 
between gender, power and sexual abuse have remained marginalised in the field of 
sexual offending explanatory and treatment theory (Brownlie, 2001).   Gender is 
infused with power because of the way in which masculinity and femininity are 
constructed as binaries: 
 
Masculinity and femininity are inherently relational concepts, which have 
meaning in relation to each other, as a social demarcation and a cultural 
opposition … Masculinity as an object of knowledge is always masculinity-
in-relation … Knowledge of masculinity arises within the project of knowing 
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gender relations … masculinities are configurations of practice structured by 
gender relations.  They are inherently historical; and their making and 
remaking is a political process … (Connell, 1995, p. 44)   
 
These relations define masculinity as the dominant subject and femininity as the 
submissive object:  “gender casts masculinity as an illusory state of omnipotence 
from which dependency must be externalised by being projected onto a female Other, 
and femininity is reciprocally constituted as the site of all that masculinity repudiates” 
(Goldner, 2004, p. 350).   This relation between masculinity and femininity has been 
compared to the master-slave relationship (Benjamin, 1988).  However, in order to 
understand relations of domination between men and men Connell introduces the 
concept of dominant and subordinate relations among masculinities and incorporates 
the concept “hegemonic masculinity” to illuminate how the cultural and historical 
formations of masculinity are a result of social practice, and are therefore open to 
change (Connell, 1995).
1
   
Hegemonic masculinity, as defined by Connell, refers to the dominant culture 
of masculinity, which legitimates patriarchy, the dominance of men over women 
(Connell, 1995, p. 77) and subordinates alternative forms of masculinity such as gay 
masculinity: 
                                                 
1
 Hegemony (or “rule”) is a term originally coined by the early twentieth century Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci  to explain why the inevitable working class revolution had not taken place as 
predicted by Marx.  Unlike most Marxists of the time, Gramsci thought that the cultural domain was 
the key to revolutionary movement rather than the economic.   Cultural hegemony (or the ruling 
culture) was a theoretical concept Gramsci used to explain how the capitalist state was able to maintain 
the economic system by a combination of force and ideology.   He argued that the working class were 
culturally colonised and came to understand themselves through the values and ideology of the middle 
class which were also tied to Christianity.  Cultural hegemony therefore represented the domination of 
middle class values on the rest of society (;Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).   
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Gay masculinity is the most conspicuous, but it is not the only subordinated 
masculinity. Some heterosexual men and boys too are expelled from the circle 
of legitimacy.  The process is marked by a rich vocabulary of abuse: wimp, 
milksop, nerd, turkey, sissy, lily liver, jellyfish, yellowbelly, candy ass, 
ladyfinger, pushover, cookie pusher, cream puff, motherfucker, pantywaist, 
mother‟s boy, four eyes, ear-ole, dweeb, geek, Milquetoast, Cedric, and so on.  
Here too the symbolic blurring with femininity is obvious. (Connell, 1995, p. 
79) 
 
Apart from gay masculinity, heterosexual men who identify with metrosexuality can 
also be seen as taking up an alternative way of doing masculinity, because they share 
“an unashamed interest in shopping, fashion, fitness, and personal grooming … the 
importance of the concept , according to reports, is that it liberates the young male 
from the macho straightjacket where overt care for personal appearance is viewed 
with askance and interest in any cosmetic beyond shaving gel and deodorant is 
anathema” (Euromonitor-Archive, 2006, p. ??). Another example I came across in my 
work was young men who identified as “Emo‟s”.  This was an expression that came 
from a particular genre of pop music but also involved a dress code that would 
transgress hegemonic masculinity, such as the wearing of eye make-up.  However, 
hegemonic masculinity (and homophobia) was still the dominant form of masculinity 
even in the 2000s and represented the dominant sociocultural context for many of the 
participants on the programme. 
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Hegemonic masculinity is reproduced in the dominant cultural prescriptions 
that boys operate under. For example, Pollack‟s  (1999) sociological research 
identified a social code for boys consisting of four dominant prescriptions for 
boyhood: 
 
The “sturdy oak”.  Boys do not share pain or grieve openly, i.e., boys don‟t 
cry.  To do so is to be weak = feminine. 
“Give „em hell”.  The prescription to be dare-devils, ride fast cars, take risks 
and not be scared.  Be tough and macho. 
The “big wheel”.  The need to achieve status, dominance and power.  To 
avoid shame at all costs, to look cool, and to act as if everything is going okay 
(even if it is in reality falling apart). 
“No sissy stuff”.  The gender straitjacket that prohibits boys from expressing 
feelings or desires seen as “feminine” – dependence, warmth and empathy. 
(Pollack, 1999) 
 
These prescriptions and their variants are played out every day in our school yards 
and also act to make it very difficult to engage boys in the process of therapy because 
to go into therapy is to contravene all those prescriptions. For boys who are have been 
sexually abused, apart from the initial trauma of the event, the meaning of the event is 
filtered through the culture of dominant masculinity and this affects the way they 
come to view their self and their sexuality.  Male and female rape victims are 
traumatised in a variety of ways: they feel their physical integrity has been invaded, 
their personhood as having been diminished, they feel humiliated and ashamed 
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(Sanderson, 2006). For boys and men, they may also fear they are now destined to 
become homosexual. Therefore for some boys who have been sexually abused or 
bullied in various ways for not fitting in with the prescriptions of hegemonic 
masculinity, one theory is that they may choose to sexually abuse, in order to re-
affirm their lost sense of power and control or in some cases to “prove” to themselves 
they are not homosexual or that they do match up to these prescriptions 
(Messerschmidt, 2000).  For a boy who is already insecurely attached, the sexual 
abuse or bullying only thickens a negative story of self such as personal failure, by 
comparing himself to the specifications of hegemonic masculinity.  
The decision to incorporate explorations of the effects of gender and power in 
my therapy with adolescent boys who have acted in sexually abusive ways was an 
explicit political decision as a male therapist to challenge the prescriptions of 
hegemonic masculinity.  As Jenkins once said: 
 
As a therapist, I am a political agent, whether I like it or not. I make political 
choices, and have political influence, even if I choose to deny my own power 
and the power relationships in which I participate. I can choose to 
acknowledge my power and my political role and attempt to exercise it 
responsibly – in fact, I believe I have a responsibility to act in this way 
(Jenkins, 1994). 
 
 Inviting boys and young men to consider alternative forms of masculinity which 
embody and enact different values of personhood holds the promise of not only 
personal change but also social change. 
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2.7 Towards an integrated theory 
Marshall & Barbaree (1990) (subsequently revised by Marshall & Marshall 
(2000) ) and Ward and colleagues (Ward et al., 2006) have paved the way in 
attempting to develop integrated theories of adult sexual offending. These 
comprehensive theories attempt to integrate a wide variety of factors considered to 
“play a role in the explanatory causes of sexual offending and lead to its persistence” 
(Marshall & Barbaree, 1990, p. 257).  Integrated theories attempt to account for both 
distal (predisposing) factors and proximate (precipitating and perpetuating) factors.    
Marshall and Barbaree seek to integrate biological, psychological and 
sociological factors around a unifying core assumption that “the task for human males 
is to acquire inhibitory controls over a biologically endowed propensity for self-
interest associated with a tendency to fuse sex and aggression” (p.257). Accepting 
animal research that males are innately aggressive, they argue, however, that an 
appropriate caregiving environment and healthy socialisation enables the male to 
inhibit the natural tendency to fuse sex with aggression:   
 
In this respect perhaps two of the most important outcomes of appropriate 
parenting are to instill in the young boy a sense of self-confidence and a 
strong emotional attachment to others.  Since appropriate adult sexual 
interactions usually occur within the context of an intimate, loving 
relationship, then the growing child needs to develop skills essential to 
attaining such an intimate bond (1990, p.262).   
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The origins of sexual offending are therefore seen to lie in the failure of these 
parenting and socialisation processes to provide an adequate developmental context 
for the male to distinguish between, and develop capacity to inhibit, his sexual-
aggressive drives. These conclusions are based on research into the childhoods of 
men who have raped, which have persistently found patterns of parental violence, 
especially male violence, harsh and inconsistent punishments, and humiliation 
handed out by parents or caregivers. Other contributing factors include the wider 
aspects of culture such as male socialisation. Marshall and Barbaree argue that self-
esteem in adolescent males is strongly associated with perceptions by peers of their 
sexual ability.  Hence, “the young boy who cannot develop a relationship with a 
female may turn to aggressive sex or sex with children as a way of proving to himself 
that he is masculine” (1990, p.262).  Given the failure of the caregiving environment, 
it is also unlikely that the boy has developed the capacity for intimacy, leading to 
social isolation and feelings of loneliness. They argue that loneliness is also 
associated with a higher risk of susceptibility to hostile and aggressive feelings.  
Failures in the caregiving environment also lead to empathy deficits:  “If a man is 
indifferent to the feelings of others, he will be able to ignore their rights and abuse 
them however he wishes” (p.263). Other general sociocultural features they identify 
include the predominance of violence in the media and the effects of pornography 
both of which serve to desensitize males and disinhibit their aggressive-sexual drives.  
Finally, these predisposing or distal factors only become activated when situational 
factors arise (proximal factors), that are high risk situations.  For example, a man 
loses his job (proximal factor) and at the same time has a fight with his wife because 
he perceives her as criticizing him (proximal) leading him to get drunk (proximal 
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factor) in order to cope with the negative emotion that has been generated. (The 
difficulty with regulating negative emotions goes back to poor parent-child 
relationships and is the distal factor). The alcohol only serves to depress him more 
and at the same time act as a disinhibiter which leads to him sexually abusing a child. 
 Since 1990, Marshall and Barbaree‟s integrated theory has continued to 
evolve.  Marshall and his colleagues (Marshall et al., 1999; Marshall & Marshall, 
2000) now place more emphasis on the development of deficit or vulnerability 
factors, which emerge primarily from childhood experiences.  Vulnerability is placed 
on one side of the pole with resilience or protective factors found at the other end.  
Resilience is defined to include personal characteristics, skills, beliefs, preferences 
and values (Marshall et al., 1999). They focus in particular on poor parent-child 
attachment bonds which make the child vulnerable to developing low self-esteem, a 
poor relationship style and a desperate need for attention.  This combination of 
factors increases the risk the child may be sexually abused, which in turn leads to the 
child turning to sex as a coping mechanism. On the other hand, on the basis of 
attachment research they argue that a child with secure attachment bonds is 
characterized as resilient, confident in themselves and in others‟ love for them.  In 
contrast, Marshall and Barbaree detail research to show that the families of persons 
who commit sexual offences are characterized by violence and abuse, inconsistent 
parenting, severe punishments, criminal activities, drugs and alcohol use and social 
isolation.  They also detail research which shows poor attachment to fathers to be 
correlated more strongly than poor attachment to mothers among child abusers, and 
that insecure attachments to fathers leads to the enactment of coercive sexual 
behaviours as adults (Marshall & Marshall, 2000, p. 251-253).  Because the child 
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lacks other coping skills they turn to sex as an avoidance strategy.  Because the child 
is isolated they may also be open to the advances of adults, leading to them being 
sexually abused.  Marshall and Barbaree detail research to show how adults who have 
committed sex offences have a much higher likelihood that they were sexually abused 
as children. The abuse in turn fuels masturbatory habits and the use of deviant 
fantasies.  When the child reaches adolescence and they are unable to cope with 
various stress and problems in their life, if the opportunity arises, there is a good 
chance they may offend.  In order for this to happen, there has to be the presence of 
disinhibiting factors and the situation or opportunity to offend. Alcohol and cognitive 
distortion are common disinhibiting factors; in fact Marshall and Barbaree cite 
evidence that up to 50% of sexual offences are committed under the influence of 
alcohol.  The young person will then either seize or seek out (plan) the opportunity to 
offend. 
 This model is coherent and makes sense. However, I do have a problem with 
the core assumption of the notion of biologically based sexual-aggressive drives.  I 
think the argument that the motivation towards sexual gratification  is genetically 
wired in to all human beings is reasonable (Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 
1996), but I have never been convinced by the argument that all human beings are 
innately aggressive.  I much prefer the theory of aggression, derived from the work of 
Kohut (Kohut, 1971; 1977), which I discuss in more detail in chapter 3. Kohut made 
a distinction between healthy aggression, best understood as assertiveness, and 
destructive aggression, understood as anger, rage and violent behaviour directed 
against others or the self, that arises from traumatic injuries to the self (Ornstein, 
1999).   
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I believe an appreciation of how our sense of self and personal meaning is 
derived from without by sociocultural discourse is highly relevant to understanding 
the origins of sexual offending.  For example, an appreciation of the effects of the 
power of homophobic discourse to shape a man‟s sense of self and how this is 
expressed on a micro-level through the practice of shaming (Harker, 1997; Law, 
1999; Sinclair & Monk, 2005) help us to understand the need for boys to assert 
dominance over other boys physically, verbally and sometimes, sexually.  There is 
therefore a  problem with focusing exclusively on explanations which seek to 
understand abusive behaviour by relating it to deficits in the child‟s upbringing 
(abusive and neglectful parenting) or prior victimisation history, or generally a 
combination of both (Marshall & Marshall, 2000). The problem is that these 
explanations can inadvertently render the dominant culture of hegemonic masculinity 
invisible, or at least non-problematic.  This therefore maintains the focus on 
dysfunctional families rather than cultures.  One-factor explanations such as 
attachment theory are therefore in danger of inadvertently diverting attention away 
from the responsibility we need to take at a community level, to question the 
reproduction of sociocultural discourses which promote forms of masculinity which 
define themselves by denigrating femininity and homosexuality.  We therefore need 
to pay attention to the dialectical relationship between individuals, families, peer 
groups and community. 
The paucity of space given to gender and power in the treatment literature 
struck me as paralleling the history of sexual abuse treatment.  Understanding of 
incest as a form of family dysfunction has a long history in family therapy (Luepnitz, 
1988).  However in the 1970s in response to feminist critique of circular theories of 
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causality, a new analysis of power led to adult males being held accountable 
(Herman, 1981; Kamsler, 1990; Luepnitz, 1988).  When sexually abusive behaviour 
is placed within the larger spectrum of abusive acts committed (or sanctioned) by 
boys and men, it can be seen as a form of “gender harm” (Daly, 2002); and the 
discourse of dominant or hegemonic masculinity can be seen as acting as a restraint 
on all boys (and girls) towards showing care and respect to their peers and younger 
children. 
  Gender harm is an umbrella term used to refer to the related crimes of 
domestic violence, family violence, sexualised violence and violence against 
children.  Gendered harms are indicative of gender power relations (Daly, 2002 p. 
67). Unfortunately, most of the studies of adolescent-male sexual violence are gender 
blind even though it is estimated that 96-98 per cent of adult sexual offenders are 
male (Messerschmidt, 2000, p. 287). The majority of these adult men will also start 
their offending as adolescents.  I believe the thesis of gender harm is a necessary 
complement to one-factor explanations such as attachment-trauma theory.  In my 
view, developmentally-informed explanations of sexual offending can be enhanced 
by understanding how boys‟ perspectives on problems such as sexual abuse or school 
bullying are formed through the lens of dominant masculinity discourse.  It can then 
be argued that boys boost their sense of masculine self-esteem through the use of 
physical or sexual violence; or see no other alternatives to the use of violence to solve 
interpersonal problems.  Sexual violence can therefore be seen as a form of “doing” 
or “performing” masculinity and expressing their needs for intimacy too. That is, 
boys and young men respond to “masculinity challenges”, challenges to their 
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masculine self esteem, by resorting to physical and sexual violence and exercising 
power and control over younger and smaller children  (Messerschmidt, 1999, 2000). 
Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to subordinate masculinities, 
such as gay masculinity (Connell, 1995, 2002), and in relation to a disparaging 
construction of femininity. Hegemonic masculinity also interpolates with race, class, 
sexuality and ability hierarchies. The stories documented in Part II of the thesis show 
how I seek to understand the meanings that participants had made about the events in 
their lives and of how the discourse of hegemonic masculinity shaped these 
meanings. I engaged the participants in a reflective dialogue, to think about these 
meanings and to evaluate if these meanings were similar or dissimilar to their own 
values.   
The requirement to sort through multiple and conflicting messages about 
masculinity and create a personal identity, can be understood as a major 
developmental task that boys must complete (Pope & Englar-Carlson, 2001). From 
this perspective, boys and young men are thought to become more self-conscious of 
the consequences of not identifying with the dominant discourse of masculinity and 
heterosexuality when entering adolescence and their actions are driven by fear of 
becoming marginalised and stigmatized by other boys and men.   The dominant 
prescriptions of masculinity also impoverish the ability of boys to enter into intimate 
relationships (Mesner, 2001).   
Acts of sexual abuse are often described by the metaphor of darkness (Latta, 
2003).  Indeed, they often take place in a space of both literal darkness and within the 
darkness of fantasy.  They are conducted in secret, in the dark. They take place in a 
borderland, on the boundary of both fantasy and reality.  In this sense, adolescent 
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sexual offending can be interpreted as not only the enactment of a sexual fantasy but 
also the enactment of a fantasy of maleness. Therapeutic work with adolescent boys 
who have acted in sexually abusive ways is therefore politicised when we study how 
the claims of hegemonic masculinity can restrain boys from acting non-violently and 
expressing emotions which are commonly referred to as feminine. The problem is 
then located in a patriarchal production of men‟s culture rather than individual or 
family pathology.  Thus, the point I want to argue is that insecure attachment and 
traumatic injuries to the self render boys vulnerable but do not cause violence.  It is 
generally speaking, a combination of development deficits in conjunction with an 
unstable or dangerous environment, such as a violent father or peer abuse, in 
conjunction with the dictates of hegemonic masculinity, which results in the young 
person reacting with violence to property or persons (Saxe, Ellis, & Kaplow, 2007).   
  Sexually abusive acts can be interpreted as acts of self-formation, intended to 
define one‟s place in the hierarchical order of masculine identity and sexuality. 
Within patriarchal men‟s culture femininity is still ridiculed and disparaged as a sign 
of weakness.  Most of the boys and young men I have worked with are so fearful of 
being categorised as  “gay”, “wimp”, “faggot” or “pussie” that they will act in violent 
or abusive ways and knowingly break community norms in order to identify with and 
perform their understanding of hegemonic masculinity norms. For example, in my 
clinical experience, it is common for boys to identify with the violent aggressor, 
father, as a defence against the pain and fear of traumatic stress. 
Like the concept of internal working models or attachment representations, 
beliefs that are produced from our immersion in cultural discourse tend to operate 
(influence us) outside of our conscious awareness. Prior victimisation experiences are 
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crucial to understanding sexually abusive behaviours, not only because of the need to 
treat the attachment-trauma issues involved, but also because of the meanings 
adolescent boys come to make out of these experiences once they become more 
knowledgeable about sexuality practices and hegemonic masculinity.  For example, I 
found Jamie‟s story to be in agreement with Marshall & Barbaree (1990), that some 
boys and young men therefore sexually abuse in an attempt to compensate for their 
sense of being deficient in their masculine identity because of prior victimisation 
experiences. For boys who feel powerless and out-of-control when confronted by 
violent fathers, or who feel picked on and bullied in the school ground, acting in 
sexually abusive ways provides an opportunity to feel powerful and in control, 
however temporarily. It is also the case that boys with insecure attachments are more 
likely to bully or be the victims of bullying (Sonkin & Dutton, 2002).  
Boys generally learn how to perform hegemonic masculinity from older males 
in their family and from school. I also think sport is an important site for the 
reproduction of hegemonic masculinity.  Rugby union is probably the defining iconic 
symbol of masculinity for both Maori and Pakeha boys growing up in New Zealand.  
Many boys will measure their performance of masculinity in a hierarchy determined 
by rugby.  Young women are also positioned in this discourse through the idealisation 
of this form of masculinity and become willing participants in the idolization of the 
same masculine image.     I was therefore captured by the relevance of research into 
masculinity and sports, which had me remembering my own sporting 
accomplishments and the link between sexual conquest and sporting prowess.  
However, as demonstrated in autoethnographic research, sport can also be a site 
wherein boys develop resistance strategies to hegemonic masculinity (Pringle, 2001). 
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The culture of hegemonic masculinity is also circulated through the mass 
media. I especially remember the films and television that shaped my boyhood days. I 
believe that images and narratives of hegemonic masculinity portrayed in mainstream 
television and films are enacted by boys in the school grounds and neighbourhood, 
starting in the form of play fighting and ending in real fights and violence. It has also 
been argued that Hollywood war films (Donald, 2001) act as propaganda to recruit 
boys and young men into military service and to legitimise the use of state violence 
as the solution to domestic and international conflict (such as the film, Pearl Harbor).   
When the personal is political, therapeutic change becomes social change. By 
resisting the discourse of hegemonic masculinity we are resisting the call to war and 
the reproduction of gendered harms in our homes and communities. Feminist theory 
alerts us to the need for treating all forms of violence, including sexual violence, as a 
community issue: 
 
Women and men must oppose the use of violence as a means of social control 
in all its manifestations: war, male violence against women, adult violence 
against children, teenage violence, racial violence, etc. Feminist efforts to end 
male violence against women must be expanded into a movement to end all 
forms of violence (hooks, 1984/2000, p. 132). 
 
On these terms, community development strategies (such as discussion groups in 
schools about the harmful effects of homophobia) are necessary to challenge the 
dominance of hegemonic masculinity and the patriarchal values that are reproduced 
in the performance of hegemonic masculinity. If we are to be serious about violence 
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prevention as a community, then what is required is a thorough going revision of our 
community values and community wide resistance to the current hegemonic image of 
masculinity by challenging dominant cultural practices such as the glorification of 
male violence in sport. 
 
2.8       The risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model 
Offender rehabilitation theories are commonly organised within a human 
needs based paradigm (Ward et al., 2006).  A distinction is usually made between 
criminogenic and noncriminogenic needs (Andrews & Bonta, 2003). Criminogenic 
needs are also dynamic risk factors, that is, these are needs that the offender seeks to 
meet through offending rather than by other pro-social means. The Risk-Need-
Responsivity (RNR) model is defined as a rehabilitation theory which serves as a 
bridge linking explanatory theory (factors which cause offending) and how treatment 
interventions are selected and implemented (Ward & Eccleston, 2004).  Four 
principles for effective rehabilitation have been developed. These are firstly, the risk 
principle.  Risk is an estimate of treatment needs; according to this principle high risk 
clients should receive more treatment than low or moderate risk clients.  Risk is 
typically divided into static and dynamic risk factors.  Static factors are historical and 
therefore unchanging, such as the number and type of past offences.  Static risk 
factors are the main factors that are assessed to predict the probability of future re-
offending.  Dynamic risk factors are more useful for clinicians because they target 
factors which can be changed, such as antisocial attitudes or difficulties regulating 
affect.  Secondly, according to the need principle, treatment should primarily target 
criminogenic needs (dynamic risk factors), characteristics which when changed 
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reduce the probability of recidivism. In contrast non-criminogenic needs are seen as 
aspects of the individual or his circumstances that if changed will not necessarily 
reduce the probability of recidivism.  These would include needs such as self-esteem 
needs and mental health problems such as depression and anxiety. Thirdly, the 
responsivity principle is used to refer to the style and mode of intervention in order to 
successfully engage and motivate clients to change. It is concerned to tailor treatment 
interventions to match the cognitive abilities, personalities, age and cultural 
backgrounds of the participants.  It also refers to the person and style of the therapist. 
Finally, the principle of professional discretion states that within the broad 
parameters of for example, policy and best practice standards, professionals should 
use their clinical judgment when implementing interventions, thereby allowing 
flexibility.  I would argue that these last two principles are complementary, and 
crucial to the ability of the therapist to be optimally responsive.  Clinical judgment 
can therefore override the above principles if warranted  (Ward & Eccleston, 2004; 
Ward et al., 2006).The RNR model assumes the best way to reduce recidivism rates 
and protect the community is to reduce or eliminate the dynamic risk factors through 
a combination of risk management and therapeutic interventions. These factors 
constitute clinical needs or problems (often referred to as criminogenic needs) that 
should be explicitly targeted in treatment; and risk assessment should drive the 
treatment process and offenders‟ assessed levels of risk should determine the intensity 
and duration of treatment (Ward et al., 2006). 
The RNR Model has been very influential across treatment providers.  Most 
providers would now always do a comprehensive assessment prior to accepting a 
person for treatment and this assessment would cover the variables that have been 
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identified by research as static and dynamic factors.  The assessment would usually 
include risk assessment instruments designed specifically for that purpose.   For 
example, on the treatment team I worked for in New Zealand, a risk assessment 
instrument called the Estimate of Risk of Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism 
Version 2.0 (ERASOR) played a central role in our assessments.  The ERASOR has 
been constructed on the basis of research conducted by Worling & Langstrom (2003) 
which identified statistically relevant factors correlated with adolescent sexual 
offending.  These were then classified as either static or dynamic risk factors.  The 
history of offending is always a static risk factor, whereas factors such as impulse 
control, loneliness, affect regulation, oppositional defiance and family dynamics are 
all dynamic factors. 
The RNR Model assumed that these dynamic risk factors could be primarily 
treated using a combination of cognitive behaviour therapy and educational 
interventions, primarily within a group therapy context. However, research into 
treatment effectiveness conducted by Marshall and colleagues (Ward & Marshall, 
2004) has now begun to highlight the importance of non-specific treatment 
responsivity factors, such as the therapeutic relationship and the characteristics of the 
therapist and the participant.  This research will be discussed in more detail below. 
Treatment responsivity is now seen as a key factor in treatment effectiveness, given 
as much importance as the risk and need principles (Ward & Eccleston, 2004).  
Responsivity theory refers to a number of related issues concerned with engaging the 
participant in the therapy process.  Responsivity includes internal responsivity 
(characteristics of the person who offended) and external responsivity (characteristics 
of the treatment environment and the therapist) (Birgden, 2004). In particular it 
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relates to the personal qualities of the therapist, the style of the therapist, the process 
of therapy, including the qualities of the therapeutic relationship, and the tailoring of 
interventions to match the personal qualities, cognitive abilities, learning styles and 
interests of the participants.  Contemporary theories of rehabilitation and treatment of 
adolescent sex offending have begun addressing issues of internal responsivity, such 
as specialist groups for intellectually disabled clients (Ayland & West, 2005). 
However, the topic of external responsivity is only now beginning to be addressed, 
such as the recent work on the role of the therapist, and using a positive approach to 
treatment (Drapeau, 2005; Marshall & Serran, 2004; Marshall et al., 2005; Ward et 
al., 2006). 
Contemporary approaches to the rehabilitation of both adults and adolescents 
who have sexually offended are placing more emphasis on a more positive and 
reconstructive approach to treatment emphasising the centrality of enhancing the 
quality of life of people who have offended in order to reduce the risk of re-
offending, rather than focusing solely on criminogenic needs or risk factors (Ward & 
Stewart, 2003). This movement is in line with constructive approaches to the 
rehabilitation of offenders in contradistinction to retributive approaches to offending 
(Ward et al., 2006).  The movement towards a more positive approach to offender 
rehabilitation has been given impetus by developments in explanatory theory which 
trace the origins of both adult and adolescent sexual offending to poor quality 
childhood relationships with parents and the recognition that offenders have needs for 
a good life, like other members of the community. There has therefore been a new 
emphasis placed on client values, hopes, intentions, self-esteem, the personal qualities 
of the therapist and the creation of a collaborative therapeutic relationship (Marshall, 
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2005; Marshall et al., 2005).  There is also an implicit recognition that we need to 
overcome “us and them” perceptions of offenders and break-down negative 
stereotypes of child sex offenders if we are going to improve the process of 
community re-integration.  Given that many adolescent clients have experienced 
insecure parent-child attachment relationships and various degrees of abuse and 
trauma as children, the field is now adopting a developmental attachment-based 
approach to treatment to complement the more traditional cognitive-behavioural- 
educational interventions, in order to heal past trauma, develop the reflective function 
and to build healthy self esteem so that these young men can take responsibility for 
their past actions and go on to lead good lives, free from violence and abuse (Mann, 
2004; Rich, 2006a; Schore, 2003b; Solomon & Siegel, 2003; Ward & Marshall, 
2004).   
One of the more interesting developments of the past few years has been the 
emergence in the field of strengths-based rehabilitation theory.  This is not meant to 
replace but to complement and enhance the risk-needs-responsivity based framework.  
The strengths-based model is founded on the principles of positive psychology (Ward 
et al., 2006). The strengths-based approach to assessment and treatment has also been 
influential in social work (Saleebey, 1992). Ward et al. (2006) stress that the positive 
goal-setting approach to offender rehabilitation is going to be more effective in 
reducing recidivism than the more negative risk management relapse model.  They 
argue that offenders will be more motivated to change if they can be given 
opportunities to participate in developing their own preferences for a good life.  The 
authors have developed a treatment theory which they call the “good lives model” 
(GLM). They found their theory on a primary and secondary human needs model, 
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which assumes that people who commit sexual offences still share with all other 
human beings a predisposition or motivation towards what they call “primary goods”.   
Primary goods are states of mind or forms of relating which are intrinsically 
satisfying and generate a sense of well-being. They include relatedness, health, 
autonomy, creativity and knowledge. These are distinct from instrumental or 
secondary goods which provide the means towards achieving the primary goods, such 
as the acquisition of language and income.  It is argued that the key to rehabilitation 
and treatment theory is the assumption that sexual offending is a misguided attempt 
to achieve these primary goods.  Pathways to meeting these primary goods are 
therefore mapped out, in collaboration with clients, into a good lives plan.  Emphasis 
is also placed on identity issues and how clients conceptualise their own view of a 
good life: 
 
In our view, individuals‟ conceptions of themselves directly arise from their 
basic value commitments (human goods), which are expressed in their daily 
activities and lifestyle.  People acquire a sense of who they are and what really 
matters from what they do; their actions are suffused with values. What this 
means for therapists is that it is not enough simply to equip individuals with 
skills to control or manage their risk factors; it is imperative that they are also 
given the opportunity to fashion a more adaptive personal identity, one that 
bestows a sense of meaning and fulfillment (Ward et al., 2006, p. 304). 
 
Therefore, the authors conclude that the client‟s sense of well-being should play a 
“major role in determining the form and content of rehabilitation programmes, 
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alongside that of risk management” (p. 304).   The strengths-based approach is 
therefore a positive reconstruction of the risk-need-responsivity model, and it would 
be hoped that outcome studies would show greater effectiveness through measuring 
retention rates and relapse percentages. The model makes intuitive sense and really 
opens up the field to create a more positive culture on treatment programmes than in 
the past.  It promises not only to benefit the community and the clients of 
programmes but should also motivate clinicians and help to retain clinicians working 
in this often stressful field.  I see my research in this thesis contributing to this work, 
by introducing the additional concept of optimal responsivity and by focusing on the 
therapeutic use of self. 
 
2.9 Process issues in sexual offending treatment 
As discussed above, it is only recently that research attention has been 
directed at process variables such as the person of the therapist and the therapeutic 
relationship and it has been suggested that treatment effectiveness might be improved 
by training therapists to enact the positive therapist behaviours that have been 
identified in the psychotherapy research literature (Marshall & Serran, 2000). 
Marshall also argued that treatment manuals needed to be revised to allow for 
therapist flexibility (2009).  There has been a surge of research into therapist style and 
process issues covering areas such as engagement or readiness (Ward et al., 2004); 
the therapeutic alliance (Ward et al., 2008); the therapeutic climate (Beech & 
Fordham, 1997; Beech &  Hamilton-Giachritis, 2005) and treatment manuals (Hollin, 
2009; Mann, 2009; Marshall, 2009).  This research has led to changes in the way 
treatment is practiced.  
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Marshall and his colleagues (Marshall, Fernandez et al.,2003; Serran, 
Fernandez et al., 2003) completed a comprehensive review of the literature on general 
psychotherapy which indicated that the therapist‟s style, the client‟s perceptions of 
the therapist, and the alliance between client and therapist, all influenced treatment 
effectiveness.  On the basis of the literature the following therapist factors were found 
to enhance effectiveness: Empathy, genuiness, warmth, respect, support, confidence, 
emotional responsivity, self-disclosure, open-ended questioning, directiveness, 
flexibility, encouraging active participation, rewarding, & use of humour.   Many of 
these factors are examples of the use of self. The following factors were found to 
impede change: Confrontation, lack of the above factors; low interest; expression of 
anger or hostility.  Out of all these factors it was found that empathy was the most 
important (Marshall, Fernandez, et al, 2003).   
It was also found that client‟s perceptions of the therapist and the therapeutic 
alliance had a significant impact on outcomes. The literature showed a positive 
correlation between a client‟s perceptions of the quality of the therapeutic relationship 
and their perception of positive outcome.  This survey of the literature suggested that 
it is not only what the therapist says or does, but also the way the client perceives the 
therapist‟s behavior that determines treatment outcome.   Client‟s perceptions of the 
therapist‟s confidence, involvement, focus, emotional engagement, and positive 
feelings for them, significantly influenced their view of the value of treatment and 
engagement.  Typically, client‟s sense of improvement is correlated with positive 
views of their therapists (Marshall, et. al., 2003). Research into therapeutic outcomes 
has consistently shown that the therapeutic relationship is an important factor 
(Lampard & Barley, 2002) and according to these studies, this relationship is a 
 80 
product of therapist‟s style and the client‟s perceptions of the therapist.  Similarly, 
after a review of the literature on the client‟s experience of therapy, McLeod (1990a) 
determined that clients consider the therapeutic relationship as more important than 
the use of any specific treatment procedures. Marshall‟s research showed a consistent 
and positive relationship between the quality of the alliance and treatment outcome. It 
was also clear that therapist style helps the development of the alliance and that these 
findings re therapist style and relationship apply equally to all modalities. 
After completing this comprehensive review of the general psychotherapy 
literature, Marshall and his colleagues (Marshall, et al., 2002; Marshall, et al., 2003) 
went on to conduct a series of studies aimed at elucidating the influence of the 
therapist‟s behaviour and style on treatment change with sexual offenders. They had 
access to data on treatment changes across a variety of treatment programs operated 
by the prison service in London as well as video-taped recordings of every session. 
The therapists were required to follow a detailed treatment manual.  In this way the 
same treatment was standardised across all the programmes, plus they all used the 
same pre and post treatment outcome measures.  The tapes were reviewed by the 
researchers to see if the therapist features identified in the general psychotherapy 
literature could be identified.  These studies confirmed Marshall‟s argument that a 
collaborative psychotherapy style is more beneficial than a confrontational style. 
This argument was also supported by the research conducted by Beech and 
colleagues (Beech & Fordham, 1997; Beech & Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005).  The first 
study examined the influence of group cohesiveness on behaviour changes in 12 
different sexual offender treatment groups and found that the group with the highest 
cohesiveness scores correlated with the highest change and the group with the lowest 
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cohesiveness score displayed almost no changes.  A helpful and supportive leadership 
style was found to be important whereas overcontrolling leaders were seen to have a 
detrimental effect upon group climate, thus supporting the research of Marshall that a 
collaborative over a confrontative style was preferred.  In a subsequent study it was 
again found that group cohesiveness predicted treatment outcomes. They also 
reported that the degree of emotional expression during treatment was positively 
related to beneficial changes.   They agreed with Marshall and colleagues (2003) that 
respect, support, confidence, emotional responsivity, self-disclosure, open-ended 
questioning, flexibility, positive reinforcement and the use of humour were correlated 
to good outcomes. 
In another paper (2005) Marshall & Serran argue that although past practice 
under the guidance of the risk-needs-responsivity model dictates offender 
programmes should be based within a CBT orientation, little is known about the 
impact of the therapist in delivering program content, or how therapist behaviors can 
enhance the therapeutic process. The paper argues that therapists can use the 
therapeutic relationship to build trust and rapport, and that training should aim to 
enhance these relational skills such as the use of self. The authors in particular 
emphasised the importance of a non-judgmental approach to enhance trust.   They 
also discuss the responsivity principle and argue that this implies the need for 
flexibility on the part of the therapist.   
A series of studies by Drapeau (2005) combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches also found that programme participants judged the role of the therapist to 
be crucial to any benefits they received from treatment. While some techniques were 
seen as valuable, the therapist was seen as the most important factor.  Effective 
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therapists were seen as honest and respectful, caring, non-critical and non-
judgmental.  Therapists who were confrontational led to clients withdrawing from 
effective participation, while therapists who worked collaboratively with clients were 
successful in gaining full engagement. 
 
2.10 The therapeutic alliance and sexual offending treatment 
The therapeutic alliance has been consistently demonstrated in research to be 
one of the best predictors of outcome across all therapy models (Horvath & Symonds, 
1991). According to Bordin (1979) the quality of the alliance is a function of the 
degree of agreement between therapist and client on the tasks and goals of therapy 
and the quality of the affective bond between them (Safran & Muran, 2000). The 
facilitative conditions and personal qualities of the therapist as perceived by the client 
contribute to the development and maintenance of the therapeutic bond.   The 
therapist also contributes through negotiating tasks and goals and repairing ruptures 
to the alliance: 
 
Tasks are the behaviours and processes within the therapy session that 
constitute the actual work of therapy. Both the therapist and the client must 
view these tasks as important and relevant for a strong therapeutic alliance to 
exist. The goals of therapy are the objectives of the therapy process that both 
parties endorse and value. Bonds include the positive interpersonal attachment 
between therapist and client of mutual trust, confidence, and acceptance 
(Lambert & Barley, 2002, p. 24-25). 
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The relevance of the therapeutic alliance for sexual offending treatment has been 
recently investigated from the unique perspective of sexual offending therapy (Ross, 
Polaschek & Ward, 2008).  The authors argue that in spite of the vast literature 
confirming a positive relationship between the therapeutic alliance and treatment 
outcome, there is little theoretical understanding of how the therapeutic alliance 
develops and is maintained.  In this theoretical paper the authors set out to revise 
Bordin‟s theory of the therapeutic alliance to make it relevant for therapists who work 
to reduce the future risk of criminal behaviour. Although Bordin‟s description of the 
alliance as comprising an agreement on the goals and tasks of therapy and a 
therapeutic bond has been widely influential, Ross and colleagues argue that it fails to 
account for how the alliance develops in the first place.  They identify a number of 
different factors that can hinder or enhance the development and maintenance of the 
therapeutic alliance in sexual offending therapy.    
 Following on from Marshall and colleagues‟ research, which identified a 
number of helpful therapist characteristics, Ross and colleagues argue firstly that 
therapist characteristics are important determinants of the successful development of 
an alliance: “therapists bring both who they are as a person and the effects of their 
professional training, to a therapeutic interaction” (p. 465).  Therapist behaviours, 
including self-disclosure, can contribute to the alliance. Ross and colleagues also 
bring our attention to the influence of the bias and expectations of therapists who 
work with offenders.  For example, before meeting the participant, on the basis of 
professional and court reports, the therapist may already have formed a schema of the 
client that is not going to be helpful in the long-run to the formation of a collaborative 
relationship.  Secondly, apart from therapist characteristics, participant 
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characteristics, such as aggressive or withdrawn behaviours, must also play a part in 
the development of the alliance.  For, as Marshall already argued, participants‟ 
perceptions of the therapist (empathic) and the relationship (supportive) will have an 
influence on the alliance.  As with the therapist, the interpersonal schemas (internal 
working models) the participant brings to therapy, will also have an effect on the 
development of the alliance.  For example, as mentioned previously, children with 
disorganised attachment who expect caregivers to hurt, are thought to be very 
difficult to engage in a therapeutic bond because of their fears of re-traumatisation. 
Thirdly, Ross and colleagues argue that participant motivation to change (treatment 
readiness) will be another characteristic that predicts the formation of an alliance.   
Fourthly, the quality of the therapist-participant interactions must also play a 
significant part in the formation of the alliance.  For example, is the match of 
therapist to client characteristics more important than the individual characteristics 
themselves?   Are the various attachment styles complementary? “Given the 
importance ascribed in psychotherapy to the relationship between participant and 
therapist, it is surprising that the way in which therapist and participant interactions 
affect its development has not been examined more often” (Ross et al., 2008, p. 468). 
Finally, Ross and colleagues also highlight the often neglected concern of the 
practice setting, system and social-environmental factors and role conflicts.  The ideal 
situation, of a comfortable office, tastefully decorated, with a motivated client who 
has a support network and clear goals is rarely encountered in sexual offending 
treatment. However, these setting and context factors also contribute to the alliance.  
Participants in the sexual offending field are often mandated and the settings are 
usually very basic.  System factors such as the legal process prior to entering 
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treatment or the relationships clients have had with other practitioners from different 
agencies such as juvenile justice or child protection can also have an influence.  The 
sexual offending therapist will be perceived through the schemas and narratives 
participants have developed from these experiences.  The need for risk management 
and safety planning can also be difficult to negotiate through the vehicle of a 
“collaborative therapeutic” alliance.  Participants are expected to trust their therapist 
and practice self-disclosure, but the therapist, because of limited confidentiality 
requirements, may have to report the information to someone else, thus undermining 
the client‟s trust, and potentially, the alliance. This can create role-conflicts for the 
therapist.  Social-environmental factors include how environments such as jails and 
other correctional facilities may undermine the ability of the offender to engage in a 
collaborative therapeutic alliance.  Similarly, for adolescents being treated in the 
community, their peer group or other family members may undermine the goals of 
therapy. The therapeutic alliance may also be undermined by program requirements 
which place priority on risk management.  This could mean some goals are imposed 
upon clients rather than allowing clients to negotiate their own goals thereby 
undermining the collaborative relationship and hence participants will feel less 
ownership and hence commitment to the alliance.   
On the basis of the above concerns, Ross and colleagues (2008) concluded 
their paper by proposing a revised theory of Bordin‟s therapeutic alliance, 
incorporating the above factors as outlined.  This identification of the various factors 
that help to develop and maintain the therapeutic alliance, make the revised construct 
more relevant for the treatment of people who have sexually offended.  The revised 
theory has a number of important clinical implications: 
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Since part of a therapist‟s role is to monitor therapeutic processes, this theory 
has implications for how flexible, introspective and aware a therapist needs to 
be in interactions with an offender. In essence, the RTTA (revised theory of 
the therapeutic alliance) implies that therapists may need to be more aware of 
their own personal characteristics and the behaviour that results in a therapy 
session, and to acknowledge that professional training does not create an 
objective automaton who delivers therapy to any and all comers … we 
suggest that therapists are likely to make the  best contribution to fostering 
and  repairing a TA (therapeutic alliance), when they are able to take on an 
introspective role that has only quite recently begun to gain adequate 
recognition in the cognitive-behaviour therapy domain. They need to be 
especially sensitive to how their client reacts to them, and perhaps adjust – 
through the expression of behaviour – their style of relating and working to 
suit the client. Therapists also should be encouraged that repairing ruptures is 
likely to strengthen the TA, especially if it can involve a relatively open 
discussion of the cognitive and emotional responses of both parties (Ross et 
al., 2008, p. 477). 
 
The research documented in this thesis seeks to build on this surge of interest in 
research into process issues, in particular how the therapeutic use of self helps to 
create and sustain the therapeutic alliance.   
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2.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the relationship between explanatory and  
treatment theory and stated my position on how treatment theory can benefit from the 
insights of explanatory theory, but that the subjective experience of the therapist and 
the clinical judgment which is derived from this is what should be the optimal guide 
to clinical interventions.  Following this, I reviewed the location of sexual offending 
therapy within the legal and social construction of sexual offending.  I then reviewed 
attachment theories of sexual offending and gender theory explanations of sexual 
offending.  I concluded that integrating both these levels of explanation is necessary 
in order to guide adolescent sexual offending therapists. Finally, I reviewed the 
research on process variables and the therapeutic alliance.  This research clearly 
supports the move towards greater awareness of the role of the therapist and the 
therapeutic alliance in sexual offending therapy.  In particular, the research suggests 
that the personal experiences and qualities of the therapist are just as important to 
therapy outcomes as are their professional training and techniques.  The risk-need-
responsivity rehabilitation model therefore needs to be revised in the light of these 
findings.   For example, the therapeutic use of self can make a major contribution to 
the responsivity principle and also highlights the need for treatment programmes to 
acknowledge the place of professional discretion.  I also suggested that the 
responsivity principle offers a useful guideline to treatment and can be enriched in 
practice by incorporating the relational psychoanalytic concept of optimal 
responsiveness. In chapter three I develop this argument further and theoretically 
locate the concept of optimal responsiveness within the history of relational 
psychoanalysis.  
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3. 
RELATIONAL THERAPY AND OPTIMAL RESPONSIVENESS 
 
 
The deeper and more trusting the client-worker relationship, the more the client 
reveals, and the easier it is for the practitioner to see the world through the client‟s 
eyes. (Freedberg, 2009). 
 
3.1      Introduction 
 In chapter two, after giving an introduction to the relationship between 
explanatory and treatment theory and the legal and social construction of sexual 
offending behaviour, I discussed some of the major explanations of sexual offending, 
current research into process issues and the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model of 
offender rehabilitation. The RNR model offered a useful bridge between explanatory 
theory and treatment theory and the responsivity principle was a useful guideline for 
evaluating treatment programmes.  I argued that this model needed to be expanded 
beyond the implementation of CBT techniques to take into consideration therapy 
process factors such as the participant-therapist relationship and the personal and 
professional features of the therapist as well as the characteristics of the participant.  I 
suggested that the concept of optimal responsivity could be a helpful way of thinking 
clinically on how to implement the principle of responsivity in practice.  In this 
chapter, I locate the concept of optimal responsivity within a selected theoretical 
history of relational therapy. I begin my discussion of relational therapy with a 
consideration of the therapeutic relationship and how the experience of empathy can 
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be understood as one of the key factors in generating rapport. Empathy can be seen as 
the foundation of optimal responsivity, having both a receptive mode (listening 
stance) and a responsive mode (verbal and non-verbal responses).  I then discuss the 
work of Heinz Kohut, a psychoanalyst, who was one of the key figures in the 
development of the relational approach.  Kohut‟s work is considered along with that 
of the more well-known work of Carl Rogers.  I then discuss self psychology, the 
particular relational approach that Kohut established.  Following this I discuss the 
concept of intersubjectivity, which again expands upon the concept of empathy 
developed in self psychology to include the important dimension of subject-subject 
relatedness or other-centred relating. Intersubjectivity is discussed both as a 
developmental category and as a form of relational therapy. Finally, I conclude this 
introduction to relational therapy with a discussion of the relevance of the concept of 
optimal responsivity to sexual offending therapy.  Optimal responsiveness is inclusive 
of both self-psychology and intersubjectivity theories of therapeutic change.  In 
particular, I argue that the concept of optimal responsivity, first introduced in 1985 by 
the psychoanalyst Howard Bacal (Bacal, 1998b), can make a significant contribution 
to helping to implement the responsivity principle in practice. There are many 
therapists who have contributed to the development of what has come to be known as 
the relational approach and within the short space of this chapter I cannot effectively 
overview this history.  I refer the reader to the work of Aron (1996),  DeYoung 
(2003), Freedberg (2009), Safran & Muran (2000) and Wachtel (2008) for excellent 
overviews of the historical development of this approach.  
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3.2 The therapeutic relationship 
Although I was initially trained in narrative therapy, like other narrative and 
systemic family therapists such as Bird (2000, 2004), Flaskas (1996, 2002), Flaskas 
& Perlesz (1996), Gibney (2003), Satir (2000) and Winslade, Crocket, and Monk 
(1997), I have come to the conclusion that family therapy, including narrative 
therapy, has sometimes overlooked how the participants‟ experience of the 
therapeutic relationship can be an important resource for enhancing self-awareness 
and facilitating therapeutic change.  For example, I agree with Bird‟s (2000) 
comment that: 
 
Narrative and systemic family therapies commonly leave the therapist out of 
descriptions of the therapeutic relationship. A proliferation of articles on the 
technical application of ideas together with success stories has unwittingly 
created a context where trainees and experienced therapists ignore their own 
experiences in search of the „right‟ question (p. 14). 
 
One of the reasons for this may have been the need for narrative and systemic family 
therapists to distance themselves from the psychoanalytic tradition and concepts such 
as transference and countertransference.  Indeed, White (1997) argued forcefully for 
the “decentring” of the therapist, in order to avoid privileging the “micro-world” of 
therapy over the “macro-world” of the lives and relationships of the participants.  On 
this particular point I disagree with White and agree with other narrative therapists 
such as Bird (2000) and Winslade et al., (1997) that the “here and now” experience 
participants have within the micro-world of the therapeutic relationship are invaluable 
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resources for mutual discovery and collaborative meaning-making.  In fact, if we 
wish to focus on the lived experience of the present moment in therapy (Stern, 
2004a), we have to privilege the micro-world of therapy.  To privilege the macro-
world, as White seems to imply, means we miss the rich texture of the moment-to-
moment lived experience of the therapy session.  I also wish to join with other 
narrative therapists and relational psychoanalysts (Bird, 2000, 2004; Buirski, 2005; 
Buirski & Haglund, 2001; Orange, 1994; Polster & Polster, 1973; Winslade et al., 
1997) in developing an alternative way of describing and understanding the 
therapeutic relationship from the one person psychological language of transference 
and countertransference as used in classical psychoanalysis.  Although the 
understanding of these terms has changed considerably since the days of Freud, they 
still bring with them the connotation that the client‟s experience of past relationships 
is transferred onto the blank screen of the therapist, rather than recognising the unique 
mutual influential interactions taking place within the here and now of the therapeutic 
relationship. 
Psychotherapy research has shown repeatedly that after client factors are 
taken into consideration the single most reliable predictor of successful outcomes is 
the quality of therapeutic relationship (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997a, 1997b). Lambert 
and Barley (2002) reviewed the literature on research into the therapeutic relationship 
and psychotherapy outcome, and found that psychotherapy outcome research has not 
supported the notion that specific therapy techniques are a major contributor to client 
progress, when compared with the contributions attributable to the therapeutic 
relationship (p. 17).    After a detailed analysis of the research, they concluded that 
extra-therapeutic factors contributed 40% to client progress; common factors (the 
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therapeutic alliance and the person of the therapist) contributed 30%; expectancy 
(placebo effect) contributed 15% and techniques contributed 15%. (p. 18). In this 
thesis I am concerned with relationship or “common” factors, shared in common by 
all different therapy traditions.  In particular the thesis inquires into the use of self and 
how this contributes to creating facilitative conditions and the therapeutic alliance.  
When summarising the research on outcomes and the therapeutic relationship, 
Lambert and Barley (2002, p. 21-22) found that, “… it is difficult conceptually to 
differentiate between therapist variables (interpersonal style, attributes), facilitative 
conditions (empathy, warmth, positive regard), and the client-therapist relationship 
(therapeutic alliance, working endeavour).”   It can also be shown that “despite 
concerted efforts to suppress unique therapist effects (training, manuals, supervision) 
a considerable portion of the variance in outcome between patients is likely due to the 
particular therapist who provides treatment” (p. 22).  Clients also appear to believe 
that “the personal qualities of the therapist were more important than specific 
technical factors of treatment” ( p.22).   As detailed in chapter two, several therapist 
variables have been consistently shown to have a positive effect on outcome.  These 
include “therapist credibility, skill, empathic understanding, and affirmation of the 
patient, along with the ability to engage the patient, to focus on the patient‟s 
problems, and to direct the patient‟s attention to the patient‟s affective experience” (p. 
22).  The factors most frequently reported in the research summarised by Lambert & 
Barley (2002) are those proposed by Carl Rogers (1967/76): empathic understanding, 
warmth, care and respect (positive regard) and congruence (the client‟s perception 
that the therapist is real and genuine).   
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Both Rogers‟ work on relational conditions, and Kohut‟s developmental self 
psychology, propose that empathy is a key ingredient in developing the therapeutic 
bond and a principal agent for facilitating change (Elson, 1986; Meares, 1993; Wolf, 
1988): 
 
The empathic process in which therapists steep themselves in the world of the 
other attempting to understand how others see and experience themselves and 
their worlds, putting this into words and checking their understanding, appears 
to us to be curative. Empathy is a process of co-constructing symbols for 
experience. Clients‟ process of symbolizing their experience appears to us to 
be a universal core ingredient of the therapeutic process. Being able to name 
an experience first makes the previously implicit explicit, thereby providing 
an improved sense of facilitation and comprehension of how one knows what 
one is experiencing. This in and of itself provides some clarity- and relief 
from earlier confusion.  Once one has a handle on what is felt, one can then 
also begin to reflectively operate on what has been symbolized in awareness: 
reorganizing, explaining, and exploring further, thereby creating new meaning 
and new narrative constructions. This process of becoming aware of internal 
experience, putting it into words and reorganizing it once it has been 
symbolized, is healing and leads to greater self-understanding and improved 
self-organisation.  Empathy thus helps us to make sense of our experience 
(Bohart & Greenberg, 1997b, p. 5-6). 
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However, although development of empathy for the victims of sexual abuse has long 
been recognised as one of the most commonly defined goals and hoped for outcomes 
in evaluating the progress of participants in treatment (Burke, 2001; Rich, 2003; 
Ryan, 1999; Ryan & Lane, 1997b) there has been less attention paid to it as an 
important element of the treatment process. 
  The practice of empathy is often taken for granted and the skills or approach 
to practice necessary to produce the experience of feeling understood is often 
overlooked in preference to more directive forms of intervention: “This neglect of the 
curative effects of relational empathic skills is occurring despite the fact that most of 
our psychological models of the genesis of psychopathology emphasise relationship 
deficits” (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997b, p. 4). A second wave of interest in empathy 
(after Rogers) is now occurring within the fields of psychotherapy generated by self-
psychology, feminist relational self theory (Herman, 1992; Jordan, 1997) and the 
findings of contemporary neuroscience, attachment research and especially infant 
research (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997a; Schore, 2003a).  These findings are also 
directly relevant to adolescent sexual offending treatment. Attachment theory, infant 
research and neuroscience have been influential in shaping the understanding of the 
importance of dyadic affect regulation (Schore, 2003a, 2003b; Schore & Schore, 
2008; Siegel, 1999; Stern, 1985/2000).  It has been particularly influential in helping 
us to understand how individuals with poor attachment histories are vulnerable to  
self esteem, intimacy and empathy disorders which  are linked to relationship 
difficulties, conduct disorders and sexually abusive behaviours (Chorn & Parekh, 
1997; Marshall & Marshall, 2000; Rich, 2006a; Smallbone, 2005).   It is suggested 
that the intuitive empathically attuned therapist can repair this developmental deficit, 
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by reproducing in the therapeutic relationship, an analogous situation to the 
caregiver-child relationship, hence giving the child a developmental second chance 
(Buirski & Haglund, 2001; Schore, 2003a).  This can be seen as the therapist 
facilitating a play space within which both participants create a shared, idiosyncratic 
form of “feeling language” which is productive of intimacy and an enriched sense of  
personal being (Hobson, 1985; Meares, 1993).  Evidence suggests that attachment is 
produced through the primary care-giver providing affect regulation, by mirroring the 
positive, vitalizing affects and soothing the negative affects experienced by the child.  
The provision of affect regulation by an attuned caregiver produces an emergent 
preverbal self.  For the infant, mutual affect regulation is provided through the pre-
discursive interactions with caregivers; and for adolescents and adults in therapy, it is 
provided through the experience of feeling understood by an attuned empathic 
therapist (Lichtenberg et al., 1996; Schore, 2003a; Siegel, 1999; Sroufe, 1995; Stern, 
1985/2000). Given that many of the participants in adolescent sexual offending 
programmes suffer from intimacy deficits and attachment disorders, it would 
therefore seem to be the case that all treatment interventions within adolescent sexual 
offending therapy should be grounded in an empathic and caring therapeutic 
relationship.  
Empathy also has the effect of helping clients “become more compassionate 
and empathic to themselves” (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997b p. 6).  This is considered 
to be a crucial component of therapeutic work with trauma survivors and has been 
developed into a therapeutic practice entitled “compassionate witnessing” by Kaethe 
Weingarten (2003 p. 203-206).  The capacity to become more compassionate and 
empathic towards self can be seen as the first crucial step towards becoming empathic 
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towards others. One of the widely accepted goals in adolescent sexual offending 
treatment is the development of the ability of the participant to empathise with the 
person(s) who has been harmed by their offence (Ryan & Lane, 1997a). However, 
findings from developmental psychology would suggest that the ability to empathise 
with others is not an innate ability but a higher order function which is dependent on 
the development of the ability to self-reflect, which, in turn, is dependent upon the 
establishment of a secure attachment relationship with attuned caregivers (Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2004; Schore, 2003a; Sroufe, 1995; Stern, 1985/2000).  
The ability to empathise with others, it seems, is dependent upon having the 
consistent experience of being empathised with. It is reasonable to suggest therefore, 
that children who have been raised in environments where there is abuse, neglect or 
consistent mis-attunement may grow up with an inability to express or receive 
empathy. 
   
3.3 Rogers and Kohut 
There is nothing new in the argument that the therapeutic relationship is the 
core of therapy and is more important than any particular model or intervention.  
Rogers (1957) argued that the therapeutic relationship was itself therapeutic and more 
important than specific techniques or theoretical orientation.  He also argued that the 
establishment of the therapeutic relationship was conditional upon the personal 
qualities of the therapist, such as empathy, warmth, non-judgmental acceptance and 
genuineness.  Before Rogers, psychoanalysts such as Ferenczi (1932) and Alexander 
& French (1946) argued that it was the patient‟s emotional experience of the 
therapeutic relationship rather than the transference interpretation, which was the key 
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to therapeutic change.  It was the work of these analysts and the interpersonal school 
of psychiatry founded by Sullivan (1953), together with the work of Kohut, which led 
to the development of the contemporary relational approach to psychoanalysis which 
exists today (Aron, 1996).   
Rogers claimed that it was the quality of the therapeutic relationship that was 
the single most important element in determining treatment effectiveness (Rogers, 
1967/1976) . Rogers was one of the first treatment theorists to argue that the person 
of the therapist was a key factor, in that it was important for the therapist to meet the 
client on a person to person level. According to Rogers, this was accomplished 
through the attitudinal qualities expressed by the therapist and importantly perceived 
by the client. This is a key point.  It doesn‟t matter how warm or empathic a therapist 
may experience themselves to be if the client is not feeling safe and understood by the 
therapist. 
 Rogers formulated this important insight into his three influential principles: 
congruence: the therapist is genuine, he or she, does not put up a professional front or 
façade but meets with the client as a person; unconditional positive regard: the 
therapist is accepting and non-judgmental; and empathic understanding: the therapist 
is accurately attuned to the client‟s inner life and expresses this in such a way that the 
client feels understood (Rogers, 1967/1976). Rogers defined empathy as the 
therapist‟s ability to understand the client‟s private inner world and communicate 
some of that understanding to the client:  “To sense the client‟s inner world of private 
personal meanings as if it were your own, but without ever losing the „as if‟ quality, 
this is empathy, and this seems essential to a growth-promoting relationship”(Rogers, 
1967/1976, p. 92-93). In this sense, Rogers developed a phenomenological definition 
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of empathy (Warner, 1997).  That is, staying as close as possible to the actual 
phenomena as subjectively perceived by another person. 
I find it interesting that most counselling courses cover Rogers but very few 
cover Kohut (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984). Heinz  Kohut was the founder of 
psychoanalytic self-psychology and his concept of the introspective-empathic stance 
had a significant influence on the development of relational  psychoanalysis (Buirski 
& Haglund, 2001; Wolf, 1988). It was the work of Kohut in combination with British 
analysts such as Winnicott, Fairbairn and Balint that led to the break from the classic 
drive or desire paradigm to the relational paradigm in contemporary psychoanalysis 
(Lee & Martin, 1991). Kohut argued that psychoanalysis was a human science. Its 
subject matter therefore differed from the natural sciences in that it was concerned 
with understanding subjective experience and that subjective experience could only 
be understood subjectively. He argued that we cannot directly observe or gain direct 
access to another‟s subjective experience; therefore we have to rely upon what he 
described as “vicarious introspection”. Kohut argued that psychoanalytic data were 
gathered through prolonged immersion in the patient‟s subjective experience via this 
process of vicarious introspection.  He distinguished introspective data from 
extrospective data, arguing that only introspective data were psychoanalytic data.  
Extrospective data, such as the genogram, developmental and family history and 
professional theory could be helpful in orientating the therapist during the initial 
assessment stage but introspective data was essential in understanding the patient. 
Empathy, for Kohut, is therefore a form of observation or data gathering using an 
introspective lens through which we can think and feel ourselves into another 
person‟s subjective experience (Lee & Martin, 1991; Wolf, 1988). 
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Kohut used the example of a “tall” man to illustrate the process of empathy: 
 
Only when we think ourselves into his place, only when we, by vicarious 
introspection, begin to feel his unusual size as if it were our own and thus 
revive inner experiences in which we had been unusual or conspicuous, only 
then do we begin to appreciate the meaning that the unusual size may have for 
this person and only then have we observed a psychological fact (Kohut, 
1959, pp. 207-208; quoted in Lee and Martin, 1991, p. 106). 
 
This is a good illustration of the relationship between empathy and understanding of 
personal meaning.  Like Rogers, it involves coming to an understanding of personal 
meaning by completely immersing oneself in the viewpoint of the other.  One 
difference between Kohut and Rogers was that this phenomenological immersion in 
the subjective experience of the patient was only the first step toward empathic 
understanding according to Kohut, although Kohut thought this was the most 
important step and described it as “experience near”.  The second step, and this is 
where Kohut would differ from Rogers who did not make “interpretations” 
(Rogers,1967/1976), was to articulate explanations or interpretations to the patient 
based upon this prior experience near understanding in combination with theoretical 
knowledge.  Kohut referred to this as “experience distant” empathy, because the 
language was more abstract and generalised. In a third, distinct definition, Kohut, 
following Rogers, also recognised empathy as being central to the formation of 
human bonding.  Furthermore, like Rogers, Kohut saw the work of empathic 
understanding as being central to therapeutic transformation: 
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. . . empathic immersion is not simply a new mode of data gathering. Empathy 
itself, Kohut claimed, “is a therapeutic action in its broadest sense, a 
beneficial action in the broadest sense of the word.” In other words, empathy 
as a mode of observation is inextricably intertwined with empathy as a 
therapeutic agent in its own right. Our empathic inquiry results both in our 
better understanding of our patient and in our patient‟s feeling understood.  
Thus, the inquiry itself transforms the subjective state it inquires into (Magid, 
2002, p. 15). 
 
Also, in contrast to Rogers, Kohut‟s understanding of empathy (and therapy) was 
developmental.  He saw the roots of empathy lying in the mutual responsiveness of 
the infant-caregiver dyad.  Kohut‟s emphasis on the participation of the personal self 
of the therapist was also quite different to Rogers in the sense that it is often not 
under our conscious control, hence Kohut realised that the therapist can never always 
be totally congruent and in tune with the client.  Aspects of the therapist‟s self will 
not always be totally known at any given moment in an interpersonal relationship.  It 
is therefore expected that the therapist will make mistakes, cause ruptures and hence 
hopefully mend these ruptures.  
Kohut distinguished a three phase pattern in what is now referred to as mutual 
dyadic affect regulation (Schore, 2003a): attunement, during which the therapist 
strives to be empathically attuned to the moment by moment affective states of the 
patient; disruption, when the patient perceives the analyst as being misattuned; and 
repair, when the analyst is able to pick up on the misattunement, acknowledge this 
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and repair the disruption through regaining the state of attunement.  The outcome of 
this process is the development of an attachment bond and the internalising of the 
ability in the patient to self reflect and self-regulate leading to the building of 
resilience.   This basic pattern that Kohut identified in his clinical work has since 
been demonstrated in the findings of infant research (Elson, 1986; Fonagy et al., 
2004; Fosha, 2000; Lichtenberg et al., 1996; Schore, 2003a; Sroufe, 1995; Stern, 
1985/2000), which suggests the infant‟s experience of misattunement being repaired 
by re-attunement is what creates the attachment bond.  It has also been taken as a 
metaphor for understanding how to build and repair the therapeutic alliance (Safran & 
Muran, 2000).  Kohut‟s experience of treating what are referred to as narcissistic 
disorders in psychiatric discourse led to his formulation of his developmental theory 
and his theory of self-objects. 
 
3.4 Self Psychology 
Kohut‟s theory of self psychology is a theory of human development based 
upon his clinical experience (Elson, 1986, 1987; Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984).  Kohut 
never gave an explicit definition of what he meant by the concept of self (Wolf, 
1988). Current psychoanalytic developmental theory recognises that the self should 
not be reified; it is a function rather than a thing.  It is an outcome of our 
developmental context.  According to the work of Stern (1985/2000) the infant is 
born with an emergent self which by the end of the second month, given an optimal 
responsive caregiving milieu, develops into a “core sense of self”; whereas a 
vulnerable self, prone to fragmentation emerges from a less than optimal 
environment.  Between the seventh and fifteenth month an “intersubjective self” 
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(1985/2000, pp. 124-161) emerges with a capacity for engaging in interpersonal 
relatedness such as the sharing of intentions and affective states with its caregiver.  
This includes the capacity to recognise minds – the ability to recognise other people 
have intentions and feelings separate to the self. Finally, between the ages of 15 to 18 
months the infant develops a verbal self with the capacity to enter into symbolic play 
and to create narratives and experience an objective sense of self (1985/2000, pp. 
162-184).  This is sometimes referred to as the “mirror stage”, when the infant is 
capable of recognising itself in the mirror (Jacoby, 1999). 
Without the self there can be no subjective experience (Sroufe, 1995). The 
self functions to both evaluate interactions with the environment (emotions) and to 
regulate our emotional states in much the same way that our lungs and heart regulate 
the circulation of oxygen and blood. The core sense of self which emerges at 
approximately 2-3 months could be referred to as the “core affective self” or the 
“preverbal self” (Stern, 1985/2000). This self emerges from the attachment 
relationship and has developed its own centre of initiative or sense of purpose in the 
second half of the first year.  At about 18 months the child develops the capacity of 
self-awareness, and hence experiences the so-called secondary or self-conscious 
emotions such as shame and guilt (Broucek, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Midway through the second and third years the narrative self emerges (Stern, 
1985/2000).  This emerges at the same time as the child develops a theory of mind 
and the reflective function (Fonagy et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2006).  The core 
affective self and the narrative self continue to function throughout the lifespan.  
Relational interventions, such as mirroring and affect attunement are aimed at the 
core affective self whereas narrative interventions such as reflexive questions are 
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aimed at the narrative self. This combination of interventions supports the functioning 
of the affective-narrative self in maintaining our sense of coherence, continuity and 
vitality. 
 Kohut also speaks metaphorically of a bi-polar self (Wolf, 1988), which 
develops from infancy onwards.  On one end of the polarity we have the child‟s sense 
of healthy narcissism, taking delight in its own grandiosity.  When the caregiver 
mirrors this delight in their facial expressions and vocal tones this side of the self 
develops into what in later life become our ambitions.  On the other end of the 
polarity, the child identifies with an idealisation of the caregivers.  In later life need 
for an idealising self-object becomes transformed into values and ideals.  In between 
the two polarities Kohut speaks of a tension arc of skills and abilities which are the 
means by which these ambitions and ideals can be realised. 
 According to Kohut, the self grows and develops through a process he called 
optimal frustration.   By this he means during infancy the needs of the infant 
expressed through vocal and facial cues are read by the responsive caregiver.  
Therefore, initially the physical and emotional needs of the infant are regulated by the 
caregiver.  However, inevitably there will be times when the caregiver cannot be 
there right away and the infant becomes frustrated and has to fall back upon its own 
resources.  For example, the infant may be able to soothe itself by cuddling on the 
blanket, with the blanket associated with the warmth and security of the caregiver, 
temporarily substituting for the caregiver.  If the caregiver then arrives, the infant has 
begun the process of transmuting the functions of the caregiver into self-functions.  
However, if the caregiver does not return, then the experience becomes traumatic 
because the infant goes into a state of panic.  Kohut began to call the function that is 
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performed by the caregiver, a self-object.  In infant research this is usually referred to 
as the self-regulating other (Jacoby, 1999). When the infant begins to transmute the 
function previously performed by the self-object (optimal frustration), this is what 
Kohut called structure-building, that is building the self so that the self becomes self-
regulating.   
 Kohut‟s theory of human development diverged from the dominant 
psychoanalytic theories at that time, such as Mahler (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 
1975), which emphasised the developmental trajectory as moving from symbiosis to 
individuation and autonomy – a movement from dependency to independence.  Kohut 
also rejected Freud‟s theories of narcissism (Freud, 1914/1957) and aggression 
(Freud, 1930/1973).  Freud had argued that primary narcissism is eventually 
transformed into mature object love.  Kohut, on the other hand, argued that 
narcissism has its own line of development that continues through the whole lifespan.  
This was Kohut‟s argument for a “healthy” narcissism.  Kohut argued that healthy 
narcissism eventually matured into creativity, humour and wisdom. However, if a 
child was raised in an environment in which self-objects were unreliable or abusive, 
the child would receive narcissistic injuries.  Kohut thought that destructive forms of 
interpersonal aggression were not primary drives but were secondary reactions to 
narcissistic injuries.  These injuries to the self created a vulnerability that predisposed 
the child to various forms of narcissistic rage in reaction to various precipitating 
factors such as perceived criticism or ridicule.  These children would then grow up 
into adults with unmet needs for mirroring and idealising self-object transferences 
(Wolf, 1988). 
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 Kohut claimed that when a patient with a narcissistic injury met a therapist 
who responded empathically the unmet needs of childhood would be reactivated and 
eventually manifest in what he called the self-object transferences: the mirror 
transference, the idealising transference and the twinship transference (Wolf, 1988).  
Self-object experiences refer to “any experience that enhances the strength of the self 
or, in more „experience-near‟ terms, any experience that enhances the feeling of well-
being” (Bacal, 1998a p. 149).  As with childhood, the process of analysis would 
parallel the infant-caregiver system. The self-object functions initially performed by 
the analyst would eventually, through the same process of optimal frustration, be 
transmuted into self-regulating functions.  
 
Selfobject relations, or more precisely, selfobject experiences, are the proper 
topic for psychoanalytic investigation.  Selfobject experiences are not 
objectively observable from the outside, so to speak.  They are not events in 
an interpersonal context and are not part of social psychology . . . Direct 
access to the selfobject experience is only by introspection and empathy 
(Wolf, 1988 p. 54-55). 
 
Kohut developed the concept of “selfobjects” to make sense of what he experienced 
in the transferences and as a developmental concept (Lee & Martin, 1991; Wolf, 
1988).  In these relational experiences Kohut thought that the patient made use of the 
therapist as a “selfobject” in the same way that infants made use of their caregivers. 
What he meant by this was the patient came to depend on the therapist to provide 
experiences that were missing from his or her upbringing.  Thus, mirror transference 
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referred to how the therapist would mirror back to the patient their positive affect in 
relation to an accomplishment they were proud of.  The idealising transference 
referred to the way the patient may experience the therapist as someone to look up to 
and aspire towards.  The twinship transference referred to a feeling of collegiality 
with the therapist.  The crucial point for psychoanalysis was that in formulating these 
ideas about self-objects Kohut was actually moving away from the concept of the 
separate isolated self towards the concept of the relational self.  After the death of 
Kohut, this idea was in turn expanded upon and developed by psychoanalysts who 
developed the contemporary schools of relational psychoanalysis (Aron, 1996).  His 
ideas also fitted well into the attachment or dyadic affect regulation paradigm 
(Jacoby, 1999; Schore, 2003a; Stern, 1985/2000). It is this overlap with 
psychoanalytic developmental theory and infant research which makes the work of 
Kohut still relevant today. In the next section, I first of all summarise the relational 
school known as intersubjective systems theory which builds upon and expands the 
work of Kohut.  I then introduce the work of Jessica Benjamin who developed a 
constructive critique of Kohut‟s work, which lacked a theorisation of the relation 
between inner experience and how this is mediated by the external sociocultural 
world (1988). This issue has been addressed by a number of relational theorists 
(Altman, 1995; Aron, 1996; Chodorow, 1999), however, the work of Benjamin is 
pertinent to the discussion of gender theory that was begun in the last chapter.  
  
3.5 Intersubjectivity and gender relations  
An intersubjective systems approach to therapy is an example of a relational 
psychoanalytic tradition which has built on the work of Kohut and the British object 
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relations school (Aron, 1996; Bacal, 1998b; DeYoung, 2003; Freedberg, 2009; 
Goldstein, 2001; Wachtel, 2008). Intersubjective systems theory is critical of 
diagnostic categories that pathologise individuals in a manner which does not take 
into account the relational context within which the “pathology” developed (Stolorow 
et al., 1994).  Intersubjective systems therapy understands pathology or problems as 
inherently relational and contextual: 
 
… all selfhood – including enduring patterns of personality and pathology – 
develops and is maintained within, and as a function of, the interplay between 
subjectivities …Intersubjectivity theory sees pathologies, from phobias 
through psychoses, in these terms. In other words, it radically refuses to place 
the origins or the continuance of psychopathology solely within the patient 
(Orange, Atwood et al. 1997, p. 6). 
 
The focus of therapy remains on subjective experience, but more emphasis is placed 
on the experience of mutuality. Intersubjective systems therapy moves beyond the 
limitations of liberal-humanist individualism and the isolated Cartesian self, and to 
replace this understanding with a notion of a relational or intersubjective self. There 
is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity.  The therapist cannot stand outside the 
system and become a neutral or unbiased observer who is not affected or changed in 
some way by the relationship. In this sense, psychotherapy is not a science, in the 
sense of the natural sciences, but is rather a practice of arriving at an emotional and 
dialogic understanding with the person who presents for therapy. Intersubjective 
systems therapy eschews rules and techniques and prefers to think of therapy as a 
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practice in the tradition of Aristotle‟s concept of phronesis or practical wisdom 
(Orange et al., 1997).  In the same spirit, each treatment is regarded as unique arising 
from the unique subjectivities of the participants. The person who comes for therapy 
would present differently for different therapists and the two of them together would 
create their own unique processes (Buirski, 2005). 
The two key practices in intersubjective systems theory are the empathic-
introspective stance, which is a form of listening and receiving and affect attunement, 
which is a form of response.  The therapist seeks to communicate their empathic 
understanding through verbal and nonverbal, affectively attuned responses (Buirski & 
Haglund, 2001). Intersubjective systems therapy builds upon the findings of 
psychoanalytic developmental psychology and infant research (Lichtenberg et al., 
1996; Schore, 2003a). The central organising thesis of contemporary developmental 
psychoanalysis is that the “self” emerges from the mutual affect regulation in the 
caregiver-infant dyad (Schore, 2003b; Stern, 1985/2000).  The quality of affect 
regulation provided by the caregiver will determine the ability of the child to self-
regulate. The therapeutic practice of affect attunement therefore seeks to replicate this 
process in therapy sessions.  For example, the therapist may mirror the client‟s affects 
– their crescendos and decrescendos, in their face, tone of voice and rate of speech. 
Affect articulation occurs when the therapist puts into words the feelings that they 
interpret are going on within the participant.  This is particularly important when 
working with traumatised children and adolescents who often do not have the verbal 
and narrative skills to name their feelings. This practice develops the coherence of the 
client‟s self narrative and helps them to regulate affects. In my work with adolescent 
boys, I often hear complaints from caregivers and other professionals about 
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aggressive and self-destructive behaviours directed towards others or towards 
themselves. This is often described as “acting out” (Fonagy et al., 2004, pp. 294-295) 
their emotions, such as anger or sadness, rather than putting them into words. 
Adolescent boys often experience difficulty in regulating their affects, forming 
intimate relationships, participating in intimate conversations and experiencing 
empathy (both for themselves and others) (Rich, 2006a; Saxe et al., 2007). The ability 
to articulate affect is understood to be an important skill of affect regulation (Fonagy 
et al., 2004). When the therapist tentatively articulates what the participant may be 
actually feeling and the person feels understood, their affect is co-regulated, with a 
positive soothing or calming feeling being the result.  
There is a confusing array of meanings for the words feelings, emotions and 
affect.  Damasio (2000) proposes that “the term feeling should be reserved for the 
private, mental experience of an emotion, while the term emotion should be used to 
designate the collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable.  In 
practical terms, this means that you cannot observe a feeling in someone else, 
although you can observe a feeling in yourself when, as a conscious being, you 
perceive your emotional states” (p. 42).  Although we cannot observe someone else‟s 
feelings we can observe the emotion expressed in facial gesture and tones of voice. 
The look of recognition and the reciprocal smiles on the face of the client and 
therapist signal a shared moment of understanding.  These interactions follow a 
temporal contour (Stern, 2004b). As the old cliché says, a picture tells a thousand 
words.  A smile only lasts for a brief moment but can be a deeply meaningful 
experience.  If we do manage to respond with a well placed word, it is important that 
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the word resonates with the client‟s affective embodied state.  As another cliché says 
it‟s not what you say, it‟s how you say it.   
Relational therapy understands the mind to be created through the mutual 
interactions of subjects. The self is inherently relational.  However, although the term 
selfobject as developed by Kohut expresses this understanding, it fails to adequately 
recognise the “other” as a separate centre of experience.  The meaning of 
intersubjectivity has been defined in psychoanalysis as the unique psychological field 
created by the intersection between two subjectivities (Buirski & Haglund, 2001; 
Stolorow et al., 1994) and as the mutual recognition of two subjects (Benjamin, 1990, 
2004). Intersubjectivity has also been described as a developmental achievement, 
starting with the infant and caregiver participating in shared intentional states (Stern, 
1985/2000), culminating in the child recognising the mother as an independent 
“subject” (Benjamin, 1990).  Intersubjectivity has been used by a number of 
relational psychoanalysts, and I do not have the space to cover the work of all the 
different nuances.  In this section I therefore focus on the work of Jessica Benjamin 
(Benjamin, 1988, 1990, 1998, 2004), who focuses attention on subject-subject 
relatedness within the therapeutic relationship. 
Benjamin‟s work differs from other relational psychoanalysts by focusing on 
the problem of domination as it is structured in the polarity of gender relations, and 
replicated by other dualisms such as male rationality/female irrationality; male 
subject/female object; and male autonomy/female dependence.  The achievement of 
intersubjectivity, as the relation between equal subjects is argued by Benjamin to be 
the way forward out of domination and duality.   She is critical of the work of Kohut 
and object relations theorists as failing to distinguish between using others as 
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“objects” or “selfobjects” without recognising the other as an outside subject. These 
intrapsychic models only focus on the relationship to an internal object and they 
disregard the developmental experience of a subject meeting another subject which 
she takes to be the essence of the intersubjective view.  However, she does not seek to 
replace the intrapsychic model with the intersubjective position but sees them as 
complementary ways of understanding our experience of subjectivity (Benjamin, 
1988).   
Benjamin stresses the centrality of recognition by the other in order to develop 
agency and self-assertion, and also the need to simultaneously recognise the 
subjectivity of the other. Benjamin (2004) defines intersubjectivity “in terms of a 
relationship of mutual recognition---a relation in which each person experiences the 
other as a “like subject,” another mind who can be “felt with” yet has a distinct, 
separate center of feeling and perception (p. 1)”.  Her work draws on contemporary 
infant research which shows that the relationship between the mother and infant is 
interactive, where both parties initiate the sharing of subjective experience (Stern, 
1985/2000).  Intersubjectivity is therefore a developmental achievement (capacity) 
with a separate trajectory to that of the internalization of object relations (Benjamin, 
1988; Stern, 2004b).   
In seeking to understand the relations of domination within both the 
interpersonal and social domains, Benjamin‟s work builds on Simone de Beauvoir‟s 
insight: 
 
… that woman functions as man‟s primary other, his opposite – playing 
nature to his reason, immanence to his transcendence, primordial oneness to 
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his individuated separateness, and object to his subject.  This analysis of 
gender domination as a complementarity of subject and object, each the 
mirror image of the other, offers a fresh perspective on the dualism that 
permeates Western culture. It shows how gender polarity underlies such 
familiar dualisms as autonomy and dependency, and thus establishes the 
coordinates for the positions of master and slave (Benjamin, 1988, p. 7). 
 
In her book, The Bonds of Love (1988), Benjamin argues that the phallic 
representation of sexual desire was based upon the dominant masculine culture of 
subject-object relationships, in which the masculine subject dominates the feminine 
object. Benjamin “identifies this unequal complementarity not only as the basic 
pattern of domination, but also as a masculine mode of thought and practice that 
permeates all social organisation” (Greene, 1996, p. 3-4).  For Benjamin the 
intrapsychic model misses the essence of differentiation: “the paradoxical balance 
between recognition of the other and assertion of self” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 46).  
Intrapsychic theory stressed only the differentiation from the state of merger or 
oneness to separation and autonomy, with the state of oneness being derogated as a 
form of narcissistic regression.  This creates a domination duality where the other is 
always seen as the doer or the done to, the other is the breast and the self is the 
hunger.  The experience of the intersubjective as formulated by Benjamin overcomes 
this domination duality by understanding that sameness and difference can exist 
simultaneously in mutual recognition:  
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  Experiences of “being with” are predicated on a continually evolving 
awareness of difference, on a sense of intimacy felt as occurring between “the two of 
us”… 
 
To transcend the experience of duality, so that both partners are equal, 
requires a notion of mutuality and sharing. In the intersubjective interactions 
both partners are active; it is not a reversible union of opposites (a doer and a 
done-to). The identification with the other person occurs through the sharing 
of similar states, rather than through reversal.  “Being with” breaks down the 
oppositions between powerful and helpless, active and passive; it counteracts 
the tendency to objectify and deny recognition to those weaker or different – 
to the other.  It forms the basis of compassion, what Milan Kundera calls “co-
feeling”, the ability to share feelings and intentions without demanding 
control, to experience sameness without obliterating difference (Benjamin, 
1988, p. 47-48). 
 
According to Benjamin (1988) it is during this differentiation process that the male 
child goes through a process of disidentification with the mother and anything 
feminine thereby developing his gender and identity by establishing discontinuity and 
difference from the person he is most attached: 
 
The denial of identification with the mother also tends to cut the boy off from 
the intersubjective communication that was part of the primary bond between 
mother and infant. Emotional attunement, sharing states of mind, empathically 
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assuming the other‟s position, and imaginatively perceiving the other‟s needs 
and feelings – these are now associated with cast-off femininity. Emotional 
attunement is now experienced as dangerously close to losing oneself in the 
other; affective imitation is now used negatively to tease and provoke 
(Benjamin, 1988, p. 170). 
 
Benjamin‟s work can therefore be seen to be providing a bridge between domination 
experienced at the psychic, developmental and relational level and the domination of 
hegemonic masculinity at the social level. 
 Benjamin‟s model of the need for mutual recognition between the child and 
mother also applies to the relationship between therapist and participant. The 
therapist is experienced by the participant not only as a selfobject, but as a subject, 
with an independent experience of the world.  This subtle shift in emphasis has 
implications for clinical practice, opening up possibility for a different kind of 
response from the therapist. In contrast to an empathic listening stance, where the 
therapist immerses themselves in the participant‟s experience, when a therapist listens 
from a subject-subject position, they are listening from an other-centred listener 
perspective (Fosshage, 1998), quite different to the kind of empathic listening 
recommended by Kohut.  It also follows that the therapist‟s response would also be 
different,  for example, respectfully challenging the viewpoint of the participant or 
presenting the therapist‟s opinion. This assumes that the participant is capable of and 
interested in listening to the opinion or point of view of the therapist and entering into 
a genuine dialogic interchange. 
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3.6 Optimal responsiveness, specificity, reflexivity and empathy 
Howard Bacal, a relational self psychologist, introduced the term optimal 
responsiveness in 1985; since then he has continued to revise the concept and has 
identified specificity theory as the theoretical perspective that underpins it (Bacal & 
Herzog, 2003).  The intention was to replace the concept of optimal frustration 
introduced by Kohut. Kohut had argued (consistent with traditional Freudian theory) 
that self structure was built through the process of the patient experiencing an optimal 
level of frustration in the therapy process thereby strengthening the self.  Bacal also 
challenged the preeminence of interpretation as the key change agent.  Kohut had 
described the change process as a two-step process of empathic immersion followed 
by interpretation (explanations).  Bacal proposed that the concept of optimal 
responsivity replace that of interpretation: 
 
Empathy or vicarious introspection is the process by which the therapist 
comes to understand the patient by turning in to his inner world. Optimal 
responsiveness, on the other hand, refers to the therapist‟s acts of 
communicating his understanding to his patient (Bacal, 1998, p. 5). 
 
Specificity, reflexivity and empathy are related but different concepts that refer to the 
ability of the therapist to become aware of both the subjective and intersubjective 
dimensions of the therapy process. 
Specificity theory (Bacal & Herzog, 2003) claims that the therapist cannot 
know beforehand what kind of intervention is going to work for that particular 
participant.  The intervention, verbal or nonverbal, must arise from the unique 
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configuration of the moment. Therapeutic change is inevitably a product of the 
unique personal characteristics of the therapist and the participant and the ability of 
the therapist to respond flexibly on a moment by moment basis to the needs of the 
participant. Therapy is understood as a unique personal encounter in which the 
subjectivity of both the therapist and the participant influences the ups and downs of 
the therapy process. Each therapy encounter is therefore unique to the parties 
involved.  Specificity theory therefore fits well with the responsivity principle and 
helps us to understand what this may mean in practice. 
Reflexivity is an important concept in both the systemic-narrative traditions 
and the relational tradition (Aron, 2000b; Hedges, 2005).  Reflexivity has a wider 
meaning than empathy, and refers to the capacity to both observe and think about 
both the subjective and objective sense of ourselves while at the same time being 
aware of the subjective and objective self of the participant.  It also refers to the 
ability to be aware of how both our professional theories and personal prejudices are 
constantly influencing our interactions in the therapy relationship.   
Practising therapy in a forensic setting is always going to present some 
intrinsic difficulties, in particular the importance of balancing the social control 
functions of risk management with the goal of building a therapeutic alliance
2
 with 
the participants (Ross et al., 2008).  The therapeutic relationship is characterised by a 
power imbalance even in the best of circumstances.  Working in an agency with 
legally mandated clients only increases the potential for therapists to inadvertently 
replicate abusive practices participants had previously experienced within their lives. 
                                                 
2
 I use the term therapeutic alliance (as distinct from therapeutic relationship) to describe the feeling or 
sense of working collaboratively together towards agreed upon goals and tasks (Safran & Muran, 
2000) 
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In my experience, combining the twin goals of building a therapeutic alliance and 
managing risk were often difficult to hold together. Engaging participants in a 
therapeutic alliance and being able to repair any ruptures which may occur has been 
described as the central task of therapy (Safran & Muran, 2000).   Without a 
functioning therapeutic alliance everything else falls apart.  The reflexive use of self 
is essential to alerting us to any breakdowns to the relationship. I think of self-other 
reflexivity as the capacity to be intersubjectively mindful.  My listening perspective is 
to attune myself to my here and now experience, the participant‟s here and now 
experience and the unique intersubjective space we are creating.  An optimal 
intervention is expressed through my response.  This can be either non-verbal or both 
verbal and non-verbal.  In a practice founded upon the empathic use of self, we 
cannot, not respond.  The other person‟s experience of our responsiveness will be 
partly determined by their habitual ways of organising their experience, sometimes 
referred to as transference (e.g., one more stupid therapist who sounds just like my 
father) and partly may be experienced as something new and unique. 
The reflexive and empathic use of self was the foundation of my ability to 
both understand the programme participants and at the same time to be changed by 
my meetings with them.  To be empathic, I believe we have to be open and 
vulnerable.  I also feel that an empathic approach is crucial in the field of adolescent 
sexual offending. Empathy has not always been recognised as an important factor 
when working with adolescents who have abused. This is puzzling, given the large 
body of literature documenting findings of empirical research into infant-caregiver 
relationships and the effects of trauma on children‟s brain development  (Schore, 
2003a; Siegel, 1999).  Similarly, the importance of empathy has also been 
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demonstrated by research into the socialisation of male children (Connell, 2000; 
Kindlon & Thompson, 1999; Wexler, 1999).  Both these areas of research are now 
reinforcing the importance for children of receiving empathic understanding from 
caregivers and therapists as an essential precondition for the child developing 
empathy for others.  This development of empathy can be understood through the 
lens of intersubjectivity theory. Indeed, achieving intersubjectivity can be seen as one 
of the most important developmental milestones.  The child moves from a subject-
object relational matrix to a subject-subject relational matrix, recognising the 
independent subjectivity of the other, starting with their mother (Benjamin, 1988, 
1990; Stern, 1985/2000). 
As well as aligning with the values of a positive approach and the personal 
qualities of warmth and empathy as described by Marshall and colleagues (2005), a 
responsive therapist will need to develop both a theoretical and skill-based 
experiential ability to implement forms of mutual regulation and emotional 
understanding.  A responsive therapist will also be aware that therapy is a two-way 
process which often leads to a need to reflect on one‟s own life and attachment 
history (Ross, Polaschek, & Ward, 2008). Many of the young people who are referred 
to adolescent sexual offending treatment are suffering the legacy of poor attachment 
histories and have also been the victims of violence and abuse (Rich, 2006a; Ryan & 
Lane, 1997b; Wexler, 1999).  Combined with the effects of hegemonic masculinity, 
one of the effects of this history is a reduced capacity to self regulate affects (Rich, 
2006a; Schore, 2003a, 2003b; Schore & Schore, 2008).  Or to put this in more simple 
terms, these young people, like the rest of us, want to avoid emotional pain at all 
costs.  This experiential avoidance of pain is one way of understanding how the 
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offence process occurs at the micro-level. This needs to be addressed in treatment 
through the therapist becoming empathically attuned in order to help participants 
develop the capacity to tolerate negative affects and make meaning out of their 
emotional experience (Orange, 1995).  In order to develop an emotional 
understanding of participants‟ personal and social history I draw on my relational 
skills to build an affectional bond and negotiate the therapeutic alliance with the 
participants throughout the course of therapy (Rich, 2006a). Of course, according to 
attachment theory, this is exactly what is often resisted by persons with a history of 
insecure attachment (Howe & Fearnley, 1999; Smallbone, 2005; Sroufe, 1995). The 
self and subjectivity of the therapist, including their gender and their own experience 
of adolescence, will inevitably shape this process.  In my experience I have found that 
empathic attunement is a necessary precondition for persons to experience both 
feeling understood and to developing a strong and stable therapeutic alliance. 
     
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the centrality of the therapeutic relationship to 
relational therapy and located the concept of optimal responsivity within the tradition 
of relational psychoanalysis and argued that it can strengthen and enrich the 
responsivity principle as outlined in the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model of 
offender rehabilitation. I also discussed the related concepts of specificity, reflexivity 
and empathy and how they function as key relational skills. In the next chapter I turn 
to a more detailed outline of autoethnography as a methodology or “strategy of 
inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005b), the research method I utilised to generate the 
data, and the ethical dilemmas I encountered. 
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4. 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1      Introduction 
In chapter one I introduced the research problem and identified the research 
questions: namely to investigate how the therapist can use his or her experience of 
self to be optimally responsive with participants.  I also introduced autoethnography 
as my preferred research methodology to investigate the therapist‟s use of self.  In 
this chapter I describe the methods I used to generate, story and analyse my data in 
order to answer my research questions. I introduce autoethnography as a strategy of 
inquiry that fits with a relational perspective.  I argue that autoethnography is 
uniquely suited to be able to study the subjective experience of therapy. I also review 
the historical evolution of autoethnography, with a specific focus on narrative, 
reflexivity and the politics of representation, with reference to how offender 
rehabilitation has been saturated with an “us and them” culture. This chapter therefore 
links up with the research problem I discussed in chapter one.  It is organised around 
six major topics: pluralism; epistemological considerations; ethical considerations; 
the research process; alternative justification procedures and evaluation criteria. The 
chapter begins with a critique of positivism and the positivist understanding of the 
scientist-practitioner model as the basis for evidence-based practice and an argument 
for a more inclusive model more suited to human science research. 
 
4.2      A plurality of methods 
Methodology is concerned with the application of methods for the generation 
and analysis of data.  However, the concepts of methodology and methods are often 
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only understood through the lens of positivism, such as the distinction between theory 
and facts and observer neutrality.  Positivism is a form of objective realism and seeks 
to delimit the methods in the human sciences to the experimental method as applied 
in the physical sciences, and assumes this to be the benchmark by which all research 
in the human sciences is to be evaluated. When it comes to qualitative research, 
however, methods of doing research and arriving at certain conclusions or findings do 
not have to follow the traditional methods of positivist or experimental research.  
Qualitative research is therefore not limited by experimental methodology (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005a; Howe, 2004).  For example, writing itself can be understood as a 
method of inquiry (Richardson, 1994; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005).     
A qualitative inquiry implies an investigation into something.  While agreeing 
that it is important to establish some criteria about how we are to evaluate the quality 
of the research, these criteria do not have to replicate the same criteria that are applied 
in the physical sciences.  This is simply because we are dealing with different 
ontological realms: of human realities rather than physical realities.  People can be 
treated as objects, but unless the subjective dimension of human experience is also 
taken into account we will never have a complete understanding of what it means to 
be human (Gadamer, 1975/1989; Goldstein, 1990).  Like other forms of qualitative 
research, within the field of autoethnography there is no one agreed upon “method” 
that is followed to arrive at a certain result (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Holman Jones, 
2005).  There is therefore a plurality of methods that can be employed in qualitative 
studies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005b). 
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4.3      Evidence-based practice? 
The question of how do we know what “works” or what constitutes good or 
effective therapeutic practice, is a contested terrain, with the scientist-practitioner 
model currently in the ascendant.  The scientist-practitioner model is usually 
constructed on the basis of a positivist-experimental understanding of science. 
Similarly, adolescent (and adult) sexual offending treatment is usually located within 
the individualistic paradigm in psychology, which is founded on modernist and 
objectivist epistemological foundations, and seeks to promote the positivist scientist-
practitioner model as the best form of practice.  It is a one-person psychology in 
which the expert therapist seeks to rehabilitate the almost passive offender by 
applying evidence-based interventions or techniques.  Change is therefore assumed to 
be a one-way process. 
Evidence-based practice (EBP) is now an integral part of contemporary 
mental health and the understanding of what is to count as valid “evidence” has been 
almost entirely dominated by the positivist scientist-practitioner model as it was 
developed in psychology: 
 
The scientist-practitioner employs an empirical scientist approach to practice, 
designing interventions based on the best possible information, measuring the 
impact of the interventions, and then modifying the interventions in response 
to information about their impact. 
 
EBP operates from the premise that once an intervention has been 
demonstrated to be effective with a specific problem, it should be able to be 
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implemented to good effect whenever that problem is present (King, Lloyd, & 
Meehan, 2007 p. 7). 
 
Furthermore, there are established hierarchies of evidence with the single case report 
at the bottom of the hierarchy.  This is because, it is argued, they are not generalisable 
– what works for one person might not work for another and is not replicable for 
other people or settings. According to this standard positivist view there has to be a 
demonstrable causal relationship between the intervention and the outcome.  Near the 
top of the hierarchy are randomised controlled trials (RCTs).  A common way of 
doing RCTs is to randomly allocate half of the sample research population with a 
common problem, such as depression, to a time-limited course of therapeutic 
interventions while the other half continues with care as usual or are given a placebo 
intervention.  Any differences in outcomes are therefore attributed to the 
interventions.  If a series of trials with different researchers yield similar outcomes 
then it is claimed that the evidence is persuasive and we can therefore assume that a 
causal connection between the intervention and the outcome has been established, 
and that the generalisability of the intervention has been demonstrated (King et al., 
2007, p. 8). 
I am not arguing against this specific form of research design, because I 
believe in a plurality of methodologies.  However, I believe it is just as limited in its 
claims as any alternative qualitative methodology because it is based on a debatable 
assumption that a causal relationship can be demonstrated by controlling only 
selective variables when there are so many other variables involved that cannot be 
controlled: 
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If only the therapy process lent itself to being studied by the experimental 
method, we might finally be able to resolve one of the questions that have 
nagged at therapists for the last one hundred years: whose way of working is 
most effective for which people? Unfortunately, the psychotherapy process 
does not lend itself to the systematic control of the variables that affect the 
process. This is, in large part, because the psychotherapy process involves an 
open system where many, if not most, of the variables affecting the process 
cannot be identified. Since the variables that impact the process come from 
the conscious and unconscious worlds of experience of both participants, the 
participants themselves may have no awareness of all the factors influencing 
their engagement. (Buirski, 2005, p. 39) 
   
Rather than seek to demonstrate causal connections I believe the focus of research in 
the human sciences should be at the level of meaning.  It is a question of developing 
richer understandings, rather than seeking casual explanations.  
Unfortunately, it is still the case that some forms of qualitative inquiry, such 
as autoethnography, are viewed with suspicion by those who adhere to positivist 
understanding of human science and are therefore seen as lacking in legitimacy in 
university research because of what are ultimately political decisions about what 
constitutes scientific knowledge. Initially, qualitative methods tried to follow the 
same requirements of validity and reliability that had been laid down as the criteria to 
guide the production of quantitative research. However, since that time there has been 
a number of paradigm shifts in qualitative methods, at least eight different “historical 
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moments” according to Denzin (2005).  One of the distinguishing features of these 
different shifts has been the move away from defining what is to count as valid and 
reliable knowledge based upon traditional standards of scientific methodology 
towards reclaiming the knowledge claims of the arts and humanities under the 
umbrella of qualitative studies. This is a political battle that is still being fought and 
autoethnography is one example of how many different qualitative methodologies are 
redefining the meaning of the scientist-practitioner.    
I am opposed to attempts to impose an epistemology of hierarchy in the 
human sciences, with randomised controlled trials understood as being at the pinnacle 
of what constitutes the “gold standard” in psychotherapy research.  I join with other 
therapists in opposition to the attempt to impose a very limited understanding of 
science and therapy onto the model of a  scientific-practitioner (Etherington, 2004; 
Larner, 2004; McLeod, 1999; Speedy, 2008). I see this as an ideology which I call 
scientism.  I define scientism as the attempt to impose the ideology of positivism onto 
the disciplines of counselling, psychotherapy and social work and into the political 
realm of public policy and programme funding. This attempt to promote neopositivist 
research design as the most valid form researching human subjects engaged in 
therapeutic practices is problematic on ethical and epistemological grounds (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005a) .  Ethically, I believe it reproduces “us and them” dualities, 
reproducing the therapist as the expert who is more knowledgeable than the client.  It 
also reproduces a neo-liberal position which individualises and internalises the 
problem in the “offender” rather than situating the problem contextually and 
relationally (Orange et al., 1997; White & Epston, 1990).  On epistemological 
grounds, I am not against attempts to research effectiveness and outcomes; however, I 
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believe we need to tread carefully when trying to reduce a complicated human 
interactional process to the application of a reproducible intervention to a universal 
and abstract problem. Human relationships cannot be reduced to a simple linear cause 
and effect relationship and it is impossible to separate “interventions” from the people 
and context in which they are applied. All the various diagnostic categories are lists 
of general symptoms, whereas the actual lived experience of mental health problems 
is different for each person. This does not mean we have to walk away from evidence 
as to what counts for good, effective or helpful practice.  I understand professions 
such as psychotherapy, counselling and social work to be dialogic practices aimed at 
developing mutual understanding that deal in ambiguity and uncertainty (Gray & 
Mcdonald, 2006; Orange et al., 1997; Parton & O'Byrne, 2000).  People who work in 
these professions are required to respond to complex human situations that cannot be 
reduced to the simple application of pre-designed solution. From this perspective, I 
contend that the search for evidence-based “interventions” needs to be freed from the 
shackles of positivist hierarchy and opened up to include alternative methodologies 
that are based upon constructionist and contextualist epistemologies.   
 
4.4 The autoethnographic case study and narrative analysis 
I see autoethnography as a strategy of inquiry which is congruent with the 
ideas above, undermining social hierarchies and professional knowledge which 
reproduce “us and them” dualities and “one way accounts” of therapy which are so 
prevalent in professional accounts of the therapy process (Buirski & Haglund, 2001; 
White, 1997). Autoethnography can be defined as “a form of self-narrative that places 
the self within a social context” (Reed-Danahay, 1997a, p. 9).  Autoethnography gave 
 127 
me permission to write about my subjectivity as therapist, exposing the process 
whereby the personal intersects with the professional and vice versa.  Interestingly, 
the more I got into the research process, the more aware I became of how the practice 
of autoethnography inevitably acts as a kind of self-therapy, in the sense of writing 
being a form of making sense of my own life and those of others (Richardson & St. 
Pierre, 2005) . 
I think of the researcher as a story-teller.   A good piece of research tells a 
good story.  It then becomes important to ask, what is a good story?  This is a 
question I will come back to later when I discuss the alternative ways 
autoethnographic research is evaluated.  As the name implies, auto means self; ethno 
means people or culture; and graphy means writing or describing (Ellis, 2004).  
Debra Reed-Danahay (1997a) thought the term “has a double sense – referring either 
to the ethnography of one‟s own group or to autobiographic writing that has 
ethnographic interest” (p. 2). I view autoethnography as a form of reflexive writing 
about personal experiences in a way that links these personal experiences to social 
and cultural realities. It is a narrative form of inquiry (or research) into my own 
subjective experience of self and others which is informed by various disciplines and 
which draws upon fiction writing techniques to engage my audience in the project 
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000).   
The origins of autoethnography can be traced to the growing turn towards 
narrative and reflexivity in the social sciences, particularly in sociology and 
anthropology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005b). This includes the idea of writing 
vulnerably, as in The vulnerable observer: Anthropology that breaks your heart 
written by  Ruth Behar (1996).  In this book, Behar takes the idea suggested by 
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George Devereux (1967), an ethno-psychiatrist,  that “what happens within the 
observer must be made known  … if the nature of what has been observed is to be 
understood” (Behar, 1996, p. 6).  The essays included in the book include self-
disclosure stories of personal trauma and loss from her own life that are linked 
together with her ethnographic studies of the process of grieving in a northern 
Spanish rural village.   
This is a very important organising principle for me.  I think the idea of 
writing vulnerably is what links autoethnography and therapy together.  As a therapist 
I hope to create an atmosphere of safety and trust that allows participants to expose 
their vulnerabilities.  I expect the same of myself as an autoethnographer. 
Autoethnography is also linked to what Denzin (1997) refers to as the crisis of 
representation.  I think Edward Bruner‟s 1986 paper entitled Ethnography as 
Narrative is a good place to start.   
This was published in a book which Bruner edited along with the 
anthropologist Victor Turner called The Anthropology of Experience.  It was a key 
text in the development of narrative therapy, which often gets lost in the emphasis 
that is placed on Foucault. Michael White took the “rite of passage” as an analogy to 
the process of therapy from that book, among other key ideas. For example, White 
also adopted the idea of dominant and alternative narratives. In this paper Bruner 
discussed the indigenous North American‟s construction of a “resistance” narrative as 
an alternative to the “assimilation” narrative that was previously dominant in the 
anthropological literature written by European-Americans.  His paper can also be 
seen as an early form of autoethnography (Holman Jones, 2005; Smith, 2005). The 
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previous representation of the “native” was now seen as a form of colonial oppression 
(Bishop, 2005), bringing about a “crisis of representation”.  Bruner (1986) stated: 
 
… the present is given meaning in terms of that anticipated present we call the 
future and that former present we call the past (p. 142) 
 
… the narrative structures we construct are not secondary narratives about 
data but primary narratives that establish what is to count as data (p. 142-3) 
 
… life experience is richer than discourse. Narrative structures organise and 
give meaning to experience, but there are always feelings and lived 
experience not fully encompassed by the dominant story (p.143)… .  
 
That last statement was quoted in full in Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends 
(White & Epston, 1990), which I think illustrates clearly how influential it was to the 
formation of narrative therapy. However, of more relevance to my thesis is that 
Bruner also claimed in this paper that ethnography itself was a “genre of storytelling” 
(p. 139).  Autoethnography was therefore made possible by this narrative turn and 
also by what has been called the “politics of representation” (Denzin, 1997; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005a).  In fact, Bruner was already talking about the politics of 
representation in this same paper when he makes the point that “stories are not 
ideologically neutral”; they are structures of meaning but they are also “structures of 
power” (p. 144).  It was primarily white anthropologists who told the story of how the 
Native North American peoples‟ culture was dying and being assimilated into 
 130 
European culture.  The alternative narrative of resistance and cultural resurgence had 
altogether different political implications.  
The method used by anthropologists in the past was often called ethnography, 
the study of culture.  The primary method of collecting data in ethnographic 
fieldwork was often called participant observation.  The anthropologist went into the 
field and formed a relationship with the subjects they were observing.  They lived 
alongside their participants and made their observations. Field notes (data) were taken 
and then written up through a theoretical lens.  However, what was missing from this 
write-up was an analysis of the experience of the observer; how the observer could 
not step outside of their own horizon of understanding in formulating their 
descriptions of the “native” and how their presence changed the behaviour of the 
people they were purportedly describing in their “natural” environment (Tedlock, 
2005). As philosophers of science have argued for a long time, observation is never 
value free – it is theory-laden (Popper, 1959).  So anthropologists began to situate 
themselves. They could no longer understand themselves as neutral objective 
observers.  This turning point in anthropology has parallels with the move towards 
reflexivity in family therapy, when it was also realised that therapists could not 
continue to see themselves as sitting outside the family system and the resulting 
creation of “reflecting teams” (Andersen, 1999). Parallel developments also occurred 
in psychoanalysis, in the relational psychoanalytic traditions where they argued 
against Freud‟s principle that the analyst must remain a neutral observer for exactly 
the same reasons (Orange et al., 1997; Stolorow et al., 1994). 
This is where the work of the anthropologist, Ruth Behar, comes in again.  
Behar was writing ten years after Bruner‟s paper.  The narrative turn had already been 
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well-established in the human sciences (Polkinghorne, 1988).  Behar‟s book shone 
the light of reflexivity not just on the mind but also on the heart of the 
anthropological observer. For example, she writes an autobiographical story entitled 
The Girl in the Cast.  The story tells how at nine years old she recovered from a car 
crash, only to find years later as a thirty-five year old the trauma resurfaces at an 
aerobics‟ class.  She is immobilised by fear and hides away in her bedroom.  Finally, 
through her own research, she comes to an understanding of her symptoms and 
allows the tears, which the girl could not shed, to come pouring out.  In retelling this 
story Ruth Behar weaves the effects of a trauma caused by a road accident into stories 
which link her experiences to experiences of race, class and gender.  The story 
becomes an autoethnography.   Autoethnography is postmodern because it mixes the 
genres of autobiography and ethnography and is concerned with narrative truth (Ellis, 
2004) rather than historical or representational truth. The work of Behar also 
demonstrated how writing autoethnographically could be understood as a form of 
therapeutic writing.  The wounded story-teller heals herself. 
Narrative truth is concerned with being true to your experience, whereas 
representational truth seeks a description which corresponds to the so-called objective 
facts – facts which are external to experience. For example, Freud used the metaphor 
of archaeology to describe the process of unearthing buried memories because he 
believed the historical past could be reconstructed.  Of course, these memories were 
sometimes interpreted as “fantasies”.  Freud believed the process of analysis was 
about reconstructing the truth of the actual events that did happen.  The narrative turn 
in the human sciences influenced psychoanalysts like Spence (1982), who “argued 
that psychoanalysis is not one of archeological reconstruction but is, rather, an active 
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construction of a narrative about the patient‟s life” (Aron, 1996 p. 37).  Contemporary 
relational analysis now rejects the Freudian project of the reconstruction of historical 
truth, along with the attempt to remain neutral (Aron, 1996).  These days, following 
Kohut (1959), analysts are more concerned to understand how the person undergoing 
therapy experiences their world, with the emphasis on their.   Their experience does 
not have to correspond with the “facts” of what actually happened. 
I found autoethnographic methodology to be congruent with the philosophical 
stance I was developing in my practice.  I believed it was a methodology that could 
capture the therapist‟s subjective experience of therapy and the therapist‟s empathic 
understanding of the client‟s experience of therapy. I discovered in autoethnography a 
form of doing research that was closer to my heart, closer to describing the rich 
phenomena of the intersubjective dimensions of therapy. As previously argued, I have 
never identified with the traditional scientist- practitioner model as it is usually 
narrowly conceived. I prefer to think of myself as a reflexive-practitioner, taking into 
consideration matters of literary as well as clinical merit (Etherington, 2004; Speedy, 
2008).  I was drawn to therapy, as I have been to song-writing, because it engages 
audiences and practitioners alike on both an emotional and cognitive level. 
Autoethnography offered me the opportunity to write creatively, but with a 
theoretical and ethnographic perspective.  
As far as I know, there have been no autoethnographic studies of adolescent 
sexual offending therapy, but the potential of autoethnography to research 
counselling, psychotherapy, social work and mental health nursing is now being 
recognised (Butler et al., 2007; Etherington, 2004; Foster et al., 2006; McLeod, 2003; 
Speedy, 2008).  Before discovering autoethnography I had read the work of Yalom 
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(1991) and I enjoyed his collection of therapy tales reconstructed from work with 
actual patients. These tales read like short stories and were very revealing of the self 
of the therapist, including his anxieties and reflections on his mistakes.  However, 
they were not written from a self-conscious autoethnographic perspective.  They were 
written from the perspective of an existential therapist.  After I had discovered 
autoethnography I became dimly aware of the possibility of writing 
autoethnographically about my experience of therapy.   I then read both Luepnitz‟s 
(2002) and Orbach‟s (2002) stories about therapy.  Orbach‟s characters were all 
fictional, whereas Luepnitz‟s characters, like Yalom‟s, were reconstructed from 
meetings with actual patients.  Again, neither of these authors was conscious of using 
an autoethnographic perspective.   
In regards to the fields of adult and adolescent sexual offending there is very 
little in-depth case study research, let alone autoethnographic writing.  There is, 
however, a work by a New Zealand psychologist that is a kind of autobiographical 
account of how he started working with adult sexual offenders. In fact, he started 
working with the same agency I worked for in Auckland. It is called Into the 
Darklands (Latta, 2003). It is not an academic text, it is written more like a novel.  
Again, the author is not consciously using an autoethnographic perspective.  He 
writes as a psychologist, with little disclosed about his personal life. The book is an 
example of what I call a “them and us” criminological discourse.  For one, the sub-
title is unveiling the predators among us.  I find the “predator” metaphor to be in the 
same family as the monster metaphor. I believe this use of language is unhelpful; it 
dehumanises people and contributes to creating a climate of fear that encourages the 
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kind of vigilante reaction which happened in New Zealand in May 2005.
3
  However, I 
was fortunate to discover the work of a Canadian researcher, Williams (2006), who 
has worked as a therapist in the field of adult sexual offending treatment.  
Williams is the only other researcher in this field that I am aware of who uses 
autoethnography.  He argues that autoethnography can help to overcome exactly 
these kinds of “us and them” barriers which separate criminals from the general 
public and treatment providers from inmates and clients.  This “us and them” divide 
leads to dehumanisation and the objectification of the clients as the other. Williams 
argues that autoethnography has the potential to contribute to improving the quality 
of the therapeutic alliance and thus improve treatment outcomes.  It does this by 
including stories about the person of the treatment provider in order to show that we 
are all vulnerable and sometimes capable of acting in ways that we may later be 
ashamed of: 
 
I believe it is critical for practitioners of all kinds to rediscover and embrace 
their own painful stories, which is the catalyst for the ability to empathise with 
others, including offenders, who have painful stories of their own.  Indeed, 
much of offender rehabilitation seems to be mired in a one-person psychology 
                                                 
3
 During May 2005 there was a story in the media about a man who had convictions relating to sexual 
offenses against children who had moved to a village called Blackball in the South Island.  The local 
residents found out and were led by the local mayor who warned the local police they were about to 
“take the law into their hands” unless something was done quickly.  It was found out where the man 
was residing and rocks were thrown through the windows and the house was picketed.  Needless to 
say, the man ended up moving elsewhere. On the 18 May the morning current affairs programme on 
national radio featured a debate between someone from the local community and a GP, followed by an 
interview with the Director of SAFE.  The journalist also invited listeners to email their views.  The 
radio journalist read out some of the emails and commented that this was a   “large, complex and 
emotional issue” which divides the public between the view that these people are “animals” who 
should be locked up and those who express the view that this attitude will only make it more difficult 
for disclosures to occur. 
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– that is, the dominant focus is on pathology (e.g., thinking errors) and risk of 
the offender, while little consideration is given to the therapist 
countertransference and intersubjectivity that is present within the entire 
correctional process. 
 As therapists, often we keep our painful stories hidden from both 
ourselves and others.  It can be difficult to admit that they are still a part of us 
and always will be – a raw, unrefined, but very real part that does not fit with 
revised accounts that are shaped by time and socialisation.  Nevertheless, 
these are important to rehabilitation, both for practitioners and clients, and a 
refusal to acknowledge them does not mean they do not exist.  Interestingly, 
offenders often do not want to acknowledge or share narratives exposing their 
crimes and weakness but we insist, in the name of healing, that they do. Yet 
are we prepared to do the same? Can we admit our humanness? Can we admit 
commonalities we share with those behind the prison bars? (Williams, 2006 p. 
28-29). 
 
Williams concluded that autoethnography contributes to offender rehabilitation by 
emphasising commonalities rather than differences – whereas the professional culture 
of evaluation promotes distancing because the purpose is to identify pathology or 
deviations from the “norm”.  Williams also argues that autoethnography “gives voice 
to multiple identities, which allows us to empathise and connect with others” (p.34); 
through telling stories we also learn about ourselves.   In particular, autoethnography 
can expose the intersection between the personal and the professional, whereas 
traditional academic writing has expressly prohibited the personal from entering the 
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professional in the name of neutrality and objectivity.  I agree with Williams, that it is 
our ordinary, experiential self that connects with participants: 
 
Indeed forensic psychotherapy, like psychology in general, has been quick to 
emphasise intervention techniques and theories and slow to pay careful 
attention to the therapeutic alliance – the positive cognitive-affective 
relationship between client and therapist.  This general historical 
overemphasis on intervention techniques, while largely ignoring the personal 
influences that contribute to the therapeutic dyad, is likely to be at least partly 
the result of psychology‟s fierce determination, historically, to become a 
scientific discipline.  As mentioned previously, science tends to view emotion 
as a contaminant to what is objectively real.  This is interesting, because just 
as some scholars are adamant that autoethnography is not scholarship because 
it focuses on the human self (including personal emotionality and subjectivity) 
within research, psychology has been somewhat slow to acknowledge how the 
human element affects therapeutic outcome (Williams, 2006 p. 35). 
 
One of the central critiques of autoethnography is that because it relies on the 
self as a source of data it can become self-indulgent, narcissistic and individualised 
(Atkinson, 1997).  However, I believe autoethnography can contribute to sexual 
offending therapy by helping the practitioner researcher stay connected with and 
explore their personal issues and experiences that are triggered by working in this 
field or with a particular participant.  This allows the researcher to develop self-
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empathy and empathy for the participants in exactly the same way I would hope the 
participants would be able to move from self-empathy to empathy for others.  
Polkinghorne (1995) makes a distinction between the analysis of narratives 
and narrative analysis. In the former case, the narrative is taken as data and is 
analysed using methods such as thematic analysis, conversational analysis, discourse 
analysis, in order to extract some findings.  The narrative is analysed for the 
knowledge it contains. In the latter case, the creation of the story is seen as the act of 
analysis. The story is the knowledge, is the finding. In this thesis I present an 
autoethnographic case study based on an analysis of myself as the therapist and my 
work with four participants.  The autoethnographic case study is a form of narrative 
analysis, which in the present study seeks to show how the subjectivity of the 
therapist enters into both the therapy and the research.  Unfortunately case study 
research has been seen as having less legitimacy than systematic quantitative 
research.  I agree with Hoffman (2009) who argues that the privileged status of 
systematic experimental research over in-depth case study research is unwarranted 
epistemologically and potentially damaging to our understanding of therapeutic 
process and the quality of our clinical work.  
Hoffman‟s paper considers the scientific status of individual case reports as 
compared with systematic research. Hoffman‟s argument is that case studies  
“generate possibilities for practitioners to have in mind as they work with particular 
patients” (p. 1046) that may be helpful or not and that in reality this is all that 
systematic hypothesis testing research can do and therefore systematic research does 
not deserve a higher status than case study research. Hermeneutic critiques of 
evidence-based practice as usually presented, note its “abhorrence of ambiguity, 
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complexity, uncertainty, perplexity, mystery, imperfection, and individual variation 
in treatment” (Cushman & Gilford, 2000, p. 993).  Many therapists who take a 
hermeneutic perspective consider therapy to be first and foremost a moral enterprise 
where questions such as “What is a good way to be in this moment?” and “What 
constitutes a good life?” are implicit in every response a therapist makes.  These 
questions are outside the realm of science to answer. Hoffman also contends the 
whole person of the treatment provider is involved in engaging a person who is 
struggling with problems in living. Systematic quantitative studies cannot control for 
the “consequential uniqueness” of the therapist, the participant, their relationship and 
the moment, and this detracts substantially from their scientific and pragmatic value. 
Conversely, the fact that case studies do allow for consideration of the consequential 
uniqueness of the above factors, goes a long way toward contributing to their special 
scientific power, notwithstanding whatever limitations they may have (Hoffman, 
2009). The question of bias is often thrown in as an example of the limitations of case 
study work, however, from a hermeneutic perspective “it is neither possible nor 
desirable to seek to view the object from „nowhere‟. Hermeneutic reflection always 
takes place within one‟s textured background and the situation always appears 
embedded in a particular context” (Polkinghorne, p. 166, 2004).  The response to this 
charge is also to point to the trustworthiness of the data.  The criteria of validity 
therefore need to be re-defined in order to evaluate the unique methodology of 
autoethnographic case study research (see below).  
I thought an autoethnographic case study was an excellent strategy to inquire 
how I and the other participants experienced the therapeutic process.  Writing the 
stories and reading them aloud allowed me to “feel my way” into emotionally 
 139 
important events experienced within the session.  It allowed me to show how my 
participation as a therapist-researcher transformed me on a personal level and how 
my professional practices as a therapist evolved through doing this work.  That is, the 
stories show how I was challenged and changed on a personal and professional level.  
This included my reflections on theory and practice, consideration of the therapeutic 
effects of writing autoethnography, and what this tells us about the relationship 
between the professional and the personal. I wanted to provide relevant background 
knowledge on the personal life experience of the therapist, in particular his 
relationship with his father and his sons.  This would enable the reader to see the 
relationship between the therapist‟s personal self and professional self.  I also wanted 
to show how the therapist worked through his lived experience of guilt and shame, 
often in a parallel way to the participants on the program. 
Guidelines for writing personal experience stories can be found in the works 
of ethnographer writers such as Ellis (2004) and Denzin (1997; 2003; 2006).  I 
selected events from my personal life which showed critical, turning point events, 
which were rendered into scenes.  Similarly, I chose to write up sessions from the 
therapy process which seemed to be significant in some way, either because they 
contained critical, turning point events or which captured special moments of meeting 
between the therapist and the client. 
I think other therapists will be interested in this form of autoethnographic case 
study because the self of the therapist, though omni-present, is seldom explicitly 
attended to – the focus is usually on how clients are changed. I also think this kind of 
research has implications for how therapists are trained in both therapy and research 
methodologies. Autoethnography is still relatively new to the field of offender 
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rehabilitation, hence, if it can be shown to be helpful on a clinical level that would be 
an important finding.  
 Many nights I lay awake listening to the rain falling on my tin roof, 
wondering if it was going to be possible to complete my PhD with “a methodology of 
the heart” (Pelias, 2004).  I liked the phrase, a methodology of the heart. It resonated 
with my Zen Buddhist practice, and I remembered how in Japanese Zen the word for 
mind was mind-heart.  In that tradition, the two are inseparably connected, unlike in 
the West, when practically since Descartes and the Enlightenment, the mind and the 
heart have been radically torn apart. 
 
4.5      The politics of representation  
There is a vast literature on qualitative research and the politics of 
representation (Denzin, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005a; Holman Jones, 2005), which 
because of limitations of space I cannot do justice to here.  I will therefore limit this 
discussion to the issues of representation that I was aware of while researching this 
thesis. Autoethnography presents us with ethical dilemmas about how we represent 
both ourselves and others. This takes me back to issues around  the politics of 
representation, or what I might call, after Shotter (1994), the rhetorical aspects of 
constructionist theory. Written documents are extensively used in therapy, especially 
in assessment evaluation and progress report type formats.  These written documents 
(including case notes) act as a form of accountability.  However, these documents are 
often written for professional audiences without regard for the effect they may have 
on participant readers. The use of therapeutic documents in narrative therapy has 
opened up new ways of working with written documents with a larger participant 
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audience in mind (Freeman, Epston, & Lobovits, 1997; White & Epston, 1990).  The 
autoethnographic stories I wrote about therapy sessions for the purpose of this thesis 
are another example of an alternative way of documenting work that can be shared 
with therapy participants.  Participants could also be encouraged to write their own 
autoethnographies as part of the treatment process and share them in group therapy 
(Williams, 2006).   
Autoethnography has the potential to be used as both a narrative way of 
researching the experience of therapy and as a way of improving the effectiveness of 
therapeutic practice.  For example, when the therapist writes autoethnographies, 
either during the process of therapy or at the end of therapy, these stories can act as a 
form of self-supervision, or they can be taken along and discussed in individual or 
group supervision.  When used to represent participants in research, these stories can 
be shared with participants either during or at the end of treatment and can potentially 
act as another form of therapeutic document.  These stories can also be experienced 
by participants as validating of their therapeutic journey and can also provide 
participants with an opportunity to make a contribution, by participating in research, 
to improving the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes.  The therapist can also 
share these stories with participants as another example of what  White (1997) refers 
to as a form of “taking it back practice”; that is acknowledging the contributions of 
the participants to the therapist, thus affirming therapy as a “two-way” process. 
Autoethnography is therefore both performative and participative. 
Gergen and Gergen (2002, p. 12) have written about the “relational 
consequences of ethnographic representation”.  Autoethnography has been shown to 
contribute to the development of empathy with research participants (Berger, 2001).  
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I think this is even more the case when a therapist is writing. However, consideration 
also has to be given to the impact of reading the story on those people who are 
represented in the story. In the next section I address this ethical issue in more detail, 
including discussing the process of informed consent and how I shared my 
autoethnographic stories with participants at the conclusion of their treatment. 
Sharing autoethnographic stories with participants, like other forms of therapeutic 
documents, will potentially have positive or negative therapeutic effects on their lives 
and relationships, depending upon their experience of reading the stories.  Hence, the 
stories were crafted with this consequence in mind. It was my hope that the use of 
autoethnographic stories would act to support the young person‟s preferences for 
living and to help them continue moving in preferred directions.  As Gergen and 
Gergen (2002) wrote: “Our words constitute forms of action that invite others into 
certain forms of relationship as opposed to others” (p. 13).  For the young people who 
volunteered to participate, I wanted the autoethnographic story about our clinical 
work together to act like a therapeutic intervention, supporting and consolidating the 
work they had done. I think they also saw the choice to participate in the research as 
an opportunity for them to give something back to the community. For other 
professionals, working in this field, I hope these stories stimulate self-reflection, 
discussion and debate on both clinical and policy issues.  I also think there is potential 
to use autoethnographic stories as resources for training and education for therapists 
and caregivers, whether they be foster carers or residential care workers.  I believe 
carers need to be seen as co-therapists, whose day to day interactions with these 
young people are sensitive and responsive to their therapeutic needs.   
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Finally, autoethnography can be a form of political practice, designed to bring 
about social change (Denzin, 2003, 2006; Holman Jones, 2005; Reed-Danahay, 
1997b). I believe the stories documented in this thesis can be seen as a vehicle for 
giving expression to the unique voices of these boys that does not reduce them into 
the “other” of diagnostic categories or statistical probabilities.  The stories hopefully 
open up the possibility for the audience (reader) to empathise with the participants, 
even though they have committed crimes.  Autoethnographic stories could be usefully 
incorporated into government reports and green papers thereby increasing the 
audience and possibly changing the views of policy-makers, health and correctional 
professionals and the general public towards young people who commit sexual 
crimes. This is one of the ways in which research like autoethnography can be 
evaluated.  It is not evaluated on standard positivist criteria, it is evaluated on its 
verisimilitude and its ability to move readers, and hopefully to have some impact on 
both legal and treatment policy. I agree with Denzin (2003) that autoethnography can 
be understood as a form of performance ethnography and performance ethnography 
is designed to move our minds and hearts.  Autoethnographies are intended to be 
performed.  I realised this first hand when I began reading my work to an audience.  It 
was in the reading of the work, that is, the performance, that the heartfeltness of the 
writing was experienced in a visceral way.  When I read the story aloud, I was more 
able to feel moved by the words I had written, whereas this would not have happened 
to the same extent if I had been reading silently to myself.  So, in a way, reading the 
story aloud was one of the ways I could start to evaluate my draft stories.  Academic 
writing is generally only evaluated on its capacity to move minds. This is why 
autoethnography is such a radical academic sea change. Whether read alone or read 
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out loud for others to hear, a good story is always a performance because “we” the 
reader/audience become involved on an emotional as well as cognitive level (Denzin, 
2003).  If the audience does not get involved on an emotional level then I‟d say the 
author has not been successful at engaging the reader on that level and hence fails one 
of the key evaluative criteria I will discuss later in the chapter. 
 
4.6     Ethical considerations 
In this section I consider some of the ethical concerns encountered in 
autoethnographic research, such as the protection of participants‟ rights to privacy 
and confidentiality, including family members who I wrote about in the 
autobiographical parts of the thesis. It is now an established principle within 
university codes of ethics that the pedagogical good that may come from researching 
human subjects takes second place to the ethics of non-harm and the protection of 
privacy rights (McLeod, 1999; Waikato, 2007).  Research on human subjects must 
not be undertaken if there is any possibility that it may cause harm to the people 
being researched or infringe their right to privacy. Within the general professional 
ethics literature, a set of core ethical principles have been established (McLeod, 
1999): that the research will have beneficial outcomes; that the research will avoid 
doing harm to participants; that the research will respect the autonomy of participants 
and will treat everyone involved in a fair and just manner. In addition, the human 
rights to privacy and confidentiality are also essential considerations when 
conducting research with human subjects.  Informed consent must therefore be 
obtained from research participants if their rights to privacy and confidentiality are to 
be diluted. However, when it comes to applying these principles in practice it is not 
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always so straight forward, especially when it comes to autoethnographic research 
which includes stories involving people who have not given any formal consent to be 
included in the research story (Ellis, 2004). For example, Frank (1995) in writing 
about the “wounded story teller” speaks about how “becoming a witness assumes a 
responsibility for telling what happened” (p. 137).  In telling my story I act as a 
witness to my experience of being a secondary victim of sexual offending. I tell my 
story as part of my own process of recovery. I needed to tell my story but in order for 
me to tell my story I had to disclose my father‟s story. This created the ethical 
dilemma of finding a balance between my moral responsibility as a witness to tell my 
story and the rights of my family to respect their privacy.   
According to McLeod (1999, p. 80) there are two unique ethical dilemmas 
that present themselves to therapists who research their own clients: firstly, because 
counsellors seek to go beyond not doing harm and also hope to enhance client well-
being, then it is morally wrong to compromise client well-being for the sake of 
research; secondly, it creates dual roles, therapist and researcher, and it is therefore 
important to examine if the researcher role is going to interfere in non-beneficial 
ways with the therapeutic process. In addition to these general concerns that arise 
within practitioner research, I was also conducting qualitative research into one of the 
most sensitive topics possible.  The rights to privacy and confidentiality in regards to 
sexual offences against children are crucial considerations given the extent of 
vilification people who have records of sexual offences against children are often 
subjected to, and the sense of shame already experienced both by the person who 
offended and their families. 
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  As the project progressed the ethical dilemmas became clearer as did the 
possible solutions. One of the obvious risks to participants was the potential for 
embarrassment or shame if their identity was to become known.  Participants‟ rights 
to privacy were therefore protected by disguising their identity and the agency 
identity and location. This was achieved by changing personal names and other 
identifying attributes and referring to “the agency”.  Any written publications or 
conference presentations based upon this research will also continue to disguise the 
identity of participants as above.  Other dilemmas included: At what stage of the 
therapy process should participants be asked to give informed consent?  Prior to 
commencing? Midway, after some trust has been established? Or, at the termination 
stage or even later? How consensual is the process of giving informed consent? How 
could I ensure the research did not intrude into the participants‟ private lives?  At 
what stage of the process would the participants‟ read the story? I was also concerned 
about the length of the story, and how this would affect the participants‟ ability to 
read the story. Similar dilemmas have been discussed by narrative ethnographers who 
had chosen to fictionalise their accounts because of ethical concerns (Angrosino, 
1998) and in the psychoanalytic literature about the ethics of writing case studies 
(Aron, 2000a; Kantrowitz, 2002a, 2002b; Levine & Stagno, 2001). Reading these 
papers convinced me to ask for informed consent at the time when the participants 
had formally graduated from the programme and to send them a copy of their stories 
to read a few months later thereby reducing the influence of the agency and the 
therapist on their ability to choose freely.  
The formal process of ethics approval delineated these processes and the 
research proposal was approved by both the agency and the university.  The plan was 
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to access participants who had already been allocated to me as key therapist through 
the normal agency referral process.  I proposed to offer invitations to participate in 
the research only to these young men, and possibly their parents/caregivers. During 
the earlier phase, when I was still developing my research proposal, I had considered 
doing audio/visual recordings of therapy sessions, making a transcript and then doing 
some form of discourse analysis of the transcript. The decision not to go down this 
path and to explore the possibility of using autoethnography as an alternative 
methodology of researching the therapy process was prompted by the problem of 
researching a sensitive topic.   
Sexual offending was not something that people felt comfortable talking about 
and even less being known for.  The benefit of adopting autoethnography as my 
research methodology meant that I would not have to tape the therapy sessions, 
thereby allowing me to capture the feel of a therapy session without subjecting 
participants to the possible feelings of anxiety that may have arisen if sessions were 
being taped.  I also could not risk the therapy process being hindered by the use of 
recording technology because it may have reduced the participants‟ safety to self-
disclose. In most agencies (and in private practice) there is an expectation that 
counsellors will record some notes regarding what was discussed during a 
counselling session as a form of accountability (Ludbrook, 2003).  Some counsellors 
choose to take notes within the actual session and some choose to write up the notes 
at the end of the session.  Some therapists sometimes turn these notes into therapeutic 
documents of various kinds such as therapeutic letters.  Other therapists use the notes 
to help them remember the various themes that are being discovered as the therapy 
progresses. I have tried both methods.  Recording summary notes was a requirement 
 148 
of the agency in which I worked.  The notes were recorded on a common file which 
included both group and individual sessions and any other telephone calls in between 
so that all therapists involved could be kept up to date. However, prior to formal 
approval being given for my research from the University‟s Human Research Ethics 
Committee, I began taking more detailed process notes (Gabbard, 2004) of therapy 
sessions than I was required to do by the agency.  These notes were written only after 
certain sessions, in which I felt something of significance had happened, that was 
either helpful or hindering to the therapy process.  The notes were usually written on 
my laptop when I arrived home on the same day and I would use these notes as a 
resource for supervision.  I first came across the idea of process notes in my 
psychotherapy training in Adelaide.  In psychotherapy training the supervisee is 
encouraged to take very detailed notes of what happened during a session (Gabbard, 
2004). Note taking during a session was discouraged so that I could be more present 
to the participants and at the same time mindful of my own feelings and thoughts and 
the intersubjective field (Anderson, 1997; Gabbard, 2004). This technique originated 
before the days of recording technology but has continued.  At the end of the session 
(or sometime later) a written record is made of the most salient events during the 
session.  This includes details of the dialogue, side by side with the therapist‟s 
internal thoughts and feelings, and details of the intervention.  These notes are then 
used as a basis for a supervision session. I basically adopted this technique for some 
sessions (certainly not every session!) and to varying degrees.  Gradually, I began to 
see this as being the equivalent of writing ethnographic field notes.  I also found it 
was a good practice that supported my intention to remain mindful and attuned to my 
own internal states during therapy sessions, as well as attuning to the participant. The 
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personal information relating to participants, including my process notes were 
protected by either being stored in my lap-top, which requires a password, or in a 
locked filing cabinet in my home study.  The only people who were allowed access to 
these notes apart from myself and the participants were my academic and clinical 
supervisors.  Normally, when research is completed, the University of Waikato 
Human Research Regulations requires the indefinite archiving of data from published 
research but in this case the School of Education Ethics Committee endorsed my 
preference to destroy the process notes at the completion of the project.  
As discussed above, the issue of informed consent was also a concern in 
regard to the different kinds of autoethnographic writing I was using in this project, 
which I eventually delineated into three different voices: the voice and story of the 
therapist, reconstructing stories from memory and process notes of the in-session 
therapeutic interactions; the autobiographical voice of my personal and professional 
stories, and the researcher‟s voice telling the theoretical story. It was clear that I 
needed informed consent for the participants‟ stories to be included, but this was not 
the case for the fictional-composite story involving the character named Billy. I felt at 
the time that taking process notes did not require the consent of the participants 
because these were related (as on a continuum) to the normal process of note-taking 
following a therapy session that all counsellors are required to do.  I would argue that 
apart from the accountability or ethical reasons for note taking, note-taking is a form 
of on-going research (Bird, 2000).  I therefore took the position that the process of 
informed consent was not necessary if the accounts of the therapy were to be 
fictionalised.  To ask for consent to write fictionalised accounts would be unnecessary 
and unduly restrictive upon the imagination and creativity of the researcher/writer. 
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The decision about informed consent to write about family members in my personal 
narratives was another dilemma, which I return to later in this section. For the stories 
based upon the therapy sessions, (as stated above) I decided participants would be 
recruited when they had completed the treatment programme.  
This decision was a solution to a primary ethical concern raised by the fact 
that I was playing two roles: researcher and individual therapist.  I was concerned that 
this dual relationship would affect the process of giving consent.  Therapeutic 
relationships are assumed to operate from a power imbalance.  It is very important to 
participants and their families that they are seen to be cooperating with the therapist.  
Reports written by the therapist make recommendations to the authorities about such 
issues as family reunification and ultimately therapists determine when a participant 
graduates from the programme.  I was concerned that my potential participants would 
therefore find it difficult to feel they had a choice to say no to participation in the 
research out of deference to the therapist.  I proposed to counteract this possibility by 
making it as clear as I could that they were free to say no without prejudice. I hoped 
this would address the concerns that participants would only be consenting out of 
deference (or gratitude) to the therapist or fears that it might be seen as negative and 
hinder their graduation from the programme.   
These concerns were also shared by the School of Education Ethics 
Committee who approved the project in February 2005 on the condition that the 
invitation to participants to participate in the research project invitation would first of 
all come from the manager of the regional agency where the research was to be 
conducted. It was thought potential participants would find it easier to say no to the 
manager rather than to me. The manager would explain the voluntary nature of their 
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participation.  Following this conversation a letter of introduction from the manager 
(Appendix One) was given or posted to the potential participants with the information 
form attached (Appendix Two).  It was hoped the letter would counteract any 
deference or sense of loyalty they felt to the therapist and give them a clear 
permission to decide not to participate.  It would also emphasise that “Andrew 
intends to write stories about his experiences while working on the programme”.  The 
final step in the recruitment process would take place when the participants agreed to 
meet with me, once they had been informed of the date they would be graduating 
from the treatment programme.  At this meeting I went through the informed consent 
form (Appendix Three) to ensure their understanding of the content and to answer 
any questions. These forms gave relevant details regarding such things as my 
identity; what the research would be used for; what was expected of participants; 
confidentiality; publication of papers and presentations at conferences based on the 
research; and opportunities to read all drafts of the autoethnographies and details 
clarifying acceptance or declining participation.  In order to assist participants to 
understand what they were consenting to, I read through the information form with 
them and had a discussion with them about the research.  The information form 
explained the research project and their right to decline consent. Participants therefore 
would have a sense of what they were committing themselves to.   
It was also explained this consent could be withdrawn at any time prior to the 
submission of the thesis for examination.  When a draft story was completed after the 
participant had graduated, the intention was to give the participant a copy of the story. 
They could then decline their consent, give consent on the basis of certain changes 
being made or continue to give consent for the story to be included in the PhD 
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without changes.   Given that the consent could be withdrawn after the young man 
had graduated, I reasoned that participants therefore had no further need to defer to 
my interests as a researcher because of the power relation established by my dual role 
as a therapist. 
The agency was very supportive of the research but they had been primarily 
used to positivist psychological research.  Understandably they were cautious about 
what I was proposing. During August 2005 I attended a meeting with my chief 
supervisor and the agency management team in the city to discuss the research. 
Following this meeting the clinical manager of the agency in the city emailed the 
following understanding that had been reached in relation to the proposed 
autoethnographies: 
 
 Andrew will get consent from all participants at the commencement of his 
research (not the commencement of treatment).  
  
 His research will be available for reading by the clients when they are at the 
end of treatment. This will hopefully mitigate the possibility of the therapy 
being contaminated by the self-disclosure of his therapeutic process contained 
in the writing.  
  
 Should Andrew decide to include material about other therapists in his study, 
then their consent must be sought.  
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 Andrew will consult with Ratapu Rangiawha (cultural consultant) about any 
Maori clients he uses in his research.  
  
 Andrew will keep the agency informed about his research as he goes along, 
particularly in regard to his presentation of the agency‟s policy, practice and 
related information. 
 
  Andrew will present his research to the agency‟s Journal Club when he is 
ready to do so. 
 
I went ahead with this plan following the protocols agreed to with the School of 
Education Ethics Committee and the agency.  In December 2005, three participants 
gave their consent just prior to their graduation from the programme and I agreed to 
contact them when I had finished a final draft of the story, send them a copy and then 
arrange to meet with them to discuss and clarify if they required any changes to be 
made. After meeting with the participants, I was able to discuss the effect reading the 
story had on them.  One of the participants thought it was okay and I did not need to 
make any changes.  The other two participants both told me they had found reading 
the story affirming of the changes they had made and they also felt it was another 
way in which they were giving something back to the community.   
Autoethnographic research created many ethical dilemmas in relation both to 
my participants, team members and the agency, as well as the responsibilities I feel 
towards my family members.  Autoethnographic methodology encourages the writer 
to be honest about his or her  thoughts and feelings, guided by ethical concerns. 
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Given that I was committed to sharing these stories with my participants there were 
the concerns about inadvertently re-starting the therapeutic relationship or bringing 
up issues that were painful to the participant.  It was of central importance to me that 
my research practices did not in any way harm or undermine the treatment gains 
already made.  On the other hand, I believed I had a right and a moral obligation as 
someone who was an indirect victim of sexual offending to tell my story.  My 
dilemma was to find the right balance between these competing claims, while at the 
same time telling my story.   
I particularly struggled with how best to deal with my personal disclosures 
and my responsibility to family members.  Would I meet with them and discuss it?  
Let them read the relevant story?  Embargo the relevant chapter(s)? Use another 
name? Or just go ahead in the knowledge that family members are unlikely to read 
my thesis.  I agreed with Ellis (2004) that “If we don‟t take our work back to those 
we write about, we better have very good reasons for not doing so” (p. 145).  
Therefore when I had completed a complete draft of the thesis I decided to visit my 
sister and allow her to read chapter 11 – the chapter within which I disclose most 
about my family.  I knew my sister had struggled with these issues in her own way.  
She read the chapter and was visibly moved by it.  I believe she found it honouring of 
our father.  I contemplated letting my Mum also read the chapter.  She asked me 
about it and I told her how I discussed my father‟s “illness”.  I asked Mum if she 
wanted to read it and she declined.  In regards to references to my friend at university, 
well she is dead, but her memory lives on 32 years hence.  In regards to my first wife 
and my three sons from that marriage, I decided that the story was more about me 
than them. I deleted any possible negative comments about my first wife, so that even 
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if she did read it, it could not be taken as a disparaging portrayal.  However, I did 
want to leave some significant details in, so as to convey the experience of my own 
sense of loss following the end of my first marriage.  Finally, I guess if I try to put all 
this into a nutshell - I wanted to be as clear as possible for my own peace of mind that 
I wasn‟t using these stories to promote myself – that I wasn‟t using or exploiting my 
participants or family members for self-gain.   
Finally, I also decided to use a composite character to represent my work on 
the programme with participants who were placed in out-of-home care. In fact, I 
became interested in the idea of designing a composite character not only on the basis 
of my personal experience of adolescence and my therapy/research experience but 
also on the various typologies that have been developed in the literature to profile the 
kind of young person who might engage in harmful sexual behaviours (Lambie & 
Seymour, 2006). However, following the work of Angrosino (1998) I claim that my 
representations are grounded in lived experience as well as being creations of the 
imagination.  Other therapists, such as Luepnitz (2002) and Yalom (1991), have 
written stories about their work with real people who have given consent on the basis 
that their identity would be disguised.  Luepnitz (p. 10-12) states that she struggled 
with finding the balance between concerns for confidentiality and for writing about 
real people:  
 
My imperfect solution has been to write stories about real (but carefully 
disguised) patients who have graciously granted me permission to do so. I 
have tried to render faithfully the substance of the clinical work, while 
changing information that could identify actual people.  
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Although I have combined both solutions in this project, I believe the fictional 
autoethnographies describe characters and the process of therapy with the same level 
of verisimilitude as do the stories based on actual participants. 
 
4.7       Participants and sampling procedures 
For the purpose of this thesis I was the primary participant, studying myself as 
a therapist on an adolescent sexual offending programme.  The other participants 
were recruited from the agency within which I worked as a contract therapist.
4
  The 
sampling process was purposive and opportunistic, all participants coming from my 
own case load.  The referral process was basically a random process where new 
referrals would be distributed at regular team meetings, depending on capacity. Three 
participants were invited to participate in the project and all three accepted. All 
participants were sixteen years or over at the time they were invited to participate.  As 
described previously the participants received a letter from the manager of the clinical 
programme advising them about my project and stating clearly that they were under 
no obligation to participate (Appendix One).  An information form about the research 
was also included in this letter (Appendix Two).  I then arranged a meeting with the 
participants after they had graduated from the programme to discuss their thoughts 
about including their story in the research. Participants were invited to ask questions 
about the research and I endeavoured to clarify what was involved in the research and 
                                                 
4
 In respect to the personal and professional relationships that are represented in the stories, those who 
played a significant role, such as Dr Magid, and my sister and mother were consulted about their 
inclusion. 
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the potential benefits of the research. Voluntary consent forms were then signed 
(Appendix Three).     
After the three participants had given their informed consent to participate, 
approximately one to six months later they were given a draft of the autoethnographic 
story based upon our work together.  Participants read the story and had the 
opportunity to refuse consent or to suggest changes or amendments.  They were also 
invited to write their own commentary on the story.   As it turned out all three 
participants liked the stories and suggested only minor changes.  
 
4.8     Data generation and analysis 
Following consent being given by participants, my autoethnographic stories 
about therapy were drafted primarily on the basis of the detailed process notes that I 
had written following therapy sessions, including reflections on my own subjective 
experience and my empathic conjectures on the subjective experience of the 
participant.  These process notes were kept separate from the personal files kept in the 
agency office. I saw this method of data generation as a variation of the use of 
process notes used in supervision (Gabbard, 2004; Lichtenberg et al., 1996).  Part of 
this was an ongoing study of my own subjective experience of the therapy session: 
 
Presenting process notes of sessions is probably the preferred modality of 
supervision for individual long-term dynamic psychotherapy in most training 
centers. The reason for this preference has a lot to do with how “data” are 
defined in psychodynamic work. Psychodynamic therapists are interested in 
more than the dialogue between two parties. On the basis of the conceptual 
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model that psychotherapy is essentially a two-person enterprise, supervisors in 
dynamic therapy want to know what is happening inside the therapist. When 
process notes are presented in supervision, supervisors want to know how the 
therapist felt about the patient, how the therapist thought about various 
interventions presented to the patient, and how the therapist experienced the 
patient‟s response to the interventions. Data, in this regard, are construed as 
involving the therapist‟s subjectivity and countertransference in all their 
various manifestations (Gabbard, 2004, p. 175) 
   
Of course, I knew that details of my interactions with the other participants could 
only be included in the research following the process of informed consent.  
Therefore, I didn‟t know at the time of writing, if these particular detailed process 
notes would later be able to be used as material to be transformed into the stories to 
be included in the research report. 
 The primary data were therefore generated using a combination of these 
process notes based on past therapy sessions, autobiographical memories of relevant 
events from my own personal and professional life (Ellis, 2004), and observing and 
utilising my self as research tool. This also involved using my therapeutic 
imagination to create some of the fictionalised dialogue including my ability to attune 
myself to the participant through a process of vicarious introspection coming to an 
appreciation of how the participant experienced the world (Elson, 1986; Wolf, 1988).  
Writing the therapy stories positioned me as both a therapist in transformation and as 
a compassionate witness to others, helping to deepen my empathic connection with 
participants (Berger, 2001; Weingarten, 2003).  It also allowed me to reflect on my 
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therapy practice and relations with therapy participants from a distance: for example, 
my feelings and concerns about their progress in therapy; my worries about risk 
management; the effect of the larger institutional context on my work; how this work 
impacted on my personal-professional life and how I coped with the demands of the 
work. I decided to write about my own subjective experience of therapy, my empathic 
understanding of the participants and our shared experience of the therapeutic 
relationship (intersubjective field) from my perspective as the therapist.  I did 
consider collaborating with these young men on their own writing projects, to tell 
their own stories, but decided against this on the ethical grounds that I was imposing 
my research agenda on the therapy process.   
Autoethnographers seek to write of personal experience in a way that 
represents lived experience as taking place within a sociocultural context (Denzin, 
2003; Ellis, 1999). They use narrative techniques such as rich descriptions and 
dramatic dialogues in order to do this (Ellis, 2004).  Like other attempts to represent 
the process of psychotherapy in a fictional form (Luepnitz, 2002; Orbach, 2002; 
Yalom, 1991),   I wanted to convey some of the challenges of this work, including: 
mistakes I have made, the ethical dilemmas experienced by being positioned as an 
agent of social control and a caring and empathic therapist, as well as documenting 
how the work with the young men and their families has contributed to my 
professional development and  identity as a therapist. 
In reflecting on my practice through the lens of autoethnographic research, I 
was able to capture insights which arguably would not have been possible through 
more orthodox forms of qualitative research.  For example, video/audio tapes of 
interviews do not allow us to observe the therapist‟s internal dialogue and feelings 
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(Balint et al., 1972). Of course, the reader is reliant on the degree of honesty I am able 
to bring to this work. Ethically, I believe this places the therapist in a more vulnerable 
position than research that focuses on the experience of the client or on the textual 
analysis of transcripts.  It takes us up close and personal, revealing much that would 
have remained hidden to the camera or other methodological investigations. 
However, I did sometimes regret not having taped some of my work.  It still could 
have been written-up in an autoethnographic style.  But again, I was dealing with 
some sensitive issues and I don‟t regret my decision not to go down that path. 
 In the tradition of autoethnography, the act of writing the story itself is 
understood to be a form of narrative analysis (Polkinghorne, 1995); this is because 
the aim of autoethnography is to show, rather than tell (Ellis, 2004).  However, the 
stories are analysed in the final two chapters from the perspective of both the 
systemic-narrative therapy traditions and the relational therapy tradition, which 
makes links between theory and practice.  This is a highly selective process and I am 
sure that each reader will read the stories differently and will have different 
experiences and draw different meanings from the stories.   
 
4.9     Two-way account of research 
Traditional accounts of research are predominantly one-way accounts, in 
which the researcher, through the use of various methods extracts knowledge from 
the research subjects.  The research subject is constructed as the „other‟ that these 
methods act upon.  White (1997 p. 130-32) describes a “two-way” account of 
therapy, whereby the therapist acknowledges the contribution the person who has 
been consulting them has made to the development of their skills and knowledge. In a 
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similar way, the term mutuality is used in relational therapy to convey the concept 
that in relational therapy both the therapist and the participant undergo a mutual 
process of transformation (Aron, 1996).  In the same way, I thought a two-way 
account of research would discuss the effect on the researcher(s) of entering into a 
research relationship.  Research subjects in two-way accounts of research are 
constructed as “participants” or “co-researchers” (Crocket, Drewery, McKenzie, 
Smith, & Winslade, 2004; Etherington, 2004; Speedy, 2008; Tootell, 2004) who act 
to influence or change the understandings of the principal researcher(s).  A two-way 
account of research challenges the traditional power relations inherent in most 
research discourse and foregrounds the contributions of co-researchers to the 
professional development of the principal researcher (Crocket et al., 2004; Gaddis, 
2004).  It helps to clarify, refine and re-story the principal researcher‟s own way of 
thinking about and practising therapy and research.  This will be evident throughout 
the thesis as I describe my research journey, but I will also return to this question at 
the end of the final chapter when I describe how participating in this research 
contributed to the enrichment of my own professional identity as a practitioner 
researcher. 
Most journal articles give a sanitised picture of the research process in much 
the same way that presentations of therapy stories are “glossed” and “do not 
adequately represent the disorderly process of therapy”(White, 1993, p. 22). This 
form of academic writing is often encouraged by editorial requirements that “promote 
a distorted technical picture of scientific research as a logical, linear process – which 
is far from the continually changing actual research process with its surprises, design 
changes, and reformulations of concepts and hypotheses” (Kvale, 1996, p. 83). I 
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therefore wanted to write about my research in an experience-near narrative style to 
which autoethnography lends itself, rather than the experience-distant style of most 
paradigmatic research reports (Bruner, 1986). I was committed to personalising and 
telling the story of my research journey as part of my methodological commitment to 
reflexive research and writing.  However, I discovered that the writing process was 
not just about telling a story, the writing process itself was a path of discovery:  
 
… I consider writing as a method of inquiry, a way of finding out about 
yourself and your topic. Although we usually think about writing as a mode of 
“telling” about the social world, writing is not just a mopping-up activity at 
the end of a research project. Writing is also a way of “knowing” – a method 
of discovery and analysis. By writing in different ways, we discover new 
aspects of our topic and our relationship to it. Form and content are 
inseparable (Richardson, 1994, p. 516). 
 
In writing about myself I transformed myself. 
Reflexive research is, by definition, inclusive of the self of the researcher(s) in 
the final write-up of the research report (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). Following the 
principle that form and content are inseparable, the style in which I chose to write this 
thesis was therefore both a political and methodological act, aimed at making my 
subjectivity visible, unlike traditional academic writing which aims to render the 
subjectivity of the researcher invisible. This commitment to reflexive writing seemed 
to fit with my relational approach to therapy in that it supported my commitment to 
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rendering my prejudices visible while at the same time embodying a dialogic 
approach to meaning making. 
 
4.10     Redefining validity: Alternative principles 
Validity is a contingent concept; its definition is dependent on the particular 
research methodology it is located in; however our understanding of the nature of 
truth is central to any theorisation of validity (Winter, 2000).  In order to simplify this 
discussion, I am going to discuss the difference between the objectivist-realist 
epistemology which underpins most quantitative research and the hermeneutic 
(perspectival-realist) paradigm which underpins various qualitative methodologies.  
The hermeneutic paradigm does not abandon realism for relativism but embraces a 
moderate or perspectival realism, allowing therapy to take into account the findings 
of other disciplines, (in this instance, neurobiology, infant research and attachment 
research).  However, in the hermeneutic paradigm therapy is a moral enterprise where 
the self-understanding that arises is dependent on dialogue, and involves our 
awareness of both our emotional and cognitive responses to the other and our 
awareness of their responses to us.   Because understanding is specific to the 
particular individual (in contrast to explanations which are universal) therapy needs to 
be reinvented anew at each encounter.  Understanding is also inevitably partial and 
often mistaken.  In this paradigm, then, our understanding is fallible (Orange, 2005). 
Within the objectivist-realist paradigm, validity is often defined according to 
the correspondence theory of truth.   This understanding argues that a statement is 
true, if it in some ways accurately represents, approximates or predicts events which 
occur in the world (Winter, 2000).   It is assumed that we have access to this world, 
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and that is it an objective world. Validity within this paradigm is also often associated 
with the word reliability.   Reliability also has numerous definitions, however it does 
seem to refer more to the instruments which are used to measure or quantify reality.  
Hence, reliability refers to whether the instruments which are used in fact measure 
what they purport to measure.   This suggests that if the investigation is repeated 
exactly as before it will yield the same results.  Hence we have the twin concepts of 
reliability and accuracy. This is how validity is most often understood in quantitative 
research.  This can also be the case in qualitative research, when instruments such as 
questionnaires are used to measure constructs such as intelligence or depression or 
anxiety.  Such research goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the instrument gives 
an accurate and reliable assessment of the object being studied.  
 In contrast to objectivist research is the hermeneutic tradition.  Hermeneutic 
philosophy has its origins in the interpretation of biblical texts.  This was then 
extended to include historical and literary texts.  Historians such as Dilthey (1961) 
argued that because human beings have intentions and are therefore actors, in order to 
understand history we have to understand the subjectivity of these historical agents.  
Hence, the concept of “verstehen” or understanding became central to the 
hermeneutic project.  Dilthey argued that the human sciences were concerned with 
meaningful relationships, not causal relationships.  Explanation is therefore replaced 
by understanding.   What Dilthey means by understanding is insight into the working 
of a human mind, or, as Dilthey himself says, “the rediscovery of the I in the Thou” 
(Dilthey, 1961, p. 39).  Gadamer (1975/1989) developed the tradition of 
philosophical hermeneutics where he argued that the meaning of truth did not have to 
be confined to the narrow definitions of objectivist epistemology.  Human truth is 
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ontologically different to natural truth because we are historical beings who can enter 
into dialogue.  The truth of the orbits of the planets is the not the same truth that is 
captured in Van Gogh‟s painting of the wheat field the day before he died.  The 
planets do not have a subjective experience and hence are not conscious of the 
passage of time.  They can be studied as objects and reduced to mathematical 
dimensions in a way which is congruent with their being.  But the truth expressed in a 
Van Gogh painting cannot be reduced to mathematics it can only be experienced by 
someone who is seeing or indeed reading the text.  This truth is the truth of human 
experience and it is represented in visual art and literary art forms.  And, Gadamer 
argues, we can enter into a dialogue with these texts in the same way in which we 
enter dialogue with another human being.  By entering into dialogue we are 
potentially open to being changed or moved by the experience.  Or to use Gadamer‟s 
own metaphor, our horizon of understanding is expanded. Research founded in the 
hermeneutic tradition acknowledges that our knowledge is relative to the historical 
period and cultural world we inhabit.  Hence the concepts of validity and the related 
concept of reliability are re-interpreted.   
Gadamer argued that there is a reality but that we only ever understand that 
reality from a particular perspective.  Hermeneutics is concerned with understanding, 
as opposed to knowing.  Hermeneutics starts with the text and then the text is seen as 
a metaphor for the person.  We seek to understand a text in the same way we seek to 
understand a person.   Before we engage a text we bring with us our horizon of 
understanding, all the background preconceptions and prejudices which form our 
worldview.  When we read a text the text may challenge our background knowledge.  
If we enter fully into the text and seek to understand what the text is trying to say we 
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may be changed in the process.  Similarly when we try and understand what our 
conversational partner wants to communicate we seek to understand her perspective, 
which may be different to our own.  Understanding is therefore not concerned with 
correspondence with some objective reality that can be pointed towards as the 
ultimate arbitrator; understanding is concerned with understanding perspectives only.  
Although there is only one reality, there are only perspectives when it comes to 
understanding.   
When these concepts are applied to therapy, self-understanding becomes the 
principle goal of the therapy process.  Because understanding is essentially a 
contextual and relational process, requiring two or more people engaged in a 
conversation, the true locus of hermeneutics is this “in-between”; therefore “no 
method, technique, or procedure will yield understanding” (Orange, 1995, p. 16).  
Autoethnography is located in this hermeneutic tradition, along with other forms of 
reflexive research which are concerned to highlight the subjective presence and 
experience of the researcher (Etherington, 2004).  In autoethnographic research, 
personal narrative and fictional writing techniques are used to evocatively represent a 
scene from life as lived by the autoethnographer.   There is no neutral outside 
observer who can witness the tale and tell us if it was truth.  So is validity a concept 
that can be defined for autoethnography?  Also, how does reflexive research deal with 
the challenge of bias? 
Etherington (2004) argues that we need to feel we can trust the researcher.   
Does he tell us enough to give us the confidence that what he said he did he actually 
did?  This is related to researcher transparency.  Does the researcher disclose enough 
about his personal and professional history for us to understand how they bias his 
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research interventions?  Therefore, in reflexive research the problem of bias is dealt 
with by acknowledging that the research will be inevitably biased but this is balanced 
by the researcher‟s attempt to expose this bias through the use of self-reflexivity: 
 
I understand researcher reflexivity as the capacity of the researcher to 
acknowledge how their own experiences and contexts (which might be fluid 
and changing) inform the process and outcomes of inquiry.  If we can be 
aware of how our own thoughts, feelings, culture, environment and social and 
personal history inform us as we dialogue with participants, transcribe their 
conversations with us and write our representations of the work, then perhaps 
we can come close to the rigour that is required of good qualitative research 
(Etherington, 2004, p. 31-32). 
 
 Secondly, we have to allow ourselves to trust our curiosity for stories and to trust our 
experience of the story.  Was it believable?  Did it ring true?  In other words, we 
allow ourselves to immerse ourselves in the story – do we identify with any character, 
do we become emotionally involved?  In many ways, the reader of an 
autoethnography is called upon to do the same as the researcher, to judge the story, 
among other criteria, by the extent to which he or she is emotionally moved by the 
story (Etherington, 2004).  
According to McLeod (1997), who has published widely on research into 
counselling and psychotherapy, practitioner researchers into therapy will always have 
trouble validating their findings, when validity is defined according to positivist 
criteria.  Therefore, McLeod believes it is important to develop alternative criteria 
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that are applicable to all practitioner research projects regardless of the specific 
methodology they have developed or chosen for their study.  These criteria can then 
be used to validate the findings from qualitative studies carried out by practitioners. 
He states: 
 
It has already been suggested that to be able to develop knowledge that 
enriches practice, it is necessary to be as explicit as possible about the 
organisational and personal context within which the research was carried out.  
This principle leads to the following criteria for practitioner research: 
 
 A good practitioner research study will provide sufficient descriptive 
detail of clients, counsellors, the counselling approach, setting, social and 
political context, etc., for readers to be able to make informed judgements 
regarding the similarity and applicability of the study to their own 
practice; 
 
 A good practitioner research study will provide sufficient information on 
the personal engagement of the researcher(s) in the study, and their 
heuristic process, for the reader to be able to make a judgement 
concerning authenticity, „ownership‟ and personal integrity (1999, p.18). 
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However, I believe these general criteria need to be supplemented by redefining 
validity in a way that makes it more suitable to assess the type of findings produced 
by autoethnography.   
In contrast to positivist research, where findings are understood to be the end 
result of the application of a procedural method, autoethnographers “ turn to criteria 
for judging the processes and outcomes of research projects rather than the methods 
by which outcomes are produced” (Ellis, 2004, p. 124). Autoethnographic 
productions are designed to be read, viewed or performed.  It is in the reading, 
viewing and performing and the impact that this has on the reader, viewer or audience 
that the validity of autoethnographic research is to be found.  I think it is helpful 
therefore, to develop some specific criteria for evaluating the findings of 
autoethnographic research, without implying that these are the only possible criteria.  
I have identified the following six principles for evaluating autoethnographic 
findings from the literature (Denzin, 1997; 2003; Ellis, 2004; Etherington, 2004; 
Lietz, Langer, & Furman, 2006; Polkinghorne, 1995; Richardson, 2000).  The first 
principle is emotional evocativeness. Do the stories touch our hearts in some way?  
Do they engender tears and laughter? Secondly, do the stories “hold” the 
readers/audience? Do they engage the reader/audience in some form of self-reflection 
on their own experience?  Thirdly, do the stories show how autoethnographic writing 
can also be a therapeutic act, a process of self-transformation?  Fourthly, do the 
stories achieve a sense of verisimilitude? Are they convincing? Do they ring true?  
Fifthly, do the stories demonstrate political relevance? Do they have the potential to 
generate debate and policy change? Finally, are the stories trustworthy? Do they 
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faithfully represent my relationships with the other participants, family members and 
other professionals? 
The first and second principles reminded me of the way in which I would 
evaluate my song-writing or a novel I had read.  A song only works for me if it 
moves or touches me in some way.  A good song generally evokes emotions, such as 
laughter or sadness.  Or it may make us want to get up and dance or become active 
politically!  A song has to engage me on an emotional level for me to want to perform 
it.  If I cannot feel my way into a song then it is certain that the audience also will not 
feel the song.  Similarly, with good fictional writing, the reader is absorbed in the 
text:  
  
 This is because the authors of these novels exercise an array of options in 
fostering dramatic engagement in the reading of the text.  This provides 
readers with many invitations to contribute to the development of the story-
line and to live out the drama of it.  For example, well-structured novels have 
many gaps in the storyline that must be filled in by the reader.  Good writers 
do not spell everything out, and the reader is required to participate in putting 
two and two together to make four, in bringing together specific events into 
sequences unfolding across time in the revealing of the plot, and in 
reconciling this with the underlying theme of the story. (White, 2007, p. 77) 
 
In this interpretation of active rather than passive reading, the reader literally 
performs the text. Thus, I evaluated my autoethnographic writings in the same way – 
did they engage and move me in some way when I read them?  This could also be 
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amplified, when I would test out the stories by reading them aloud to myself. In 
reading the stories I would be able to feel the emotion in a more visceral way. I think 
another criterion of good autoethnography is that it is always both an expression of 
the writer‟s genuine emotional experience – the ideas may not be unique, but the 
emotional experience is always unique and at the same time resonant with many other 
people‟s experience. 
 My experience of writing autoethnography helped me to also relate to the 
third principle: autoethnography can be understood as a form of therapeutic writing 
(Ellis, 2004).  This worked on both the personal and professional level. On a 
professional level it contributed to an empathic understanding of all the participants 
including raising awareness of the state of the therapeutic alliance.  I think 
practitioner autoethnographic research into therapy can be used in individual 
supervision in much the same way as other forms of recording such as process notes, 
audio and video recordings.  It can also be understood as a form of self-supervision. 
On a personal level, the stories contributed to helping me work through deeply 
personal emotions in relationship to my father. In this way the writing can also be 
understood as a form of therapeutic writing or self-therapy. 
   I could also relate to the fourth and fifth principles. I hoped that 
autoethnography would help me to challenge the tendency to duality in our 
professional, public and family culture towards seeing everyone and everything in 
terms of us and them, inner and outer, subjective and objective, victim and 
perpetrator.  I wanted to show an understanding based upon inclusivity rather than 
exclusivity, where a person can be both a victim and perpetrator. The world we 
inhabit is historical and cultural; we are also embodied.  The emotions we experience 
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are therefore a mix of the universal primary emotions experienced by all human 
beings, such as anger, joy and sadness and how these emotions are expressed (or not 
expressed) according to culturally determined prescriptions. We are born into unique 
historical, cultural and family constellations and we develop idiosyncratic sexual 
fantasies, dreams, aspirations and ambitions which are still however shaped by our 
historical and cultural horizons.  My thoughts and feelings come and go, but there are 
repetitions, patterns, recurrent themes.  My sense of self from the very beginning is 
created in non-verbal and then verbal conversations and by the process of 
identification with feelings and personal and cultural narratives leading to a sense of 
continuity.   
I think of writing autoethnography as a way of integrating my interest in 
biographical history, the relational self and its historical and cultural context. It can be 
understood as a postmodern alternative to the modernist case study, situating the 
therapist-autoethnographer in the text as both an empathic observer and engaged 
participant. In the same way that disclosing aspects of the researcher‟s own stories in 
ethnographic interviews can help the development of rapport (Berger, 2001), I came 
to see autoethnographic observation and writing as a pathway towards therapeutic 
empathy by introspectively reflecting on my own personal history and imaginatively 
entering into the world of the young person I was working with. Choosing 
autoethnography as my research method allowed me to consider the social and 
cultural context of adolescent sexual offending, while also keeping a focus on my 
own introspective-empathic experience of therapy practice.  As well as observing and 
interacting with my participants, I also had the freedom to include my observations 
and reflections on the larger institutional context of my work, my own attachment 
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history (Holmes, 2001), and how this work impacted on my personal-professional 
life. 
Finally, I was concerned that my research participants and the people from my 
personal and professional life (including Dr. Magid and family members) were 
represented in a respectful and trustworthy way. The representation of the participants 
and Dr. Magid were validated by sending each participant and Dr. Magid a copy of 
the relevant story.  They were invited to edit the story if they did not feel the story 
was a trustworthy representation.  Similarly, my sister read the relevant sections 
relating to our parents and I invited my mother to read the same sections but she 
declined.  This idea does share a family resemblance to the concept of member 
validation often used in qualitative research.  Member validation is used to validate 
the analyst‟s findings by “demonstrating a correspondence” (Bloor, 1997, p 41) with 
the research subject‟s own understandings of what happened.   
    
4.11     Conclusion 
In this chapter I have covered the research process involved in producing this 
thesis on a practical level and I have also discussed some of the philosophical issues 
and ethical dilemmas involved in conducting autoethnographic research with its 
grounding in subjective experience. I believe I have demonstrated my personal 
commitment to finding a balance between protecting the programme participants and 
other family members from unintended harm arising out of the research processes and 
my own right and moral obligation to tell my own story.  I have also made a clear 
distinction between validity, as understood in positivist research and the alternative 
validity criteria that I have developed from my readings of the literature.   
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5. 
MY STORY, PART I 
 
In 1975 I graduated from Keira Boys High School in Wollongong, New 
South Wales, Australia, with a passion for music, literature and philosophy. 
These passions lead me to place a high value on freedom to express 
individual difference and to follow one‟s own path.  I was also introduced to 
the politics of social justice by the lyrics and music of Bob Dylan and John 
Lennon. However, in graduating from high school I had little interest in or 
knowledge of political organisations and collective action to bring about social 
change.  I had been too young to appreciate the excitement and energy 
generated by the election of the Whitlam Labour government in Australia in 
1972.   However, it didn‟t take me long to begin my political education. 
 In the 1970s, although situated between rainforest covered mountains 
and the sparkling blue Pacific Ocean, Wollongong could still be described as 
an industrial city with a large port designed to export coal and steel products.  
Many migrants from Europe had settled in Wollongong following the end of 
the Second World War, and were eagerly swallowed up by the local 
steelworks and coal mines, owned by BHP.  During these years Wollongong 
developed a strong militant trade union movement. While studying for a BA 
degree at Wollongong University (1978-1981) I came under the influence of a 
charismatic sociology lecturer who was also a committed Marxist.  It wasn‟t 
long before he had recruited me into the Communist Party of Australia where 
I met many influential trade union leaders. This was in the late seventies, 
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when it was still possible to dream of a future socialist utopia. I became 
involved with the local trade union movement as a research assistant, with 
the possibility of becoming a future trade union leader.  However, I found the 
relational politics within the party and the union movement to be contradictory 
to the kind of world I was hoping to create.  I remember at the time learning 
from another sociology lecturer, who described herself as an “ecofeminist”, 
that the personal is political; the ends can never justify the means and that 
patriarchal power relations were just as entrenched in left-wing socialist 
parties as they were in the wider society.   I witnessed small factions within 
the party seemingly more concerned with their own territorial battles for power 
than the wider issues of social injustice we were supposed to be addressing. 
After a few years I eventually grew disillusioned and left the party. 
Following this I began working in Sydney as a consultant in both 
Commonwealth and then State Industrial Relations Departments, where I 
specialised in employee participation and industrial democracy projects. 
These projects were designed to facilitate the production of local knowledge 
and expertise from the workforce to improve both jobs and production 
efficiency. During the 1980s when the Hawke Labour government was in 
power in Australia I enjoyed this work very much.  However, when the Work 
Advisory Unit I was working in was abolished following a change of State 
government, I resigned from the public service and began doing a law degree 
with the intention of becoming a self-employed industrial relations consultant; 
this coincided with the birth of my son, and also wanting to work closer to 
home. However, when I commenced studying family law as part of my law 
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degree, I became more interested in family counselling (than family law) and 
did my research essay on this topic (which involved interviewing the local 
counsellor employed by the court).  At the same time my first marriage was 
coming to an end and I had participated with my wife and my adolescent 
step-sons in some family counselling sessions. I hadn‟t studied family 
violence and abuse at university; however, I knew from experience something 
about its effects.  
After separating from my wife in 1993 I enrolled in a social work degree 
at Sydney University. I was 37 years old and eager to revise my personal and 
professional identity! I enjoyed completing this degree, and the major essay 
at the end of first year asked us to write about the practice and theory of 
social work and its relationship to biography and empowerment.   In many 
ways this PhD is another attempt to answer this question that has stayed with 
me through my 13 years of practice since graduating in 1995.  In this essay 
we were encouraged to find social work theory that resonated with our 
biography and personal style.  Building on my knowledge from studying 
sociology in my previous degree, I incorporated my understanding of the 
critical theorist Habermas (1971), who argued that the sciences can be 
divided into the technical interests of the “empirical-analytic” and the practical 
and emancipatory interests of the “historical-hermeneutic” (McCarthy, 1978 p. 
56). The former are concerned with the technical mastery of nature and 
society, with explanation and prediction. The latter are concerned with 
“securing and  expanding possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the 
conduct of life” or the “reflection-in-action mode” of practice (Jones, 1990).  I 
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identified with the argument that social work is a practical-moral activity with 
closer affinities to the arts and humanities than the positivist sciences 
concerned with explanation and prediction (Gray, 2002; Gray & Mcdonald, 
2006; Jones, 1990; Lovat & Gray, 2007; Parton & O'Byrne, 2000).  I was 
attracted to this account of practice as a form of reflection-in-action because it 
was “fitting to situations of instability and uncertainty (most of social work)”.  
This form of practice required a “reflective conversation between enquirer and 
subject in attaining resolution” of problems.  According to Jones (1990), in the 
technical rationality mode, “seen as possibly appropriate in situations of 
stability and certainty (rare in social work), the enquirer applies a pre-
determined procedure to the object in order to solve the problem.” In contrast, 
“reflection-in-action requires openness, mutuality, receptivity, self-adjustment, 
on the spot creativity – qualities understood as the „artistic‟, when this is 
portrayed as polar to the „scientific‟” (p. 189). 
Also in this essay, I wrote about my understanding of spirituality and its 
relationship to social work practice.  I saw that spiritual contemplation and 
spiritual engagement in the world were complementary aspects of the same 
process (Howe, 1987).  I saw that in seeking to understand ourselves we 
understood others better; and in seeking to understand others we understood 
ourselves better. For example, to be with and understand the suffering of 
someone bereaved I turned to my own experience of loss and pain.  
According to Rothberg (1993 ): “the intention of such spirituality is 
simultaneously to inquire into and to transform self and society, self and 
world, not to have to choose to transform only self or only world” (p. 112). 
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I first came across narrative therapy while I was still studying at 
Sydney University, while in the final year of my social work degree in 1995. I 
had successfully gained a placement with a Centacare agency in Sydney that 
specialised in working with people who had been the victims of sexual abuse.  
My agency supervisor at that time was also experienced in working with men 
who had perpetrated abuse, so she introduced me not only to  literature in 
relation to the victims of sexual abuse (Durrant & White, 1990) but also to the 
literature on working with men who had sexually abused children (Jenkins, 
1990). At the time I was already familiar with various schools of family 
therapy, from an optional subject I had taken as part of my social work 
degree.  In fact, I had chosen this placement because the supervisor had 
described a preference for narrative therapy, as being one of the therapy 
models she mostly used in her work.  For the duration of this placement I saw 
one client in weekly therapy over a 12 week period.  He was my first ever 
therapy client: a 14 year old boy who had experienced neglect, physical and 
sexual abuse for most of his life up to the age of 10 when he had been 
removed from his mother‟s care.  His foster father had reached the end of his 
tether because of this young person‟s erratic and often violent temper.  While 
working with this young person and his foster father, we externalised the 
problem of his rage and over the weeks that followed he was able to see a 
connection between the rage and the abuse that had been perpetrated on 
him.  Therefore, in the following year, after successfully completing my social 
work degree, I moved down to Adelaide, South Australia, with my new 
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partner, Annie, to study narrative therapy at the Dulwich Centre and to start a 
new life. 
Narrative therapy, as developed by White and Epston, seemed to me 
to offer a form of political therapy, and a form of political practice that I could 
relate to more on a personal level, than in my previous experiences in union 
and party politics. I liked how narrative therapy drew on the work of the 
French philosopher and historian of ideas, Michel Foucault, to understand 
how power also produced the possibility of resistance to power. Narrative 
therapy seemed to offer a way of working politically on a personal level.  
White and Epston (1990) had brought my attention to how what we as 
counsellors see, hear and describe to others is primarily determined by the 
professional training we have been indoctrinated in. I also learned in my 
narrative therapy training how I could use therapy conversations to bring forth 
the values, skills and local knowledge of participants.  These ideas were 
similar to the vision of the industrial democracy projects I had previously been 
involved with.   
In 1996 I was employed as a project officer by the Northern 
Metropolitan Community Health  Service of South Australia for one year to 
write a manual for group workers working with men who wanted to stop being 
violent in their relationships with women and their families. The agency 
wanted the manual to be written from the position of pro-feminist and 
narrative therapy practice principles.  Rather than taking an educational 
approach (such as the Duluth model), the manual broke new ground by 
encouraging group leaders to take an “experience-near” (White, 1995) 
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position in their work with group members.  It was argued this would be a 
better way of engaging men in the work and was also consistent with 
narrative therapy practice (Tootell et al., 1997).   
After completing the manual I gained employment in child and 
adolescent community mental health. I worked with children who had been 
victims of abuse and neglect and many children who had witnessed domestic 
violence, but I had little experience in working with boys and young men who 
had sexually abused younger children.  However, I never forgot the 
experience of doing group therapy with boys in Murray Bridge (one hour north 
of Adelaide) who had been suspended from school because of violent and 
abusive behaviours towards peers.  It came as no surprise to me to discover 
that these boys had themselves been the victims of violence and abuse, both 
at home and at school.  I saw how these boys would soon be the men I had 
been working with earlier.  Reflective dialogue was a cultural practice few of 
these boys were familiar with.  I found it difficult to engage them in narrative 
therapy style conversations without them jumping out the window and 
escaping from the community health centre where I worked at the time. 
These experiences had a significant impact on me and led to my 
interest in the centrality of the use of self in therapy (Baldwin, 2000), and to 
the psychoanalytic tradition and eventually to self psychology (Wolf, 1988), 
contemporary relational psychoanalysis (Aron, 1996) and contemporary 
attachment-affect regulation theory (Schore & Schore, 2008). Self psychology 
and attachment theory helped me to understand that traumatised, insecurely 
attached children often lacked the capacity for “mentalization or reflective 
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function”, thereby limiting their capacity to engage in narrative retellings of 
their lives (Fonagy et al., 2004).  I responded by paying more attention to 
feelings and the non-verbal aspects of the therapeutic relationship.  This 
included taking therapy outside the consulting room and into community 
parklands and fast food outlets.  I also placed more emphasis on developing 
a sense of safety, playfulness and trust in an attempt to engage the child in a 
therapeutic alliance.    
In 2000 I enrolled in a part-time research masters degree in the 
Department of Psychiatry at Adelaide University.  I completed a Masters 
Research Thesis entitled: Decentring research: Reflecting on reflecting teams 
(Tootell, 2003). For this thesis I interviewed members of a solution-focused 
family therapy reflecting team and their clients in the agency in which I 
worked at the time.  A key finding to emerge from this study was the 
importance of the therapeutic relationship and for “therapists to be there as 
persons not just as professionals” (p. iii).  Therefore even with solution-
focused therapy, the person of the therapist and the quality of the relationship 
were what the participants remembered more than any particular intervention. 
This fitted with a large body of research evidence that more than any model 
or technique it is the qualities of the therapeutic relationship and the individual 
therapist that account for successful treatment outcomes (Horvath & 
Symonds, 1991; Hubble et al., 1999; Luborsky, McLellan, Diguer, Woody, & 
Seligman, 1997).  My research findings also highlighted the experience of 
therapy as being a two-way process, and that the therapist was open to 
change just as much as the client (Tootell, 2003). The degree also included a 
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four-year seminar programme on psychoanalytic theory and treatment 
provided by the members of the South Australian Institute for Psychoanalysis.  
This seminar series introduced me to psychoanalytic developmental theory, 
especially self psychology and attachment theory, and helped me to make 
sense of my work with the disaffiliated boys I was doing therapy with at 
Murray Bridge.  This programme also introduced me to contemporary 
relational psychoanalysis and intersubjectivity theory (Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 
1990; Stolorow et al., 1994) and contemporary infant research (Sroufe, 1995; 
Stern, 1985/2000).  At this time I also engaged in weekly personal 
psychoanalytic therapy with Dr. Ric Curnow and fortnightly psychoanalytic 
supervision with Dr. Elizabeth Heath. 
At the end of 2002, I obtained a senior social work position in child and 
adolescent mental health at the Innisfail hospital in Northern Queensland. 
While working there I suffered from a sense of professional isolation.  It was 
then that I started up an email correspondence with a psychoanalyst and Zen 
teacher named Dr. Barry Magid. Barry, who is based in Manhattan, practices 
in the self psychology tradition, and my personal and professional relationship 
with Barry continues to enrich my understanding of therapy and Zen practice 
today. 
During 2003, while working in Northern Queensland, I completed my 
master‟s thesis on research into family therapy in a child and adolescent 
mental health agency in South Australia.  I approached the Dulwich Centre in 
Adelaide, with my friend and colleague, Dr. Steven Gaddis, to generate 
interest in producing a journal on narrative forms of research.  Cheryl White, 
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one of the directors of the Dulwich Centre, encouraged us to make contact 
with the staff members of the Department of Human Development and 
Counselling at the University of Waikato, New Zealand.  I therefore began an 
email correspondence with Assoc. Prof. Wendy Drewery and Dr. Kathie 
Crocket.   When in March 2004 I landed in New Zealand, Wendy was the first 
person I visited and we began a conversation about the possibility of doing a 
PhD.  Shortly after that I gained employment as a contract therapist on an 
adolescent sexual offending programme, and the idea of this thesis began to 
form. 
The agency in which I worked had grown since the early 1990s into a 
busy non-governmental agency specialising in both adult and adolescent 
sexual offending assessment and treatment programmes.  The regional office 
in which I worked had previously been used as a medical centre.  It consisted 
of a staff room and kitchen, four counselling rooms and one group room. The 
floors were carpeted, and one of the counselling rooms had a sand tray and 
lots of figurines for sandplay therapy.  When I arrived, the agency staff 
consisted of a full-time clinical manager and a team of contract therapists, 
who provided an assessment and treatment service to boys and young men5 
who had either acknowledged or had allegedly acted in sexually abusive 
ways. The full adolescent treatment programme involved individual, family 
and group therapy plus an annual wilderness camp.  The agency received 
referrals from Child Youth and Family Services (child protection and juvenile 
                                                 
5
 According to legislation constituting the Youth Court of New Zealand people under 14 years of age 
are defined as “children” and people aged 14, 15 and 16 are defined as “young persons”.  For the 
duration of this dissertation I will adopt this definition. 
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justice) for youth aged 12-17.  Before being offered the position, I had met 
with the clinical manager who had then introduced me to all the members of 
the treatment team. They were all experienced therapists with a broad range 
of trainings and expertise, ranging from cognitive-behaviour therapy, to 
gestalt therapy and narrative therapy. They worked within a common 
framework of professional standards which had been developed over the 
years by the agency, and the Australian and New Zealand Association for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ANZATSA). As a team, they met once a week 
to discuss new referrals, comprehensive assessment reports and other 
clinical issues.     
Prior to me starting work the agency had organised a powhiri, a 
traditional Maori ceremony, associated with the welcoming and hosting of 
visitors onto the marae6 (Barlow, 1991). These traditions had been adapted 
into many aspects of Pakeha New Zealand culture and in this case the 
powhiri was to welcome both Annie and me to the agency and also to New 
Zealand.  It was a moving experience, culminating in each participant naming 
their river and mountain that marks their place of home.  At the end of the 
ceremony, the guests who had been welcomed were required to sing a song.  
Annie stood next to me and although we were both nervous, we proudly sang 
a song in Gaelic from our own collection of Australian-Celtic songs we had 
written and recorded in the Adelaide Hills in 1996. It felt right, honouring the 
                                                 
6
 A marae (or community house) is where members of whanau (family community) who belong to a 
geographically located hapu (section of an iwi or tribe/people) meet for celebrating family events, 
mediating conflict and welcoming visitors.  The marae also house the ancestors, whose photographs 
are displayed on the walls of the marae. 
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indigenous culture in New Zealand, still vibrant and alive, along with the 
distant indigenous culture of our own ancestry, long since lost. 
Ten years had now passed since I had started my social work-therapy 
journey.  It has been suggested that “the first decade of our professional life is 
spent imitating the master clinicians before we ever consider what we really 
believe in our hearts” (Kottler, 1986, p. 15).  My first master was Michael 
White.  However, I was now searching to find a way to express my own 
unique way of doing therapy.  However, the enduring legacy of Michael‟s 
teaching on my work was not his model of narrative therapy, but his personal 
qualities: his attention to detail; his warmth, empathy, respect and humility 
and perhaps more than anything else, the sense of never giving up, the hope 
that there was always some sparkling event, some unique outcome or 
initiative, no matter how small, that was there waiting to be discovered. 
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6. 
Billy’s Story 
 
 
Billy was brought to his first assessment session by his foster mother, Kate 
Smith; he was a small fourteen year old boy with fair hair, freckles and an engaging 
smile, when he smiled, which was not often. Kate had previous experience as a nurse 
and was an experienced foster carer.   Kate explained that Billy had been living with 
her for about three months; at first on a trial basis and now on a permanent basis.  
She said it had been a difficult period of adjustment for them both.  Billy‟s previous 
placements had broken down due to his challenging behaviours.  
Prior to the meeting I had learned from the referral information that Billy was 
taken into foster care when he was 6 years old along with his siblings.  As so often 
happens, the siblings had been separated and placed with different families. Both his 
father and mother had drinking problems when he had lived at home and his father 
was violent towards his mother. His father was now in jail.  His mother had 
apparently given up drinking and was currently looking after two young 
grandchildren because they had been removed from the care of her oldest daughter.     
At this initial meeting (as it was to be in future meetings) Billy found it hard to 
talk about his birth mother.   As Billy narrated to me this brief chronicle of his life I 
thought about the emotional pain of rejection that must have underlain much of 
Billy‟s external behaviours, which Billy needed to dissociate from in order to 
maintain his hope for some future reconciliation. Unfortunately, the longer a child 
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has been in foster care the more difficult it is to facilitate reunification with birth 
parents, leaving caseworkers and therapists with the only other alternative of trying 
to facilitate developmental attachment to foster carers.    
At this first meeting we talked about what Billy could remember about his 
family of origin, which was not much.  It felt like his life story was full of blank pages.  
I learned he had three brothers and two sisters.  He had sexually offended against his 
younger sister during one of the previous foster placements.  There had been a lot of 
sexualized behaviour occurring among all the siblings.  There had been conjectures 
among the professionals involved that Billy had been sexually abused by his father 
and/or possibly an older brother.  The older brother was himself up for sexual assault 
charges. Billy did not have much contact with his siblings.  He told us he would like 
to see them and his birth mother more often, but he realised his birth Mum was really 
busy and didn‟t have that much time, so he attempted to reconcile himself to the 
situation.   
I changed the subject and talked about school and his social interests. Billy 
said he had plenty of friends, but I knew from the referral information that he really 
didn‟t have any friends.   
Children who suffer from relational trauma often have difficulty forming 
intimate relationships, first with peers and later with adults.  Relationships tend to be 
superficial and shallow.  One person or object can easily replace another one.  One 
way of understanding this is that they have not experienced an attachment 
relationship of any depth.  Another way of understanding this is that it is a protective 
mechanism – you don‟t allow yourself to get too close to anyone – it hurts too much 
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when you get let down!  I sensed Billy‟s loneliness and simultaneously his fear of 
getting close in case he was rejected again.  
He told me he enjoyed cricket, rugby and basketball.  Kate told me he won 1
st
 
place in the school cross country race and then came third in the inter-school event.  
Kate thought he was a “neat kid” and with some help with his school work she 
thought he would “go a long way”.  I was heartened by the ability of Kate to see a 
positive future ahead, but I also knew that it wouldn‟t all be smooth sailing with Billy.  
And I knew that Billy himself found it difficult to envision a positive future for himself.  
There would probably be some storms ahead I thought, but I hoped the placement 
would survive and not sink, as so many in the past had done. 
 “How long do you think you‟ll be staying with Kate, Billy?” I asked matter of 
factly.  Billy looked at Kate and said with a big charming smile “as long as I like”.  I 
continued, “Have you ever felt like you had a home before?” 
Billy lowered his head and said “No.” 
“So this must be very important to you, knowing that you can stay with 
Kate?” 
“Yeah.  I don‟t want to move again”. 
 I asked Billy about how many times he had moved and he named all the 
different foster homes he had been in.  He detailed about seven different places.  Then 
he said emphatically: 
 “I want to stay with Kate till I die.” 
 “That‟s great Billy.”   
 He then turned towards Kate and said, “I have found a home for the first 
time.” 
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*   *   *   *   *   * 
Billy attended the programme once per week, having the whole day off school 
in order to this. He would arrive early in the morning for his group session, which 
would be followed by his individual session with me.  The weeks went by and then the 
months. Progress was slow and Billy was difficult to engage.   Today he didn‟t look 
happy. I invited him into the counselling room.  He sat down glumly and glared up at 
me. 
“I‟ve got a new uniform, thanks to you,” he said, tartly. The tone of voice 
indicated to me that he was not necessarily pleased.   
“I smell, do I?” he said, looking daggers at me and folding his arms in an 
aggressive posture. 
Last week I had noticed that his grey shirt looked as if it hadn‟t been washed 
for a few days.  Then I received a complaint from Billy‟s group leaders saying the 
same thing and also saying the aroma left behind in the room from Billy was not very 
pleasant.  I therefore contacted his caregiver, Kate, and left a message informing her 
about the hygiene issue and also about his school shirt. 
“It looks really good Billy - new shorts as well?” I said, trying hard to sound 
upbeat. 
“Yeah.” 
He did look good.  I thought he was a handsome young man.  But today he did 
not look happy.  Billy seemed to me to vacillate between a cheerful willing to please 
mood and an aggressive “it‟s not fair” mood.  However, in his short life he probably 
had good reason to feel life was not fair.  
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“Look Billy, it wasn‟t just me you know.  I received a complaint from the 
group leaders last week.” 
“Yeah, but it was you who told her.” 
I knew that Billy knew that this was not just about the hygiene issue. He had 
previously told me that he was playing unsupervised with some of the neighbourhood 
children and I had recently informed his social worker and caregiver about this being 
a concern.  
“Look, we talked last week about supervision.  How it‟s a shared 
responsibility, not just mine.  We agreed that you had to take responsibility for 
keeping safe. So, how did you go on the weekend with the neighbourhood children?”  
“Yeah, and I‟m pissed off with that too.” 
“Why?” 
“Well it‟s not fair.  She‟s old enough to be my friend.” 
“How old?” 
“Eleven.” 
“And how old are you?” 
“She could beat me up.”  
 “Look Billy, don‟t take it so personally.  It‟s the contract that you signed 
when you came on the programme.  It‟s not just you; the rules apply to all the guys 
on the programme.  It clearly states that you are not allowed to be alone with 
children unless it is with an informed adult.”  I sounded like a lawyer, I thought, 
distant and somewhat aloof. 
“It‟s just a fuckin stupid piece of paper.” 
“There‟s no need to swear.” 
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“You‟re ruining my life.  There are no other kids my age to play with.” 
“The rules are there to keep you safe.  You don‟t want to put yourself in a 
situation where you‟re alone with a child.” 
“She‟s not a child. She‟s eleven years old.” 
“And you are about to turn fifteen.” 
“So, I told you, she could beat me up.” 
“Well that‟s a bit different from what you told me last week.  You said that 
you enjoyed being „the master‟.” 
“Well, they like to follow me.  I like to be in control.” 
“Don‟t you see Billy? That‟s another reason why it is a safety issue.  
Remember the discussions we have had about power and control and sexual abuse?” 
“No”. 
“Look, you are putting yourself in a seriously risky situation.  However, we 
could inform her father about your past offending.”  I immediately regretted this 
response. It felt like an indirect threat, expressing my irritation and the power 
imbalance in our relationship.   
“No way!” 
“Well then, you‟ll just need to follow the rules.”  I felt I was colliding into 
Billy, rather than working collaboratively. 
 “What else am I going to do?  It‟s really boring!” 
“Are there any clubs you could join so that you could make friends your own 
age?” 
“No.  There‟s nothing to do.  At least at Ed‟s place (previous foster carer) I 
had my playstation.” 
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“You know why that was confiscated.” 
“No I don‟t.” 
“For playing R rated games.” 
“They weren‟t R rated.”   
Billy‟s previous foster carer and guidance officer had been alarmed at what 
they perceived as Billy‟s obsession with violent video games, which Billy himself 
would see as harmless;  hence, another injustice. 
“My friend lets me play on her playstation.” 
“Well, you are not to play with her anymore.” 
“It stinks.  Why can‟t I have my playstation back?” 
“Well, maybe I could bring it up at the next review meeting.” 
I wished I hadn‟t said that.  I didn‟t have a clue what happened to it after 
Billy‟s social worker had taken it.    
I noticed that Billy had been picking at a scab on his knee with a sharp metal 
object he‟d found in the room.  Billy had a bad habit of “picking” at his scabs.  At the 
same time I felt heavy hearted; tired. I noted a familiar negative thought passing 
through my mind: You are not helping this boy - You are a lousy therapist. 
 I knew this voice well, the voice of self-criticism, aiming to expose me as an 
incompetent, fake therapist.  I knew it well because it was often around.  It 
complained, this is a hopeless therapeutic conversation.  You can‟t even ask one 
decent question!    
“Billy can you stop doing that – look, it‟s starting to bleed.” 
Sure enough a blob of red blood had formed on his knee. 
“Can you get me a plaster Andrew?” 
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“Sure, hold on, while I get the first aid kit.” 
I went into the office and fetched the kit.  I searched in the tin container for 
plasters.  Fortunately we had some.  I put one across the sore, and then Billy said: 
“It‟ll fall off if you don‟t put some extra tape around it.” 
I found some tape and Billy instructed me how to do it.  The heaviness I was 
feeling a moment ago was replaced by a feeling of tenderness.  Billy also softened. 
He was being cared for.  I sensed the lack of human warmth and tenderness in his 
life. I knew that Kate felt uneasy about close physical contact with Billy.  I wondered 
when the last time was that someone had genuinely given him a loving cuddle …   
“Would you like to go for a walk and I‟ll get you a bottle of ginger beer?” 
“Yeah.”  
He smiled.  We were friends again.  We walked down the street laughing and 
making small talk and we headed for the bakery which also had a fast-food take-away 
section.   He looked hungrily at the sausages. 
“Look Andrew, they‟re only a dollar, like in the shop near my place.” 
I bought him a sausage.  He appreciated this and it seemed to cement a bond 
between us.     
The next session, before sitting down in the counselling room, we went for 
another walk and I bought him another sausage and before I knew it, we had created 
the sausage buying ritual.  But I didn‟t mind, after all, they only cost a dollar.     
 
One week later, I was sitting with Billy in the sand-tray room. He wandered over to 
the sandtray and pondered the complicated world created by another child.  I 
remembered Billy‟s previous sandtray pictures in our earlier sessions - they 
 195 
illustrated a consistent theme of attack and defence, soldiers, police – his life as one 
long war.  
 “Billy, would you like to come and join me.  I feel lonely sitting here all by 
myself.” 
 He came over and sat down facing me. 
 “You were angry with me last week.” 
 “Was I,” he half smiled.  “I‟ve forgotten.” 
 He probably had forgotten, I thought. 
 “I think you probably experienced me as questioning you like a policeman or 
something.”  He smiled.  “I‟m sorry about that, but that‟s part of my job,” I continue, 
“to ask you about the safety plan and stuff.  To make sure you and others are safe.  
You understand that don‟t you?” 
 “Yeah, I guess so.” 
 “I‟m sorry I missed your talk in group about your grandmother‟s blanket 
though.” 
 “I showed it to you.” 
 “Yes, but I didn‟t hear you talking about it. How was it made?” 
 “She knitted it.” 
 “Wow.  She must love you a lot.” 
Billy nodded his head, sadly.  
 
We decided to go for a walk.  It was good to get out into the fresh air. 
 “I haven‟t had lunch yet,” I said to Billy. 
 “Me neither” said Billy. 
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 “You must have been disappointed about your birth Mum not being here 
today?” 
 “Yeah, I am.” 
Billy started to play his usual game of picking up the walking pace and 
leaving  
me behind.  He turned around and smiled. 
 “Hang on” I said. “Remember, I‟m an old man.” 
 We arrived at the bakery. 
 “Would you like a pie or a sausage?” 
 “Pie.” 
 I grabbed a sandwich. 
 “Can I have one of those Andrew?” Billy pointed to a chocolate milk drink. 
 “Yeah, sure.” 
 We walked back to the clinic and into the counselling room.  I was wondering, 
how do I start?  Can we hold a conversation for a little while?  I wanted to say 
something about his birth Mum, something about how important she was and how 
important the hope of reunification had been to him.  But was this hope of 
reunification helpful to Billy in the long-run and did it stop him bonding with Kate, or 
for that matter, any other caregiver? 
 “Billy, I‟m sorry I didn‟t realise how precious your hope is to be reunited 
again with your birth Mum.” 
 Silence.  Then, almost impatiently, as if waiting for more, he said, catching me 
by surprise: 
 “Yeah, go on …” His tone implied, is that all you‟ve got to say? 
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 “How did you manage to keep alive that hope all the time?  There must have 
been times when you felt angry at your Mum for not being there for you?” 
 Silence.  I continued, stumbling along in the dark. 
 “You must really miss your Mum?” 
 “Yeah, I do.” 
  I was not sure where to go next. I turned to the whiteboard. 
 “Remember when we used to draw?” I said. 
 “Yeah, squiggles.”  He remembered the name of the game I took from the 
British paediatrician and psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicott (Phillips, 1988).  He drew 
a squiggle on the board and I started to create a picture.  I drew a sad face peaking 
out from behind some clouds. Free associative drawing. I drew a baby in a pram.  
The mother was absent, or was the mother the sad face peaking through the clouds?  
The drawing was then erased - the transience of the therapeutic moment.  An 
opportunity missed?  Billy said nothing about the content.  I squiggled some more 
lines and he began to draw.  
 “There,” he said with a sense of satisfaction:  “A two-headed shark.”  He 
drew a balloon from the mouth and in the balloon he wrote the words: “I want to eat 
you up.”   
 “Who is the shark and who does the shark want to eat Billy?” 
 “I dunno.” 
 “And why two heads, do you think?” 
 “I dunno.” 
When Billy had finished the drawing he said, “Can we play ball now?”  
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I replied, “I think you are changing the topic.  What are you feeling right 
now?” 
“I dunno.” 
“I know.  How about we play a little game?  How about you pretend to be the 
shark and I ask you some questions. Is that okay?” 
“Alright.” 
“Hello Mr Shark, what big teeth you have!” 
“All the better to eat you up with!” 
We both laughed. 
“Mr Shark, I would like to be your friend, but I feel you want to chase me 
away whenever I get close.” 
“Go away!” 
“Okay, okay.” I decided not to push too much – in my experience Billy would 
only withdraw even more if I tried to push too far. 
“You sound angry Mr Shark.  Are you feeling angry?” 
“Yes!” 
“Let‟s play some more then.  Maybe that way you will trust me better and 
then you might change into a playful dolphin!” 
So I suggested we play hand-football.  He enjoyed this game, especially when 
he was winning.  Near the end of the game, he started to gesture like a gorilla.  I 
joined in the game, down on my hands and knees.  He laughed at me beating my 
hands on my chest, imitating a gorilla.  Then he started to beat his chest with his fist 
and again I joined him.  Before long we were both laughing and enjoying ourselves 
immensely. 
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 Finally, I reminded him gently that it was time to finish and asked for his help 
in tidying up the room.  When we had finished tidying he moved off freely and without 
hesitation to his group session.  Billy was back and re-engaged again with the 
therapy, but how long would it last, I wondered, and would his birth Mum come next 
week? 
   
 
It was another blue sky autumn day.  The ritual was now firmly established 
and Billy followed me out the door onto the street.  We walked towards the bakery, 
turned the corner and crossed the road.  I said, “Be careful crossing the road,” but it 
was already too late, he had run across, just in front of a car; “Billy how many times 
do I have to tell you?” 
 “Hey, Andrew, can we play the car racing video game after the bakery?” 
 “No.” 
 “Oh, why not?” 
 “Because I want to be with you - I‟d rather play football than watch you play 
the video game.  I like to look at you, face to face.  We only get to be with each other 
one hour per week and I want to make the most of it.  Besides you can play those 
computer games at home.” 
 “No I can‟t, I don‟t have a playstation.” 
 “Well, the answer is still no.” 
 We entered the bakery. 
 “Can I have a drink Andrew?” 
 “Sure,” 
 200 
Billy picked out his usual coke with no sugar. 
 “That‟s my third drink today”, he said with a smile.” He then went over to the 
glass display tray where the pies were displayed. 
“Look”, he said excitedly, “they‟ve got my favourite pie.‟ 
I went up close to have a look. 
“Oh, pizza pie” I said.  Then I started to sing: 
“When the moon hits the sky  
Like a big pizza pie that‟s amore …” 
Billy gave me a funny look, imploring me to stop singing. We went to pay and at the 
counter he eyed the strawberry and chocolate tarts.   
“They look nice,” he said. 
“We‟ll have one of those as well,” I said to the shop girl. 
“Six dollars thanks.” 
We walked back to the agency building, saying hello to some of the other boys from 
the group who were also sitting outside the shop.  On the way back, I gave Billy one 
of my new business cards. Billy looked pleased to receive it. 
 “Thank you,” he said.  “I‟ll put your number on my cell phone.” 
 “I didn‟t know you had a phone.  How long have you had it?” 
 “Couple of days.” 
 “Did your social worker give it to you?” 
 “Yeah.” 
We arrived back at the clinic.  
 201 
“Which room shall we go in?” Billy chose the group room, because it was the 
room we played football in.  He sat down at the table and we finished eating our 
lunch together.  
 “Okay, let‟s talk”, I said. 
 “Okay, but I don‟t know what to talk about.” 
 “Well, it can be helpful to talk about the past.  I know you don‟t want to go 
there because it‟s too painful but at some stage it‟s going to be important for your 
healing to talk.”  Here I go again.  This was a big assumption on my part. I didn‟t 
have the right to push anyone to talk about the past if they didn‟t want to talk about 
it. 
 “At some stage, but not now,” he said.  “Can‟t we talk about the present?” 
 “Fine, let‟s talk about the present.” 
There was a long silence. 
 “Well, how‟s your week been,” I said. 
 “Good.” 
 “Do you have any news?” He threw a small hand made object on the table. 
 “That‟s a scoopy doo. A girl made it for me.” 
 “Oh, that‟s nice. Why do you think she gave it to you?” 
 “Because at the time she liked me and wanted to go out with me.” 
“Yeah, and she must have given that to you to remind you of her. Why did she 
stop liking you?” 
 “I don‟t want to talk about that.” 
 “Well, can we talk about girls in general?” 
He smiles: “No”. 
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 „Well, how about we talk about sexuality then.  After all, that‟s why you‟re 
here.” 
 “Nope.” 
I shook my head.  Billy was successfully controlling the session and I felt stuck - 
another impasse. 
 “Okay, then.  Come over here.”  I lay down on the carpet.  “Let‟s have a 
hand wrestle.” 
Billy came down and joined me. 
 “Now be careful, because I broke my right arm and it‟s not as strong as it 
used to be”.   
Billy nodded his head in agreement. We started to hand wrestle and Billy‟s 
arm gradually forced mine down to the ground. 
 “I‟m not hurting you, am I?” he said. 
 “No, I‟m okay.” I let Billy force my arm down.  I was touched by this gesture 
of expressed concern for my well-being; the first that I could remember receiving 
from him.  We wrestled with the other arm and Billy was triumphant again.  We did it 
one more time and Billy was established as the champion arm wrestler. 
 “Can we play soccer now?” asked Billy.  I went to get the ball while Billy set 
up the room.  We each had our own goals at each end of the room.  We played for 
about 15 minutes.  He enjoyed the game but I quickly tired.  “Okay”, I said, “let‟s go 
for another walk and play that racing car game.” 
 Back outside again we walked along in the sunshine.  I wanted so much to 
connect on an emotional level with Billy, but he consistently seemed to resist any 
 203 
form of closeness other than play. But at least when we played there was a closeness. 
Well then, if that‟s where he‟s at, I thought, that‟s where I have to be at. 
 “Billy, I do care about you, you know.  I know it‟s easy for me to say that – I 
mean I only see you for one hour a week. But I do care.” 
 He smiled. 
 “Well at least you know I respect your boundaries.  I‟m not going to force you 
to talk about anything you don‟t want to talk about.”  But then I wondered, was that 
allowing him to manipulate and control the sessions too much? 
We entered the shopping centre.  They were playing Cat Steven‟s song Father 
and Son on the music system as we entered.  I started to sing along … 
 
 “It‟s not time to make a change 
 Just relax take it easy, you‟re still young 
 That‟s your fault, there‟s so much you have to go through …” 
 
I remembered lying on my bed when I was Billy‟s age, or maybe just a little older, 
listening to that song and thinking about my Dad … 
 
 “All the times that I tried to be all the things I knew inside 
 But it‟s always been the same, the same old story, 
 From the moment I was born I was ordered to listen now there‟s a way, 
 That I know, and I have to go away, you know, I have to go …” 
 
 Billy gave me another funny look and tugged on my shirt to say stop singing. 
 204 
We arrived at the machine. 
 “Do you want to play, Andrew?” 
 “Yeah.” 
We had two or three races.  The graphics were amazing and I kept on crashing my 
car.  I thought of the movie, Crash, which I had just seen.  The movie is set in LA, and 
the cars which crash into one another are metaphors of the isolated person, alienated 
and afraid.  They only connect when they crash into one another – and maybe, just 
maybe, there are times when they touch – like the father‟s love for the child … We got 
back just in time for Billy to go into his group. 
 
A few months later we were sitting in the group room again finishing our 
lunch.   
“Let‟s talk”, I said. 
“I don‟t want to talk,” said Billy. 
“The World Cup starts on the weekend.  Are you going to watch some of the 
games?” 
“I don‟t care about that.” 
“Billy, what do you care about?” I said softly. 
“I dunno.” 
“Billy, how do you think you are going to graduate from the programme if 
you don‟t talk?” 
“I dunno.” 
“How‟s the placement going?” 
“What do you mean?” 
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“How‟s things been with Kate?” 
“The same.  I don‟t want to be there but I have no choice.” 
“Yes, I agree there‟s not many options.  But has Kate been more 
understanding?” 
“I dunno. Can we play now?” 
“Billy, how do you think I feel when you refuse to talk all the time?” 
“I dunno.” 
“I feel like you don‟t want to be with me.” 
Billy lowered his head and looked serious.  He seemed to be listening.  I was 
immediately struck by what I had just said and I continued, “I know that‟s how you 
must feel some of the time – that people don‟t want to be with you - but you‟re going 
to have to let yourself get close to someone one day.  You can‟t keep shutting people 
out all the time because you are frightened they are going to hurt you. You are a good 
person and I like you but you won‟t let me in.  I thought you would have been able to 
trust me by now. It‟s been almost two years now since our first meeting.  If you don‟t 
let someone get close you are always going to be lonely and I don‟t want that.  I care 
about you …” 
Billy‟s head remained bowed. 
“Billy, when do you think you are going to be ready to graduate?  At the end 
of this year? Next year? What do you think?” 
“Well, I won‟t be ready at the end of this year.” 
“Really? Why is that?” 
“I dunno. I just won‟t.” 
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A few weeks later Billy finished his group session and we followed the usual 
routine walking down to the bakery to buy some lunch.   
“Some good news Billy – your social worker is coming today to take you 
shopping for your new bike. Are you feeling excited?” Billy had been expecting 
Amelia, his social worker, to take him shopping for the last two weeks. 
“Sure, I‟ll believe it when I see it.” 
“No really.  I just talked to her on the phone this morning.” 
“We‟ll see.” 
At the bakery he had a sausage and chips and I got my salad sandwich and we 
sat down to have lunch together. We then walked back to the clinic and into our usual 
counselling room. I would normally let Billy start the conversation, but this time I 
began: 
 “Billy, Kate rang me this morning. She told me you had some issues you 
wanted to talk about today?”  She didn‟t really expect Billy to raise the issues.  She 
wanted me to, but I thought I would just give Billy a chance to see what he would  
say. Billy shrugged his shoulders and said: 
 “I can‟t remember anything.” 
 “You sure?”  I gave him another chance. 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Well she told me that last Friday when she came home she found a condom 
full of urine tied to the front steps.” 
 “What?  She‟s a liar!” 
 “Billy!”    
“Well she‟s just such a bitch.” 
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“Remember, I prefer you to speak respectfully of people here, even if you‟re 
angry with them. She says you got the condom from the agency.” 
 “What?” 
 “Well, I said we don‟t have any condoms here.” 
 “That‟s right.  That‟s what I told her.” 
 “So where did you get it from then?” 
 “I found it on the street.” 
 “Right.  Well thanks for being honest with me.  You must have been really 
angry with her.” 
 “Yeah.  I felt like putting a dead bird on her bed.” 
 “Billy!” 
 “Well I hate her!” 
 “Maybe the hate stops you from feeling close and maybe it‟s easier that 
way?” 
 “I suppose so. I‟m never going to get close to anyone again because you 
always get moved on.” 
 I paused for a minute, taking in how Billy had managed to understand some of 
the issues we had been talking about and repeat them in a way that made sense to 
himself. “Billy, you just said something really important.  Maybe you don‟t 
want to get too close to Kate in case you get taken away.” 
 “Maybe,” said Billy, but I could see he was thinking about what I had said. 
 “Billy, there is one other issue that Kate wanted me to discuss with you.  
Remember Amanda?  The girl in the special needs class at your school?” 
 “Yeah?” 
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“Well, Kate says she has complained to the Deputy Principal about you 
punching and slapping her again.” 
 “What? I didn‟t punch her! I slapped her.  If I‟d have punched her she would 
have known it.” 
 “So you admit to slapping her?” 
 “Yeah – well, she scratched me first!  What do you expect me to do?” 
 “Well, maybe you could walk away and tell a teacher.” 
 “Sure, they don‟t care – they don‟t listen to me.” 
 “How come you didn‟t punch her?” 
 “I dunno.” 
 “Well, you made a choice not to punch her.  Why?” 
 “I don‟t know.” 
 “I think it was because you didn‟t want to hurt her.  Is that possible?” 
 “Hmm.  Maybe.” 
 “Billy, you know that Amanda has an intellectual disability.  What if it had 
been a three or four year old who scratched you?  Would you have still hit them?” 
 “Sure.” 
 “What about if it had been your own son who scratched you?  What would 
you do?” 
 “I‟d hit him real good” 
 “Really? Billy, is that what happened to you?” Billy lowered his head.  I 
continued, “Billy, who used to hit you?” 
 “My Dad did.” 
 “I thought so.” 
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   “I use to get kicked up the arse and punched in the face for not looking after 
my brothers properly.”  Billy was beginning to disclose about his own victimisation. 
While Billy had been talking he had picked up a small bird from the shelf.  The toy 
bird had feathers but its wings had come off. He tried to fix them back on without any 
success. 
 “Do you have any sticky tape?” he asked 
 “Sure, I‟ll go and get some”.  When I came back I handed him the tape and 
he fixed the wings on the bird. 
 “Now it can fly again” – I said, “just like you.”  Billy smiled.   
 “I‟ll give it some eyes as well,” he said. 
Billy picked up the white board marker and made two dots representing eyes. 
 “Now it can see and fly,” I said. 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Hey, Billy would you like a hot Milo drink?” 
 He nodded his head, “thanks.” 
He drank his Milo and then we waited outside.  Finally, after a few minutes wait, sure 
enough, the social worker arrived to take Billy shopping for his new bicycle. 
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7. 
MY STORY, PART II 
 
As part of the requirements of my final year of training at the Dulwich 
Centre in 1998, trainees were invited to choose a topic they would like to 
explore in a narrative therapy conversation with the teacher, Michael White. I 
chose to focus on my relationships to my parents and to the children in my 
life, and how they had contributed to preferred developments in my 
professional work. I began the interview by saying I didn‟t think it was an 
accident that I was working with children.  Contact with my own children had 
been difficult and sporadic both during and after my social work training 
because of the problems I had in my relationship with my first wife, Nadia.7  I 
had started living with her when I was 19, just after finishing high school.  She 
was 5 years older and she had two small children: Phillip who was five years 
old and Sam who was two years old.  I remember Sam was still in his high 
chair when he had his feeds.  In some ways Nadia was a safe harbour, a 
retreat from the three rejections I had received from young women my own 
age.  I had just dropped out of university at the time, after a young woman I 
had been having a relationship with at university had veered off the road in a 
traffic accident and died.  This left me feeling both grief-torn and guilty. 
 I had met Mandy at a party when I first arrived at university.  She was 
living in an adjacent college to mine.  I had approached her at the party 
because she was sitting by herself looking drunk and depressed.  I managed 
                                                 
7
 All the names have been changed. 
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to engage her in conversation about existentialism and the limits of freedom 
and I walked her home to her room at the college and said goodnight.  The 
following morning I was surprised to hear a knock on my door.  I was still in 
bed, so I said “come-in”.  The door opened and Mandy came in and joined 
me together in my bed.  Our “affair” continued for a few weeks until I heard 
from college gossip that I wasn‟t the only young man she was sleeping with.  
This may or may not have been true, but I experienced a kind of jealous 
resentment which I hid from her.  This eventually came out one night and I 
expressed my underlying feelings of jealousy by putting Mandy down in a 
typical patriarchal way for sleeping around like a “whore”.  She neither 
confirmed nor denied the rumours, she just sat on the bed and her eyes filled 
with tears.  Understandably, she asked me to leave.  That was the last time I 
saw her alive.  I went away for the Easter holidays back to my parents‟ place 
and when I returned a guy ran up to me saying the university had been trying 
to contact me.  Mandy had died in a car crash and they thought I might have 
been in the car with her. I was in a state of disbelief and I remember feeling 
numb.  I retired to my little room and kept playing the song “Nancy” by 
Leonard Cohen, over and over again.  It‟s another sad but beautiful song 
about a woman who committed suicide, who “wore blue stockings and slept 
with everyone”. At the time I thought Mandy took her own life. Now, I‟m not so 
sure, I don‟t think we can ever know – maybe she had been driving too fast 
and spun off the road. 
Following Mandy‟s funeral, at which I gave a heartfelt speech about 
the loneliness of university colleges, I dropped out of university and moved 
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back to my parents‟ place in Wollongong.  I took a labouring job at the BHP 
steelworks in Port Kembla and Mum helped me find a flat. At the time I had 
big plans to save money from the job and go to Paris to live my fantasy of 
being a writer, like Henry Miller and Ernest Hemingway, or go to a Greek 
island like Alexander Durrell and Leonard Cohen. It was during this time that I 
began the relationship with Nadia. I had known Nadia from my circle of 
friends before I left Wollongong to go to university in Canberra.  We met up 
again at the local folk club and began a relationship.  Nadia was quite 
persistent in her affections, and after a short time I was eventually spending 
more and more time at her place until eventually I decided to let go of my flat 
and move in.  But there was another side to Nadia that I was to meet.  Near 
the end of her short-lived first marriage with a manic musician called Tony, 
who was prone to fits of violence, she had ended up in the inpatient 
psychiatric unit after what she called a “nervous breakdown”.   At first this 
history added a somewhat romantic sheen to her character and appealed to 
my sense of being the heroic knight on the white horse.  Phillip and Sam 
enjoyed playing with me and it wasn‟t long before little Sam would toddle up 
the driveway to greet me when I came home from work.  It wasn‟t long before 
I became fond of both the children and an affectional bond grew between us. 
Two years later we were married at the local registry office.  My 
parents could not hide their disappointment at my choice, but they did their 
best to be part of the celebrations. The marriage lasted precariously for 15 
years. I found Nadia had a histrionic personality which was hard to bear, 
moving from clingy dependency one moment to outright verbal abuse, rage 
 213 
and violence the next.  I am sure I contributed to this by my ambivalence right 
from the start about marrying her, and this never changed.  I am sure this only 
fueled her insecurity and distress. I couldn‟t cope with these extreme swings 
of moods and behaviours but I also lacked an understanding of trauma and 
abuse.  During this time I had separated from her a number of times, but 
came back, pulled by my love for the children and my own insecurities. On 
the 26 December 1988, my son Justin was born, much to my joy and the 
delight of my parents. This kept the marriage going for another four years, but 
it didn‟t last. Then, one day when I was on the brink of despair, a new woman 
walked into my life, Annie, and I fell in love.  The relationship with Annie 
commenced while I was still living with Nadia and then I moved out.  This had 
devastating consequences, which I never could have foreseen, for my son 
Justin. Unfortunately Nadia found out about the affair, and she became 
hostile, making it impossible for me to see my son. She also left threats 
written on paper on Annie‟s car, which was traumatising for Annie. We 
therefore moved inter-state for peace of mind, but it was a struggle for me to 
see my son for many years without torrents of verbal abuse being unleashed 
upon me. I decided not to contest custody, because, in my experience, 
motivated by the rage of betrayal and the fear of losing Justin, Nadia was 
capable of doing anything.  So I had infrequent contact with Justin, Phillip and 
Sam and the relationship between the three boys and I was never quite the 
same again.  
 I don‟t think I would have coped as well as I did, if it hadn‟t been for 
my work as a therapist in child and adolescent mental health. I guess the 
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boys I worked with helped me just as much if not more than I was able to help 
them. When I started to work with children therapeutically, I guess you could 
say I experienced a closer connection to the kids I saw in therapy than I did 
with my own children.  At time of the interview with Michael White I stated to 
him that I had a sense of them fading out of my life and I guessed that they 
must have experienced a similar sense of me fading out of their life.  The only 
exception to this scenario was that Justin and I did keep in contact through 
writing letters to begin with, and emails later on.  Some of these letters were 
quite precious to me and maintained my hope that maybe one day things 
might be different. 
 Michael began the interview by asking me, “What are some of the 
good memories of your connection with Phillip and Sam?”  I remembered 
backwards, starting with their teenage years.  We had had some good in-
depth discussions with each other about philosophical issues and they used 
to enjoy staying up late when my friends came round who also enjoyed 
philosophical discussion, ranging from politics to Buddhism.  Then the 
memories of taking them out to movies and musicals and restaurants; taking 
pleasure when they did some good work at school;  and we had some great 
games of table tennis together; watching sport on TV; reading stories to them 
like the Dr Seuss book, The Lorax (Seuss & Seuss Geisel, 1971): 
  
At the far end of town  
Where the Grickle-grass grows 
 And the wind smells slow-and-sour when it blows 
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 And no birds ever sing excepting old crows … 
Is the Street of the Lifted Lorax. 
And deep in the Grickle-grass, some people say, 
If you look deep enough you can still see, today, 
Where the Lorax once stood 
Just as long as it could 
Before somebody lifted the Lorax away 
 
What was the Lorax? 
And why was it there?  
And why was it lifted and taken somewhere 
From the far end of town where the Grickle-grass grows? 
The old Once-ler still lives here.  
Ask him, He knows.  
 
At this point in the interview I began to sob.  Michael asked me, “What are 
you thinking about – what are the feelings that go with those tears?” And I 
replied, “The years I‟ve missed out on with Justin”.  Remembering all these 
activities only made it clear that I would miss out on all those experiences with 
Justin.  He was only four and a half when we separated …I was never going 
to be able to experience these special moments with him, I thought, 
compounding my sense of loss.  I let my mind wander back again, 
remembering playing games with them, bringing back memories of playing 
games with my own parents: Monopoly, Risk and even before that card 
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games and party games like “Old Maid”.  Dad was good at those games, 
good at birthday parties playing “Simon Says”.  I realised that the games I 
played with the children who consulted me at work had a lot in common with 
these experiences. I‟d realised that the best way to connect with children 
before attempting any real talking therapy, especially if these children had a 
history of traumatic experiences, was to play with them. 
 Then Michael asked me, “What‟s your sense of what these boys 
experienced with you?” He was referring to my own children.  I said, “Care 
and love – someone who wanted them, who took pleasure and delight in 
being with them.  I also shared my values with them – they would have 
developed a good sense of what I stood for – but I think that‟s probably all 
shattered now…” 
Michael continued, this time exploring the other side of the equation, 
parenting.  Parenting, like therapy, like all intimate human relationships, is a 
two-way process.  “What did they bring to your life, being a parent-figure to 
Phillip and Sam and a father to Justin?  How are you different from having 
been their parent?  How would you be now if you hadn‟t been their parent?”  I 
replied if it hadn‟t been for them I would never have experienced what it is like 
being a parent.  I told a story about meeting Phillip in a pub about three years 
earlier.  He won the pool competition while I witnessed it – it was one of those 
rare occasions when I got to experience a sense of pride – like, “that‟s my 
boy!”  As I reflected more on Michael‟s questions I realised how they had 
given me the opportunity to participate in a child‟s world again – the world of 
the imagination – remembering my own childhood – the child‟s sense of 
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wonder, adventure and play.  I remembered Justin as a baby – the beautiful 
sense of stillness and oneness with the universe when he began sitting 
upright for the first time. I remembered how at his birth when I first held him in 
my arms thinking what a perfect being, wanting to be an equally perfect 
parent myself – to protect him from the world of suffering. Then I began to sob 
again, knowing that I had unintentionally introduced him to traumatic 
emotional pain before he even turned five….  
 Michael continued, “So they brought lots of things to your life, 
connections with your own history of being parented and the love that they 
gave to you?”  Yes, my own experience of being a parent helped me to 
appreciate my parents.  “How come?” asked Michael.  “To appreciate the 
commitment it takes to be a parent,” I replied, “the time that they gave to me, 
playing with me, and the way that they always stuck by me.”   
 “How is all this expressed in your work?” he asked. 
 “I often find myself in awe of the parents I meet with,” I replied. 
 “What does this make possible in your work?” 
 “I hope I‟ve never had a parent who felt they weren‟t being heard or 
listened to.  There is such a dominant culture of parent blame in our mental 
health system.  I‟m no expert on parenting (laughing) so there is a certain 
humility I think I bring to this work – I certainly don‟t come across as the 
expert in how they should parent!” 
 (Laughing together)  “How do you think your children‟s contribution to 
you – the pride and the pleasure – their invitation for you to participate with 
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them in their world – how does this continue to get played out in your work, 
do you think?” 
 “I think children have magical capacities to change.  They also put me 
back in touch with my own childhood.  I remembered how my work with a 
young man called Dylan and his struggles with youthful embarrassment and 
shyness had helped me to remember my own struggles with these issues as 
an eleven-year-old:8 
  
I too had freckles, felt uncomfortable undressing and going to the pool 
for swimming lessons, and would never ask a girl to dance!  But, more 
importantly, I‟d like to thank Dylan for putting me in touch with some of 
the special qualities and abilities of the eleven-year-old Andrew, which 
will now be more present for me in my counselling work with children 
and families (Tootell, 1999, p. 28) 
 
Also, a lot of the children and young people I work with, and they are mainly 
boys and young men, come with the labels ADHD and Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (ODD).  So I need to find alternative ways of talking about these 
problems without resorting to these labels.  I often find that the effects of 
trauma and abuse are a much fairer and exact way of talking about these 
challenging behaviours.  I also have to find ways of connecting with each 
child – because each one will be different and I agree with Irvin Yalom 
                                                 
8
 Dylan was a boy I had seen while I was studying at the Dulwich Centre.  I wrote about our therapy 
work together as part of the course requirements and it was subsequently published (Tootell, 1999)  
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(Yalom, 2001) that we have to reinvent therapy for each new client we start to 
work with. 
 I think I owe a large legacy to my relationship with the boys I have 
worked with and how that continues to influence my work. I believe I am more 
able to connect, to get in touch with and appreciate the children who consult 
with me because of the legacy of my relationship with Phillip, Sam and Justin. 
In this way, they are present in my work. I feel more attuned and spontaneous 
– going with whatever arises in the moment. 
  This interview with Michael White certainly helped me to continue 
coping with the difficult constraints placed around my contacts with Phillip, 
Sam and Justin. Acknowledging their presence in my work helped to alleviate 
the sadness.  There will always be a sadness that we don‟t have a closer 
connection and I can deal with that, but the sadness that is like an invitation 
to self-blame had been lifted from my life.  It also put me more in touch with 
the contribution my parents had made to my life.  Much more appreciation 
and a growing fondness – they had always been with me.  I felt more in touch 
with my father‟s gentleness.  Being in this line of work helps me cope with the 
sadness, because they too are present always in this work – the work itself 
evokes them – always bringing back memories – of my children and my 
childhood that are sustaining of my present self and the work that I do. 
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8. 
Peter’s story 
I began working with Peter in individual sessions when he was fifteen.  He 
had been adopted as a baby, but his adoptive parents separated and divorced when 
he was about ten years old.  He was living with his adoptive mother (who he called 
“Mum”) and stepfather at the time we began working together. 
   
It was a cold day in early June. Peter was now nine months into the 
programme.  He was dressed in a smart blue tracksuit jacket, pressed blue jeans and 
brown slippers.  He had been wearing those slippers now for quite a few weeks, even 
though we were now approaching middle winter.  I had always assumed it to be a 
fashion statement, vaguely remembering reading somewhere of a rapper in the USA 
wearing slippers.   
 “So, what would you like to talk about today?” 
Peter looked down at the carpet then looked up briefly, smiled, made eye 
contact and then lowered his head again.  There was a period of silence, and then I 
said: “Do you remember what we were talking about last week, when your Mum was 
here?  I enjoyed that session.  Do you remember?  We talked about the anger 
problem, shyness and your relationship with your stepfather, Brian.  Oh, and the 
concentration problem. We discussed some practices you could try out, like self-
observation.  I talked about just practising being aware and noticing if anger was 
present, by paying attention to your body and mind.” 
 “I was angry this morning.”  
 “Yeah, what happened?” 
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 “Mum slept in and she never bothered to give me the money for my shoes.” 
 “Do you need new shoes?”   I realised suddenly that the slippers were not a 
fashion statement!  
 “Yeah, I get sore feet from the wet socks.  These are the only shoes I‟ve got.  
I‟ve got two other pairs but they don‟t fit.” 
 “Peter, I always thought you wore those slippers as a fashion statement.  I 
would never have guessed … Is that what the guys in the group think as well?  That 
they are a fashion statement?” 
 Peter smiled. 
 “Mum‟s been promising me shoes now for six weeks.” 
 “So you were hoping to get them today?” 
 “Yeah.  They‟re on lay-by.  We‟ve paid $60 and still owe a $100.”  He 
paused, and then said: “Mum does that heaps.” 
 “What?” 
 “Gets my hopes up. She always lets me down.” 
 The words, “lets me down”, resonated in my mind. I wondered how many 
times in his short life had Peter experienced this feeling. “What do you remember 
feeling first, the let down feeling or the angry feeling?” I asked. 
 “Probably the let down feeling.” 
 “Can you say a bit more what the let down feeling feels like?” 
 “Makes you feel like shit.” 
 “Can you remember other times in the past when you have felt like shit?” 
 “When Dad said he was going to stay and see me and didn‟t.”  
 “What kind of thinking does let down feelings encourage?” 
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 “Feeling shit.” 
 “If feeling like shit could speak what would it say?” 
 “Nobody cares about me.” 
 I felt his sense of isolation and said: “It sometimes feels like neither your 
Mum nor your Dad care about you.” 
 “Yeah.”     
 “Anything else?” 
 “I wish this hadn‟t happened.” 
 “Yeah, your expectations have been disappointed.”  I wanted to help Peter 
contain this feeling of disappointment.  No caregiver is perfect.  So I responded with 
“What do you think you have learnt about life and about yourself from being let 
down?” 
 “There‟s no point worrying about what you can‟t change.”   
 “That‟s great, Peter”.   I got up and wrote his words onto the white board.  
“Anything else?”   
“Not to get my hopes up.” 
I wrote that down as well. 
 “Yes.  Anything else?” 
  “People don‟t always do what they say.”  Sad, but true I thought to myself. I 
wrote that down and as I was writing I wondered if we could identify or put some 
names to some of the coping skills that Peter was teaching me about. 
 “So, when you look back with the benefit of hindsight, what are some of the 
skills you have used to get you through the times when you were feeling like shit?” 
 “Sometimes I would cry it all out.” 
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 “Yeah, you were able to do that?  Have you ever told anybody about that?” 
 “No.” 
 “It takes strength to sit and feel the pain and cry.” 
 Peter nods his head in confirmation and smiles.   
 
*   *   *    *   *    *   * 
 
 “Hi Peter, what would you like to talk about today?” 
 “I‟m not sure.” 
 “Would you like me to suggest some options?” 
 “Sure.” 
 “Well, we could talk about relationships.  Like your relationship with your 
girlfriend, or your Mum and step-Father or your Dad or your brother and sisters.  
Or, we could talk about what kind of work you would like to do; or we could review 
some of the sexual offence specific work that we‟ve done?”  
 “Relationships.” 
 “Okay, which one?” 
 “My girlfriend.” 
 “Just remind me, what‟s your girlfriend called again?” 
 “Sarah.” 
 “Sarah, yeah.”   
 “I‟m really looking forward to seeing her tonight.” 
 “Great. Do you think she is really looking forward to seeing you?” 
 “Yeah.” 
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 “That‟s even better.” 
 “I‟m staying at her place tonight.” 
 “Tell me, what is she like as a person.  What are some of the things she likes 
to do?” 
 “She‟s really happy and loud.” 
 “Kind of like the opposite to you?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Yeah, that‟s like me and my wife.  She is more outgoing and I am the quieter 
one. What are some of the things she likes to do?” 
 “She likes dancing.” 
 “Hip hop?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Do you dance much Peter?” 
 “No.” 
 “Would Sarah like you to dance?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Would you like to dance?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “What do you think stops you?” 
 “Dunno.”   
 “Do you think it has anything to do with shyness?” 
 “Yeah, definitely.” 
 “Peter, when was the last time you got up and danced?” 
 “It was ages ago.” 
 225 
 “Try and remember when.” 
 “About February this year.” 
 “This year?  Was it at a party?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Had you been drinking?” 
 “Yeah, I was pretty drunk.” 
 “And the shyness went away?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Interesting isn‟t it?  The relationship between alcohol and shyness.  Did you 
know that alcohol acts as a dis-inhibiter?  Do you know what that means?  
“No.” 
“When you drink alcohol the chemical affects that part of your brain which 
acts as an inhibitor.  To exhibit means to show.  To inhibit means to hide.” 
 “I wasn‟t always a shy person.  When I was a boy my Mum tells me I was a 
show-off” 
 “Right, can you remember any of those times?” 
 “No.” 
 “But we do know there was a time when you didn‟t worry too much about 
what other people thought about you. Because when you think about it, there is a 
relationship between shyness and self-consciousness, or even worse, self-criticism.  
Like with me, I have always worried about not being good enough in many areas of 
my life, especially in music.  For most of my life I have found it difficult to perform in 
public when singing songs and playing my guitar.  My hands would shake and my 
body would be frozen in tension.  It‟s only been over the last few years that I have 
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relaxed more when playing in front of people informally but put me on a stage and 
it‟s still the same.  I think that‟s because I‟m so critical of my playing that I can‟t just 
let myself go into the song.  So, coming back to alcohol then, do you think alcohol is 
the solution to the problem of shyness?” 
 “No.” 
 “Why not?” 
 “Because you get drunk?” 
 “Yeah.  On the one hand, alcohol acts as a disinhibiter and you feel free to 
dance because you don‟t care what people think. But the problem with that is it can 
also disinhibit you in other ways.  For example, you might say things you‟ll regret in 
the morning.  Have you ever experienced that?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Or you might start kicking a car that doesn‟t belong to you.” 
 Peter smiles. 
 “So what is the answer to this problem of shyness?” 
 “I‟m not sure.” 
 “Do you think knowing Sarah has helped you to reduce the influence shyness 
has in your life, or has shyness increased its influence or is it just the same?” 
 “It‟s reduced the influence.  When I first started to see Sarah at her place, if 
her parents asked me if I wanted something to eat I would say no even though I was 
really hungry.  When they spoke to me I would usually look down at the ground.  Now 
I say yes and look them in the eye.” 
 “So it‟s helped getting to know them, they don‟t feel like strangers anymore.  I 
remember you have expressed this knowledge before.  That shyness has more 
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influence over you when you are with strangers but when you get to know them 
shyness has less influence.  Is that right?” 
 “Yes.” 
 “Are there any other ways that your relationship with Sarah has helped you 
to reduce the influence of shyness?” 
 “Yes, I would be really shy of eating in front of girls.  Now I‟m not.” 
 “Hmm, that‟s interesting.” 
 “When I was a boy”, Peter continued, “my father was always critical of the 
way I used to eat.  He would say things like „stop eating like a pig‟ and he would 
make me eat things I didn‟t like and stuff like that.” 
 “Right.  Can you think of any other areas of your life in which the influence of 
shyness has been reduced?” 
 “Hmm …” 
 “I can think of one.  It‟s an obvious one, what about sex?” 
 “Yeah, I was really shy to begin with.” 
 “And now?” 
 “No, I‟m not so shy anymore.” 
 “So, knowing Sarah has really helped you to reduce the influence of shyness 
hasn‟t it?” 
 “Yeah.” 
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9. 
MY STORY, PART III 
       
Every morning I set my alarm for 6.00am and I rise from bed and make 
myself a cup of tea.  When I have finished my tea I go into my counselling 
room, light some incense and set the timer for thirty minutes.  I then sit down 
on my zafu (meditation cushion), cross my legs in front of me in the 
“Burmese” posture, straighten my spine, take a deep breath and begin my 
daily morning meditation.  As I sit I simply observe my physical sensations, 
returning often to the sensations of breathing; I also simply listen to the 
different sounds of the bird calls; at the same time, I observe my mental state, 
in particular, the array of feelings-thoughts that parade through my awareness 
field during the time period.  The idea is not to try and stop the thought 
process, which is impossible; but rather to non-judgmentally observe the 
thoughts without getting caught up in the internal conversation.  In order to do 
this, I practice a form of thought labeling, that is, when a thought arises in my 
awareness field I will either find a label to name it, such as “planning”, or 
simply say to myself “having the thought - I need to ring the real estate agent 
today”.  This is a form of contemporary Zen meditation, the practice of non-
judgmental awareness. This quality of mindfulness, or non-judgmental 
awareness which is developed in a consistent meditation practice, is also a 
form of acceptance of what is.  One of my hopes is that I can re-enter this 
form of awareness when I am doing therapy, hence bringing forth this sense 
of self-acceptance as a core process of my practice. 
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I had read about Buddhism when I was an adolescent, but I didn‟t start 
practising meditation until after the birth of my son Justin.  I found the books 
of the Zen teacher Charlotte Joko Beck particularly inspiring (Beck, 1989, 
1993). I think it was her ability to make Zen sound relevant to everyday life, in 
particular, to working with emotions and relationships that made her books so 
appealing.  As I previously discussed, my first marriage was very stressful, 
and I thought Zen practice could help me deal with my situation and keep me 
sane!  I also liked the way Joko placed a lot of emphasis on fully experiencing 
this moment, on a physical level, even if at that moment we were sad, elated 
or depressed it didn‟t matter.  I learnt from Joko, and much later from Barry, 
that this is it.  There is not another time or place we can live – only here and 
now.  Now, I had heard that expression before, it was very popular in the 
sixties and seventies and it sounded romantic but the actual practice was not 
at all romantic!  Sitting still without moving when your leg has gone numb and 
the pain is starting to rise is not a pleasant experience, but it taught me 
perseverance and patience.  I would also like to think I have become a little 
less self-centred over the last twenty years but I‟m not so sure about that! 
I had first come across the link between mindfulness and therapy in the 
social work literature (Brandon, 1979), but it was actually Dr. Barry  Magid 
who helped me to see the link between mindfulness, empathy, affect 
regulation and psychotherapy (Magid, 2002).  In fact over the past fifteen 
years there has been an explosion of interest in integrating mindfulness and 
psychotherapy in both the cognitive-behaviour traditions and the 
psychoanalytic traditions (Brazier, 1995; Epstein, 1995; Harris, 2007; Hayes & 
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Strosahl, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2003; Safran, 2003; Siegel, 2007; 
Young-Eisendrath, 2004).  There has also been a paper produced on 
narrative therapy and mindfulness, arguing how social constructionist thought 
has much in common with Buddhism and how externalising conversations 
can be understood as a form of mindfulness practice (Gaddis, 2004; Lax, 
1996). The popularity of mindfulness as a therapeutic intervention continues 
to grow in Western psychotherapy and it is also being seen as a key 
intervention for trauma-informed therapy (Saxe et al., 2007).  
There are basically three ways in which I believe mindfulness practice 
is relevant to the mental health professions.   Firstly, it has beneficial 
outcomes for the practitioners themselves, acting as a form of self-attunement 
(Siegel, 2007) .  Secondly, a daily practice of half an hour to one hour of 
meditation prepares the practitioner in being able to keep focused on their 
subjectivity as well as at the same time entering empathically into the world of 
the participant and being aware of the intersubjective dimension of the 
relationship (Hughes, 2007; Lax, 1996; Magid, 2002; Siegel, 2007).     Thirdly, 
mindfulness practice helps to keep the therapist focused on the experiential 
“here and now” and to engage in collaborative reflection on this experience in 
therapy, which strengthens the reflective function of all participants (Fonagy 
et al., 2004; Siegel, 2007).  The reflective function is when a child is able to 
both reflect on the contents of their own mind and those of others.  Empathy 
would not be possible without the development of this function. 
Mindfulness is a transpersonal awareness practice, in the sense that 
our tendency to identify with our linguistic “I” arises from the fact that the 
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culture we live and breathe in is saturated in subject-object duality and binary 
thinking: us and them; men and women; therapist and client.  By practising 
everyday and going on intensive retreats we can learn to disidentify from our 
conditioned dualistic reactions and just stay with the basic non-dual reality of 
what is.   
 
*   *   *   *   *   * 
 
In 2003 I was living with my wife Annie at Mission Beach, Northern 
Queensland, a literal tropical paradise. Only, I wasn‟t happy.  I was missing 
friends and the stimulation of colleagues from my narrative and 
psychoanalytic networks in Adelaide.  I read Barry‟s book on the relationship 
between Zen Buddhism and psychotherapy and I sent him an email: 
 
April 7, 2003 
Dear Barry 
I live in a remote region of Northern Queensland opposite a beautiful 
beach. I work as a therapist in a child and adolescent mental health service. I 
have tried to maintain a fairly solitary Zen practice for 15 years. I have always 
been attracted to the work of Joko (Beck) and I have a shared interest in self 
psychology, intersubjectivity theory.  I have done a limited amount of 
(personal) therapy with a psychoanalyst in Adelaide. I have also trained in 
narrative family therapy with Michael White. 
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I really enjoyed how you grappled with the ideas from the two traditions 
in your recent book and felt a close affinity with you.  I don’t know if this is 
possible, but could I become a student via the internet? I have never worked 
outside of a retreat with a teacher and now feel like it’s time. 
However, if not possible, thank you for your clear expression of the 
ordinary mind way and its connection with contemporary ideas. 
Regards, Andrew 
 
Much to my surprise, 12 hours later I received the following reply: 
 
7 April, 2003 
 Andrew – I’d be happy to work with you whatever way we can via e-
mail. Write whenever/whatever you like. Just please be patient if I cannot 
always respond immediately. 
 I hope I can be of some use, 
 Barry.  
 
One week later I wrote back:  
 
13 April, 2003 
 Dear Barry 
 Thank you for your kind and generous offer.  I guess maybe you may 
become like a selfobject.  Maybe also a replacement for the analyst I use to 
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see in Adelaide weekly for about a couple of years. So once again, thank you 
for being there. 
 Regards Andrew 
  
 Again to my surprise, the following reply arrived 24 hours later: 
 
 14 April, 2003 
 Andrew – I’m happy to serve as a cyber-selfobject (or would Kohut 
want me to drop that hyphen)? 
 If you practice on your own, I’d say make non-avoidance the centre of 
your practice – which means paying attention to the edge of avoidance we all 
have someplace in our daily life. When I talk about leaving everything alone, I 
mean especially watching what we don’t want to leave alone, where our 
efforts at control, self-improvement, denial kick-in.  Take a look at what you’re 
trying to do as a therapist – how much helping/fixing intrudes … 
 Best, Barry. 
 
 So I had found myself an on-line analyst and Zen master all rolled into 
one! Over the months and years that followed I learned a great deal from 
Barry, not only about Zen practice but also about therapy.  In particular, I liked 
how Barry emphasised the importance of not trying to “fix” people and to have 
trust in the healing powers of empathy. After selling our apartment at Mission 
Beach and moving to New Zealand I was fortunate enough to be able to go to 
New York and visit Barry to attend a Zen retreat. 
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*   *   *   *   *   * 
 
In April 2006 I travelled to New York to attend a weekend retreat with 
Barry and his Zen group at the Garrison Institute in New York.   Prior to 
attending the retreat, I had arranged to stay with my friend, Steven Gaddis, 
another therapist, who lived in Salem, Massachusetts.  Steven drove me 
down to New York and I stayed overnight with his family who lived on the 
Hudson River. On the following day, I managed to find my way to Grand 
Central Station and caught the metro along the Hudson River line along to 
Garrison.  The Garrison Institute was a converted monastery that now 
functions as a retreat centre for various spiritual organisations, including a 
number of Zen Buddhist groups.   The Institute was situated right on the river 
with well-appointed dormitory style rooms and good clean bathroom facilities.  
On the other side of the river, directly opposite, was the United States Military 
Academy, West Point. 
We rose at 5.00am (quite luxurious by comparison to some other Zen 
retreats I had been on) and began the day with morning zazen (seated 
meditation) and chanting from 5.30 to 7.00am.  This was followed by 
breakfast and then more zazen until lunch.  Following lunch was more zazen 
and then in the afternoon Barry would give what is called in Buddhism a 
“Dharma” talk.  This talk is meant to encourage students in their practice and 
can range from formal commentaries on Zen koans (teaching stories) to more 
informal talks about relationships and modern life.   Barry gave a talk entitled 
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“Sameness and Difference”.  The focus of the talk was on the relationship 
between the experience of “oneness” or “nonduality” and difference.  Many 
spiritual traditions only focus on realising the oneness of reality and the Zen 
tradition is quite unique in its emphasis on working with both sides of the 
same coin, so to speak.  So although Zen practice begins with the intention to 
unite with the whole universe, this can only be done with one object or one 
activity – whatever it is we are doing at this very moment, we do it with full 
mindfulness, washing one spoon, then one fork at a time.  If you are cleaning 
the oven, just cleaning the oven; if you are bowing you are, just bowing; if 
you‟re sitting, you‟re just sitting.  Then Barry brought our attention to the 
resistance that arises in just being the moment – if we are feeling blissful, 
then that‟s easy to just sit and be that; but if the pain is sharp, we don‟t want 
to be that – we want to escape that; or if boredom and restlessness are 
strong, we don‟t want to be that, we want to escape into some kind of day 
dream.  Barry then told us to pay attention to that desire to avoid the moment, 
because we are conditioned to only pay attention to things that we think are 
worthwhile or that are “ours”.  We might be meticulous about keeping “our” 
house clean, but walk down the street and we ignore the litter that is lying all 
around us.   So oneness or sameness practice means to value everything 
equally. Applying that to all people is hard; we usually place value on our 
small circle, our family and friends, and then our attention gets diluted the 
further and further we go out.  Barry drew an analogy between sameness 
practice in Zen and the practice of empathy in therapy: 
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One of the ways we engage people, analogous to the way we engage 
ritual objects in a Soto temple, is through empathy. Empathy means 
fully entering into the subjective experience of another person. Just 
totally letting yourself be in their world. And while you're doing that, that 
world is all there is. You see everything through their eyes. You let 
yourself enter into their reality rather than having a separate reality of 
your own that's bumping into theirs. And once again we practice 
looking at what kinds of experiences, what kind of worlds are we willing 
to enter into and where do we draw the line. There's a nice quote from 
Goethe that says, “I've never heard of a crime I couldn't imagine myself 
committing.” That was Goethe expressing his sense of his common 
humanity with everybody. Empathy is based on the fundamental belief, 
or the trust, that understanding is possible. That when you enter into 
another person's worldview what you're going to find in there is going 
to be basically recognizable and intelligible - that everyone has a 
shared form of life that includes things like love and attachment and 
loss and pain and hunger and dying. It's this common, shared form of 
life that makes it possible to enter into another person's worldview and 
have it make sense (Magid, 2008b). 
 
Barry‟s favourite philosopher is Wittgenstein, who makes the point that the 
reason why we can understand each other is that there is no such thing as 
private experience.  This is very close to the social constructionist position, 
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especially the work of the Russian developmentalist psychologist Vygotsky 
(1962).  For example: 
 
The reason we can understand each other is that everything about 
who we are, and what's going on inside of us, is something that we've 
taken in from the outside, from others, from our shared existence. Our 
inner world is made up of the things we've brought in from the outer 
world. For Wittgenstein this happens primarily through language. By 
language, he meant a whole system of interaction. It's not how we go 
about sending reports from our private inner world out into the outer 
world where you then take the message into your inner world and try to 
decipher it. Instead it's about how we exist together in this big soup of 
life and language and there is no boundary between inside and 
outside. That's what makes empathy possible, that we're all living in 
the midst of the same life. But at an emotional level we always bump 
up against personal barriers of empathy. What we recoil from, when 
we want to say, “that's not me, I could never do that.” We all do that at 
some point (Magid, 2008). 
 
Barry went on to say that his teacher‟s style of practice “was always to pay 
attention to that boundary of resistance, the place where you are inclined to 
say, “That's not me, I'm not like that!””  The experience of anxiety or anger 
can be an indication that we are experiencing that boundary of resistance.  
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We want to believe we are “a different kind of person”, but Goethe's point is 
we're all exactly that kind of person.  Barry asked all the students to consider:  
 
What kind of empathy and courage does it take to allow yourself to be 
everything? That's the real psychological problem of oneness, it means 
letting everything in, letting yourself be everybody. It means not 
dividing the world into good guys and bad guys and us and them. It's 
like the old Pogo cartoon “We've met the enemy and he is us.” You 
have to be willing to identify with everything, even the things that we 
want to keep at arms length (Magid, 2008b). 
 
Barry then went on to talk about the other side of the coin – difference; to 
allow and respect difference.  We allow people to be different to us; we don‟t 
expect them to be the same.  We are willing to be with them in their difference 
without judgment, as “separate centers of agency and subjectivity”.  We no 
longer ask, is this person meeting my needs or expectations – this constant 
evaluation of others from our own spectrum of interests – what are they doing 
for me? The same applies to stereotypes, the habit we easily fall into of 
reducing individual difference to sameness: 
 
And even if we're not personally related to them we categorize them or 
give them a stereotype or a role where we immediately know they're 
one of those. You know, “They're Republican.” End of story, right. How 
many versions of that do you know, that as soon as you get people in 
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to one or another narrative pigeon-hole, it's the end of the story. You 
don't have to know anything else about them. You've understood them 
so well that they're obliterated. That kind of understanding negates the 
other person's real subjective existence and genuine otherness. 
There's a quality of otherness or differentiation that we only appreciate 
when we don't understand them, when we acknowledge that they are 
too complex to sum up. Some times we can allow that, very rarely I 
think, in personal relationships: when we really feel that the other 
person has so many quirks and depths and qualities and talents that 
we'll never get to the bottom of them. They've had all these life 
experiences and I can see them in analysis 5 times a week, or be 
married to them for 20 years and I'll never get to the end of who they 
are. Very rarely are we able to treat people as that different, that new 
without sort of quickly saying, “Oh, I know her; I know all about her.” 
We understand them so well and so quickly that there's nothing new to 
learn. In that way we obliterate difference, we obliterate otherness. So 
there's a big resistance that we have to watch out for on this side too. 
The resistance to letting ourselves be impacted by the difference of 
other people without immediately sweeping them up into an agenda, 
into a story, who they are to me, who they are in my narrative world. 
 
So sameness and difference each offer their own challenge: the 
challenge of letting ourselves be the same as everyone else; the 
challenge of allowing everyone else to be different from us. 
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We have to learn to put those two sides together and see that what we 
have in common is that we're all different (Magid, 2008b). 
 
 As I listened to Barry‟s talk, I thought of how this problem of “sameness 
and difference” captured the intersection between spirituality and politics or 
the personal and the political.  Essentially, the inability to recognise 
sameness and accept difference seemed to be the source of conflict within 
the world, at all levels, whether it is class, race, ethnicity, religion, family or 
nation state.  We needed to see the oneness or equality of all people and at 
the same time respect their unique difference. It is also reminded me of some 
articles I had recently read on hospitality towards strangers, as the foundation 
for human sociality (Sampson, 2003).  The talk also triggered thoughts about 
my work as a sexual offending therapist.  I particularly liked the way in which 
Barry‟s emphasis on sameness and difference undermined the usual labels 
and subtle and not so subtle “us and them” distinctions that I was so used to 
coming across in the attitudes of some of the professionals I worked with in 
this area.  
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10. 
Adrian’s story    
 
Adrian made himself comfortable in the lounge chair.  He looked relaxed and 
thoughtful.  I remembered the first time I met Adrian during the assessment sessions a 
couple of months ago. I had been struck by his good looks and thin wraith-like frame: 
tall and lanky, slightly feminine, almost elfin in appearance.  His eyes were clear 
blue,  
intense and intelligent.  He reminded me of the young James Dean from the film 
„Rebel without a Cause‟.   
When Adrian first started the programme he was preoccupied with the 
question, why did I do it?  This is a common question, one that usually preoccupies 
the mind of family members as well.  Adrian‟s auntie had taken an interest in his 
welfare and education. She had grown concerned that Adrian‟s Mum and Dad, who 
both lived independently with intellectual disability, were neglecting his hygiene and 
his education.  She offered for Adrian to come and live with her and her husband. 
Adrian moved from the city to a town in the country where his auntie and uncle were 
dairy farmers.  His auntie‟s daughter, Margaret, took a liking to Adrian and treated 
him like a younger brother.  Margaret had a five year old son and Adrian would 
sometimes play with him.  Sometimes he would also be left to baby-sit and that‟s 
when he began to engage in sexual offending. He was about twelve years old at the 
time.  It had taken the form of a game in dark places.   
After starting to experience nightmares, the child told his Mother and Adrian 
was removed from the care of his auntie by Child, Youth and Family Services 
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Department.  He was then placed with a caregiver. Later, he would be moved into 
boarding college at a private Catholic school with the financial support of his auntie 
and uncle. He would stay with his parents on weekends. Margaret had been so 
traumatised when she found out about the offending she couldn‟t work for a number 
of months.  Adrian attended a Family Group Conference organised by the 
Department where he had to face up to Margaret and the rest of his family.  He was 
remorseful for what he had done and agreed to pay compensation to Margaret from 
his wages. He also agreed to attend the programme. 
At our first individual session together we had discussed the question, what is 
counselling?  Adrian had said “you talk about what you‟ve done.”  I asked if he had 
any other ideas and he thought for a while before replying, “You try and put things in 
the right place”.  This fitted well with my own understanding of therapy – a 
collaborative process of making sense together.  I had been enjoying my sessions with 
Adrian. He was easy to talk with and he was comfortable initiating conversations, 
which made my job easier. Many of my young male clients found it hard to talk freely.  
Not Adrian. He talked about family, school, computers, especially computers, work 
and girls. He worked hard at a part-time sales assistant job, which he maintained 
while still attending high school.  School was not his favourite place.  He found the 
teachers condescending at times, but he was making the best of it. 
I knew that personal freedom was important to Adrian.  Given his parents‟ 
limitations, he had grown up with a strong sense of independence and was quite 
mature for his years.  Adrian‟s freedom of movement was constrained by his safety 
plan.  Initially he was allowed no contact with friends outside of work and school and 
no contact with his victim.  Over time, as Adrian moved through the programme, he 
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would gain more personal freedom. Eventually this would culminate in his 
graduation and reincorporation back into the community as a trusted citizen. 
We started to talk about his parents.  We hadn‟t talked about them that much. 
When I met with them for the first time at the assessment they were cooperative and 
likeable in a child-like way.   
   “What was it like growing up with your parents?” I said. 
   “I remember I was left alone a lot with nothing much to do.” 
 “It must have felt lonely at times?” 
   “Yeah, but I had one of those computer games I would play on all the time.  
Dad sometimes played with me.” 
“Oh? What kind of games did Dad play with you?” 
“I remember this toy train set.  I think we had fun playing with that together.” 
“Adrian, when do you think you first realised your parents were a bit 
different?” 
“I can‟t really say I‟ve thought about it that much.  I guess when I started 
visiting friends I began to realise my parents were a bit different from my friends‟ 
parents.” 
“You care a lot about your parents don‟t you?” 
“Yeah, they‟re the only ones I‟ve got!” 
“Almost protective at times?” 
“I guess so.” 
“How would you describe your relationship with your Mum?” 
“Tense.” 
“Why is that?”  
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“She annoys me at times. I enjoy my Dad‟s company more.” 
“Tell me more about your parents.” 
“My parents fight about how much running around they do for me.  Dad can 
sometimes get angry with me.  He sometimes says things like „as far as I am 
concerned you can spend the rest of your Christmas holidays in the cell‟.  That hurt 
me a lot.”  
There was a pause. I noticed a small tear forming and slowly rolling down the 
side of Adrian‟s pale and drawn face. He continued, “Sometimes I hear Dad say, „I 
wish I was dead‟ when he feels frustrated with Mum.  Dad says that a lot.  He feels 
like he is being ruled by or dictated by Mum. They need each other – they can‟t really 
function without each other – Dad is good at talking and explaining things and Mum 
is good at sometimes being a fun person - she doesn‟t worry about big things but little 
things and she does all the financial stuff – my Dad can work but Mum is restricted 
from working by arthritis.” 
“What‟s it like when you go round and live with them on weekends?” 
“The problem I find when I go on weekends is that they have no one to share 
their problems with so they talk to me about it - such as petrol money - but I‟ve got 
my own problems so it gets annoying when they tell me all their problems.” 
“A bit like you being the parent to them?” 
“Yeah. I think I spend too much time with them – I start to worry about their 
fighting and I need my time to be around people my own age.” 
“Yeah, that must be pretty hard – with all the other things you have to worry 
about.”   
“Yeah. I was talking to Mary last night …” 
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“Who‟s Mary?” 
“My caregiver.” 
“That‟s right.  Sorry.” 
“… about staying with her once a fortnight on weekends to give me a break 
from Mum and Dad – they fight and I become the parent – they can fight all night and 
I try and stop it then it gets sour between me and Mum because she thinks I am trying 
to manipulate her and sometimes she thinks I side with Dad.” 
“Do you?”   
“Maybe. I say, „shut up - stop fighting‟ and she‟ll say, „stop swearing‟ and 
Dad will say „well he‟s right‟ and she‟ll say, „you don‟t back me up‟ and then Dad 
sits in his chair and sulks and it‟s horrible to see that …” 
“It‟s horrible to see the way they hurt each other.” 
“Yeah. My auntie tells me to ignore it but she doesn‟t understand how bad the 
fighting is, it is hard to ignore it.  I would like to tape it for her.” 
“Yeah, I guess it‟s hard to know what it‟s like unless you‟ve lived with them.” 
“Exactly. The fighting problem is getting worse.  Mum used to join in playing 
games like monopoly but now she doesn‟t - she just turns the TV up.” 
“Oh, no.”   
“It seems worse because I have seen the difference between living with my 
auntie and uncle – Dad also thinks the family thinks he is lazy because he doesn‟t 
work – low self esteem – he goes for jobs then feels rejected when he doesn‟t get the 
job, then Mum says, „I told you, you wouldn‟t get it!‟  Then Dad feels hurt and it just 
goes on and on …” 
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A couple of weeks later his parents attended a family therapy session.  
Adrian‟s Dad broke down in tears when he talked about how other family members 
didn‟t really respect him and judged him unfairly that he was lazy. I saw the look of 
pain and embarrassment on Adrian‟s face when he witnessed this. I wondered how 
witnessing these breakdowns had affected Adrian‟s own sense of self-esteem, and 
how this motivated Adrian to do well at work. We were able to discuss in this session 
the effects of the arguments on Adrian and this did lead to some lessoning of tension. 
Later, Adrian‟s Dad was successful at gaining full-time employment and this seemed 
to help him consolidate his fragile sense of his own self-worth and dignity.  
  
Although the content is different, Adrian‟s descriptions of his parent‟s 
relationship remind me of my own parents after my Dad had lost his teaching 
job because of the offending.  I re-remembered the sense that my Dad had 
been disgraced in the eyes of my Mum.  Although my Mum never mentioned 
the offending, her feelings of resentment came out in the tone of her voice, in 
the way she used to sometimes criticize Dad.  This shared experience 
enabled me to get some sense of what it must have been like for Adrian to 
witness these parental fights. 
Adrian‟s sense of shame or embarrassment about his father reminded me of 
my own struggle to come to terms with my own sense of shame regarding my 
father.  I felt this was something we had in common, something that helped 
me to understand him.  The association with James Dean from Rebel without 
a Cause came into my mind.  I recalled how the son in the movie perceived 
his father as weak, symbolised by his wearing the apron – symbol of the 
 247 
subjugated feminine.  Our fathers didn‟t measure up to hegemonic 
masculinity – they had fallen from the status of hero and their vulnerabilities 
had been revealed. 
 
 
Over the next few weeks we explored Adrian‟s experience of the culture of 
masculinity on his journey towards manhood. I started by inquiring into Adrian‟s 
experience of sport.  He told me he had never really enjoyed sport much.  It didn‟t 
surprise me to learn that his Mum and Dad didn‟t play sport either. He had started 
playing rugby just before he turned nine, just before he moved to his auntie‟s place. 
Adrian didn‟t like it because he didn‟t think he was any good and he was teased by 
the other guys.  He remembered a time when he messed up by dropping the ball and 
he could remember being told “you‟ve let us all down – it was your fault – you can‟t 
play for shit”.  He also remembered being called a “faggot”. This was a humiliating 
experience for Adrian, one that he never forgot.  Adrian‟s experience of school work 
was not much better.  He told me how he had never really achieved at school and that 
he would get into “heaps of trouble” at school when he still lived with Mum and Dad. 
He remembered his best friend, Jason, who also didn‟t like sport.  They used to crawl 
under the school into what Adrian described as a “bomb shelter”.  They took food 
with them and they would spend the whole day hiding out down there or hiding in a 
shed at the school.  He remembered that as being fun.  Adrian said “everyone saw me 
as being a rebel at school – but most of the time I really wanted to be like everyone 
else”.  However, Adrian still remembered a couple of teachers who had taken a liking 
to him.  Maybe they had also been attracted to his thin Oliver Twist-like face.  I think 
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Adrian had that quality which would call forth nurture in people.  When Adrian went 
to live with his auntie he had to say goodbye to his best friend and lost contact with 
him.  He found the transition to the new High School difficult.  He made friends with 
Daniel, another boy who was an outsider with a reputation for being “gay”.  They 
eventually became “enemies” because Adrian was worried about being seen as 
“gay” as he was sometimes called “A Anal Stretch” and Daniel was called “Danny 
de homo”.  The guys at the school would also say things like “God you‟re ugly –girls 
would never go near you.”   Adrian was so convinced that he was ugly that if a girl 
said something different he wouldn‟t believe them.   
Adrian talked about “proving he wasn‟t gay” when he went out with a girl in 
fourth form.  The girl liked wearing glitter on her face so Adrian was given another 
name: “glitter-boy”.   Adrian described himself as “cracking up” at this point and he 
attacked four boys who had been teasing him. After that, they never teased him again.  
Adrian concluded, “I knew I wasn‟t gay”.  When reflecting back on the sexual 
offending, Adrian thought he had initiated the sexual abuse with his victim because 
other guys his age were talking about having sex and he desperately wanted to be 
seen as a man.  Adrian said the other guys bragged about having done this or that 
and he felt jealous. He wanted to be one of those who‟d “done it”.  This feeling of 
“missing out” is something that is often reported by young men who are insecure 
about their masculinity status.  
 It wasn‟t long after Adrian turned 16 that he had a new girlfriend, also aged 
16, and they were going steady and having regular safe sex. This new relationship 
definitely helped Adrian move towards maturity.  However, my wonderings about 
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Adrian needing his entry into manhood acknowledged by his peers was verified when 
he finally moved into the boarding college.  
He came into the next session with a smile on his face and something about 
him felt different. He began to tell me all about how he had survived the “gauntlet”, 
an “ordeal of pain”, a male initiation rite that the older boys made the younger boys 
endure.    A gauntlet is formed by a group of boys lining up on both sides of a hall, 
who punch and hit the initiate as he runs up and then down the gauntlet. (The rule is 
that they are not supposed to hit the runner in the face, but sometimes it happens.)  
Adrian was proud and transformed by his accomplishment. Everyone was shaking his 
hands and patting him on the back. Although I felt concerned that this form of 
coercive ritual was allowed at the college I didn‟t want to take anything away from 
how surviving this trial had boosted Adrian‟s self-esteem.  It was heartening to me 
that Adrian did feel sorry for another boy who had been too frightened to attempt the 
gauntlet and was now suffering the consequences for his so-called “cowardice”.  
Adrian was able to understand how this boy was actually a victim of this kind of 
initiation rite.  
I asked Adrian what he thought running the gauntlet was all about and he 
said it was about being able to “withstand pain”.  He said the older boys had told 
him, “Tonight you go from being a boy to being a man”. Adrian felt that he had 
finally been accepted into the tribe of men, at last.  He said “once you‟ve done it, you 
are accepted as a mate”.  Adrian reported that he felt really respected once he got 
through it.  He said the first few steps are the hardest. I asked him, what gains the 
respect?  He said, because you‟ve shown you can take the pain without crying, that 
you didn‟t let the fear of being hurt stop you. He said he had taken at least fifty 
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punches and that “if someone explains something in words it‟s not that important, but 
if you go through the gauntlet you don‟t forget it – it‟s punched into you. Nothing else 
compares to that in my life as a learning experience.” Adrian concluded, “It was 
definitely an experience I will never forget and that I will one day tell my kids”. 
 
A few months later I found Adrian waiting for me outside the office.  He was 
having trouble lighting his roll-your-own cigarette with a small flint lighter that had 
run out of fluid.  It sparked repeatedly but didn‟t light. 
“Looks like you‟ll just have to go without for a while,” I said and smiled. 
Adrian was dressed in his Catholic college uniform, long trousers hanging round his 
ankles. He looked tall and gawky still.  However, his face was now changing from a 
boy‟s to a man‟s face.   
We entered the building and walked through to the familiar counselling room 
where Adrian collapsed on the comfortable lounge chair, one leg hanging over the 
side. 
“What would be helpful to talk about today?” I said. Adrian paused and 
contemplated before replying.   
“I told my girlfriend about my past offending after our session last week.”  I 
remembered that Adrian talked about doing this last week. Another of the group 
members, Peter, had disclosed in the group, after he had told me in an individual 
session, that he had disclosed to his girlfriend and that she had appreciated it.  This 
had inspired Adrian to do the same.  I took a few deep breaths and continued: 
“How did she respond?”  I asked. There was a pause.  It is a risky business, I 
thought to myself.  I hope that it hasn‟t backfired on him. 
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“She was shocked at first but she said she didn‟t want our relationship to 
change.” 
“If you don‟t mind me asking, I‟m curious what you said to her?” 
“I said about a year ago I sexually abused my second cousin.  She asked me 
how old he was and I told her.” 
“Did she ask why?” 
“No, but I said when the offending first started I was having trouble getting a 
girlfriend.” 
“Right” 
  “I think she appreciated my honesty because she thought about it and decided 
she was going to be honest too. One day later she told her Mum that her Father had 
been sexually abusing her the last two years.”  
“Oh, my god!” 
I was astounded by this turn of events.  I was proud of Adrian‟s courage and 
responsibility in confiding with his girlfriend and what this had now brought out into 
the open. 
“What do you think was the effect on your girlfriend after you had disclosed 
your offending to her?” 
“She thanked me for telling her rather than hearing from someone else.” 
“Do you think she respected you?” 
“Yeah, she appreciated my honesty.” 
“What effect did your honesty have on her?” 
“It made her honest.” 
“And was that a good thing?” 
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“Yeah.” 
“Why?” 
“Because she was being sexually abused since she was thirteen. She was able 
to tell her Mum.” 
“Did her Mum believe her?” 
“Yes she did. They said to her father on the Saturday that if he did it again 
they would go to the police.  Then he did it again on Monday and she texted me to tell 
me about it. I said you‟ve got to tell.  She said she was too scared.  I said do you want 
me to do it? She said yes.” 
“What do you think she was scared of?” 
“She was scared that her father might hurt her.” 
“So what did you do next?” 
“I rang the CYFS emergency number.” 
“Did you find it in the telephone directory?” 
“Yeah, it took me ages to find it.” 
“What happened?‟ 
“I spoke to the worker and told her what my girlfriend had told me.  After that 
she said I needed to get my girlfriend to ring.” 
“And did you?” 
“After I spoke to her she did ring. On Tuesday she went to the school 
counsellor‟s office in the morning and the CYFS worker came and they went back to 
her place and packed her things.” 
“Where is she living now?” 
“She is with her grandparents.” 
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“So how is she coping with all that has happened?” 
“She‟s doing really well.  She‟s talking a lot more than she used to.  She 
always looked worried, kind of withdrawn before.” 
“Yes, the power of conversation is amazing.” I thought of the ripple effects. 
This was how therapy flowed into community work.  Conversations created 
possibilities for action. The world was changed.   
“Adrian, I was just thinking … by choosing to disclose about your past 
offending how do you think you were standing against the effects of abuse?” 
“Well, by being honest I was going against secrecy.” 
“Yeah, and we know that secrecy is one of the tactics used by people who 
abuse. What else have you learned?” 
“Well because of my work on the programme I understand how victims are 
often held in the grip of secrecy because of fear.” 
“Right. Has anyone else acknowledged this action that you took?” 
“Yeah, my social worker spoke to my auntie about it and also the guys in the 
group all think it was amazing.  Jamie said that the guys who had disclosed to their 
girlfriends were „legends‟.” 
“What was it that prepared you for that step of disclosing to your girlfriend?” 
“It was practising disclosure in the group.” 
“What was the hardest disclosure you made?” 
“Probably the first one I made to the group.  And the time I disclosed to my 
family, when Margaret was there, at the review meeting.” 
“How did it affect you after you had told your girlfriend?” 
“I felt relief that I had told her.  You feel better about getting it out.” 
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There was a short pause.  I wondered how to respond next. I wanted to link 
this with other themes and alternative stories of self that we had touched on in 
previous sessions. 
“Remember how last week we were talking about your plans about joining the 
army.  I gave you a question to think about during the week.  I asked you to be really 
clear that you weren‟t joining the army to prove you were a man?” 
“Yeah.” 
“Remember when you talked about that initiation ritual? About running the 
gauntlet?  You said it was an experience you would never forget?  You felt that you 
had become a man that day?  Well, I was just wondering, what do you think was the 
most important step you took towards being a man – disclosing to your girlfriend or 
running the gauntlet?” 
“Disclosing to my girlfriend. Definitely!” 
As the session ended and we got up to leave, I walked over and shook his 
hand like I always did.  I said on parting, “See you next week Adrian.  You know, I 
really respect what you did. Well done!” 
Whether it was running the gauntlet or entering into a relationship with a girl 
he cared for deeply, Adrian never seemed to look back, and went from strength to 
strength in treatment.  I admired the way he worked hard at his job and managed to 
stay at school, even though he didn‟t enjoy it. At the end of the year he graduated 
from the programme surrounded by the other group participants and invited guests 
including his girlfriend, his parents and his auntie and uncle. I remember how proud 
I felt and when he broke down in tears midway through a fine speech I felt myself 
crying as well.  
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The following year he was successful at gaining full-time employment, with 
plans to attend further education and training in the computer industry in the future. 
He was no longer a rebel without a cause.  
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11. 
MY STORY, PART IV 9 
 
“In writing from the heart, we learn how to love, to forgive, to heal, and 
to move forward.” (Denzin, 2006 p. 334) 
 
Prior to attending the Zen retreat in New York, I had organised with 
Barry to do a couple of therapy sessions. So one beautiful spring morning I 
found myself walking down Columbus Ave, in “up-town” Manhattan, in the 
direction of Barry‟s consulting room, just down the road from Central Park. 
Earlier in the morning I had walked around Greenwich Village, through a 
snowfall, seeking out the ghost of Bob Dylan.  He was nowhere to be found.  I 
wondered, what ghosts was I likely to find with Barry? 
I turned down 82nd street and continued walking along past the rows 
of terraced houses and flower shops and finally I found the golden name 
plaque on the outside of the building and pressed the buzzer.  The door 
opened and I walked down the red carpeted corridor through another door 
and into the waiting room with copies of the New Yorker magazine lying on 
the side table.  It was not long before Barry came out to greet me and showed 
me into his room.   
I settled into a comfortable leather armchair, next to the obligatory 
chaise lounge opposite Barry. Barry‟s face was kind and his eyes had a Zen 
                                                 
9
 This is a fictionalised reconstruction of the therapy session and should not be seen as an accurate 
representation of how Barry actually works as an analyst. 
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twinkle which indicated a dry sense of humour. He had a long oval shaped 
face, clean shaven with a receding hair line and small round glasses that sat 
on top of a long aquiline nose.  Unlike Zen masters seen in shop windows 
with big pot-bellies, he was lean and well-dressed.   He wore a tweed jacket, 
a waist coat and a tie, befitting of a middle-aged Manhattan analyst.  I looked 
around the room briefly. On one side of the room, was an original painting by 
the modernist landscape painter Albert York; on the other side was a book 
shelf with glass doors.  On the other wall, next to each other, were a faded 
black and white photograph of Dr. Heinz Kohut and a colour photograph of 
Joko Beck, Barry‟s Zen teacher.  I turned back to face Barry and we looked at 
each other in silence and smiled.  I thought to myself, ah, I know this routine.  
He is waiting for me to say the first words.  I waited a few more seconds and 
then obliged, saying: 
 “Well, I finally made it.  It‟s good to be here.” 
 “And it‟s good to see you again Andrew.  You have traveled a long 
way.  What have you found?” 
 Ah, I thought to myself, this must be a Zen-style koan question.  I 
thought for a moment and then replied, “My self”. 
 Barry laughed, “Yes, wherever you go, there you are!”  We both 
laughed some more and then Barry said, “What would you like to talk about 
today?” 
“Well, I have thought a lot about this on the plane coming over.  Time 
is short, and I do not want to waste it.  I do want to talk about my father, but 
before we do that, I would like to talk about my work.” 
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“Feel free to talk about whatever you wish – this is your time.”  
“As you know, I work as a therapist on an adolescent sexual offending 
programme and I am interested in writing about therapeutic change as a 
mutual two-way process as experienced by all participants, therapist and 
client. Unfortunately, the relevance of the self and subjectivity of the therapist 
has, until recently, tended to be ignored in the sexual offending field.  This is 
because the field has been dominated by behaviorist and then cognitive 
behaviorist therapy, which have traditionally ignored the importance of the 
therapeutic relationship, though this is now changing.  However, this resulted 
in an emphasis being placed on technical interventions and treatment 
outcomes, which could be observed and measured.  Therapist techniques 
were seen as being the only factor to deliver outcomes and hence the attempt 
was made to identify these factors and record them in treatment manuals.  
Therapists could all then be trained in these techniques.  The therapist was 
therefore seen as a technologist and the self and subjectivity of the therapist 
were all but ignored as irrelevant to treatment outcomes.”  
“Yes, I am aware of the evidence-based practice movement – it is not 
very kind to psychoanalysis.” 
 “Yes, exactly; fortunately,  some practitioner researchers are now 
seeing that outcomes and techniques are only one side of the coin, so to 
speak; and to only focus on research into techniques is one-sided, as 
research into therapy has demonstrated the client‟s perception of the  
personal qualities of the therapist, the therapeutic relationship, and the 
personal qualities of the client, can also account for treatment effectiveness 
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or outcomes (Hubble et al., 1999; Marshall & Serran, 2004).  Therapy 
techniques only account for 15% of therapeutic effectiveness according to 
these research studies (equal to the placebo effect).  As a result of this, 
clinicians and researchers in the sexual offending field have belatedly come 
to the realisation that therapist, client and process variables also need to be 
acknowledged and researched. So with the growing recognition of attachment 
and trauma problems, increasing attention is now being given to therapist 
responsivity. For example, issues of transference and countertransference 
are now being discussed in the field. However, these are often framed in 
negative terms.” 
“Yes, and that was the case when Freud originally formulated his idea 
of the countertransference.  He saw it as contaminating the therapy process 
(Aron, 1996).  However, over time analysts came to realise that 
countertransference was about paying attention to the therapist‟s beliefs and 
assumptions about the world and secondly how the therapist is in turn 
influenced by the patient.  This is why some analysts now prefer to speak of 
co-transference, rather than transference and countertransference (Orange, 
1994).” 
“Yeah, that fits for me.  Take my work for example. The ability of the 
therapist to be appropriately responsive to the client is going to be influenced 
by their attitudes to offending in general and sexual offending in particular.  
This is going to be even more relevant if the therapist has been touched in a 
more personal way by offending, whether as a direct victim, a secondary 
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victim (family and close friends of the person who offended) or as a member 
of the community (all women are tertiary victims of the crime of rape).” 
 “Yes, and this attitude is inevitably going to be communicated either 
verbally or non-verbally to the client.  In fact, more and more contemporary 
analysts are coming to the conclusion that perfect anonymity and neutrality 
are both questionable as ideals and, in any case, unattainable in practice 
(Magid, 2002; Orange et al., 1997).  Our race, patterns of speech, gender, 
style of dressing, office decoration and location all inevitably speak volumes 
about who we are.  Our goal as analysts, therefore, must be not to strive to 
eliminate the impact of these inevitable latent communications, but to 
acknowledge their existence and strive to make explicit their impact on our 
patients‟ perceptions and fantasies.  An intersubjective approach assumes 
that the analyst‟s personality, her actions and inactions, always continually 
shape the course of the treatment (Magid, 2002 p. 147-148).” 
 “An intersubjective approach also assumes that the relationship will 
also be transformative of the therapist. Would you agree with that?” 
“Yes, I think that is a good description of the therapy process.” 
“Michael White has also developed a consistent critique of what he 
refers to as the “one way account of therapy” (White, 1997).  He argued that 
the context of therapy cannot be separated off from the politics of 
relationships, gender, culture, ethnicity and the hierarchies of knowledge.  He 
was persistently critical of the attempt by professional associations to 
demarcate professional expertise and knowledge from what may be called 
folk knowledge.  White believed this was degrading of the people who 
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consulted professionals and also created a responsibility overload for 
professionals rendering them subject to self doubt and burn-out.  He argued 
that by redefining therapy as a two-way process, therapists would be able to 
participate equally in the transformative process of therapy.” 
“Hmm, yes I can see there is a family resemblance. However, I don‟t 
know enough about White‟s work to comment.” 
I stopped talking and paused for a minute.  Then I said, “I guess this 
brings me to the real topic I wanted to discuss today – my father.” 
 “Good.” 
“I found out my father had died when I received a phone call from my  
brother in Australia, early on Sunday morning the 27th of June 2004; I 
remember it quite clearly. We had only been in New Zealand a few months 
and I had just enrolled in the PhD. The previous weekend I had spoken to my 
Dad on the phone about the European Soccer championship game where 
England had just been beaten by Portugal.  He died peacefully in his sleep.  
He probably would have hung on longer if England had won, but now he 
could let go. I knew he wanted to go because he had more or less told me so.  
Mum told me later how the night before he died he had really enjoyed his last 
supper, so to speak.  Almost like his body knew.  I could hear Mum sobbing in 
the background while my brother talked.  Riveting, heartfelt sobs that I‟d 
never heard from her before.  My father had slipped away silently into the 
night.  No more would my mother hear his gasping breaths, his snoring 
restless nights and his mumbling protestations about his deteriorating body. 
His last, final out breath had come and gone. He was free, at last.   Mum 
 262 
woke up to find his still, cold body, soulless and stranded on the bed.  How 
she must have wept that morning.  Still in shock the reality still dawning.  Her 
soul mate was gone.  I guess we all have to face that moment one day with 
our partner – who will go first and who will be left behind?”    
 “When was the last time you saw him?”   
“The last time I saw my Dad alive was on the ANZAC day weekend 
2004.  I had flown over from New Zealand especially to be there. He was 
eighty-five years old and his body was weakened from fighting bowel cancer 
and now he had a heart condition.  I watched the parade with my Mum and 
sister beside me.  ANZAC day had always been a special day for Dad. He 
could no longer walk so he was chauffeur-driven in a limousine.  I could see 
his pale and drawn face inside the car.  He was smiling and waving at the 
cheering crowds that lined the street.  I could see the twinkle of pride and 
self-respect in his eyes.  I too felt pride.  After the funeral my mother sent me 
a duplicate set of medals that I now wear with pride every ANZAC day in 
honour of my father. But it wasn‟t always that way.  Back in the seventies, the 
young people of my generation, outraged by the Vietnam War, saw ANZAC 
day as a glorification of war.  I even remember the angry words from one of 
my very first songs about my Dad after I learnt to play basic guitar: 
 
 You‟ve got six shining medals on your chest 
 But that doesn‟t make you better than the rest 
 Just cause you‟ve got six medals on your chest. 
 
 263 
This song expressed a relatively recent change of heart, brought on by the 
upheavals of adolescence and the discovery of injustice.  Round about 
sixteen I began to rebel against war and patriarchal authority, wearing glitter 
and a caftan to school as a form of protest against hegemonic masculinity.  
My primary school years in contrast, had been quite different.” 
 “Where did you grow up?” 
“My boyhood years were lived in the suburbs of the Lancashire cotton 
mill town of Oldham. My mother and father‟s family came from Bolton.  Dad 
was in a tank regiment during the Second World War and when he came 
home he studied short hand and typing and became a clerical worker.  His 
father had worked in the cotton mills and had been a strong “Labour” man.  
Dad was the first “white collar” worker in the family, and he proudly wore a tie. 
Eventually he went back to evening school and became a teacher himself, at 
a technical college in Oldham.” 
“Tell me more about your Dad.” 
“My father was a gentle man.  He was never violent towards me nor 
did I witness him being violent to others.  Yet, as a boy the image of my father 
that made the biggest impact upon me was that of a soldier. I use to love 
sitting with my mother and looking at the old faded black and white photos of 
Dad in his khaki uniform posing in front of the Egyptian pyramids. I loved to 
draw pictures of tanks and planes and bombs.  I loved to make model tanks 
and model warships.  I also loved my mother to read to me from The Wonder 
Book of Daring Deeds, a book which had previously belonged to my older 
brother.  My brother had married and left home before I was born.   These 
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stories were all about male heroics such as the young man who stood by his 
gun on the battleship while all around him perished; the story of Scott of the 
Antarctic; Lawrence of Arabia and the real Robinson Crusoe.  I would play act 
some of these stories with my friends.  During winter when the snow drifts 
piled up on the fields, I would be Scott of the Antarctic taking his final tragic 
walk into the snow.  
Dad also loved football and cricket. He told me that his Dad could have 
played professional football but he decided to stay home with his mates in the 
mill. I dreamed of being a footballer or a cricketer.   I would go and watch 
Oldham Athletics‟ home games every second Saturday afternoon during 
winter.  Dad was often working on Saturdays but sometimes, every blue 
moon, he would take me to Old Trafford to watch Manchester United play.  
That was magical. It was the era of Bobby Charlton, Dennis Law and Georgie 
Best, legends in their own lifetimes.   The stadium was called “Old Trafford”; 
they now call it “the theatre of dreams”.  It holds 75,000 people.  I loved the 
atmosphere and the chanting of the crowd at the Stratford end: 
 
 Oh when the reds, go marching in 
 Oh when the reds go marching in 
 I‟m gonna be in that number 
 When the reds go marching in 
 
 United! United! United! 
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Yeah, those were the days!” 
 “What else do you remember about those days Andrew?” 
“I hated going to school and from almost my first day I had to fight.  I 
fought many fights in that first year until the kids stopped picking fights with 
me.  I hated the cold milk we were forced to drink, the lessons we were forced 
to learn.  But I loved football, cricket and athletics.” 
“What else?” 
  “It was the 1960s”, I said, smiling in nostalgia.  “My sister had a good 
collection of Beatles records.  I liked my sister, she use to play with me when I 
was little. On Saturday mornings I would jump into her bed and wake her up! 
When I was older we would sometimes fight over what programmes to watch 
on TV.  She liked music and had some classical records like Swan Lake that I 
also listened to in secret. It was through my sister that I grew to love the 
Beatles. I bought my first “single” at Oldham markets.  It was the Beatle‟s “I 
am the Walrus” and “Strawberry Fields”. When my sister married and decided 
to migrate to Australia my mother missed her so much that when my sister 
became pregnant two years later we decided to follow.  I had just started first 
year high school in England,  it was called a “Comprehensive” school to 
distinguish it from “Grammar” school.  My sister had gone to grammar school 
but I had “failed” my eleven plus exam,  not that I worried about that at the 
time.  In my first week at high school I was in a big fight.  This time with a boy 
who came from a different primary school.  We were both regarded as the 
best fighters from our respective primary schools and we were surrounded by 
a host of cheering boys.  Unlike the other boys I had fought, this boy wouldn‟t 
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give in, even though I had my arm around him in a neck lock and I was 
punching and punching him in the face, he still wouldn‟t give in.  Finally, my 
mother arrived on the scene and stopped the fight.  One of the 
neighbourhood girls had told her and Mum had walked from the house to stop 
the fight.  That would have taken her at least 10 minutes, so the fight must 
have been going for about half-an-hour.  I didn‟t want to stop because I was 
winning and felt embarrassed that it had been my mother who came.  I cried 
in frustration all the way home.” 
“Two cocks fighting to the death!” 
“Exactly!  It was the winter of 1969.  We watched I Love Lucy and the 
Dick Van Dyke show on TV.  My favourite was The Saint and Dr Who. The 
Americans had just walked on the moon, which I had stayed up all night to 
watch.  Russian tanks had rolled into Czechoslovakia. Not that I really 
understood the politics of the situation.  That would take a few more years. 
United had just won the European Cup.  My parents sold our house that had 
been our home for eight years and we gave away my pet poodle, Cindy, who 
we all loved.  We moved into a guest house while waiting for the big day to 
arrive when we would board the ocean liner to sail away to Australia.  The 
promised land!   
I had just turned 13.  Not long before I had accidentally discovered the 
pleasures of masturbation, lying down on my back in the toilet with the door 
locked. One day I was quite surprised to notice some clear liquid coming out 
of my penis after I had reached climax.  It wasn‟t long before it turned into a 
thicker milky kind of stuff.  I didn‟t even know at the time it was called sperm.  
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It was over two years later that my parents gave me a copy of the “little red 
book”, a sex education manual for teenagers.  Round about the same time I 
became fascinated by cigarettes and the illicit pleasure they afforded and the 
joys of reading.  I devoured books like Tom Sawyer, Treasure Island and King 
Solomon’s Mines.          
Then the big day arrived: December 17, 1969, the day we were 
destined to sail away. When the ship we had boarded, called the Fairstar, had 
disembarked from the docks at Southampton I looked backwards and 
imagined my old life disappearing under the horizon.  I turned towards the 
future and felt happy.  I didn‟t know it at the time, but this early migratory 
experience was going to become an integral part of my future identity. I was 
excited about the journey and the migration process.  It was like an initiation 
rite, crossing the equator between what had been and what was to be.  It was 
interesting that it coincided with my passage into puberty.  It was the first time 
in my life, but not the last, that I would take it as an opportunity to reinvent 
myself.  For one thing, I had made a commitment to myself to stay out of 
fights.  I was never again involved in a fight, well, at least not until my first 
marriage.  I also decided to start wearing my glasses all the time.  I guess that 
was when I began to resist the prescriptions of hegemonic masculinity. 
Australia was not a disappointment.  As the Fairstar sailed along the 
coast I saw my first flying fish and dolphins following the ship in its wake.  We 
docked at Circular Quay, Sydney, and travelled by car to stay with my sister 
and her husband in Canberra.  They had just had their first child. We spent 
Christmas with them. It was a long happy holiday for me.  Then we traveled 
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back up to Wollongong where Dad was going to teach and we rented a home 
unit.  The unit was close to the best surfing beach, a picturesque harbour with 
fishing boats, and an old light house facing out to sea.  It was January, it was 
hot and I was excited by my first experience of the Australian surf.  I enjoyed 
that long hot summer very much, between innocence and experience, the 
mountains and the sea. 
School started and it was decided that I would repeat first year again.  
It was like being given a second chance.  At the end of that first year I walked 
out in front of the assembly to receive my first ever academic prize.  I had 
done exceedingly well in all my subjects.  I discovered I did have a brain after 
all!   
The migration experience turned out well for me, but not so for Dad.  
He was terribly homesick and depressed. I remember one day Mum spoke to 
me saying that we had to go back to England because Dad was not very well. 
I cried and protested.  I couldn‟t bear the thought of returning. However, we 
didn‟t leave and I continued to thrive.  I played soccer and cricket and made 
new friends.  My best friend at the time had Greek parents and I invited him 
back to my place to see my collection of plastic toy soldiers and my fish tank.   
My father was still “not well”.  Mum told me there was something wrong 
with his brain.  Mum would drive up to Sydney to visit Dad who was in a 
hospital and I would be her navigator.  I didn‟t realise at the time he was 
staying in the psychiatric ward and I wouldn‟t have understood the meaning of 
this at the time.  I guess Mum made a decision she wanted to protect me from 
knowing the full-story about what was happening.  At night we would listen to 
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music, like the Nutcracker Suite and sometimes Mum would tickle me on my 
back. It was soothing.  
Dad came out of hospital and things returned to normal.  However, he 
was no longer working in his teaching job and was now working at the 
accountancy department at BHP Steelworks in a clerical capacity.  Funny, I 
don‟t think I wondered much about why this was the case.  I was so involved 
in my own world. 
Slowly I began to develop an alternative identity. Although never quite 
letting go of soccer and cricket, I began to get more and more into literature 
and philosophy and music. At sixteen I was reading the Penguin modern 
classics, lots of poetry and learning how to play guitar. Although I couldn‟t 
have said it at the time, Dad radiated disillusionment. Symbolically, he had 
become a fallen hero and had been replaced by my new heroes, Bob Dylan 
and Leonard Cohen.  
Just before I turned seventeen I had my first heterosexual sexual 
experience with a lovely sixteen year old girl who had German parents.  I had 
“fallen in love” with her at a party. It all happened in the dark and it was pretty 
rushed and I didn‟t really know what I was doing but after that night I was 
literally walking on air! This was the ultimate initiation into manhood. 
Unfortunately, she had a boyfriend and although I beat him in the Regional 
1500 metres athletics final, she still went back to him.  
After I had successfully completed High School, my parents had 
decided to take a holiday back to England to visit my sister who had returned 
with her husband and two children the year before.  Dad gave me a lot of 
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money and I left first on my own. I met a young Australian woman who had 
just completed her teaching diploma on the bus from Heathrow to London.  
We spent some nights together and journeyed by train to Stratford on Avon. I 
bought a long suede overcoat with a fur collar and a wide brimmed hat. I had 
decided I was going to study literature and become a writer and therefore it 
was a requirement to dress like one.  We said goodbye and I went on to 
Manchester to meet up with my parents at my sister‟s place for Christmas. I 
was reading Sylvia Plath at the time.  
It was the night before Christmas, 1975, that I learned the truth about 
Dad‟s “illness”.  I was having a get-to-know each other session with my sister 
and brother-in-law, aided by lots of drinks.  I received the whole story about 
how Dad had exposed himself, both on the street where we lived and at the 
Technical College where he worked.  The news sank in deep under the 
anesthetic of the alcohol. The conversation triggered a memory – it unwound 
in my mind like I was sitting back observing it pass before me like a movie … 
 
It is a bright sunny Sunday afternoon in October 1970.  I am almost 
fourteen at the time, and looking forward with excitement to traveling up to 
Sydney to see a movie called Napoleon, starring Rod Stieger. I am looking for 
Dad but can’t find him anywhere. 
  “Where’s Dad, Mum?” 
 “I don’t know love. I thought he was out on the verandah?” 
 “No, he’s not Mum”. 
 “That’s strange.” 
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 “We’re going to be late Mum.” 
 “Don’t worry.  He must have just popped out to the shop.” 
Half-an-hour goes by. Mum is now starting to look anxious.  Dad had 
disappeared.  I am fuming.  I go upstairs to my bedroom to read.  I think I am 
reading War of the Worlds by HG Wells. Then I hear Mum’s voice downstairs. 
 “Where have you been Tom?” 
 Dad mumbles something I can’t hear.  I race down stairs. 
 “Dad we’re late for Napoleon”. 
 There is a look of seriousness on their faces, I haven’t seen before.  I 
can’t remember if Mum had been crying but I think her eyes were red and 
swollen. 
 “Andrew, go back to your bedroom, we’re talking.” 
 “But what about the movie?” 
 “We’re not going now.” 
 “But you promised!”  I run upstairs, crying in anger and bang the door 
behind me. I can hear them talking in the kitchen. 
 “But don’t you realize this is serious?” Dad says. 
 “It doesn’t matter.  We promised we’ll take him and we are going to 
take him.” About five minutes later I hear a knock on my door.  Dad comes in. 
 “Do you still want to see the movie?” He tries his best to sound 
cheerful. 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Well, we can still go.” 
 272 
 I am happy again.  We drive to Sydney.  I remember Mum is unusually 
quiet and the atmosphere in the car is charged with tension.  I put it down to 
the anxiety of driving to Sydney. Something that dad doesn’t like to do. I enjoy 
the movie, especially the battle scenes, the colorful uniforms, the cavalry 
charge.  Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo.  We drive home through the 
darkness in silence. Something else had been lost that day, but only later was 
I able to identify the sadness in my chest as belonging to my father.  
 
On Christmas Day, 1975, my brother and his wife and their parents 
came for Christmas dinner at my sister‟s place.  My paternal Aunty and her 
husband also came.  It was supposed to be a happy reunion until I made a 
scene, acting out my pain and anger at the news I had just received. I was 
restrained by the code of secrecy and did not speak about the real reason 
behind what I was doing.  My theme for the night was hypocrisy. I focused on 
the rift between my sister and sister-in-law but that was only the 
smokescreen.  I was drunk on scotch whiskey.  My brother almost punched 
me.  In the morning it was all explained away as adolescent immaturity and 
drunkenness. I joined in the conspiracy of silence and went on my way. I 
wandered the streets of London for a few days before flying back to Australia.  
All I could see were William Blake‟s “Marks of weakness, marks of woe.”   
Then a woman approached me, she said:  
“Do you want a woman, love?” 
I had never met a prostitute before.  Her breath smelt of alcohol and she 
wasn‟t even pretty.  She asked for some money and I naively gave it to her 
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and she asked me to follow her.  She quickly disappeared into the dense 
Soho crowd, and I never saw her again. 
After that I bought my first book on psychotherapy, written by Anthony 
Storr, entitled “Human Aggression”.  My parents met me at Sydney airport 
with the Higher School Certificate results.  I had done well and decided to 
leave Wollongong and move to Canberra to study a Bachelor of Arts Degree 
at the Australian National University.” 
I fell into silent reverie.  I could hear cars driving past in the 
background and I was vaguely aware of Barry‟s presence.  I had been so 
wrapped up in the telling of the story; I had almost forgotten he was there.  I 
made eye contact and Barry said: “So did you ever get round to talking about 
this secret with your Dad?” 
“Well, a few years later, in my early thirties, I found myself as a 
successful public servant, in a well paid position in the Department of 
Industrial Relations,  wearing my new  grey suit and tie with self-conscious 
pride and enthusiasm.  I had reinvented myself again.  During this time, I 
attended an expensive personal development course called “The Forum”.  It 
involved attending from Friday night through the weekend finishing late on 
Sunday night.   We were asked to return on Wednesday evening with people 
we cared for.  An excellent marketing technique – we were to bring in the new 
customers.  However, for all my retrospective criticisms of this programme, it 
was intense and powerful.  On the Monday evening, following the weekend, I 
drove down the coast to visit my Mum and Dad.  We had never spoken about 
the shameful family secret.  It was my intention to confront this head on.   
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I began by telling them about The Forum and the projects I was going 
to undertake.  Then I got down on my knees in front of my Dad and with tears 
in my eyes held both his hands and said, Dad, I know what happened – why 
you went to hospital.  I wanted to let you know that it‟s okay – I forgive you. 
 After that I think we cuddled for the first time, a practice which we 
continued until the day he died.  I felt better even though Dad didn‟t talk about 
it and we never mentioned the topic again.” 
 “What about your Mum?”   
“Funny you should ask, I‟ve been doing some writing about that. Two 
years after Dad‟s death Mum came over for a visit to New Zealand with my 
sister. I remember it well because she brought up the subject of Dad‟s 
“illness” with me for the first time.   We were visiting the snow-capped 
volcano, Mount Ruapehu, which towers over the little town of Ohakune.  My 
sister also came and two of her adult children.  We were going to share a 
meal together in honour of the second anniversary of Dad‟s death.  I can still 
see in my mind‟s eye the vision of the mountain shining in the moonlight 
through the window. 
 During the afternoon I had gone with Mum to the travel agency to sort 
out some problems with her entry visa back into Australia.  The last time she 
had traveled overseas had been to England and she hadn‟t had the passport 
stamped.  When we arrived back at the chalet we found ourselves alone. 
Everyone else had gone up the mountain to have a go at ski-ing.  I asked 
Mum how come they had never become Australian citizens and she said they 
did get the forms once, but when Dad looked at them he said “I‟m not going to 
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tell them what I did” so they never did.  I assumed Dad may have had a 
criminal record and he didn‟t want to disclose that but Mum said she didn‟t 
know.  I said to Mum, “It took a lot of courage, strength and loyalty to get 
through all those years” and she said, “Oh, you always praise me.” Mum has 
never been comfortable with praise, even to this day. 
Then I asked her what she thought caused Dad‟s nervous breakdown 
and she said “I don‟t know ….  It just came out of the blue!”  She thought 
some more and said “I think maybe coming here at 50.  He was depressed 
with home-sickness.”  I asked her what did the doctors say and she said 
“They just interrogated you … and they asked me if I wanted to leave him.”  I 
asked her why she didn‟t tell me, and she said, “I just wanted to protect you”. 
She asked the doctors and the solicitors to keep it out of the papers and they 
did.  She looked at me with tears in her eyes and said, “We came through all 
right didn‟t we?”   I said, “Yes, we did Mum, we did,” then I reached over and 
held her hand.   Mum told me that even now she still gets scared when she 
bumps into one of Dad‟s ex-students and they say they studied short-hand 
and typing. She said, “You haven‟t got any idea how it felt when someone 
said, „Oh, my daughter was in your husband‟s class‟.   
I could only imagine the pain and embarrassment and humiliation Mum 
must have felt, especially at those moments.  And she never received any 
help, although she said the counsellors helped him to get an office job at the 
steelworks – which he couldn‟t stand – she said it bored him to tears.  I said 
to Mum “Do you know how I found out?” and she said “Was it your sister‟s ex-
husband?” and I said “Yeah.”  Mum acknowledged, “He was good to me at 
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the time.”  Then Mum said, “You know we never talked about it?”  I couldn‟t 
believe it.  I said “Really?”  Mum said “Your Dad never spoke of it again after 
he came out of hospital,” and I said “Just like the war, Mum?” and she said 
“Yes, just like the war.” 
 I fell silent again. I felt the old sadness that had been there in the 
background for so many years, rising again in my chest. 
 “My father and my mother never talked to me about my father‟s 
“illness”.  It was shameful and had to be hidden away.  My father exposing 
himself in class did not fit with the professional image.  I guess I‟ve always 
worried that I might one day do something bad because if my Dad was 
capable, then why not me? After all, am I not similar to my Dad in many 
ways?” 
 “Are you not also different to your Dad in many ways?” 
 “Yes, I guess so. Though, I had a dream last night.” 
 “I‟m listening” said Barry.  
“I dreamt about a dog which had some kind of disease. In the dream I 
was naked and I was hitchhiking back to my parents‟ place and I was given a 
lift by a woman in a white van.  When she dropped me off she gave me some 
clothes to wear.  I then saw this dog with a foaming mouth showing its teeth 
at the end of the road and I felt afraid. I was worried that if the dog bit me I 
would become contaminated, and I felt dirty, ashamed.   The woman in the 
car saw the dog, and so to keep me safe, she drove me further down the 
road.” 
“Rabies.” 
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“What?” 
“The dog had rabies – a contagious disease.” 
“But who does the dog symbolize?” 
“Maybe your father‟s illness?” 
“Ahh …” 
“You were on your way back to your parents‟ place – your place of 
origin.  But there is something that is poisoned in the land.  Your father is 
wounded and you are also afraid the wound might be contagious.  Are you 
bound to repeat the past? Would you develop a similar problem?” 
 “Yes, now that we are talking about it, that interpretation does seem to 
make sense.  The fear I could barely articulate ever since I had heard the 
story about Dad -  I used to worry there might be something wrong with me -  
if my Dad could do it, then why not me?” 
“It is important to pay attention to everything that shows up, including 
those thoughts, memories, feelings that make us uncomfortable.  Jung use to 
talk of the shadow self – Freud talked about repression – all these ideas 
these days can be talked about as forms of experiential avoidance – Joko 
talked about the edge of resistance – these are all aspects of ourselves that 
we want to deny, split off, forget about – our practice is about facing up and 
letting these experiences be without pushing them away.” 
“Yes, I can see that. You know, I once asked my father, just before he 
died, if he had his life over again, what would he have liked to have done as a 
career?  He answered without hesitation, a professional ball-room dancer.” 
 “Right.” 
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 “You know, it‟s like he had to repress that side of himself – like I did all 
the things that he never allowed himself to do.” 
 “Yes.” 
   “He loved dancing but it was not possible given the circumstances, his 
class background and the historical period that he could ever consider doing 
something like that professionally.  He sacrificed all that for what realistically I 
guess he thought was the best way to support his family.” 
 “It‟s also possible his parents did not recognise or value that side of 
him.”  
 “Barry, how much do you know about exhibitionism?” 
 “Well according to the DSM-IV, „Exhibitionism‟ can be classified as one 
of the many different varieties of „Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders‟.  
Specifically, it is characterised as one of the „paraphilias‟, which include any 
aberration of either the sexual act or the sexual object, for example, 
exhibitionism, as well as frotteurism, sexual masochism, sexual sadism or 
voyeurism.” 
 “How common is it?” 
 “Indecent exposure is a very large problem, being the most common 
sexual offence.  I think it constitutes approximately one third of all sexual 
offences committed (Kahr, 2001 p. 19).  I don‟t know if you know this, but 
even Dr Heinz Kohut, while perilously ill from pneumonia at the age of 67, 
exposed his penis every morning to the nurses at the University of Chicago 
Billings Hospital (Kahr, 2001 p. 32-33).” 
 “That‟s amazing! No, I didn‟t know that!” 
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 “Yes, so your Dad wasn‟t the only one.” 
 “Well, what is commonly understood to be the cause?” 
 “When your father was ill, I‟d say the dominant psychiatric theory would 
have been some form of neurological abnormality.” 
 “What about psychoanalysis?” 
 “Well, Freud helped us to understand that every human being 
possesses strong exhibitionistic urges from infancy onwards.  Children 
frequently delight in exhibiting their naked bodies. Although most of us adults 
never expose our private parts in public, we nevertheless find ways of 
exhibiting ourselves, and of being recognised (Kahr, 2001 p. 40). Some 
analysts talk about the desire to know the other and the desire to be known 
by the other.  Classical analysts would reduce these desires to the 
component drives of scoptophilia (voyeurism) and exhibitionism.  They might 
talk about the wish to reveal oneself to the other as well as the longing to 
know the other. In some families, this wish may be expressed concretely, 
through sexually exhibitionistic or voyeuristic fantasies or behaviours (Aron, 
1996 p. 234).”   
 “So Dad was metaphorically saying, look at me.” 
“Some more contemporary theorists argue that exhibitionism (in males) 
functions as a means of affirming their sense of masculinity.  It has also been 
suggested that the male exhibitionist may have endured a difficult relationship 
with his mother, possibly neglect or overly intrusive behaviour showing a lack 
of respect for personal privacy,   leading to depression later in life.  It has 
been suggested that the act of indecent exposure not only affirms the man‟s 
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sense of masculinity but also functions to stave off depressive affects as well 
(Kahr, 2001 p. 50-51).” 
“You know Barry that makes sense.  I remember my sister telling me a 
story about how when Dad returned from the war he would go over to his 
mother‟s place for a bath and she would wash him.  He was also certainly 
depressed in Australia at the time the offending began.”   
We finished the session and I thanked Barry for all his help, promising 
to come back again. As I was about to leave I stood at the door and turned 
around. 
“Barry, why do you think is it so important to feel known and 
understood?” 
“Because when we feel known and understood, we no longer feel so 
all alone. What was previously unbearable when we were alone is now 
bearable within the context of feeling understood by an empathic other.” 
I smiled and said goodbye. 
I stepped outside. A cold wind was blowing through the trees. I 
wrapped my overcoat around me and walked towards Central Park. I realised 
I could never know for sure why my father had sexually offended all those 
years ago, but I did know that I loved him and he loved me.  It was a 
knowledge I could bear, it was something I could speak about in public and 
no longer feel ashamed about.  What he did was wrong, but he was still the 
father who cared for me all those years and took me to the football and 
cricket.  He was a good man, and I was proud of him.   
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Like so many of his generation, not only had Dad gone to war for five 
years, but he had also devoted himself to learning and teaching secretarial 
skills, while all the time what he would rather have been doing was ballroom 
dancing! This was his sacrifice towards giving his family a better life.  
I was like my Dad in some ways, but different in others.  I followed my 
dreams and I took risks. I didn‟t always put my children first. 
I walked into Central Park, and sat down on a bench near the John 
Lennon memorial.  A young man was playing guitar and singing “I wish you 
were here”, by Pink Floyd.  I thought of John Lennon and of Dad, and I 
thought of all the victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse everywhere in the 
world and I felt compassion for them all.  A feeling of peace and acceptance 
came over me.  I looked up into the darkening sky and saw the evening star.  
I smiled at the pigeons, content just being in the moment, and I watched the 
sun setting behind the trees. It was time to move on. 
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12. 
Jamie’s story 
 
Jamie had been separated from his family as part of his safety plan and was 
living in residential accommodation for adults because there was no adolescent 
accommodation in the town where he lived. The House was owned and managed by 
an evangelical Christian church.  Jamie described to me how he shared a room with 
a 22 year old guy who was the chef of the house.   Jamie was not allowed to go out 
much, apart from going to church.   The manager would share his passion for the 
Bible with him, but Jamie was not sure if he wanted to identify as Christian.  He 
talked to me in the early sessions about feeling confused about his identity, stating 
that “I try to please people all the time. I‟m not sure who is the real me any more, 
because I try to impress people all the time”.  I found Jamie to be more articulate 
than I might expect of an average fifteen year old.  He liked to read and he had a 
good vocabulary.   After a few weeks of working together the following conversation 
occurred.   
 Jamie looked hesitant, as if deciding whether or not to speak about something 
that was on his mind.  Then he said:  “Andrew, horrific memories came back after 
talking with you last session.”   
This caught me off guard and I replied: “Do you feel okay about talking about 
them?” 
“I have been trying to suppress them,” he continued.   
“Do you think it would helpful to talk about them?” 
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Jamie then proceeded to tell me in detail about how he had been sexually 
assaulted in a park a number of years ago by two older teenage boys. 
 “I‟m really sorry that happened to you Jamie. That‟s awful. Do your Mum 
and Dad know?” 
“No.  The guys threatened me. They said. „If you ever tell anyone, remember, 
we know where you live.‟ When I got home my parents noticed I was upset and I told 
them some older boys beat me up.  My parents reported it to the police as a physical 
assault.” 
“Have you told anyone?” 
“Yeah, after my sister disclosed, my aunt and uncle confronted me. They said 
I would end up in prison and get raped … then they asked me if anyone had abused 
me.  I broke down and told them. It was the embarrassment that stopped me from 
telling.  I didn‟t want to admit to myself that it had happened. But talking about what 
has happened took a big load off my shoulders.  Now I can‟t hide from it.” 
“It felt like a huge burden was lifted?” 
“Yeah. I felt I had to suppress my anger a lot, being so young I couldn‟t fight 
back and also I had to stay quiet. I feel the anger is still bottled up inside. In my 
dreams I used to want to kick the shit out of them.” 
“Yeah, so you‟ve been walking around with all this rage bottled up inside but 
with nowhere to turn.” 
“That‟s right.  I hate those bastards!” 
“How else do you think it might have affected you?  
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“I became more secretive – I‟d keep many secrets. I tried to block it out – 
sometimes I‟d have nightmares, flashbacks. Since I‟ve admitted it, it has become 
more real and I am dreaming about it more.” 
 “In what ways may it have affected how you think about your self?” 
“I wanted to prove to myself that I was still straight, not gay.  I would have 
done anything to prove I was straight.”  
“Jamie, I have worked with a lot of young men who have also been afraid of 
being called gay.  Why do you think that is so?” 
“Because it is a big put down.” 
“Yeah.  It‟s a common form of ridicule which is demeaning to men who are 
sexually attracted to other men.  It is sometimes called homophobia – fear of 
homosexuality.” 
“It says in the Bible that it is a sin.” 
“Well, some Christians choose to read the Bible in that way.  There has been 
often a strong prejudice within various cultures, but not all cultures, against 
homosexuality.  How do you think it affects young men who are attracted sexually to 
other men?” 
“It must be hard for them – they would try and keep it a secret.” 
“Yeah.  Jamie, how do you think your life would have been different, if the 
rape hadn‟t happened and if homophobia wasn‟t so influential?” 
“I don‟t think I would have done some of the things I did … I‟m positive I 
wouldn‟t have done what I did to my sisters. I would have been more respectful to 
people. I wouldn‟t be so confused about who I am.  It‟s like the rape separated me 
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from reasoning … thinking things through and the homophobia made me keep the 
rape a secret.” 
 
 Not long after Jamie had disclosed the traumatic event of his own abuse, the 
following conversation ensued. 
“When we were coming up in the car today my Dad told me that he had been 
sexually abused when he was younger by an uncle. I wished I‟d known that before,” 
he said thoughtfully. 
“How did it affect your Dad?” 
“He let it out in different ways, whereas I wanted to prove to myself I wasn‟t 
gay.” 
“Has knowing this changed your relationship with your Dad in any way?” 
“Yeah, I think we are a lot closer now.  We talk a lot more because he drives 
me here every week.” 
  
We began talking about school and about Jamie‟s ambitions.  He played 
down his academic abilities saying, “It‟s not cool to be seen as brainy”.  He told me 
most of his friends were “goodie goods” in his “pack”. He talked about the 
importance of being seen as “being cool”.  He said he would like to have bigger 
muscles, because “it signals to other guys I‟m tough.”  Jamie thought being seen as 
“tough” gained you more respect than being seen as intelligent. 
“What do they call brainy kids?” I asked. 
“Geeks!  Kids beat up people who are good geeks or faggots.” 
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“Do you think there is some connection between you wanting to be seen as 
tough and your own sexual abuse?” 
“Yeah. When I was abused I was eight.  I was still short. Prior to the abuse I 
used to get picked on.  I remember I got a hiding – a huge black eye – when I told this 
dude to stop teasing me about Mum.  But I didn‟t make a connection between being 
gay and the abuse until I was about ten or eleven.  That‟s when I learnt about 
homosexuality. I was scared I might be gay – even to this day I haven‟t told my mates 
about the abuse.  Now I fear homosexuality less because I know I‟m attracted to 
women.” 
 “Do you have a girlfriend?” 
 “Not yet.  It‟s the rich little white boys get the chicks, not the outsiders.” 
 
 
After a few months in the programme, Jamie began to notice how he was 
feeling differently, how he was experiencing a new sense of self. He also talked about 
friendships with a number of girlfriends.  He was now comparing the “old self” with 
the “new self”.   He was clear that he preferred his “new self” to the “old self”: 
“I use to go out of my way to make female teachers life a hell – playing to the 
audience of other guys. I didn‟t know who the real me was.  I didn‟t want the other 
guys to see me as soft and when I was around other guys I was a dickhead.” 
“What changes have you noticed since coming to therapy?” 
“Since coming to therapy my mates have noticed I am becoming more polite – 
I have been standing against dissing people.” 
“Have you made any other commitments?” 
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“I‟m no longer going to play I‟m dumber than I am.  I am going to be my own 
person now.” 
 
For Jamie‟s last session I took him to the café to celebrate.  He‟d been on the 
programme for eighteen months. 
“Jamie, I‟ve been asking you a lot of questions since we‟ve been meeting. Are 
there any questions you‟d like to ask me?” 
Jamie took a long pause, thought and then asked: “What advice would you 
give about telling someone about why I come here every week?”  
“Well, every person and situation is going to be unique.  I don‟t think you 
need to feel obliged to tell anyone – lots of people have skeletons in their closets so to 
speak – there are no perfect people walking around out there – but on the other hand, 
if you trust this person, then it might be okay … 
“What if you were going to marry someone, would you tell them then?” 
“Again, it‟s really your own judgment call – if you love a person and they 
love you, then usually people will disclose more about events from the past that they 
might sometimes be ashamed of because they know the other person is judging them 
on the person they are today, not what they might have done in the past.” 
“Yeah, but what if you don‟t tell and then they find out about what I did from 
someone else?” 
“I guess there is always a slight possibility that might happen, but it is 
unlikely. But I understand your concerns. I am sure it would be better if the person 
heard it directly from you rather than indirectly from someone else.” 
“Well, I‟ve told Vicky.” 
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“You have?” 
“Yeah.” 
“What was her response?” 
“She kind of looked a bit shocked for a few seconds but then she said it was 
alright and gave me a big hug.” 
“Why did you decide to tell her?” 
“She asked me why I was at The House.  She said, she had a friend once who 
had stabbed somebody and she kept on being their friend.” 
“Do you think she cares about you?” 
“Yeah, I think so. I said I wish I had stabbed somebody rather than living with 
the shame about what I did.” 
“Jamie, I am going to tell you something in confidence; I haven‟t told many 
people.  My father was a “sex offender”.  I don‟t like that language.  He was not 
abusive towards children but he exposed himself to young women more than once. It 
happened when I was going through my adolescence.  I found out about it when I was 
nineteen from another family member.  In retrospect I wish my Dad had been able to 
tell me himself.  It disturbed me for many years but I didn‟t talk about it much.  
Sometimes it would come out when I was very drunk.  Eventually, I told my Dad I 
forgave him and that my knowledge of what he had done didn‟t affect my love for 
him.  You see, that‟s why I do this work Jamie. My Dad was a decent, honorable, 
gentle and loving man yet he did some stuff he was so ashamed of he could never 
speak about it to anyone.”  I feel tears forming in my eyes as I tell this story.  Jamie is 
very quiet, and then he says: 
“I don‟t know what to say.” 
 289 
“That‟s okay.” 
“I feel honoured.” 
I notice my watch and its five minutes past two. 
“Oh, we‟re running late.” 
We walk quickly back. I hope my disclosure is helpful to him in some way.  My 
Dad could never overcome the shame barrier and disclose to me.    
“I‟ve really enjoyed meeting with you every week Jamie.  I have admired your 
courage and commitment to talk through all that you‟ve been through.” 
We shook hands and I said, “See you next week at the Graduation.” 
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13. 
 
THE USE OF SELF IN THERAPY:  
A META-ANALYSIS OF THE STORIES    
 
13.1      Introduction 
In narrative research, including autoethnography, there are two basic forms of 
analysis: the analysis of narratives and narrative analysis (Polkinghorne, 1995; 
Etherington, 2004; Ellis, 2004). In the analysis of narratives, the narrative itself 
becomes the data to be analysed.  The narrative could be anything ranging from a 
short story to a film to a transcript of a conversation.  Analysis can be based on 
concepts derived from previously known theories which are applied to the data or 
concepts derived from the data (Etherington, 2004, p. 80), or, I would suggest, a 
combination of both.  Specific methods such as conversational analysis, thematic 
analysis, grounded theory and discourse analysis have been developed and refined in 
order to carry out these tasks.   Alternatively, the concept of narrative analysis 
recognises that the story itself is a form of analysis, as told by the researcher.  The 
story is not just raw data to be analysed but is actually constitutive of the life of the 
researcher who is telling the story.  In autoethnography the telling of a coherent story 
which engages the reader on both an intellectual and emotional level is the analysis 
(Etherington, 2004; Ellis, 2004).  Therefore for autoethnography, narrative analysis 
is, by definition, essential; whereas the analysis of narrative is therefore optional.  
When an analysis is done of a piece of autoethnographic writing it is therefore a 
meta-analysis. 
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In this chapter I have chosen to include an analysis of the stories from part 
two of the thesis based upon my reading of the stories from the perspective of both 
the systemic-narrative therapy traditions and the relational psychotherapy tradition 
and to show how the use of self links together these two traditions.  In particular, I 
identify and describe how the use of self becomes involved in the intersubjective and 
interactive processes of dyadic therapy.   This is just one reading, and I am sure each 
reader would have a different interpretation and understanding of the stories.  The 
cyclical interactive pattern that stood out for me in dyadic therapy involved an action 
or a response from the participant followed by an action or response from the 
therapist and so on.  I refer to this as the action-response (A-R) cycle. Viewed from 
an intersubjective perspective, the use of self is sometimes an intentional act; and at 
other times it is an improvised spontaneous response, often outside of conscious 
awareness, such as the subtle emotions communicated non-verbally through facial 
expressions, voice prosody, gesture and posture (Schore, 2005).  
Both the systemic-narrative traditions and the relational traditions recognise 
the importance of the use of self; however, as discussed in chapter three, they differ in 
the amount of attention given to this aspect of the therapy process and their 
understanding of what constitutes the main mechanism of change.  In systemic-
narrative therapies, the therapist primarily uses questions as the main form of 
intervention, to generate new meanings; whereas relational therapies generate new 
meanings through the use of interpretations.  Relational therapies also recognise the 
importance of non-verbal implicit communications and work on the assumption that 
the therapeutic relationship has the potential to provide the context for the participant 
to undergo change through experiencing a corrective emotional experience with the 
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therapist.  Although the importance of a respectful collaborative relationship is 
acknowledged in the systemic-narrative traditions, with some exceptions, the use of 
self, implicit non-verbal communications and the transformational potential of the 
relationship between therapist and client is given less weight (Bird, 2004; Flaskas & 
Perlesz, 1996; Flaskas,2002). 
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the tradition of judgment-based 
practice.  This sets the scene for my analysis of the moment-to-moment process of 
interactions. I begin with how I used both a combination of reflexive questions and 
interpretations in order to facilitate the creation of meaning.  These were intentional 
interventions, in which I took the lead in initiating the interactional cycle. This is 
followed by a discussion of position calls and optimal responsiveness, two alternative 
ways of analysing therapeutic interactions.  I then analyse the use of intentional self-
disclosure and the facilitation of critical reflections on hegemonic masculinity.  This 
is followed by a discussion of how a sense of relatedness and intimacy is created 
through various types of playful interactions.  In particular, I focus on the need to find 
creative and flexible ways of emotionally engaging participants who are significantly 
affected by abuse related trauma.  Finally, I finish this chapter with a discussion of 
how therapist self-reflexivity (or intersubjective mindfulness) is central to the therapy 
process and an analysis of how self-and-other reflexivity is constantly being used by 
the therapist as a means of attuning to the here and now of the intersubjective context 
of the interactional cycles.  
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13.2 Judgment-based practice 
Both therapist and participant are unique individuals who develop a unique 
relationship which cannot be replicated. The notion of developing therapy anew for 
each participant fits with the ideas of optimal responsiveness and specificity theory, 
as discussed in chapter three.  These ideas can be seen to belong to a much older 
tradition known as judgment-based practice (Polkinghorne, 2004). Unlike the 
scientist-practitioner model, a judgment-based practice approach argues that 
interventions cannot be separated off (and studied as independent variables) from the 
unique configuration of subjectivities involved in the therapy process.  I have argued 
in chapter three, that the related ideas of optimal responsiveness and specificity 
theory can enrich the principle of treatment responsivity as discussed in chapter two.  
However, the practice of professional discretion or the art of clinical judgment has 
not been researched in sexual offending therapy.  I argue that a better understanding 
of the role of clinical judgment in therapy practice can make a significant contribution 
to the critique developed by Marshall, Ward and colleagues (Marshall et al., 2003; 
Ross et al., 2008; Ward & Marshall, 2004; Ward, Melser, & Yates, 2007) of the 
failure of the risk-need-responsivity rehabilitation model to adequately theorise the 
importance of the person of the therapist and the therapeutic alliance to treatment 
effectiveness.   
Polkinghorne (2004) traces his version of judgment-based practice to the 
philosophy of Aristotle, who distinguished between what we would now call the 
physical sciences, the technological applications of the physical sciences, and the 
moral or human sciences.  Polkinghorne presents the case for a “judgment-based 
approach as against the technological approach, for the practices of care”.  I contend 
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that the dominant understanding of evidence-based practice is analogous to a 
technological approach to the practice of care. The technological version of evidence-
based practice argues that it is possible to define and isolate the procedures that are 
applied in the practices of care, and through experimental research, (ideally the 
randomised controlled trial), establish evidence for what “works” in practice.  The 
problem with this technological interpretation of evidence-based practice is that it 
assumes it is possible to isolate the procedure from the people involved in 
implementing the procedure, without acknowledging how this is removed from the 
reality of clinical practice (Hoffman, 2009; Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997; 
Strupp, 2001). This assumption is also contradicted by research into psychotherapy 
outcome research which has shown that techniques only account for 15% of client 
progress (Lambert & Barley, 2002).  Polkinghorne (2004) argues that it is the 
practitioner themselves that is more important than any procedure or technique:   
  
On the basis of a practitioner‟s self-knowledge, experience and training, he or 
she is expected to make judgments about what actions will accomplish a goal 
with a specific person, in a specific situation, at a specific time.  Judgment-
based practice focuses on the practitioner as the factor that produces change. It 
argues that practitioners can take into account the needs of particular 
individuals and respond to situational differences (p. 3). 
 
Polkinghorne argues accountability should therefore be focused on the outcomes 
produced in a particular situation, not just on the prior selection of a validated 
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program or procedure. I therefore became curious about how clinical judgment 
actually works in practice. 
 I began to see a connection between the use of self and judgment-based 
practice.   Judgment-based practice is founded on the ability of the therapist to learn 
from the participant and to be able to respond flexibly on a moment by moment basis.  
The skill of reflexive self awareness or the analogous concept of intersubjective 
mindfulness captured for me the primary receptive stance of the therapist.   This 
included my ability to be aware of my embodied affective and cognitive experience 
as well as being attuned to nonverbal and verbal communications of the participant in 
the here and now of the therapy session.  From this open posture of intersubjective 
mindfulness I would then be called upon to respond with an action of some kind or 
initiate an intentional intervention.   Intentional interventions, which involve elements 
of deliberation and choice, are carefully crafted responses to the atmosphere of the 
encounter as interpreted by the therapist in that moment.  However, at the same time, 
there is a more subtle emotional communication happening at the non-verbal level, 
often taking place outside the conscious awareness of the therapist and participant 
(Schore, 2003a; 2005). If the intentional intervention is incongruent with the 
emotional context of the interaction, it is unlikely to be experienced by the participant 
as an optimal response, and therefore more likely to have a negative effect.   
Polkinghorne (2004) defines judgment-based practice as a form of practical 
knowledge or practical wisdom which comes from Aristotle‟s theory of knowledge.   
Aristotle classified knowledge into three categories: “episteme”, “techne” and 
“phronesis”.  Episteme refers to certain knowledge that we would describe as 
deductive or mathematical. Techne refers to the use of knowledge to produce objects 
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of practical value such as building a house.  Phronesis refers to the realm of morality, 
it concerns the good life: 
  
A phronetic perspective on being with others reveals their needs and pains and 
calls forth a human caring response. Phronesis unconceals the moral 
dimension of human existence and seeks to promote the good and avoid 
causing harm to others (p. 45). 
 
The concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, is central to the idea of a human 
science (Gadamer, 1975/1989), and it is inclusive of “all our human sensitivities, 
including our emotions” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p.107):  
 
Because of the unique, emerged characteristics of human beings, successful 
practice with them requires improvisation and ongoing adjustments informed 
by situated practitioner judgment. Such a practice was taught by Aristotle for 
use in human interactions. He spelled out the characteristics of this 
nontechnical practice and termed the deliberation employed in it to determine 
actions „phronesis‟ (p. 95). 
 
The human sciences study the subjectivity of human actors who have intentions and 
goals. The question of what constitutes a good life and the path towards living a good 
life are ultimately questions of morality rather than science.  In contrast to the 
methodologies of the physical sciences, which seek to identify empirically valid 
propositions that are universal in their application, the human sciences study the 
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particular and unpredictable realm of human practice.  The findings of a human 
science cannot instruct us as to how we should proceed to reach the end we are 
seeking but rather provide us with “useful descriptions of what has worked in other 
situations and might work in the present one” (p. 94).  This is exactly the way in 
which case studies are therefore judged as useful. 
Polkinghorne argues (2004, p. 110) that human choice is guided by values, 
specificity of the situation, and emotions and imagination (emotional understanding).   
Our emotional response can be a better guide to a situation than an intellectual 
response.  We therefore need to remain present and open to responding with our 
whole being.   It is often the case that an improvised response will be the best 
response.  Practitioners of care such as therapists are often responding to the 
perceived response of the client to their actions.   “The interaction between the 
caregiver and the other person, whose responses are not scripted, is like musical 
improvisation in which each player is attuned to and responsive to the other‟s 
performance” (p. 119).  
Phronetic knowledge is therefore a form of embodied rationality. When 
engaged in it, practitioners “draw on their values, feelings and imagination; they 
incorporate their cultural understandings, personal experiences, training, and 
applicable scientific findings.  It is deliberative processing that occurs both within 
and outside their conscious awareness” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p.131). Similarly, 
Damasio‟s (2000) “ view of practical decision making is that it is experientially 
based, drawing on images from a person‟s past encounters and enactments in the 
world  … Images are not merely visual but include all manner of internal and external 
sensing; for example, sounds, taste, smell, and touch” (p.147). 
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Phronesis is also related to the concept of reflective understanding.  For 
example, Polkinghorne (2004) states: “The ability to ask the right questions about the 
topic under investigation is something of an art, an art which above all requires 
insight and good judgment (or better, phronesis) as a condition of its possibility.  
Framing questions that lead to an enlarged understanding is a creative process that 
cannot be reduced to a set of rules” (p. 165). Reflective understanding results in 
action: 
 
Schon believed that a substantial part of practitioner expertise, and probably 
the most important part, comes in the form of „knowledge-in-action‟ which 
can be distinguished from „knowledge-for-action‟ …Validity is determined by 
its effectiveness in a particular situation at a particular time … Practitioners of 
care must monitor the effect of their judgments continuously (Polkinghorne, 
2004, p.169-171). 
 
 Practitioners therefore both monitor and model the interactive process by the 
use of reflexive self-awareness.     
 
13.3 The creation of meaning: Reflexive questions and interpretations 
 The stories revealed to me how much I used questions as well as 
interpretations.   I understood this to be a consequence of my initial training in 
narrative therapy.   Narrative therapy grew out of strategic and systemic family 
therapy.   It was the Milan Associates who introduced so-called “circular questions” 
in 1980 into the therapy world (Palazzoli et al., 1980).  These questions were called 
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circular because each family member was asked in turn questions about the behaviour 
of two or more family members.  These questions were initially designed to generate 
information about difference.   This news of difference in turn changed both client 
and therapist.  The questions were also circular in the sense that the feedback 
observed by the therapist changed the therapist‟s response.  Circular questions 
became the most important intervention in systemic therapy (Boscolo & Bertrando, 
1996).  In congruence with their systemic epistemology, the Milan school used 
circular questions, initially as a means of developing an hypothesis about the family 
system but they gradually came to the conclusion that the questions themselves where 
enough to bring forth new meanings and hence change.  Karl Tomm called this style 
of practice “interventive interviewing”.  Tomm divided circular questions initially 
into two categories: informative and reflexive.  Informative questions generated 
information and reflexive questions facilitated change (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1996, p. 
107; Tomm, 1987a, 1987b, 1988). 
  Narrative therapists also used questions as primary interventions to create 
new meanings.  White & Epston (1990) introduced what they called “relative 
influence” questions.   These questions built on the innovation of circular questions, 
and created news of difference in relation to the influence of an externalised problem 
on the client and the influence of the client over the problem.   The use of questions in 
both systemic and narrative therapy worked in very similar ways because these types 
of questions positioned the client as a reflective observer on the behaviours, feelings 
and thoughts of themselves and others, often in relation to a problem or a solution.  
They were designed specifically to facilitate the client‟s ability to generate new 
meanings and alternate stories about their lives and relationships: 
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Considered from a linguistic point of view, therapy is a subtle game of 
hermeneutics and rhetoric … in analytic therapies the client is a rhetorician 
and the therapist is a hermeneutist (the client speaks and the therapist 
interprets the client‟s words), in systemic therapy the relationship is turned 
upside down: the therapist is the rhetorician (the one who asks questions) and 
the client is the hermeneutist, the one who furnishes meaning.  The questions 
of the therapist implicitly delegate the responsibility of interpretation, i.e. the 
attribution of meaning, to the client (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1996, p. 136). 
 
The questions that I used in the stories are derived from these traditions.  I call them 
reflexive questions, not only because they facilitate change through the generation of 
new meanings, but to try and confer how these kinds of questions facilitate the 
participant‟s development of reflexive self-awareness or mentalisation, the ability to 
hold in mind other people‟s minds as well as one‟s own. These questions were my 
dominant mode of intentional intervention in the stories, except in my work with 
Billy.  
Billy as a composite character was representative of my work with children in 
out-of-home care, who have often suffered abuse related trauma.  These children 
often experience difficulty in “mentalising” that is, reflecting on the internal states of 
themselves and others.  I found in my work with young people in out-of-home care 
that because of the effects of abuse related trauma, they were not yet at an appropriate 
stage in their maturational process to respond to these questions, and I learned, 
therefore, they were not an optimal response.  However, in my work with the 
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participants who had a secure attachment to at least one parent, they responded 
positively to well-timed reflexive questions.   
 For example, the following excerpt illustrates how reflexive questions were 
less than optimal with Billy, and how I picked up on Billy‟s cues and 
communications, such as the response “I dunno” and his associated non-verbal 
communications such as lowering of the head.  I therefore responded by using 
alternative intentional interventions such as communicating empathy through 
interpretations and using intentional self-disclosure as a form of metacommunication: 
 
“Billy, what do you care about?” I said softly. 
“I dunno.” 
“Billy, how do you think you are going to graduate from the programme if 
you don‟t talk?” 
“I dunno.” 
“How‟s the placement going?” 
“What do you mean?” 
“How‟s things been with Kate?” 
“The same.  I don‟t want to be there but I have no choice.” 
“Yes, I agree there are not many options.  But has Kate been more 
understanding?” 
“I dunno. Can we play now?” 
“Billy, how do you think I feel when you refuse to talk all the time?” 
“I dunno.” 
“I feel like you don‟t want to be with me.” 
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This move to respond by an intentional self-disclosure is a turning point.   Billy was 
withdrawing from my questions, following the disclosure Billy seems to listen again: 
 
Billy lowered his head and looked serious.  He seemed to be listening.  I was 
immediately struck by what I had just said and I continued, “I know that‟s 
how you must feel some of the time – that people don‟t want to be with you - 
but you‟re going to have to let yourself get close to someone one day.  You 
can‟t keep shutting people out all the time because you are frightened they are 
going to hurt you. You are a good person and I like you but you won‟t let me 
in.  I thought you would have been able to trust me by now. It‟s been almost 
two years now since our first meeting.  If you don‟t let someone get close you 
are always going to be lonely and I don‟t want that.  I care about you …” 
Billy‟s head remained bowed. 
“Billy, when do you think you are going to be ready to graduate?  At the end 
of this year? Next year? What do you think?” 
“Well, I won‟t be ready at the end of this year.” 
“Really? Why is that?” 
“I dunno. I just won‟t.” 
 
In contrast to how the reflexive questions fell flat with Billy, there are many examples 
to show how the questions generated meanings for the other participants. For 
example, this following excerpt is from my session with Peter: 
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The words, “lets me down”, resonated in my mind. I wondered how many 
times in his short life had Peter experienced this feeling. “What do you 
remember feeling first, the let down feeling or the angry feeling?” I asked. 
 “Probably the let down feeling.” 
 “Can you say a bit more what the let down feeling feels like?” 
 “Makes you feel like shit.” 
 “Can you remember other times in the past when you have felt like shit?” 
 “When Dad said he was going to stay and see me and didn‟t.”  
 “What kind of thinking does let down feelings encourage?” 
 “Feeling shit.” 
 “If feeling like shit could speak what would it say?” 
 “Nobody cares about me.” 
 
In contrast to Billy, Peter is able to respond to the invitation to reflect on his feelings, 
and therefore he is able to clearly articulate his sense that “nobody cares about me”. 
By putting these feelings into words (symbolising), Peter is on his way to being able 
to self-regulate these feelings of let down and disappointment, whereas for much of 
the time Billy can only enact his feelings that nobody cares about me.  This also 
creates the potential for a future dialogue with Peter‟s mother about these feelings and 
an opportunity for Peter‟s mother to respond to his feelings and repair the rupture in 
their relationship.  The conversational interactions have a feeling of flow, which 
communicated to me that the intervention was optimal. 
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13.4 Optimal responsiveness and position calls                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
I slowly began to see how the use of self mediated the action-response (A-R)  
cycle that I had identified in the stories.  This idea resonated with ideas found in both 
the systemic-narrative traditions and in the relational traditions.  In the first, I found 
the work of Drewery (2005) to provide one way of thinking about this A-R pattern 
through the lens of positioning theory (Harre & Langenhove, 1999).  This 
understanding is based in the paradigm of discursive theory and practice.  In the 
relational tradition, as discussed at length in chapter three, I found the concept of 
optimal responsiveness (Bacal, 1998 a,b,c), which builds on the work of Kohut, to be 
another, equally engaging way of conceptualising this interaction pattern.  It was a 
genuine insight for me to discover how the systemic-narrative tradition focused on 
the rhetorical skills of the therapist to initiate interactions, especially the skillful use 
of interventive interviewing (Tomm, 1987a; 1987b; 1988), wherein the skillful use of 
questions invites the participant into the agentive position of meaning making; and 
how the relational tradition focused on the hermeneutic skills of the therapist to 
respond with well-timed, empathic interpretations with the participant being 
positioned as the rhetorician (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1996). 
I agree with Drewery (2005) that: 
 
The professional practice of teachers of counselling requires among other 
things close analysis of what is therapeutic about conversations:  we need to 
distinguish, and thus teach our students to distinguish, between different kinds 
of responses and different kinds of conversational moves.  We need to be able 
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to say clearly why one way of speaking is more therapeutic than another (p 
306). 
  
In order to do this Drewery turns to positioning theory, “a body of writing that centres 
on the use of positioning as a conceptual tool.”  Positioning theory can be used to 
understand how subjectivities are produced through conversations and how preferred 
identities are taken up.  Drewery is particularly interested in “the production of 
relationships of respect” and the ways in which language can be used to call people 
into “agentive subject positions”.  She refers to “position calls” to describe the 
micropolitics of everyday conversations in which people routinely accept or decline 
being positioned within discourses.  Drewery suggests that therapists are “discourse 
users whose sensitivity to language is brought into service to invite their clients into 
an agentive position in relation to the problem with which they are concerned” (p. 
318).  From a relational perspective, therapists also need to be sensitive to the rhythm 
and music of nonverbal communications and to hold in mind the subjective 
experience of the participant (Schore, 2005).   As discussed by Bacal (1998c) in 
relation to his concept of optimal responsiveness, everything a therapist does or says 
(or does not do or say) is a form of communication.  Similarly, everything a 
participant does or says (or does not do or say) is a form of communication.   In this 
sense, contrary to Freud, therapy is not the talking cure, but the communicating cure 
(Schore, 2005). The therapist communicates acceptance or respect non-verbally and 
verbally, through actions as well as through words.  The therapist also needs to be 
sensitive to affects, both to her own experience and the affects as expressed by the 
participant.  In a similar way, if conversation is taken in this more inclusive sense, to 
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include both the verbal and non-verbal components of interactions, then it may be 
also possible to apply positioning theory to the many different A-R patterns I have 
identified in the stories.  For example, Billy‟s call, “Can you get me a plaster 
Andrew?” calls forth a nurturing response.  The participant initiates and I respond.  It 
is an optimal response because it repairs the rupture in the relationship and moves the 
therapy process along.  Similarly, a reflexive question invites people into 
“mentalising” positions, helping them to identify their intentions, desires, dreams or 
wishes.  Or, when a participant lowers their head and sighs, this calls for some kind 
of empathic response.  
In summary, there are two ways of analysing these interactions on the basis of 
who is doing the calling, or the invite.  In the systemic and narrative therapies it is 
often the therapist who takes the lead, inviting a response from the client.  In this 
form of practice the therapist is positioned as the rhetorician, the one who asks the 
question and the client is positioned as the hermeneutist, the one who provides the 
response, the making of meaning. When this process is reversed, it is the client who is 
doing the calling and the therapist is positioned as the one who provides a response.   
This response can be a natural, spontaneous response such as “would you like a cup 
of tea”?  Or, it could be a well-crafted interpretation, such as “you feel as if no one 
wants you”. To add an extra layer of complexity, it is also possible for the therapist to 
be mindful of calls coming from within, that is, internal cues, such as a physical sense 
of tightness in the chest and shoulders, and in this case the therapist plays interpreter 
to her own internal cues and might say silently or out loud, “I am feeling anxious”.    
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13.5 Intentional self-disclosure and hegemonic masculinity  
Although adolescent treatment literature is now emphasising the importance 
of creating psychologically safe relationships through creating a trusting therapeutic 
relationship with an empathic therapist and providing a new or corrective emotional 
experience for the  young person (Ryan & Lane, 1997a), the place of therapist self-
disclosure in adolescent sexual offending treatment is rarely researched or discussed 
in any detailed or meaningful way.  I have previously discussed how our subjectivity 
always enters the therapy relationship, whether we like it or not; we will always be 
communicating certain aspects of our personal self all the time, from the clothes we 
wear, the accent we speak in, to the inner thoughts that flow through our mind that 
are not usually disclosed.  All this will be expressed through our non-verbal 
communications (Schore, 2003a; Winslade et al., 1997).  The stories show how self-
disclosure was ubiquitous to the therapy process, in the sense that the therapist cannot 
not, self-disclose. However, in this section the focus of my discussion will be on 
intentional self-disclosure.  The stories suggest that intentional self-disclosure can 
deepen the connection experienced in the therapeutic relationship, and give the 
participants in the therapy process the experience of being treated as equal partners.  
It can also model the use of self-reflection, by communicating the therapist‟s 
subjective experience in the here and now, or telling a story about the therapist‟s 
experience when he was a young man.  I also found that the judicious use of 
intentional self-disclosure can be a way of facilitating reflection on cultural discourse, 
especially in relation to the effects of hegemonic masculinity on the participants.  
Because of my personal experience of male culture and my personal experience of 
being a son and a father, I often found myself resonating in response to the stories 
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being told by the participants.  For example, the fact that my father had sexually 
offended was a factor that enhanced my ability to identify with the participants non-
judgmentally.  It also aided my ability to empathise with the participants‟ own sense 
of shame. I also drew on my own experience of male culture and my experience of 
being a boy, a son and a father, to respond to what the participants were disclosing.  
I used intentional self-disclosure in a number of the sessions.  For example, 
when talking with Peter about shyness, I make a fairly lengthy self-disclosure as 
preparation for inviting him to make a link between his use of alcohol and his 
experience of shyness:  
 
“But we do know there was a time when you didn‟t worry too much about 
what other people thought about you. Because when you think about it, there 
is a relationship between shyness and self-consciousness, or even worse, self-
criticism.  Like with me, I have always worried about not being good enough 
in many areas of my life, especially in music.  For most of my life I have found 
it difficult to perform in public when singing songs and playing my guitar.  My 
hands would shake and my body would be frozen in tension.  It‟s only been 
over the last few years that I have relaxed more when playing in front of 
people informally but put me on a stage and it‟s still the same.  I think that‟s 
because I‟m so critical of my playing that I can‟t just let myself go into the 
song.  So, coming back to alcohol then, do you think alcohol is the solution to 
the problem of shyness?” 
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Peter‟s story also illustrates how sharing my story about self-consciousness in 
relation to performing also helps to consolidate our relational bond.  The intentional 
use of self disclosure can also help to facilitate the experience of mutual empathy and 
encourage greater levels of self-disclosure by the participant.  For example, Jamie‟s 
story concludes with an intentional self-disclosure regarding my father‟s offending.  I 
think the disclosure was well-timed and gave Jamie a sense of acknowledgement, as 
somebody whom I considered trustworthy to share such information and also to 
provide him with an opportunity to be empathic towards me.  The story suggests that 
empathy can be a mutual experience and illustrates how the sharing of personal 
stories transforms both participants. 
The stories often touched on issues of male culture, in particular the effect of 
gender hierarchies, in particular homophobia (Connell, 2000), on the participant‟s 
experience of self.  The concept of “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1995, 2002) 
was a useful way of understanding how gender relations shaped the subjectivity of 
participants and therefore the meanings that participants made from their own 
experience of victimisation and how this may have contributed to their own offending 
behaviour.  The sociocultural concept of hegemonic masculinity also complemented 
the neurobiological and developmental-psychological concepts of abuse related 
trauma, insecure attachment and Benjamin‟s (1988; 1990) theory of intersubjectivity 
as discussed in chapter three.  The effects of hegemonic masculinity provides a 
complementary understanding, alongside the effects of abuse related trauma and 
insecure attachment, of why some of the boys and young men on the programme 
found it difficult to contact and express their feelings and to show empathy towards 
others.  According to Benjamin (1990), intersubjectivity is a developmental 
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achievement which involves a relationship based upon mutual recognition, not 
domination.  These theories helped me to understand how many of the participants 
found the expression of vulnerable emotions, commonly referred to as feminine, a 
difficult challenge. Adolescent sexual offending could therefore be understood as a 
reactionary act of self-formation, intended to define one‟s place in the hierarchical 
order of masculinity and a form of domination over the weaker feminised other.  My 
interventions in the stories were influenced by these different theoretical perspectives. 
The construction of masculinity as strong and active and femininity as weak and 
passive, reinforced by such cultural institutions as religion, sport, Hollywood and the 
family, can be seen being reenacted in the stories told by Adrian, Peter and Jamie.  
Jamie and Adrian‟s fear of being seen as “gay” and Adrian‟s sense of 
accomplishment in running the gauntlet are examples of the force of hegemonic 
masculinity to shape the adolescent‟s fragile sense of identity.   
In Adrian‟s narrative I was emotionally touched when he began to tell the 
story of his parent‟s relationship with each other and his relationship with them.  In 
particular, I was touched by Adrian‟s identification with his father, which reminded 
me of my own relationship with my father.  This scene brought forth my associations 
with the film Rebel without a cause.  In this movie the son perceives his father‟s 
“weakness” through the lens of hegemonic masculinity.  Adrian both identifies with 
his father and, at the same time, wishes to destroy that identification.  The conflict 
builds both at home and at school.  At school he is subjected to homophobic teasing 
and at home he witnesses how others view his father as weak and lazy.  Hence he 
experiences running the gauntlet, that traditional masculinist (abusive?) initiation 
ritual, as a positive and validating experience.  Rather than challenging this directly, 
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which would have been misattuned to his subjective experience, I waited until Adrian 
retells in therapy how he discloses his offending behaviour to his girlfriend which 
leads to his girlfriend disclosing details of her own sexual abuse.  Adrian tells how he 
supports her in this.  Near the end of the story I respond by inviting Adrian to reflect 
on his actions and compare them to running the gauntlet, and he states that disclosing 
to his girlfriend was a more important step towards becoming a man than running the 
gauntlet.  This provides a foundation for developing a different story of what it means 
to be a man than that provided by the gauntlet.  This positive outcome was 
contributed to by the way I was able to empathise with how important the gauntlet 
experience had been for Adrian.  It would have been easy to explicitly question his 
enthusiasm for the experience.  However, this would have been I think, a less than 
optimal response.  However, waiting till another moment arises, later in the session, 
and juxtaposing these two affirming experiences, allows Adrian‟s values of care and 
compassion to be more richly articulated.   
Similarly, Peter‟s story illustrates how he was able to acknowledge 
experiences and skills that are usually expressly prohibited for boys by the dictates of 
hegemonic masculinity.  He is able to speak about his vulnerable feelings of being 
“let-down”.  He also shares how “crying it all out” has helped him to cope with the 
let-down feeling. I provide a mirroring response and name this practice as a skill and 
an expression of strength, helping to build Peter‟s self-esteem.  My intentional self-
disclosure shows that, like Peter, I also struggled with social inhibition when asking 
girls to dance when I was a boy, and how I also saw myself as a “shy” person.  This is 
an example of how the effects of hegemonic masculinity (it is “sissy” or “gay” to like 
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ballroom dancing or ballet) are internalised as psychological deficits.
10
  Peter‟s story 
also illustrates how consuming alcohol, a practice which is congruent with hegemonic 
masculinity, also enables the overcoming of social inhibition.  However, in 
considering the effects of alcohol, such as disinhibiting the social restraints around 
violence, Peter was able to resist hegemonic masculinity.  Also, the conversation 
highlights how the experience of a mutually respectful, intimate relationship with his 
girlfriend Sarah, was also an antidote to feelings of shyness and shame.  Interestingly, 
the reference to feeling inhibited around eating evokes associations of his relationship 
with his father, who could at times be violent and shaming, demonstrating how 
attachment relationships, as well as sociocultural discourse, are formative of our 
sense of self. 
  Finally, Jamie‟s story shows how the impact of sexual abuse on boys and 
men is complicated by the culture of hegemonic masculinity. For boys who are 
sexually assaulted, apart from the initial trauma of the event, the meaning of the event 
is filtered through the lens of hegemonic masculinity and this affects the way they 
come to view their masculinity and their sexuality.  Most boys in our culture would 
view their masculinity as having been diminished, and they fear they are now 
destined to become homosexual.  Sexually abusive behaviours then become 
understood as misguided attempts by adolescent boys to re-affirm their lost sense of 
power and control or in some cases to “prove” to themselves they are not 
homosexual. For a boy who is already insecure, being a victim of sexual assault only 
thickens a negative story of self such as personal failure, by comparing himself to the 
                                                 
10
 It would be interesting to research contemporary dance forms, such as “rap” or “hip hop” and to 
explore their relationship with hegemonic masculinity. 
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specifications of hegemonic masculinity.  It is unlikely that Jamie would have been 
able to disclose these feelings and make these links, without the level of trust he 
experienced with me as a male therapist.  It is not easy for a man to disclose he has 
been a victim of rape. Jamie was also able to respond to my intentional interventions, 
so that when I asked him in what ways the rape had “affected how you think about 
yourself?” he was able to articulate how he wanted to prove that he was still straight 
and not gay.  This then enabled us to externalise homophobia and hence helped Jamie 
to develop the capacity to critically reflect on male culture. 
 
13.6 Playful improvisations and the experience of intimacy 
 Meares (2005) argues that one of the signs of progress in therapy is the feeling 
of flow, the sense of “inner aliveness”, and how this is communicated through the 
quality of the therapeutic conversation (p. 18).  Abuse related trauma, in this account, 
takes away an ability to reflect inwardly.  Reflection is a higher function, easily lost.  
The ability to connect is also lost because an awareness of inner life allows others to 
connect with us (p. 89).  It was very hard going sometimes to feel a sense of 
connection with Billy, because of this lack of awareness of an inner life.  According 
to Meares, restoration of a healthy sense of self is often signaled by an ability to play 
and this is reflected in the quality of the therapeutic conversation: 
 
Therapy is a means of enabling a play-like mental activity to begin again.  
Therapy, ideally, establishes a play space in which can be generated an 
experience of selfhood which Jane Goodall believes may be unique to the 
human primate.  It depends upon the exchange of that which is most „inward,‟ 
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the meaning of „intimate.‟  Intimacy is an interplay between people who know 
the experience of self. The play, in this case, is with symbols which we use in 
our ordinary conversations without noticing what we are doing.  Such 
interplay is necessary to the maintenance and growth of self (p. 163) 
 
Mears argues that people who have been damaged by the early circumstances of their 
lives have often not reached the maturational level of symbolic play.  An earlier stage 
of maturation must be activated first.   Therapy can provide a form of relatedness 
equivalent to the non-verbal proto-conversation experienced during infancy (p. 170), 
however this cannot be modeled on the mother-infant interaction. 
Meares believes the parent‟s responsiveness (as with the therapist‟s 
responsivity) can be described as a three phase process of coupling (joining in with 
the positive affect), amplification (amplifying the positive affect) and representation 
(starting with facial expressions representing emotions): 
 
Coupling is a conversational linking to the most „personal‟ aspect or element 
of what has just been offered … the therapist must also be unfocused and 
aware of a series of themes of sensations, perceptions, feelings, imaginings, 
and memories.  This state includes the capacity to notice changes in one‟s self 
as the patient‟s story is being told and, as it were, to become a spectator to 
those experiences (p. 176-177). 
 
Meares encourages therapists to stay with the client‟s experience and to use the 
client‟s words, perhaps elaborating on them.  “Amplification typically includes the 
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enhancement of positive affect, which is very often muted … A principal feature of 
amplification is that it gives value.” (p. 179).  Representation refers to the attempt to 
empathise, to portray through the use of metaphors, the emerging inner world of the 
client.  Meares argues that “the therapist‟s capacity for empathy is the principal agent 
of beneficial change in the patient”  (p. 181). The attention of the therapist shifts to 
representing the inner life of the client (equivalent to the symbolic play space).   The 
use of metaphor is a crucial part of this process of the transformation of thoughts into 
visual images: 
 
Metaphor is necessary to the empathic process since the intangible 
movements of inner life can only be conveyed by means of things that can be 
seen and touched.  Emotions, at the bottom, are always expressed in terms of 
metaphor (p. 182). 
 
Early pretend play in children is significantly related to the development of the 
reflective function, an understanding of other people‟s feelings and beliefs.   People 
affected by abuse related trauma are often lacking in empathy for self and others.  
Meares argues that the communication of feeling tone is more important 
therapeutically than the construction of meaning. 
 The trauma is dissolved through the process of creating a play space within 
the therapeutic conversation in which the client can reconnect with previously 
compartmentalised parts of the self.  The on-going effects of traumatic memory can 
be inferred from the quality of the conversation: 
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When traumatic experience underlies the conversation, the language becomes 
a limited form of „social speech‟ taking the form of „chronicles‟ or „scripts‟.  
The consciousness, as Janet put it, is constricted.  A second major difference, 
of course, involves reflective awareness, which is lacking in the traumatic 
state … 
 Traumatic memory … remains sequestered, unable to mingle with the 
experience of self …The traumatic memory system must change in its form so 
that it becomes more like reflective or dualistic consciousness, allowing it to 
mingle, or, as it were, to dissolve in it. In order to allow the dissolution of the 
traumatic material into the consciousness of self, it is necessary to have a self 
present in the first place, into which the destabilizing and diminishing 
memory system can be integrated.  The establishment of self must be a 
priority. Self is not a fixed state.  It comes and goes … a particular form of 
relatedness with others is necessary to the generation and maintenance of self.  
That kind of relationship has the quality of empathy (p. 194- 195). 
 
In summary, Meares argues that the experience of self arises in the context of a 
particular form of relatedness.  This particular form of relatedness is mediated by an 
empathically attuned conversation.  This way of talking together, and the relationship 
from which it emerges is, therefore, the transformational element.  
 In my work with Billy, it was difficult to experience a verbal therapeutic 
conversation in which intimacy could be mutually experienced because of the effects 
of abuse related trauma.  I therefore had to find more optimally responsive ways of 
engaging him, working on a more bodily and intuitive level, mediated by the right 
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hemisphere of the brain, which is responsible for our emotional experience in 
intimate attachment relationships (Schore, 2003, 2008; Siegel, 1999, 2003).  One of 
the ways I made use of myself to create an experience of intimacy was through the 
spontaneous expression of acceptance and care and the spontaneous engagement in 
playful improvisations. My subjective experience of acceptance and care helped to 
facilitate a similar experience of self-acceptance and self-care for the participant.  
 The stories show how my subjective experience of acceptance and care or 
compassion was foundational to practice, especially when I experienced a mutual 
experience of caring to be present. This occurred when I knew, that the participant 
knew, that I was experiencing and expressing care.  This captures the experience of 
the intersubjective, of “being with” the participant through the sharing of similar 
subjective states (Benjamin, 1988; Stern, 1985/2000). The stories also showed how 
the experience of mutual care was a key relational experience that indicated to me 
that my responses had been optimal and therefore a process of mutual transformation 
was underway.    
Generally speaking a caring holding environment is the responsibility of the 
therapist to create.   Care cannot be turned on like a tap; it has to be genuinely 
experienced.  The experience of care is usually initiated by the therapist, and the 
participant responds when they experience the therapist‟s expressions of care and 
emotional understanding to be genuine.  Care and emotional understanding are 
expressed in a variety of ways: through the process of self-disclosure, ranging from 
facial gaze, tone of voice and attentive listening through to the expression of various 
forms of mutual understanding, including the sharing of personal and professional 
stories.   
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I was aware of the importance of practicing care on a foundation of non-
judgmental acceptance and unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1957).  This is, of 
course, not always possible to sustain, given that the therapist, like the participant, is 
subject to emotional reactions based upon past experience.   Spontaneous 
responsiveness was also central to my practice (Bacal, 1998c).  Planned agendas 
would be set aside in order to allow myself to respond, as appropriate, in a more 
flexible manner.  I quickly realised that trying to force a predetermined agenda was 
often not optimally responsive, and instead began attuning to the participant in the 
here and now. As the therapy progressed I also experienced the development of an 
affectional bond with the participant (Holmes, 2001) and became curious as to how 
the participant was experiencing their relationship with me, both over time, and in the 
here and now of the therapeutic session. In order to facilitate this process I also began 
sharing some of my experience of the relationship with the participant.  This kind of 
intervention has been described as a form of “metacommunication” (Safran & Muran, 
2000), that is, communicating about the therapist‟s own subjective experience of the 
verbal and non-verbal communicative process, hoping to open up these experiences 
in an accessible way to the participants for discussion.  It could also be described as a 
form of intentional self-disclosure, as discussed in the previous section, as,  for 
example, when I acknowledged to Billy that I was experiencing a feeling of being 
unwanted and wondering if this was how Billy often felt. I was also aware of the 
importance of expressing non-verbal or affective communications – with the 
professional knowledge that it was crucial that the participants could see that I cared 
(Fosha, 2000; Schore, 2003a).  I understood that it didn‟t really matter how much I 
believed I genuinely cared, if the participants could not see or feel that I cared.  It is 
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doubtful that therapists can be of much help unless the participants have a conscious 
experience of being cared for or a sense of being liked and validated by the therapist 
(Bird, 2000; Rogers, 1957).  
This sense of caring for and the experience of being cared for were therefore 
at the centre of the therapy process. Similarly, in my work with participants who were 
in out-of-home care, summarised in the composite character of Billy, I struggled to 
forge a connection.  One possible explanation was that they found it much harder to 
allow themselves to experience being cared for.  Given the personal and family 
history of many participants it was understandable that it would have been hard to 
trust the therapist.  Many of the participants began the programme isolated and 
alienated from themselves and others.  Some of them had closed the door, especially 
those participants like Billy who had multiple experiences of abuse, rejection, 
abandonment and shame.  Rarely in their lives had they experienced sharing an 
intimate space with family members or friends. They were uncertain as to how to 
form close relationships with others, and possibly reluctant to form close bonds with 
others.  Hence, a feeling state of aloneness was often pervasive. Facilitating 
connection was not always an easy task, having to overcome not only age and cultural 
barriers but also the participants‟ own protective strategies against feeling close to 
someone again.   
I tried different ways of responding to find a way of connecting with Billy; for 
example, I engaged a number of times in playful improvisations.  Billy was often 
lacking the capacity to engage in conversations generated by reflexive questions, 
hence I had to engage him in other more direct ways, involving sensorimotor skills 
such as ball games and other forms of physical play. However, Billy also responded 
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well to visual games, such as the game of “squiggles”, which generated the sharing of 
positive affect.   However, whenever I attempted to switch from embodied affective 
responses to reflexive questions Billy would again respond by withdrawing, as 
illustrated in the following excerpt: 
 
“There,” he said with a sense of satisfaction:  “A two-headed shark.”  He 
drew a balloon from the mouth and in the balloon he wrote the words: “I 
want to eat you up.”   
 “Who is the shark and who does the shark want to eat Billy?” 
 “I dunno.” 
 “And why two heads, do you think?” 
 “I dunno.” 
When Billy had finished the drawing he said, “Can we play ball now?”  
I replied, “I think you are changing the topic.  What are you feeling right 
now?” 
“I dunno.” 
 
In this series of A-R interactions, my attempt to introduce reflexive questions was not 
optimal, as can be witnessed by the participant‟s blunt responses.   I would probably 
have done better to have tried an empathic communication such as “maybe you are 
afraid someone is going to hurt you”.  However, I picked up on the participants cue 
and tried a playful improvised response instead, which created a feeling of safety: 
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“I know.  How about we play a little game?  How about you pretend to be the 
shark and I ask you some questions. Is that okay?” 
“Alright.” 
“Hello Mr. Shark, what big teeth you have!” 
“All the better to eat you up with!” 
We both laughed. 
“Mr. Shark, I would like to be your friend, but I feel you want to chase me 
away whenever I get close.” 
“Go away!” 
“Okay, okay.” I decided not to push too much – in my experience Billy would 
only withdraw even more if I tried to push too far. 
“You sound angry Mr. Shark.  Are you feeling angry?” 
“Yes!” 
“Let‟s play some more then.  Maybe that way you will trust me better and 
then you might change into a playful dolphin!” 
So I suggested we play hand-football.  He enjoyed this game, especially when 
he was winning.  Near the end of the game, he started to gesture like a gorilla.  
I joined in the game, down on my hands and knees.  He laughed at me beating 
my hands on my chest, imitating a gorilla.  Then he started to beat his chest 
with his fist and again I joined him.  Before long we were both laughing and 
enjoying ourselves immensely. 
 
In the above excerpt, I succeeded in engaging Billy in a playful conversation but 
when I tried to engage Billy in reflecting on his feelings, again, he pulled away.  So I 
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returned to engaging Billy in a playful improvisation involving gorillas, resulting in a 
mutually enjoyable experience. 
I therefore tried many ways to form a connection. For example, in Billy‟s 
story, when I was feeling disconnected, I went to get a plaster at Billy‟s request from 
the First Aid Kit.  Looking back at this scene, my actions can be understood as 
expressing my emotional understanding – an embodied affective communication – 
the spontaneous expression of care. Billy was able to communicate his need for this 
kind of nurturing action, which was exactly the kind of response he had not been 
receiving from his foster carer. My experience of acceptance and care seemed to arise 
together.  Perhaps these are both elements of compassion - without acceptance we 
cannot care.  Without care for the other there can be no acceptance.  I think this also 
involves an ability to be self-accepting on the part of the therapist (Safran & Muran, 
2000). Billy‟s story shows how my ability to practice acceptance (and tolerate Billy‟s 
anger) creates a context for the participant to begin the process of accepting 
themselves (Safran & Muran, 2000). This can be complicated by a resistance to being 
cared for and accepted, because of previous ambivalent experiences with caregivers. 
If the experience of being supposedly “cared for” was also associated with the 
experience of being hurt, then to surrender to someone else‟s care was not always an 
easy option for some participants.   
So I learned about the importance of practicing with care and acceptance. It 
was not an “intervention” that could be learnt. It had to begin with my acceptance of 
my own uncertainties and insecurities; the fact that I did not have the answer, or the 
intervention to fix the problem (Magid, 2008a).  Partly, it was about creating 
intersubjective spaces of acceptance and spontaneous play, a transitional space where 
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therapist and participant could find a way to connect (Meares, 1993). Playfulness 
often generated the possibility of sharing positive affect, the pleasure, the excitement 
of entering a play world together.   Laughing together and enjoying each other‟s 
company. Knowing with the participant that the experience of enjoyment or intimacy 
was a genuine, mutually shared experience involving a process of joint actions, had a 
powerful therapeutic effect. Spontaneous unstructured play activity helped to create 
the attachment bond. This could also be understood as a form of mutual responsivity 
(Katz & Shotter, 2004). If the participant enjoys the session, he looks forward to the 
next session; hence he begins to miss the therapist or to look forward to seeing him 
again.  A genuine relationship is created.   
These spontaneous expressions of acceptance and care and playful 
improvisations laid the ground for new relational experiences, in which I had the felt 
sense that something significant had been communicated that was mutually 
connecting and moved the therapy process on in a positive direction.  These 
interactions may be entirely non-verbal and can sometimes happen outside of the 
conscious awareness of both the participant and the therapist. Spontaneous 
expressions of emotional understanding, such as the plaster story, demonstrated key 
turning points in the sessions and possibly in the therapy.  The first challenge 
therefore, when I met with a participant for the first time, was to move from the 
feeling of being the “other”, of being strangers to each other, to experiencing what 
Martin Buber called a genuine meeting (Orange, 1995 p. 20-21) and what Benjamin 
(1988) refers to as the intersubjective sense of “being with” the participant. 
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13.7 Self-reflexivity and re-membering   
Aron (2000) reviewed the literature on self-reflexivity in the psychoanalytic 
tradition.  He views therapist self-reflexivity as a significant contributor to therapeutic 
action; also for Aron, the final and most important outcome for a client is the 
development and maintenance of self-reflexivity.   Self-reflexivity involves a 
“meeting of minds”.   It involves the embodied self and the verbal self; the self as 
subject and the self as object; the other as subject and the other as object; the intra-
psychic and the intersubjective dimensions of consciousness.  Aron uses the terms 
intrapsychic and intersubjective as Benjamin (1995) defined them, “ to refer to two 
types of relationships to the self and to the other, two complementary modes of 
experience, in which individuals relate both to the self and to the other as both subject 
and as object” (p. 668).  He links this conceptualisation of the self to William James.  
James viewed the “me” as referring to the sense of the self-as-object and the “I”, as 
the sense of the self-as-subject.  The sense of the self-as-object, is what is known (and 
how we may feel others know us), and the sense of the self-as-subject is the knower 
and the doer: 
 
Reflexive self-awareness, or self-reflexivity, is the capacity to move smoothly 
between subjective and objective perspectives on the self … To love, one 
must be able to experience oneself and the other as separate yet related and 
similar subjects, whereas to lust, one must be able to experience the other as 
an object of one‟s desire and one must also be able to “let go” of one‟s own 
self-as-agent, in charge and in control … (p. 673-675). 
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Self-reflexive awareness refers to the ability to hold in mind both the sense of the self 
as subject and the self as object and the other as subject and object.  Following 
Winnicott, Benjamin (1988) argues that a child learns to reflect on her mind (and her 
mother‟s mind) because another person regards her as having a mind to reflect on.  
Self-reflexive awareness can be interpreted as intersubjective or relational 
mindfulness: a key skill in therapeutic practice (Safran & Muran, 2000; Hughes, 
2007).   
Self-reflexivity therefore refers to the ability of the therapist to be mindful of  
both his own internal cues, thoughts and feelings and the participant‟s subjectivity, expressed 
through his responses and cues on a moment by moment basis.  This can be understood as the 
practice of intersubjective mindfulness: 
 
What I am describing is intersubjective mindfulness. The therapist is fully in the 
present moment, accepting whatever presents itself, being curious about what she is 
being aware of, having compassion for self and other. In contrast to the more 
traditional centers of awareness in mindfulness (breathing, sounds, a tree), in this 
situation the subjectivity of the present other is the center of awareness, along with 
one‟s own subjective response to his or her subjectivity, and the other‟s subjective 
response to one‟s own subjective response. (Hughes, 2007, p. 97). 
 
This flow of sensation, feeling and inner conversation is available to the conscious awareness 
of the therapist prior to making an intentional intervention (there may also be processes 
occurring simultaneously that the therapist is not aware of).  In this section I identify and 
discuss in relation to the stories the practice of intersubjective mindfulness, specifically my 
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awareness of my own flow of thoughts and feelings, including drawing upon a stock of 
background knowledge relevant to the interactional sequence.   
I was struck by how my feeling of self-worth and competence as a therapist 
was directly linked to the responsiveness of the participant I was working with. In 
this way, when I experienced the participant as a positive self-object, it helped to 
facilitate the flow of the therapy process; when I experienced the participant as a 
negative or critical self-object, it impeded the flow of therapy. It was also my 
awareness of the quality of the responsiveness of the participant that indicated to me 
if I was being optimally responsive or not. I became aware of how the non-
responsiveness, or the hostile responsiveness of the participant, had an impact on my 
self-confidence in my ability to be therapeutic , illustrating how responsiveness is a 
two-way street and how the therapist also depends upon a certain amount of positive 
responsiveness from the participant (Bacal & Thomson, 1998).  For example, in the 
following interaction with Billy I am aware of my self-state becoming increasingly 
disillusioned in response to Billy‟s aggressive and dismissive self-state:   
 
“Look Billy, don‟t take it so personally.  It‟s the contract that you signed 
when you came on the programme.  It‟s not just you; the rules apply to all the 
guys on the programme.  It clearly states that you are not allowed to be alone 
with children unless it is with an informed adult.”  I sounded like a lawyer, I 
thought, distant and somewhat aloof. 
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I am also aware of how my own communications have a frustrated tone, exacerbating 
the disjunction: 
 
“Look, you are putting yourself in a seriously risky situation.  However, we 
could inform her father about your past offending.”  I immediately regretted 
this response. It felt like an indirect threat, expressing my irritation and the 
power imbalance in our relationship.   
“No way!” 
“Well then, you‟ll just need to follow the rules.”  I felt I was colliding into 
Billy, rather than working collaboratively. 
 
At the same time I am aware of the subjectivity of the participant I am also 
simultaneously aware of my own disillusioned self-state: 
 
I noticed that Billy had been picking at a scab on his knee with a sharp metal 
object he‟d found in the room.  Billy had a bad habit of “picking” at his 
scabs.  At the same time I felt heavy hearted; tired. I noted a familiar negative 
thought passing through my mind: You are not helping this boy - You are a 
lousy therapist. 
I knew this voice well, the voice of self-criticism, aiming to expose me as an 
incompetent, fake therapist.  I knew it well because it was often around.  It 
complained, this is a hopeless therapeutic conversation.  You can‟t even ask 
one decent question!    
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The participant‟s non-responsiveness, or hostile responsiveness, was often 
experienced as a form of disruption to the relationship or profound sense of 
disconnection from self and others (Meares, 2000).  This led me to identify this 
experience as being part of the disruption and restoration cycle that has been noted 
by a number of relational therapists (Safran & Muran, 2000; Wolf, 1988, 1998).  My 
sense of professional failure is related to the degree to which the participant is 
experienced as being non-responsive; however, when I am able to facilitate 
restoration of the therapeutic alliance, the sense of well-being also returns and I no 
longer feel like a failure: 
 
I found some tape and Billy instructed me how to do it.  The heaviness I was 
feeling a moment ago was replaced by a feeling of tenderness.  Billy also 
softened. He was being cared for.  I sensed the lack of human warmth and 
tenderness in his life. I knew that Kate felt uneasy about close physical 
contact with Billy.  I wondered when the last time was that someone had 
genuinely given him a loving cuddle …   
“Would you like to go for a walk and I‟ll get you a bottle of ginger beer?” 
“Yeah.”  
He smiled.  We were friends again.  We walked down the street 
laughing and making small talk and we headed for the bakery which also had 
a fast-food take-away section.   He looked hungrily at the sausages. 
 
In the above excerpt, I am able to let go of my own preoccupations and doubts and 
follow the lead of the participant.  I notice how my inner landscape of feelings is 
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changing in response to how Billy‟s self-state is also changing. I also intuit Billy‟s 
need for affection and nurture. I know on a feeling level that my response is now 
hitting the mark, “resonating” with the client‟s feelings in a positive cycle of 
relationship repair. The rupture is mended and a feeling of aliveness emerges 
(Meares, 2005). 
This example illustrates how the participants in therapy can send cues to the  
therapist as to what might be a more appropriate response.  If the therapist is alert and 
aware enough to pick these cues up it can often produce rich therapeutic moments. 
When the participant was unresponsive to my interventions I felt at times hopeless, 
incompetent and self-critical. Before placing the plaster I was feeling disconnected, 
dis-empowered and irritable, and I had started to resort to using power over tactics. I 
was also caught up in my own professional self-doubt and criticism. The plaster 
transformed this back into a sense of being connected again.  A feeling of 
professional competence and well-being returned. In this case it happened to be a 
nurturing interaction.  I then cemented the bond with the sausage buying ritual. 
How do we explain this from a relational perspective?  I think the interaction 
with the plaster takes me out of my professional self (thinking about what to do or 
say) and I just respond without deliberation.  Maybe I was attuning and responding to 
Billy‟s communications outside of my conscious awareness. However, I would also 
like to consider why Billy was so angry at the beginning of the story. I think he 
probably felt betrayed.  In some of his sandtray work Billy had consistently used 
soldiers to depict two forces at war.   He often experienced Child, Youth and Family 
Services as one of the enemies.  He wanted me to be on his side.  He was therefore 
hurt.  To be reminded about the hygiene issues must also have been humiliating for 
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him.  Billy‟s trust in me had therefore been seriously compromised. This highlights 
the fine line therapists working in this specialised field have to walk, wanting to be 
seen as aligned both with the participant and the community.  It is our accountability 
to victims and to community safety that takes precedence in the final instance – hence 
the need to help Billy see this also. My internal voice of self-criticism is triggered in 
Billy‟s story when I begin to understand Billy‟s feelings of betrayal.  My sense of 
despair and failure was also triggered when I experienced Billy as withdrawing 
behind his defensive wall. In the story Billy has become defensive and some would 
say resistant.  He is resisting my invitation to work in collaboration.   Collaboration is 
one of the goals of most therapies, no matter who the participant is.  It is crucial that 
the participant is engaged in the therapeutic process.  My attempts to engage Billy in 
taking responsibility to monitor his own situation and to make sure he doesn‟t put 
himself (and therefore, someone else) at risk only serves to alienate him.  I feel his 
pain, his isolation.  Part of me feels that Billy can be trusted, that his relationship with 
the neighbourhood kids is healthy.  Yet the part of me that wears the risk 
management hat cannot risk this – it is still too early. I feel divided and disillusioned. 
I try hard to invite Billy to collaborate with me – to be on the same team – to share 
the responsibility of supervising his relationships with children, but my invitations are 
declined. 
I think the story also illustrates how quickly I became aware that there has 
been a rupture in the relationship and I need to mend it, but I can‟t seem to find a way 
to do that with words.  Hence I also become vulnerable to narcissistic wounding – I 
have failed as a therapist.  I start to get caught up in thoughts that I am not making a 
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difference.  I start to blame myself.   The thoughts weigh heavy on my body – I feel 
like giving up. 
Then by luck, or chance, or by the subtle movements that occur within the 
intersubjective space, there is a turning point experience - we have an opening into 
compassion and the nurturing act.  Billy is picking at a scab, trying to distract 
himself, maybe, from the emotional pain of experiencing rejection and exclusion once 
again.  He then shows me how to re-connect to him by the simple request of a plaster.  
This one simple act of attending to his wound creates an emotional experience for us 
both. It is a tender “moment of meeting” (Stern, 2004b). Billy visibly softens; the 
bitterness and the hardness dissolve in this simple act of kindness. This shared 
experience, experienced by Billy as a new experience, outside of what he would have 
predicted, mends the rupture and the therapeutic alliance is back on track. I believe 
this one act not only restored the relationship, but actually delivered a turning point in 
the therapy process.  I showed that I did care and the participant recognised this care.  
Again this is reinforced by the regular walk to buy sausages, which begins a ritual 
that is repeated again and again in future sessions.  This illustrates how actions 
sometimes speak louder than words, especially joint actions, doing things together 
often communicate more than any word. 
The stories also illuminated how I would draw upon my awareness of 
background knowledge to guide my response.  This could be professional knowledge, 
such as developmental theory or wisdom that I had inherited from previous clients or 
personal experience knowledge gained from my life.  For example, in the following 
excerpt, I am drawing on my professional knowledge:   
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At this initial meeting (as it was to be in future meetings) Billy found it hard to 
talk about his birth mother.   As Billy narrated to me this brief chronicle of his 
life I thought about the emotional pain of rejection that must have underlain 
much of Billy‟s external behaviours, which Billy needed to dissociate from in 
order to maintain his hope for some future reconciliation. Unfortunately, the 
longer a child has been in foster care the more difficult it is to facilitate 
reunification with birth parents, leaving caseworkers and therapists with the 
only other alternative of trying to facilitate developmental attachment to 
foster carers.    
 
Children who suffer from relational trauma often have difficulty forming 
intimate relationships, first with peers and later with adults.  Relationships 
tend to be superficial and shallow.  One person or object can easily replace 
another one.  One way of understanding this is that they have not experienced 
an attachment relationship of any depth.  Another way of understanding this 
is that it is a protective mechanism – you don‟t allow yourself to get too close 
to anyone – it hurts too much when you get let down!  I sensed Billy‟s 
loneliness and simultaneously his fear of getting close in case he was rejected 
again.  
 
I also often found myself in a position of recalling memories from my own family 
history and using this personal knowledge to help guide my responsiveness.  This can 
be referred to as a form of “re-membering”, both for the therapist as well as the 
participant (White, 1997).  For example, when I was being interviewed by Michael 
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White in chapter five, I spoke about how I was able to re-member my experience of 
play with my parents and my own children in my work with the participants: 
 
I let my mind wander back again, remembering playing games with 
them, bringing back memories of playing games with my own parents: 
Monopoly, Risk and even before that card games and party games like 
“Old Maid”.  Dad was good at those games, good at birthday parties 
playing “Simon Says”.  I realised that the games I played with the 
children who consulted me at work had a lot in common with these 
experiences. I‟d realised that the best way to connect with children 
before attempting any real talking therapy, especially if these children 
had a history of traumatic experiences, was to play with them. 
  
The stories also illustrate how I drew on my memories of family troubles and shame 
to empathise with the participants: 
 
Although the content is different, Adrian‟s descriptions of his parent‟s 
relationship remind me of my own parents after my Dad had lost his 
teaching job because of the offending.  I re-remembered the sense 
that my Dad had been disgraced in the eyes of my Mum.  Although my 
Mum never mentioned the offending, her feelings of resentment came 
out in the tone of her voice, in the way she used to sometimes criticise 
Dad.  This shared experience enabled me to get some sense of what it 
must have been like for Adrian to witness these parental fights. 
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Adrian‟s sense of shame or embarrassment about his father 
reminded me of my own struggle to come to terms with my own sense 
of shame regarding my father.  I felt this was something we had in 
common, something that helped me to understand him.  The 
association with James Dean from Rebel without a Cause came into 
my mind.  I recalled how the son in the movie perceived his father as 
weak, symbolised by his wearing the apron – symbol of the subjugated 
feminine.  Our fathers didn‟t measure up to hegemonic masculinity – 
they had fallen from the status of hero and their vulnerabilities had 
been revealed. 
 
My background knowledge therefore covers an enormous range of prior experience 
and learning, ranging from professional training and reading, to prior work with 
clients in similar situations and the full extent of my relevant explicit 
autobiographical memories as well as my implicit procedural memories (relational 
templates) of how to engage in playful interactions with children. 
 
  
13.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the use of self intersects both the systemic-
narrative and relational psychotherapy traditions, and enables the therapist to move 
flexibly between these two traditions to provide an optimal therapeutic response 
based upon the unique circumstances of the here and now moment.  All interventions 
are required to be introduced with sensitivity to the relational context and the timing 
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must be appropriate to the moment.  Interventions can be taught, but the relational 
knowing (Smith, 2004) that is involved in when and how to introduce an intervention, 
is a form of practice wisdom. I have therefore located the use of self in the judgment-
based practice tradition and related it to the concept of phronesis. I have shown how 
the use of self mediates the action-response (A-R) cycles within which the therapist 
both initiates interventions and responds to the initiatives or responses of participants.  
I have analysed how this works with intentional interventions, such as reflexive 
questions or interpretations.  I have suggested that both the concept of position calls 
and optimal responsiveness offer principles to help therapists to distinguish between 
positive and negative therapeutic interventions.  I have also shown how the 
intentional act of self-disclosure not only helps to build safety and trust in the 
therapeutic relationship, but can also offer a pathway into conversations which invite 
participants to critically evaluate the effects of hegemonic masculinity on their sense 
of personal identity.  The use of self was also intimately involved in helping me relate 
to the participants through playful improvisations, often re-membering my own 
memories of playful interactions with my father and my sons.  Finally, I have 
identified self-reflexivity and the capacity for intersubjective mindfulness to lie at the 
heart of this process.  
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14. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
14.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, a meta-analysis of the autoethnographic stories 
illustrated how my use of self in adolescent sexual offending therapy enhanced my 
ability to be optimally responsive.  The stories showed how I became emotionally 
engaged in the therapeutic relationship with the participants in order to generate 
intersubjective experiences which were possibly transformative of both the therapist 
and the participant. I also discovered as an outcome of this research how the therapist 
is influenced by the responsivity of the participant as the participant is influenced by 
the responsivity of the therapist. This is in contrast to the earlier tendency in sexual 
offending rehabilitation literature to conceptualise therapy as a one-way process 
where the therapist applies certain procedures or techniques (cognitive restructuring) 
to change, correct or “fix” the participant (offender) in some way.  The stories 
presented in this thesis show how the subjectivity of the therapist enters into the 
therapy process and how therapy works as a mutual process of change. I have 
included stories of events from my personal life, in order to provide an 
autobiographical context for understanding some of the influences on my use of self 
as a therapist, and to directly show the impact of my professional life as a therapist on 
my personal self.  However, the act of writing these stories also worked as a form of 
self-therapy for me, helping me resolve the original trauma of discovering that my 
father had been a “sexual offender”.   This PhD has completed putting this trauma 
into the larger context of my personal and family history.   In this way the trauma is 
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gradually dissolved (Meares, 2005) by becoming one of the chapters in my personal 
story.  This personal journey models and parallels the process of therapy that the 
participants also had to go through.  The autoethnographic research therefore 
deconstructs the conceptualisation of therapy as a “them and us” process, exposing 
the therapist to the same level of vulnerability as the participant.  The therapist, like 
the participant, is human, all too human.  This thesis therefore stands as a case study 
of a therapist‟s experience of being changed by therapy and by research and how my 
research into the use of self contributed to the ongoing integration of my professional 
and personal self.     
In this final chapter, I will discuss the findings of my research in response to 
the second research question: 
 
How might research into the therapist‟s experience of their use of self in 
therapy contribute to the integration of the personal and professional self 
of the therapist? 
 
As far as I am aware, this is the first time that autoethnographic methodology has 
been applied in the field of adolescent sexual offending therapy to investigate this 
kind of question. My stories show the process of the integration of the professional 
and personal self of the therapist and how this interweaves with the use of self in 
therapy as described in chapter 13. I then discuss the implications of the research for 
policy and practice in the area of sexual offending therapy.  I emphasise, on the basis 
of the research, the need for therapists who work in this field to develop their capacity 
for self-reflexivity in order to develop self-knowledge and skills for the use of self in 
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therapy.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion about the limitations of this kind of 
research and the need for further research on this topic.   
 
14.2     The autoethnographic journey 
In recent years, with the growing acceptance of feminist, narrative, reflexive 
and autoethnographic research, interest has grown in the use of self in research, 
including research into psychotherapy and mental health practice (Etherington, 2004; 
Foster et al., 2006; Holman Jones, 2005; Speedy, 2008; Wolsket, 1999).   Engaging in 
this research project enabled me to clarify not only the importance of the person and 
subjectivity of the therapist to the therapy process, but also to revise my professional 
identity as a therapist/researcher.  
Professional development, practitioner research and supervision can be seen 
as a process of continually revising and refining the story of one‟s professional 
identity (Crocket, 2004a, 2004b; McKenzie & Monk, 1997; Winslade, 2002).  The 
process of writing this thesis is one example of practitioner research in action and 
shows how the writing of autoethnographic stories was constitutive of my 
professional identity as a therapist/researcher and also how this writing also made a 
significant contribution to helping me work through my personal story in relation to 
my own family.   
I found that writing is itself a method of inquiry, that leads to the discovery of 
new meanings and the development of ethical and reflexive selves (Etherington, 
2004; Richardson, 1994; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005).  Autoethnography is a 
research method that calls for self-reflexivity; however, practicing autoethnography 
also develops the skills of self-reflexivity. For example, the findings of this research 
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(the autoethnographic stories) have enabled me to story myself as a therapist who 
works from within and between different traditions and perspective. I also discovered 
that when autoethnography is used to research the relationship between the personal 
and professional self of the therapist, it can function as a form of self-supervision 
(Lowe, 2000). For example, autoethnography increased my awareness of the 
relationship between my personal life and my professional life.  There are numerous 
examples of how I drew from my personal experience when interacting with the 
participants, as detailed in chapter 13.  Autoethnography allowed me to articulate my 
experience of therapy as a “two-way” change process: firstly, by describing the 
relationship between my personal life and my professional experience as a therapist; 
secondly, by giving detailed description of therapy interactions within the framework 
of a first person narrative account; and thirdly, by giving expression to the unique 
voice of the young people I worked with, thereby challenging the dominant cultural 
practice of dividing people into “us and them” categories in which the “other”, seen 
through the lens of deficit, is understood as being very different to ourselves. 
My participation in the adolescent sexual offending therapy programme, along 
with my research project, were significant chapters in my personal and professional 
development as a therapist, helping me to integrate and acknowledge how both the 
systemic-narrative and the relational tradition continue to inform my practice as a 
therapist.  As demonstrated in chapter 13, autoethnography contributed to my ability 
to work on this integration process over the six year period I have been involved in 
this project. During this period I have found that my personal and professional selves 
are intimately related (Edwards & Bess, 1998 p. 99).  If this is the case, it is therefore 
not possible to evaluate therapeutic processes without taking into account the person 
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and subjectivity of the therapist.  Good practice therefore needs to be founded upon 
the competent and ethical use of self. As my analysis in chapter 13 shows, this 
required me to engage in an ongoing self-reflexive process, both of my own 
emotional and cognitive experiences, of cultural discourses, of professional 
knowledge and of the emotional and cognitive experiences of the participants, as well 
as their own knowledge of themselves, their families and their cultures.  It was my 
intention to create a context in which the other participants in the therapy process 
experienced themselves as equal if not senior partners in this process (Winslade et. 
al., 1999).  
The development of an ethical and self-reflexive professional self requires 
ongoing practice, commonly referred to as professional development. Therapy 
becomes a means towards caring for the self (and by implication, the other), albeit a 
particular, professional form of caring, in the same way that Zazen practice can be 
described as another means of caring for the self or cultivating one‟s attention to this 
moment, which is complementary to the practice of therapy.  Or, to use the language 
of Habermas,  therapy, undertaken as a practical and moral activity, can be described 
as an emancipatory dialogue characterised by the practice of reflection on self in 
relation to others (Habermas, 1971).  Therapy is therefore positioned within an ethical 
and political discourse. Within an ethical-political discourse, the participants are 
invited into a position of equal partnership (or even senior partnership) in the 
relationship, giving them the freedom to be the author(ity) on their lives and 
relationships (Winslade et al., 1997). The effective use of self must therefore be 
founded upon an ethics of emancipation.   
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Therapy is therefore founded upon a competent and ethical use of self and the 
development of a collaborative therapeutic relationship. The therapeutic relationship 
provides a context for the growth of self-awareness and self-reflexivity for both the 
therapist and the participants.  The therapist, through their own reflexive use of self, 
demonstrates a practice of self-awareness and self-acceptance which is communicated 
to the participant.   This is why I conclude that all good practice which relies upon 
interpersonal communication has to be founded upon the competent use of self and 
the ability to enter into ethical-professional relationship.  Practice techniques can be 
taught but we need to be careful that they do not become disembodied, reified and de-
contextualised (Bird, 2000; Safran & Muran, 2000). For example, the choice to self-
disclose is always dependent upon the relational context existing at that moment in 
time.  At its core, it is a response, coming from our emotional understanding of that 
particular moment, as discussed in chapter 13.   
The practice of autoethnography, (writing and reading the stories), confirmed 
for me my preference for understanding therapy as a practical-moral activity, situated 
within an ethical-political discourse rather than a scientific discourse.  (This does not 
mean that therapy cannot be researched scientifically using different methodologies 
or that therapists cannot draw upon scientific research, such as neurobiology and 
attachment research).  This understanding of therapy was initially a legacy of the 
work of my first teacher, Michael White (1995; 1997; 2007).  For example, it was 
important to me that the therapeutic relationship did not replicate other professional 
relationships in which the participant was subjected to the knowledge and expertise of 
the professional.   I wanted to create a context for collaborative conversations that 
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would facilitate the ability of the participants to reflect ethically on their actions while 
at the same time I was conscious of not wanting to “impose” ideas on them. 
Autoethnography was also an important form of clinical supervision, whether 
as a form of self-supervision, group supervision or in consultations with an individual 
supervisor. The development of self-awareness through writing and reflecting on this 
writing was both a form of self-supervision and a preparation for discussion of my 
work with my clinical supervisor.  Reading the stories helped me to re-experience 
what I felt during the sessions. When I read some of these stories out loud to an 
audience I realised how much they touched me and moved me.  Sometimes, when I 
felt hopelessly overwhelmed by my inability to make a difference to their situation, 
writing the stories helped me to contain these feelings. Discussing the stories in 
clinical supervision also helped, as did my Zen practice.  
Zen is a practice that makes no distinctions between work and life.  Working 
with my teacher enabled me to see the connection between empathy and ethics; how 
resisting cultural barriers to objectify otherness begins with the practice of empathy;  
how Zen itself has been described as a practice of “no gain”; and how this practice of 
no-gain can help me to step back from powerful invitations to try and “fix” people. 
For example, Dr Magid would often encourage me to bring my Zen practice into my 
work. For example, he would often ask me what my edge was.  That is, what did I 
want to avoid in my work?  One example I gave was the feeling that the help I was 
trying to provide wasn‟t helping.  I was regularly witnessing people suffering and was 
feeling that whatever help I was offering was not making a difference. How to keep 
going under those circumstances?  Dr Magid suggested I try disclosing my feelings of 
helplessness and failure with the participant.  These feelings were possibly telling me 
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something about how the participants might be feeling, and I could share this with 
them.  I also came to see this as part of my Zen practice, to be aware of these feelings 
when they arose and name them and fully experience them in the body, accept them 
rather than push them away.  If I could not bear to hold these feelings, then how could 
I possibly expect the participants to be able to get in touch with those feelings, and 
slowly be able to acknowledge them and place them into a narrative about their life? 
Invariably, when I disclosed concerns that I was not being of help, the participants 
responded that I was being of help in ways that were unique to themselves and also 
with the understanding that they didn‟t expect me to be able to fix everything with 
my magic box of tricks. 
As I discussed in chapter four, autoethnography is a form of self-inquiry that 
can also be a form of self-therapy; as Laurel Richardson argued: “the self that is 
writing the story is changed by the process of writing it”.  In writing about my self I 
constitute myself (Foucault, 1997, p. 207-222). By writing in first person narrative 
form I became a witness to my own work.  I also became a witness to the lives of the 
other participants, including documenting some of their stories. This served the same 
purpose as video work, but unlike video work, an autoethnography reveals the inner 
life of the therapist and the relationship of the work to the therapist‟s personal history. 
Writing in this way helped me to attune and empathise with both myself and with the 
young person I was working with. By reflecting on my practice in this way, I began 
to shape the way I theorised and practiced therapy.   
One of the major themes demonstrated by autoethnography was the extent to 
which experiences and stories from the “macro-world” of my personal and family life 
entered into the “micro-world” of therapy; and how my personal narratives from the 
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“macro-world” of my personal and family life were also transformed by the research.  
Autoethnography enhanced my practice by helping me become more self-aware of 
the presence of these stories and the effects of these stories on how I related to myself 
and other participants.  
The task of integrating the professional self with the personal self is a life-
long process, similar in many ways to self-analysis.  This ability, to integrate or meld 
the professional and personal selves, is described by Dewane as a “hallmark of skilled 
practice” (2006, p. 543).  It is also argued that the “development of congruity between 
personal and professional identities” through the “dynamic process of self-narration” 
is the hallmark of the experienced practitioner (Butler et al., 2007, p. 293-295). It has 
been previously recognised that autoethnographic practice can act like a form of self-
therapy (Bochner & Ellis, 2002). I think by now it is clear how much the therapy 
process triggered associated memories from my personal life and all the 
corresponding stories and feelings associated with those memories. One example of 
this was that working with participants with attachment-trauma experiences brought 
up my own attachment-trauma experiences associated with my sons and with my 
father.   This of course included re-telling the story of my disconnection from my 
sons and witnessing the story of my father‟s offending in a public forum. The story of 
my father and how our relationship was affected by sexual offending is one of the 
dominant plots of the thesis.  It can be seen as a form of redemption or atonement 
story.  In the same way that children are affected by the insecure attachment 
relationship their parents experienced, my relationship with my father was affected by 
his family and war experiences.  After being told about the history of my father‟s 
offending, the family‟s secret shame story was passed along to me, and I wanted to 
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survive and recover from this burden.  Rather than continue to not speak of it, as my 
father had done, I chose to speak about it to trusted friends and professional 
confidants.  I became a “witness” to my father‟s “illness”: 
 
Becoming a witness assumes a responsibility for telling what happened.  The 
witness offers testimony to a truth that is generally unrecognised or 
suppressed.  People who tell stories of illness are witnesses, turning illness 
into a moral responsibility (Frank, 1995, p. 137). 
  
Writing this thesis has taken my witnessing one step further, by placing it in the 
public domain.  In this way I have stood up against the power and oppression of the 
secret shame story and used this experience to hopefully contribute something to 
adolescent sexual offending rehabilitation as discussed above.    
Re-working and integrating these personal memories was an important part of 
the autoethnographic process and involved me writing therapeutically and vulnerably 
(Ellis, 2004).  I was able to use my personal experience of loss or shame to connect 
with participants emotionally and use self-disclosure therapeutically (Butler et al., 
2007). I also believe this is a form of ethical practice, equivalent to what Rogers 
(1957) would have described as genuineness.  A therapist is not neutral when it 
comes to all the issues he or she works with.  In doing this research I demonstrated 
how a therapist, informed by both systemic-narrative and relational perspectives, 
experiences therapy as a bi-directional intersubjective process (Aron, 1996; White, 
1997).   As a therapist, I may learn just as much about myself from the process of 
therapy as will the other participants.  The fact that I have lived through the shameful 
 347 
after-effects of my father‟s sexual offending, means I will always have a uniquely 
personal viewpoint of sexual offending.  In my case, I think I was able to use this 
experience in a way which enabled me to empathise with both people who were 
victims of sexual offending and the people who were responsible for offending.    
In the same way, the therapy process evoked memories of my relationship 
with my sons, and it became clear to me how the boys and young men I have worked 
with in therapy have given me so much back, and have helped me so much to 
overcome the personal pain involved in this area of my life.  Research has shown that 
therapists often become therapists from a desire to heal themselves, hence the 
metaphor of the “wounded healer” (Sedgwick, 1994; Sussman, 2007).  As more 
clinicians confront “the fact that they bring as many unresolved difficulties to the 
therapeutic encounter as their patients do, they have been more willing to view the 
healing process as one where both parties wish to grow” (Strean, 1999 p. 128). For 
example, I speak in this thesis about an episode in my life in which I acted harmfully 
based upon sexual jealousy.  Although this wasn‟t a sexual offence, it was an act of 
disrespect based upon notions of male entitlement.   These personal disclosures carry 
with them an element of professional risk, but I decided to include them because it 
shows how we are all “more human than otherwise”(Sullivan, 1953), and by 
appropriately acknowledging our human frailties and vulnerabilities, we are less 
likely to reproduce a “them and us” professional culture (Butler et al., 2007; 
Williams, 2006). Ultimately, the process of integrating our professional and personal 
selves is a life-long project.  For me, it is at the “heart” of professional development.   
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14.3 Implications for agency policy and practice 
This thesis provides qualitative support for the argument that the use of self is 
a crucial factor in developing and maintaining the therapeutic alliance and enhancing 
the effectiveness of our interventions. The capacity of the therapist (or caregiver) to 
provide attuned and flexible responses is also crucial to the recovery process of 
children and young people who have experienced abuse related trauma (Tucci, 
Mitchell & Goddard, 2010). Although the findings of this kind of case study research 
cannot be generalised, they suggest possibilities for practitioners to have in mind as 
they work with particular clients (Hoffman, 2009).  They also suggest that evidence-
based procedures or techniques depend upon the reflexive use of self if they are going 
to be implemented in an optimally responsive way.   In order to conform to the 
requirements of “objective” science, randomised controlled trials distort the complex 
reality of clinical practice.  However, there is no reason why these complexities 
cannot be acknowledged.  These complexities, I suggest, are best studied through 
qualitative methodologies, such as case studies and discourse analysis.   
Therefore, perhaps it is now time for reconciliation between the evidence-
based practice tradition and the tradition of judgment based practice.  That evidence-
based practice needs to pay closer attention to relational skills and indeed the 
subjectivities of the participants and the unique intersubjective field that is created 
within each therapeutic dyad.  In this way, even though therapy is invented anew for 
each participant, it would be possible to develop principles and guidelines for 
therapists and others who are interested in the systemic-narrative and relational-non-
verbal aspects of the therapy process.   Indeed, when it comes to the questions of 
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manuals, as discussed in chapter two, this is exactly the argument that is put forward 
by practitioners (Safran & Muran, 2000; Marshall, 2010). 
I believe the implications of the findings of this research for the specialist 
field of adolescent sexual offending are that the emphasis on risk management needs 
to be balanced by agency responsiveness to the therapeutic needs of participants, the 
majority of whom have experienced abuse related trauma.   For example, residential 
and community treatment programmes and the out-of-home care services, should all 
be alert to ensuring all staff and processes as well as referring agencies such as child 
safety agencies do their best to provide an empathic service that takes into account 
the attachment needs of clients, including their needs for security and containment. I 
therefore agree with Ward and Brown (2004) when they argue that risk management 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rehabilitation of people who have 
offended; treatment approaches must also take into account the needs and preferences 
of persons who have offended to live more fulfilling and worthwhile lives.  As 
discussed in chapter two, many of the vulnerabilities experienced by adolescents who 
sexually offend originate in problematic childhoods characterized by the lack of 
empathic attunement and care (Chorn & Parekh, 1997; Marshall & Marshall, 2000; 
Rich, 2006a).   Although therapists can never become parents to vulnerable young 
clients, I do believe that they can provide a treatment experience that creates the 
preconditions for young people to develop resilience and go on to lead fulfilling and 
worthwhile lives. Ideally this needs to be complemented by placing young people 
into environments that provide a caring and empathic response on a day by day basis 
(Rich, 2006a).  This can involve assisting young people develop an attachment 
relationship with foster carers or repair the rupture in the relationship with their 
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family of origin.  Indeed, in contrast with the emphasis on group work in the adult 
programmes, it can be argued that an attachment focused family therapy approach 
(Hughes, 2007) should be the core intervention in adolescent programmes. 
I believe the first goal in the treatment process is for the therapist to create the 
preconditions for the formation of a therapeutic alliance, with the young person and 
also with the caregiver/s, if there is someone available.  The way to go about doing 
this is for the young person and caregiver/s to experience the therapist as someone 
who is consistently empathically attuned and responsive to their lived experience of 
the world on a session by session basis. However, it is not always an easy task to 
balance empathic attunement with risk management responsibilities.  While 
acknowledging the potential pitfalls involved, I believe the art of balancing empathy 
with risk management lies in the stability and strength of the therapeutic alliance.  If 
the alliance lacks these qualities, then it is unlikely the mutually supportive goals of 
risk management and empathy will be met.   
The research also alerts therapists to the importance of paying attention to 
integrating their professional and personal selves as part of their ongoing professional 
development.  I suggest that, at a practice level, attention is given to encouraging self-
reflexivity by practitioners on the relationship between their personal and 
professional selves with a view to integrating autobiographical knowledge with 
professional knowledge of theory and technique (Edwards & Bess, 1998). For 
example, this includes paying attention to their experience of being parented and their 
personal experience of cultural contexts such as class, race and gender. The research 
highlights the relevance of the subjective experience of gender identity, an area that 
often goes under-represented in the delivery of adolescent sexual offending 
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programmes.  This research supports the inclusion of gender specific interventions in 
these programmes.  The findings also support the argument that the experience of 
caring for and being cared for is central to treatment, and that self reflexivity can be 
both a process and an outcome goal for all therapy participants, both client and 
therapist.   Therefore, in keeping with the move towards holistic approaches to 
treatment (Ryan, 1999; Rich, 2006a), as well as focusing on sexual offending 
specifics (such as offence cycles) the research suggests that treatment would be 
enhanced by focusing on the psychological-developmental context (effects of abuse 
related trauma) and the sociocultural context (hegemonic masculinity).    
My research demonstrates how the practice of honest introspection by the therapist 
can lead to a more humble and genuine response to young people who have offended.  
This mitigates against the temptation (which is always there) to get caught up in 
viewing the person who committed an offence as the “other”.  These realisations 
therefore have significant implications for policy and practice. 
 At a practice level, both during training, supervision and ongoing therapy, 
therapists can be encouraged to pay more attention to their own subjectivity and their 
own moment-by-moment experiences of the therapy process.  In this way, the 
therapist will learn about themselves as well as about the person they are working 
with.  This also means encouraging all therapists who work in this area to see self-
therapy as an ongoing inquiry that never ends, in the classical psychoanalytic 
tradition.  This does not mean that a therapist has to go into analysis for a lifetime but 
it does mean that a therapist can (and I would argue should) use supervision and other 
forms of self-inquiry (such as personal therapy, meditation or autoethnography) to be 
constantly self-reflective and vigilant.   
 352 
I would also suggest that agencies need to be careful that the emphasis on risk 
management does not overshadow the principle of responsivity.  The problem in 
highlighting the story of the “risky child” (Brownlie, 2001) is that it can tend to 
render invisible the effects of abuse related trauma on the children and young people 
referred to the programme.  This problem was illustrated in the belief held by some 
clinicians whom I have encountered, that offender treatment should not be confused 
with victim treatment. This dilemma, of finding an appropriate balance between 
treatment which is sexual offence specific, and treatment which considers the 
“whole” child, is currently being discussed and debated within the field (Rich, 2003; 
Ryan & Lane, 1997b). It constituted much of my external and internal dialogue in this 
work. This led me to question the inclusion of adolescent programmes within 
specialist agencies that also provide programmes for adults.  I consider that this 
inclusion tends to tar adolescents with the same offender stigma as adults, leading to 
ongoing suspicion and to a rigorous supervision of these adolescents while they were 
on the programme, when they could be seen as young people who are in need of 
nurture, and appropriate space in which to mature.  In my view, practices driven by 
an overemphasis on risk management to the diminishment of personal healing and the 
development of hope for a better life in the future, run the risk of not only 
undermining the therapeutic alliance but of re-traumatising the young person. 
 On a policy level, what counts as evidence-based practice needs to be 
expanded so that policy makers come to understand the importance of clinical 
judgment, responsivity and professional discretion. I believe the traditional 
definitions of the scientist-practitioner can and must be challenged to allow for a 
diversity of research traditions to find their place within public policy debates and 
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ultimately for the judgment-based practice tradition to enter into dialogue with the 
evidence-based tradition.  I am concerned that at the moment in the health and justice 
policy arenas, the only understanding of evidence-based practice is based on the 
medical model characterized by the randomised control trial of drugs.  This has been 
able to successfully give the impression that therapies such as cognitive behaviour 
therapy (CBT) can be administered to clients in the same way as a medication. The 
person and subjectivity of the therapist have been totally excluded.  This is in contrast 
to most advocates of CBT who do argue that the therapeutic alliance is foundational 
to the successful implementation of CBT interventions, and it also forgets the 
historical origins of CBT in Hellenistic ethics, which was centrally concerned with 
the care or government of the self (Nussbaum, 1994; Rabinow, 1997). 
Finally, although the focus of this work is on the practice of adolescent sexual 
offending therapy, it was my intention that this research is honouring of all victims of 
sexual abuse and makes a contribution to understanding how people can change and 
make choices that are consistent with respectful ways of relating to other people. I 
think the research is significant to others (professionals and consumers) because the 
clinical implications of this study present a challenge to the current ways in which 
adolescent sexual offending therapy is sometimes conceptualised and practised.  I 
would hope that other therapists who work in this area would be encouraged to 
question the relationship between the personal and the professional in their own 
practice and to question the binaries built within conventional English language 
which operates to set ourselves up as the “good” therapist and the participants as the 
“bad” other (Bird, 2004). I also hope my work contributes to improving the 
rehabilitation of young people who have sexually offended. I believe 
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autoethnography has the potential to do this by helping professionals improve their 
ability to develop a therapeutic alliance with programme participants, thereby helping 
participants to reach a place within themselves of authentic realisation of empathy 
towards the people they have harmed (including themselves), leading to a healthy 
experience of guilt and the arising of the genuine need to make reparations (Jenkins, 
2006).    
 
14.4     Limitations of the study 
The qualitative evidence presented in this study for the various possible ways 
in which adolescent sexual offending therapists may use self-reflexivity in their 
practice  is based upon what could be called a singular case study of one therapist‟s 
work with a small number of participants.  I think it is important to note that the 
stories were never meant to be read as “transcripts” – autoethnographies deliberately 
set out to “capture” a broader range of emotive engagement, as conveyed in the 
literary aspects of story-telling, than is possible in a recording or a transcript. The 
ability to draw general conclusions from the evidence presented is therefore limited in 
a number of ways.  Firstly, the evidence is filtered through my subjectivity and what I 
selected to include in the stories.  The main strength of the study, which can be 
characterized as experience-near research, is therefore also its major limitation - it is 
based primarily on data based on one therapist‟s self-observation and the therapist‟s 
observation of others.  Secondly, the data generated for this study was based upon the 
recollections of the therapist writing detailed process notes of the sessions following 
the completion of the session.  With some exceptions (see chapter four), notes were 
usually completed after the sessions.  Recall from memory is not as reliable as 
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recordings. When the descriptions of therapy are based exclusively on the therapist‟s 
descriptions it misses some of the nuances that take place in the clinical exchange that 
other methodologies using audio or video technology would have picked up (Safran 
& Muran, 2000, p. 215). These observations cannot therefore be validated by external 
observers; however, the stories were read and confirmed for their accuracy of the 
observations by the three participants who volunteered to be a part of the study; the 
stories can also be evaluated by my peers as to their verisimilitude, which is one of 
the criteria commonly used for evaluating autoethnography (Richardson, 2000).   
 Although the ability to draw general conclusions is limited by the above 
concerns, case study research provides opportunities for other practitioners to explore 
the kinds of therapist responses detailed in the case study and encourages other 
practitioners to reflect on their own work in the light of the findings of this case 
study.  The stories present possibilities for other practitioners to hold in mind 
(Hoffman, 2009).  Advances in the theory and practice of psychotherapy have often 
been inspired by research using single case study observations by the therapist 
practitioner (Balint et al., 1972; Freud, 1909/1955; McLeod, 1999).  Case study 
research also provides a substantial base for the development of principles and 
guidelines for practitioners.  I also believe evidence based upon personal experience 
is legitimate and can be used to support claims about the effectiveness of therapeutic 
interventions. I believe the method of recording used in this study allows the clear 
emergence of the characters of the participants to unfold on a session by session basis 
along with the nature of the therapeutic interventions employed, which otherwise 
would have needed to be laboriously extracted from thousands of pages of transcript 
material (Balint et al., 1972). Although the research cannot demonstrate the 
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effectiveness of the treatment sessions discussed when measured according to the 
criteria demanded by neopositivist evidence-based research, it will be up to the reader 
to decide if the research as presented lives up to the six criteria for evaluating 
autoethnographic research as discussed in chapter four. The first principle is 
emotional evocativeness. Do the stories touch our hearts in some way?  Do they 
engender tears and laughter? Secondly, do the stories “hold” the readers/audience? 
Do they engage the reader/audience in some form of self-reflection on their own 
experience?  Thirdly, do the stories show how autoethnographic writing can also be a 
therapeutic act, a process of self-transformation?  Fourthly, do the stories achieve a 
sense of verisimilitude? Are they convincing? Do they ring true?  Fifthly, do the 
stories demonstrate political relevance? Do they have the potential to generate debate 
and policy change? Finally, are the stories trustworthy? Do they faithfully represent 
my relationships with the other participants, family members and other professionals? 
 In conclusion, the findings of this case study of one therapist cannot be 
generalised to the population of all therapists working in this field.  Additional studies 
are needed to explore these findings further.  Nevertheless, these limitations are 
balanced by the potential appeal of these stories to clinicians working in the field. 
Some of these stories may resonate with other therapists, some may not.  It is to be 
hoped that for those therapists who identify with the stories discussed in this thesis 
that this will provide validation of their experience and hopefully inspire them to 
research and publish their own research in relation to therapist responsivity and the 
therapeutic alliance in adolescent sexual offending therapy.   
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14.5    Further research 
Further autoethnographic case study research, into the subjective and  
intersubjective experience of both therapists and participants involved in sexual 
offending rehabilitation programmes, would develop these ideas further and give us 
the opportunity to compare autoethnographic case studies. I believe autoethnography 
can make substantial contributions to the accumulated research into therapist 
responsivity and the therapeutic relationship and hence our understanding of the 
processes involved in being optimally responsive.  Finally, I would also like to think 
that this research will provide an example for other therapists who may be interested 
in finding an appropriate research methodology to explore their own experience of 
the integration of their personal and professional selves.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
AGENCY LETTER 
 
 
Re: Andrew Tootell‟s PhD Research  
 
 
Dear (Programme Participants) 
 
As discussed on the phone, Andrew will soon be contacting you to see if you are interested in 
meeting to discuss participating in his PhD research. In this study Andrew intends to write 
stories about his therapeutic practice while working on the programme. I am attaching an 
Information Form to this letter which explains the proposed research project.   
 
I wish to again emphasise, in order to successfully complete the programme it is not a 
requirement that you participate in Andrew‟s research. You are free to participate or to 
decline – it is your decision.   
 
The agency has always placed a great deal of importance on supporting on-going 
research into our services. We are supportive of Andrew‟s research project as detailed 
on your information form.  We also support the collaborative nature of Andrew‟s 
project, sharing his work with you and asking for your feedback. 
 
We have no hesitation in encouraging you to participate in this project, however once 
again I want to underline that this is entirely voluntary and we respect your choice 
either way.  If you agree, Andrew will discuss the project with you all at a convenient 
time and will ask you to sign some written consent forms.  Andrew will be able to 
answer any questions you have about the project at this time. 
 
 
Best wishes 
 
 
Agency Manager 
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APPENDIX TWO 
RESEARCH PROJECT INFORMATION FORM 
 
 
 
 
Dear Parent/Caregiver/Young Person 
 
I am currently enrolled as a student at The University of Waikato, in the Department of Human 
Development and Counselling.  I am conducting research into my own therapeutic practice while 
working as a therapist on the programme for the purpose of my PhD in Counselling.  I am asking for 
your assistance and cooperation in writing about my practice. I would like for you to give your consent 
for me to possibly include one or more stories about some of the therapy sessions we have had 
together.  Your son is under no obligation to participate and is free to decline. 
 
I would like to include a story about our therapeutic work together, in individual and/or family therapy 
in my PhD.  
 
The therapy story will be written from my perspective.  It is likely that I will have a different 
perspective to your own. However, I am hoping that whatever I write you will find to be respectful.  
Copies of relevant draft stories will be given to you for comment when the treatment programme has 
been completed.   I will be happy to include any comments you may have at the end of the story.  Also, 
I will be happy to incorporate any changes that you would like to make.   In writing up this research I 
will take great care to ensure your identity is hidden and cannot be recognised. No stories will be 
published in the PhD involving reference to our work together without your consent.  If at any stage of 
my research prior to my submitting my PhD for examination, you wish to withdraw your consent for 
me to include your story in my PhD, you are free to do so. 
 
Thank you for your time and help in making this study possible.  My chief research supervisor is Prof. 
Wendy Drewery, Assistant Dean of Graduate Studies, University of Waikato.  Her address and contact 
numbers are listed above.  If you have any queries regarding ethical concerns, please contact my 
Supervisor in the first instance. 
 
Alternatively you could contact: 
The Chairperson,  
School of Education Ethics Committee,  
University of Waikato,  
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton. 
 
I will be contacting you soon to confirm if you are willing to meet to discuss your participation in this 
project.  If so, I will arrange a meeting to answer any questions you may have and to sign the formal 
consent forms if you agree to participate. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely 
 
 
Andrew Tootell. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT CONSENT FORM 
(Young Person) 
 
 
 
1. I, ………………………………………………………………………………(please 
print name) consent to be included in the above named research project. 
2. I acknowledge that I have read the Information Form. 
3. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, explained to my satisfaction by Andrew 
and I understand that my participation may not be of any benefit to me.  
4. My consent is given freely. 
5. I understand that the purpose of the research is for Andrew to write stories about the 
work he is doing on the programme and how it affects both himself and the people he 
works with. 
6. I have been informed the stories written by Andrew are to be included in his 
dissertation to be published as a PhD qualification.  
7. I also give my consent for the same stories to be included in a book or academic 
paper that Andrew may write based upon his research. 
8. I have also been informed that any personal identifying characteristics relating to 
myself or my parents/caregivers will not be included in the stories to be published. 
9. I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent for my inclusion in the project at 
any time prior to Andrew submitting his PhD for examination and that this will not 
influence in any way the continuing therapeutic service that I receive from the 
agency. 
10. I have also been informed that I will receive a draft copy of the story that relates to 
me when I have finished the programme and that I will be able to make comments 
and suggest changes. 
11. I am aware that I should retain a copy of this consent form when completed. 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
YOUNG PERSON‟S SIGNATURE      DATE 
 
 
I have described to ………………………………………………………. (name of 
participant) the nature of the research in which I am asking them to be involved.  In my 
opinion he understood the explanation. 
 
 
Status in Project: Sole researcher and candidate for PhD. 
 
Name: Andrew Tootell, BA; BSW (Hons); Grad. Dip. Law; MCS) 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
RESEARCHER‟S SIGNATURE      DATE 
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